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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
[E]ntitlements are a product of history,  
not logic -- of evolution, not design.  Wildavsky 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Medicaid is arguably the most complex program in American social policy.  It 
represents multiple paradoxes in that it is both a federal and a state program; it overlaps 
both welfare and health politics; it funds acute and long-term care; it assists the middle-
class but continues as a critical part of the safety net; it is a public program that is 
financially important for many private industries  particularly nursing homes; and it 
maintains federal minimum requirements for state governments but states retain the 
ability to waiver federal requirements through petitions. 
This work addresses an area that is understudied, the federal decision making 
apparatus and its policy decision making that shapes the Medicaid program.  While texts 
review certain aspects of Medicaid federalism or review the different versions of state 
Medicaid programs, this text focuses on how the institutional arrangements in the federal 
government and policy bargains shape the program.  It concentrates particularly on 
debates related to Medicaids grant structure, but also considers waiver authority and 
decision making regarding which state financing schemes will be allowed.  Past work on 
social policy federalism work concentrating on American governance has excluded 
Medicaid, claiming it is a lower-profile social policy issue related to federalism.1  
                                                
1 See Footnote #8 in Daniel Béland and François Vergniolle de Chantal,Fighting Big Government: 
Frames, Federalism, and Social Policy Reform in the United States, in the Canadian Journal of Sociology 
29(2) 2004: 237-264. 
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Medicaid provides health care to 55 million Americans and costs $350 billion dollars 
annually, second only to Social Security in entitlement spending.  It is, by far, the largest 
grant the American government provides for the states, comprising the largest portion of 
many state budgets.  How Medicaid qualifies as lower profile in American federalism 
defies imagination.  Due to these types of miscalculations, Medicaid and the decision 
making apparatus that shapes the structure of its federal-state relationship is understudied. 
 
BROAD TRENDS 
 
This project concentrates on the primary moments in time when the Medicaid 
financing and administrative structure was prioritized on the national agenda.  Stated 
broadly, the project studies the Political Economy of Medicaid federalism.  In doing so, it 
focuses on those times when the institutional grant structure was debated and challenged 
on the national stage.  Figure 1 provides an overview of the major punctuations in the 
Political Economy of Medicaid Federalism. 
 
Pre-Development and Enactment Years 
 
In the pre-developmental and enactment years, the moments chosen for review 
are key periods before, during, and shortly after Medicaid enactment that include the two 
big bangs in American social policy  The New Deal and The Great Society  as well as 
two fertile periods of rights activism  Franklin Delano Roosevelts Economic and Social 
Bill of Rights and the Civil Rights Movement.  This development era is distinguished by 
rights based rhetoric as an undercurrent of domestic policy debate.  The Warren Court 
and its progressive Supreme Court decisions supported this policy stream.  Also the 
involvement of institutional economists trained in the old institutionalist tradition that 
embraced historicity contributed to this trend.   
During this era, President Nixon, the Republican ironically known for his New 
Federalism initiative, effectuated the federalization of three public assistance programs 
into the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program and also proposed the 
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federalization of the fourth cash welfare program enacted during the New Deal, Aid to 
Families With Dependent Children (AFDC).  AFDC was not federalized, but at that point 
remained an open-matching grant, and a program historically linked to Medicaid. 
 
The Major SeaChange and Reasons for the Policy Crater in 1974 and 1981 
 
Policy bargaining in national domestic, particularly social, politics changed 
substantially after the mid-1970s.  This was a tipping point in the way that Medicaids 
structure as a national agenda item was bargained.  Part of the explanation for this shift is 
the 1974 Budget Act that introduced a new institutional structure for the United States 
Congress to address the countrys budget. 2  In 1981, the process was first used as a 
vehicle for entitlement reform.  Although there are a myriad of additional reasons for this 
shift in macro domestic policy that will be discussed, the new uses of budget bargaining 
provided a new vehicle for entitlement politics. The first major proposed Medicaid 
reform in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) process was in 1982.  With 
vastly different rules than typical Congressional debate, Democrats and Republicans both 
used it for strategic reasons.   While not necessarily benefiting one side, it shifted power, 
decision points, committee involvement, and the terms of Congressional debate.   
Also, the role of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), a White House 
based office, in this budget process changed fundamentally in 1981 when Reagans OMB 
Director, David Stockman, introduced campaign tactics to the process.3  Similar to 
those used in both political and military campaigns, the OMBs role was much more 
prominent and the scope of interaction broadened in the budget process after 1981.   
 
 
 
                                                
2 In fact, the enactment of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act was to protect 
Congressional intent from Presidential power.  Nixon had used Impoundment in so many ways to subvert 
Congressional intent that this Act was passed. 
3 David G. Smith referred to this as Campaign Mode in his book, Entitlement Politics: Medicare and 
Medicaid 1995  2001 (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2002). 
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What theorist Theodore Lowi referred to as the Second Republic was ebbing to a 
close.  The Second Republic according to Lowi was an eagerness to establish and 
maintain a national government presence in all aspects of social and economic life.1  If 
President Fords Administration began the Second Republics descent, then President 
Reagan slammed the door.  Adding to these trends, the Warren Court had ended. 
Extensions of civil rights based arguments to disability, women, poverty, and health 
entered a new era with the Burger Court.   
Another reason for the shift in the mid-1970s that is particular to Social Security 
Act legislation  of which Medicaid is the 19th Title -- is that many of the core group of 
economists who served as Presidential advisors, Agency Secretaries and key staff, and 
indeed drafted a great deal of the Social Security Act legislation for Congress going back 
to The New Deal, either retired or became less active from these hands-on roles in 
government life.  The group held different ideals, marked by a belief for lack of a better 
descriptoras communitarianism.  A part of this faith was in what today is called the old 
institutional economics.  Cohen, Witte, Altmeyer and others had either directly trained or 
been influenced by the Johns Commons tradition at The University of Wisconsin.  The 
Commons brand of economics emphasized its historical, institutional, and dynamic 
components.2  Also, some key players in government generally, including J.K. Galbraith, 
were trained as agricultural economists who considered a wide range of factors in 
addition to the generally highly mathematical modeling of neoclassicism. 3  This general 
                                                
1 Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States, 2nd ed. (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1979), 274. 
2 In a 1931 American Economic Review article, John Commons outlined some thoughts on institutional 
economics.  He writes, The difficulty in defining a field for the so-called institutional economics is the 
uncertainty of meaning of an institutionIf we endeavor to find a universal circumstance, common to all 
behavior known as institutional, we may define an institution as collective action in control, liberation and 
expansion of individual action.  Collective action ranges all the way from unorganized custom to the many 
organized going concerns, such as the family, the corporation, the trade association, the trade union, the 
reserve system, the state.  The principle common to all of them is greater or less control, liberation and 
expansion of individual action by collective action.  See John R. Commons, Institutional Economics, 
American Economic Review, 21 (1931), 648 - 657. 
3 Thorstein Veblens work was the bedrock for the institutional paradigm.  His Theories of the Leisure 
Class: An Economic Study in the Evolution of Institutions, originally published as (NewYork: Macmillon, 
1899) and more recently (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1994) is required reading for social scientists.   In general, 
he postulates that human behavior at the socio-economic level requires explanation in evolutionary terms.  
Ethical ideas shape institutions and social institutions are shaped by human habits and behavior.  A famous 
  6
trend shifted, while many institutionalists were no longer the ones brokering Social 
Security Act deals.   
The new economists negotiating Medicaid and other social policy legislation, 
beginning roughly from the Nixon/Ford era, more often than not could be lumped into a 
large group termed neoclassical theorists  a sharply different paradigm.  While 
sociologists, political scientists, policy specialists, and others were part of these 
processes, an increasing faith was placed in the predominance of neoclassicism in 
economic thinking.  In social sciences other than economics, many adapted economic 
rational choice thinking to their own disciplines as well.  The old institutionalism of 
Commons, Ayers, and others faded from the language of the select public intellectuals 
who had developed and applied it so effectively and the neoclassical tradition took 
center-stage.   
In particular, this trend also emphasizes the importance that a few select 
individuals can have on national policy.  Wilbur Cohens influence on the Social Security 
Act was so substantial that his move back into academia alone and his reduced role in 
policy brokering after the LBJ era in and of itself marks a turn in Social Security Act 
negotiations.  Certainly an institutionalist, Cohen was a master policy bargainer who had 
expressed plans for Medicaid to be federalized.  The questions asked by the 
institutionalists are wholly different than those asked by the neoclassical economist.   
Questions asked by institutionalists include the nature of the desired policy 
outcomes and the original intent of the program, while the questions asked in The Budget 
Era framed policy decisions in terms of aggregate budget totals.  Post-Vietnam, and in the 
midst of the Watergate scandal, the 1974 Budget Act was enacted to restrict Presidential 
power in impoundment of federal funds.  Also, the 1981 Reconciliation changes were 
enacted shortly after the assassination attempt on Reagan, a time during which he was 
politically popular.  All of these factors contributed to a larger sea change, which 
profoundly affected Medicaid policy bargaining along with American governance more 
generally. 
                                                                                                                                            
Veblen quote likens the hedonistic conception of man to be that of a lightning calculator of pleasures and 
pains.   
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The Modern Era 
 
Significant events in Statewide 1115 waivers occurred in 1993 and 1994 when the 
Oregon and Tennessee waivers changed the Medicaid landscape forever in the Clinton 
Administration.  Known as the Waiver President, Bill Clintons states as laboratories 
beliefs -- honed as Governor of Arkansas -- were evident in the Administrations 
approach to all social policy and not only Medicaid.  Block grant politics defined the 
mid-1990s with eager Republican House freshman working to permanently cap the 
program and remove the individual entitlement.  President Clintons principled stand 
against the Reconciliation package defined Medicaid for the rest of his Administration.  
The Administrations own per capita cap proposal -- only suggested as a counter to 
Republican block grant plans during the negotiation -- was revisited in the next couple of 
years.  So were several other themes generated from the National Health Reform 
discussion in 1993 - 1994.  Many of these negotiated and re-negotiated terms were finally 
implemented in the 1997 Balanced Budget Act (BBA). 
During the G.W. Bush era, a rise in the Administrative state is a primary trend.  
Waivers are utilized to negotiate Medicaid with states in new ways, passing a great deal 
of responsibility -- as well as decision making flexibility -- onto individual state 
governments.  Passing the buck politics via waivers has resulted in many unintended 
consequences, including states like Massachusetts turning to universal coverage due to 
the hardball tactics of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).  Waiver 
pluralism has gone wild, negating the original Medicaid principles of statewideness, 
beneficiary freedom of choice of provider, and comparability of benefits.  There is now a 
much greater emphasis on non-transparent, non-public dispute resolution processes 
between federal and state governments than in the past.  This was formalized in the DRA 
of 2005 where many Medicaid requirements previously requiring a waiver application 
now only require a State Plan Amendment (SPA) change. 
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TRENDS IN MEDICAID POLITICAL ECONOMY 
 
So far, a dialectic has been established for this work.  On one side of this dialectic 
is the pre-mid 1970s culture where rights-based rhetoric permeated Medicaid discussions 
stemming back to FDRs Social and Economic Bill of Rights to the Civil Rights era and 
extending through the Nixon era.  On the other side, particularly gaining force with 
OBRA 1981 and the Reagan Presidency, is the use of a newly instituted budget based 
institutional structure for framing discussion on which level of government is best to 
handle various Medicaid program functions.   Like most dialectics, this requires a number 
of caveats and refinements and, of course, is not by any means absolute.   
Rights arguments did not abruptly end in 1974, nor was there no consideration of 
budget politics before 1974.  In fact, this was not true at all.  Wilbur Mills, the influential 
Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee that brokered the Medicaid/Medicare 
package was obsessed with ensuring future financial solvency of the programs.  Also, 
every civil rights victory since 1974 disproves the notion that there was an abrupt drop-
off.  What changed was the nature of the policy streams, the strength of the moral 
imperative behind ensuring Equal Opportunity, the emotional link between justice and 
federal enforcement powers as opposed to then prejudicial state politics, and the 
institutional rules of the budget process.  In short, the streams behind rights based rhetoric 
and budget politics has proceeded throughout Medicaid policy history, but the strength 
and direction of those streams has changed significantly.   
Many of the major rights based legislative achievements in The Modern Era, 
including the 1990 Americans With Disabilities Act, were based on the 1964 Civil Rights 
model.  In this and a multitude of other ways, that achievement lives on.  The distrust of 
state governments, so prevalent of progressives during the Civil Rights Era, has given 
way to questions of the degree to which federalism is now progressive via the use of 
Medicaid waivers to provide universal coverage for the uninsured in some states.  In a 
few states, social and economics rights were set in state constitutions since the notion was 
abandoned at the national level in the early 1970s.  The pre-dominance of these trends  
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or the strength and direction of these policy streams has changed.  The changes are 
effectuated in the day-to day-policy choices that accumulate over time. 
The timing and sequence of events during enactment were particularly important.  
First, the Civil Rights Bill was enacted in 1964.  Medicaid was then enacted the next year 
in 1965.  The structure of Civil Rights framed in many ways the principles behind 
Medicaid.  The original Medicaid statute talked of Equal Opportunity, ensuring access to 
the same institutions and providers that people with other payers had access to, and 
instructing states to work towards providing comprehensive care for eligibles.  Because 
the mandates were federal, there was a certain floor level of standardization across the 
country, and, with regard to these ideals, all states would comply.  The federal 
government was seen as an arm of the State that worked toward justice, as opposed to 
Southern state governments.   
At the same time, the political bargaining that resulted in both Medicaid and 
Medicare was highly influenced by participating private interest groups.  Coalition 
politics and interest-based politics were important in the early bargaining in the program.  
Many more concessions were made to private interests to get them on board than would 
be made by an institutional designer rationally planning a program in the absence of the 
constructs of this type of a policy negotiation.  These interests bargained for considerable 
latitude in payment methodologies for institutional providers and physicians during 
enactment but also in discussions with Administrative agency staff in the year following 
enactment.  The Administrative staff of the Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) 
Department gave away the farm so to speak.  The fragmentation of the American 
system requires subsidization of private industry in order to incorporate them into the 
fabric of social and health security.  This is the American way; it is required by our health 
systems fundamental institutional design.  Once this is fully realized and embraced, we 
will stop comparing our health expenditure figures to that of European countries because 
the metric is different.  We spend so much more on health care because we are 
subsidizing, including, embracing private industry.  
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During these early policy bargains, very little was required in the way of cost 
containment.  An emphasis on rights and an interest-based bargaining environment that 
resulted in little cost containment were co-evolutionary policy forces.  Two streams that 
fed into the same tributary, so to speak.  Also, due to leeway initially given to states in 
the Medicaid program, the programs first enacted by state legislatures were significantly 
larger than had been anticipated by federal actors.  In fact, New York States Medicaid 
program alone cost more than had been projected for the entire countrys Medicaid 
program.  Federalism itself was also inflationary.   This meant that Medicaid would first 
incur the added costs of policy bargaining and getting private interests on board, as well 
as the added costs that federalism incurs.  In cost escalation terms, in addition to the 
escalation in health costs due to technology improvements and other factors generally, 
the Medicaid program faced a double and triple effect.   
 
MEDICAID FEDERALISM AND PURPOSE OF THIS WORK 
 
Medicaid federalism as a concept implies more than the structural changes in 
Medicaids grant structure to states.  It also includes waiver processes where states 
experiment in various ways to provide different models than stipulated by the federal 
government.  It includes various strategies that states have used over the years, including 
the Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments, provider donations and taxes, and 
other mechanism to maximize federal matching dollars without paying the requisite state 
matching amount.  These strategies attempt to substitute federal dollars for state dollars in 
Medicaid funding through gaming the system whereby federal dollars match state 
dollars spent on the program.  Medicaid federalism also includes a plethora of mandates 
by the federal government  some funded, some not  that affect states ability to 
administer and fund their share of the program.  When Medicaid federalism is considered 
more broadly, it includes the myriad of decisions that states make regarding their 
Medicaid programs that may alter in turn the national agenda.  This work considers all of 
these factors in its review of the evolution of this vital program.   
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In many ways, this work is about institutional design what affects it and how to 
shape it.  The point of the project is to investigate the evolution of these concepts in the 
way that they really happen  in evolutionary, dynamic, and interactive ways that are 
profoundly shaped both by institutional design and coalition transformation.  The idea is 
that studying Medicaid this way will teach us about the real levers of reform.  Where do 
we take action if we truly require change?  If we need to understand public policy, how it 
unfolds and how things become what they are, we can simply footnote the phenomenon 
as spontaneous order or we can learn the rules of how these things transpire.  For some, 
nothing short of a prediction of the future is adequate.  Here, the lessons are more about 
maturation in our understanding of the policy process so that we hone our judgment and 
discernment as policy professionals.   
A good part of this process understands the things we can change and its 
attendant degree of difficulty-- and the things we cannot change.  We may never hold the 
moment of complete certainty when making many policy decisions, but we hone our 
understanding, our judgment, our discernment, free a relatively clear view of how things 
really evolve so that we make the best possible choice  even from a selection of sub-
optimal ones.  Finally, we are learning that if we ask certain questions, we are going to 
get certain answers.  Improving the public good means knowing the questions to ask and 
having the strength as a nation to face the real hard-felt effects that those decisions have 
on policy losers  those left out of the favored circle by everyday policy choices.  
Lessons include such factors as the profound effect that single actors can have on 
the policy subsystem, the importance of life-changing events -- such as the assassination 
of JFK, 9-11, Watergate, and the assassination attempt on Reagan -- the typical 
behavioral patterns between federal and state governments, the effects of various grant 
models, the importance of rights debates and how all sides invoke the moral weight of 
rights arguments, intricacies of the budget process and the profound effect of these 
institutional rules on Medicaid, agenda setting patterns in national policy, the tug and pull 
between the power of the Executive and the Legislative branches, and the importance of 
Administrative Agency and private business negotiation after a bill is through Congress. 
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PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
This work serves as a review of the evolution of the Medicaid program, a unique 
analysis of the federal role in policy decision making for the largest grant-in-aid program 
to the American states.  The project is meant for a number of audiences including those 
interested in policy theory, in institutional economics, in American social policy, in 
health system management, in American federalism, and policy history. 
While the areas of policy inquiry are broad, this work addresses three primary 
research questions: 
1. What conflict resolution and political bargaining processes have resulted 
in key choices in Medicaid federalism?  Who were the primary actors? 
2. What are the paradigm shifts, tipping points, veto points, shifts of policy 
bargaining venues, critical junctures, the results of asset specificity 
(investing in a policy to the point of supporting it more intensely in the 
future), and co-evolutionary trends?  In other words, what is the common 
decision calculus for Medicaid policymakers? 
3. What legislation, court decisions, and executive actions have resulted in 
the greatest shifts in Medicaid federalism? 
 
METHODOLOGY OF THIS WORK 
 
 The Methodology is organized according to methodologies utilized for Part II, for 
Part III, and those used jointly for both Parts II and III of the Dissertation.  Part II, the 
Medicaid in Retrospective section of the Dissertation relied on several methodologies.  
Extensive archival research was conducted at the LBJ Presidential Library, including 
review of the Personal Papers of Wilbur J. Cohen, dozens of Oral Histories, dozens of 
Presidential Telephone Conversations, dozens of boxes of material from the White House 
Central Files (WHCF), the Personal Papers of John Gardner, the Office Files of Harry 
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McPherson, the Office Files of S. Douglass Cater, and the Administrative History 
Collection.  In addition, archival research was conducted spanning several years of 
Congressional papers and hearings at The Center for Legislative Archives at the 
National Archives in Washington, D.C. 
 For Part III, The Modern Era, 25 interviews were conducted with the nations 
most prolific decision makers and policy bargainers in the modern era (1992 - 2007).  
The interviews averaged two hours in length, ranging from 50 minutes to three hours and 
30 minutes.  The interviews were digitally recorded and anonymity was only requested in 
two cases.  The interviewees were chosen from a list of individuals who were known to 
have participated in the most important Medicaid policy bargains during the 1992 - 2007 
time period or to be among the nations most important thought leaders in the scholarly 
areas covered in the research.  Ten of the interviewees have played major roles in state 
level Medicaid politics, representing state interests in the macro Medicaid policy 
bargaining arena.  These include a Governor, State Secretaries of Health, State Medicaid 
Directors, and individuals who represent state interests at the national level for a state 
lobbying organization.  Ten of the interviewees played substantial roles negotiating 
Medicaid policy for the United States Congress.  Only Congressional staff who were at 
the table during these negotiations were interviewed, representing the Authorizing, 
Budget, and Appropriations Committees.  Eight of the interviewees have served at some 
point in their careers in the White House or at the highest level of Federal Agency 
decision making.  Four of the countrys leading Medicaid law and/or welfare rights 
experts were also interviewed.  Also represented in the interviews are the current 
Presidents Medicaid Commission, by two interviews, and the National Governors 
Association Medicaid Task Force, by a Governor on the Task Force. 
For Part III, a compilation of dozens of newspapers were searched using the Lexis 
search engine for relevant articles during The Modern Era.  Examples of newspapers 
where the search generated articles that were quoted in the dissertation include The New 
York Times, The Washington Post, The Houston Chronicle, The Dallas Morning News, 
The Times - Picayune (New Orleans, LA), and The National Journal.   
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 Methodologies overlapping both Parts II and III include the research of more than 
twenty-five Congressional hearings from The Law Library of the Library of Congress 
and the Center for Legislative Archives.  Several collections from the Library of 
Congress were accessed, including the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States.  Several periodicals were reviewed in a systematic way, including --but not 
limited to -- The Congressional Quarterly Almanac from 1960 - 2004, Congress and The 
Nation from 1992 - 2004, and CQ Weekly from 1992 - 2000.  Primary research was also 
conducted at the National Library of Medicine in Bethesda, Maryland.  Several literature 
searches generated secondary sources.  The search engines used to conduct these searches 
included, but were not limited to, EconoLit, JSTOR, and PubMed.  Hundreds of 
secondary sources were reviewed for this work. 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE TEXT 
 
 This work is organized in four parts: Policy and Federalism Theory; Medicaid In 
Retrospective; The Modern Era; and Summary and Conclusions.  Part One is dedicated to 
policy and federalism theory.  Part II considers the Medicaid program prior to 1992 from 
a historical perspective.  Uncoiling the negotiations from the New Deals First Big Bang 
that established the cash welfare model until the George H.W. Bush era in four chapters, 
Part II focuses particularly on the policy history of the program.  This begins with early 
welfare program development in 1935, continuing to Medicaid enactment in 1965, and in 
aftershock reforms in 1967.  This era continues through Richard Nixons Presidency 
where he proposed a national health plan that would be supported by a federalized 
Medicaid program.  Reagans budget revolution is the focus of the final chapter in Part II.  
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the budget reconciliation process was used 
successfully to expand the program several times by Congressional Democrats and select 
moderate Republicans.   
Part III is comprised of five concise chapters concentrating on particular policy 
bargains in The Modern Era.  The first chapter, entitled Prelude to a National 
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Discussion: The Medicaid and State Federalism Environment Before the Near Big Bang, 
introduces the national debate that informed health politics over the next several years.  
The second chapter considers state federalism and waiver politics prior to the 1993-1994 
national health reform discussion, while the third focuses on the effects on Medicaid of 
that discussion.  The next to last chapter reviews the 1995 - 1996 Medicaid block grant 
attempts, AFDC reform, and the 1997 BBA.  The G.W. Bush era is considered in 
Medicaid Transformed, the final chapter of Part III.  Of particular importance is the 
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 and its reworking of the federal uniformity in benefits 
between categories of Medicaid eligibles.  Part IV is comprised of the Summary and 
Conclusions of this work. 
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1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR  
THE MEDICAID EVOLUTION 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In many ways, The Medicaid Evolution: The Political Economy of Medicaid 
Federalism can be seen within the context of both economic history and political science.  
It traces economic history from the demand side of poverty -- of a financing program 
bent on addressing the demand side of poverty.  This work identifies the highlights of 
Medicaid federalism over a long span of time and then investigates the policy bargaining 
of coalitions and actors in greater detail at each of these moments in time.  The theory 
behind this work is not purely political science.  Medicaid is a financing program and the 
unfolding of events over time is linked to both the history of economics and historicity of 
political institutions.  From the first of these traditions, Douglass C. North writes, 
History matters.  It matters not just because we can learn from the past, but because the 
present and the future are connected to the past by the continuity of a societys 
institutions.  Todays and tomorrows choices are shaped by the past.  And the past can 
only be made intelligible as a story of institutional evolution.  Integrating institutions into 
economic theory and economic history is an essential step in improving that theory and 
history.1  It is in this tradition that the Medicaid program was investigated, era by era. 
A wealth of literature informs the theoretic structure of The Medicaid Evolution: 
The Political Economy of Medicaid Federalism, particularly Institutional Economics on 
                                                
1 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Political Economy of 
Institutions and Decisions Series,  (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990; repr. 2004) 
Preface, vii. 
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the economics side and a group of political science theories on the political science side 
including the central themes from Historical Institutionalism and Punctuated Equilibrium, 
the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), Incrementalism and Gradualism, and the 
Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM).  Since one political science tradition did not address 
all of the aspects utilized for this work, these were combined in a framework called The 
Macro Public Policy Framework (MPP). 
 A major precept of this work  -- the Conceptual Framework that drives it -- is that 
by studying policy (institutional) development using a marriage of Institutional 
Economics on one side and the Macro Public Policy Framework on the political science 
side as a theoretic lens, it is possible to identify paradigm shifts, tipping points, veto 
points, shifts of policy bargaining venues, critical junctures, the results of asset specificity 
(investing in a policy to the point of supporting it more intensely in the future), and co-
evolutionary trends.  In other words, it is possible to learn the common decision calculus 
for Medicaid policymakers.  The importance of institutional economics is discussed 
throughout this work but particularly in greater detail in the Introduction and in Chapter 
5, The Watershed Years, New Federalism, and Proposals for a New Federal Role in 
Medicaid.  The remainder of this chapter will consider the component parts of the MPP 
Framework. 
 
Historical Institutionalism and Punctuated Equilibrium 
 
 Historical Institutionalism has, for some time, acknowledged that institutional 
change typically involves a dynamic of punctuated equilibrium -- periods of 
institutional creation followed by periods of stasis. 2  Over time, there are heightened, 
more active periods of institutional change.  These punctuations were identified over the 
course of the history of the Medicaid program.  The benefit of approaching the analysis in 
this way is that it lends itself to macro, big-picture analysis, allowing the work to 
consider macro trends in the evolution of Medicaid.  Part II, Chapters 3 to 6, concentrates 
                                                
2 Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 134-135. 
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on Medicaid in Retrospective, and in particular, attempts to consider the periods in 
between the major moments of Medicaid policy bargaining as possibly containing 
important data on policy development.  The lack of consideration of these times of stasis 
has been a criticism of historical institutionalist accounts in the past.   
Historical institutionalism is particularly concerned with how institutions and 
policies evolve over time.  Institutions are defined as the rules of the game in a society, 
or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.3  
Institutions may represent rules of the game for formal entities such as the U.S. Congress, 
the Supreme Court, federal agencies, and state governments.  Institutions are also the 
informal rules, culture, and mores that govern policy decision making.  Policies are types 
of institutions in that they are rules that structure how the game unfolds  particularly 
who wins and who loses.  In Medicaid policy, institutions structure who receives benefits, 
what benefits they receive, what providers are paid, standards of quality, and innumerable 
other factors.   
Historical institutionalism generally considers long-periods of policy evolution in 
order to understand broader, macro-level policy change.  Studies usually require long 
periods of inquiry in order to understand how institutional and policy change unfolds.  It 
is this long-range macro birds eye view that is its strength.  Timing, sequence of events, 
and positive feedback are all critical considerations.  The timing of when a reform occurs 
will change its effect on the policy, as will the order in which events occur, and self-
reinforcing dynamics.4  Historical Institutionalism recognizes that there is a stickiness of 
inherited social arrangements.5  Path dependence results in self-reinforcing processes.  
Later on, there is no longer a clean slate per se but a bricolage effect   where key 
                                                
3 Paul Pierson, Politics In Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press: 2004), 27. 
4 Paul Pierson identifies policy feedback as self-reinforcing dynamics in Politics In Time, a must read text 
on the tangencies of historical institutionalism and rational choice. 
5 Pierson, Politics In Time (2004), 8. 
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actors are not building from scratch but rather reworking the institutional materials at 
hand.6   
The biological concept of punctuated equilibrium is also used as a policy 
construct.  Critical junctures, or moments where Medicaid is prioritized on the national 
agenda are studied longitudinally.  The overall project concentrates on particular 
punctuations -- or key events -- in the Medicaid timeline.  The Punctuated Equilibrium 
Framework holds that: 
 
In policymaking, new ways of thinking about public problems, rapid 
mobilizations of new constituencies, chances in institutional structures, and self-
reinforcing effects of these trends occasionally combine to create dramatic and 
unpredictable policy changes in an issue-area.  Such punctuations are an 
important part of policymaking even if most policies most of the times are 
subject to no such dramatic events.  Rather than making moderate adaptive 
adjustments to an ever-changing environment, political decision making is 
characterized sometimes by stasis, when existing decision designs are routinely 
employed, and sometimes by punctuations, when a slowly growing condition 
suddenly bursts onto the agendas of a new set of policymakers or when existing 
decision makers shift attention to new attributes or dimensions of an existing 
situation.7   
 
Punctuated Equilibrium was originally a biological construct developed by Stephen Jay 
Gould and Niles Eldredge that is now applied to policy constructs.8  It recognizes 
incrementalism by saying that punctuations interrupt normal incremental political 
interchange. 
 
Incrementalism and Gradualism of American Social Policy 
 
In any study of American social policy, it is necessary to recognize that American 
social policy is characterized by incrementalism and gradualism as opposed to wholesale 
                                                
6 Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis,  In J. 
Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer (eds.), Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2003), 227. 
7 Bryan D. Jones, Frank R. Baumgartner, and James L. True, Policy Punctuations: U.S. Budget Authority, 
1947  1995, The Journal of Politics 60, no. 1 (Feb., 1998): 1  33. 
8 Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge, Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative to Phyletic Gradualism, 
in Thomas J.M. Schopf (ed.), Models in Paleobiology (San Francisco: Freeman Cooper, 1972). 
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change.  During the formation of the Social Security Act in the years preceding 1935 and 
the Great Society in the years preceding 1965, a group of institutional economists played 
the major role in designing, advising the different Presidents and Congress regarding, and 
finally implementing the major pieces of social policy over 30 years.  Arthur Altmeyer, 
Edwin Witte, Elizabeth Wickenden, Wilbur Cohen, I.S. Falk, Robert Ball, and several 
others, many from the Wisconsin school of thought, used a philosophy of incrementalism 
to guide the development of American social policy.  This philosophy of incrementalism 
holds true today.  Wilbur Cohen describes this philosophy in an oral history: 
 
I think this has been a typically incremental American way of going at a problem, 
not with some kind of overall plan that Congress really had, but a more or less ad 
hoc, incremental, adaptive plan arising out of the felt needs of people and the 
adjustment of various institutions to fill a role that had not existed.  It may not be 
the most efficient way, it may not be the way that limits overutilization, but it is 
typically American in that it has evolved piecemeal in a way that is more or less 
acceptable to the American people.  Whether, after all the parts of this jigsaw are 
in place, someone will try to rationalize it in a much more efficient way, that 
remains to be seen.9 
 
Incrementalism, also known as Muddling Through, was developed in the 1950s 
by Charles E. Lindblom in a number of classic articles in the Public Administration 
Review and numerous books.10  Lindblom observed that it was not necessary for actors to 
align their preferences, but instead to come to some agreement on a policy issue.  He held 
that for the method of successive limited comparisons, the test is agreement on policy 
itself, which remains possible even when agreement on values is not.  The process of 
mutual adjustment between actors is a signal of societys preferences and comparisons to 
                                                
9 Transcript. Wilbur Cohen Oral History, August 6 & 7, 1979, by Lewis E. Weeks, Wilbur J. Cohen: In 
First Person: An Oral History, Lewis E. Weeks (Ed.), Hospital Administration Oral History Collection, 
Lewis E. Weeks Series, 17 and 18.  Retrieved from the LBJ Presidential Library. 
10 Select works by Lindblom on incrementalism include The Market as Prison, The Journal of Politics 
44, no. 2, (May 1982): 324-336; Democracy and Market System (London: Norwegian University Press, 
1988); The Intelligence of Democracy: Decision Making Through Mutual Adjustment (The Free Press: New 
York, 1965); The Science of Muddling Through, Public Administration Review 19, no. 2 (Spring 
1959): 78-88; Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, Public Administration Review 7 (April 1967): 211-222; 
Policy Analysis, American Economic Review 48 (June 1958): 298-312; The Market as Prison, The 
Journal of Politics 44, no. 2 (May 1982): 324-336. 
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past events provides the only data to indicate how societys preferences change over time.  
Our policy reality today is based on successive policy choices made up to the present.   
 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)   
 
Conceptualized in 1981 by Paul Sabatier, the ACF borrows from organizational 
management and the natural sciences in its structuring of policy subsystems.11  The 
ACF includes two sets of factors that influence coalition actors.  The first set are fixed 
factors, described as Relatively Stable Parameters, that are difficult to change, 
influence coalition behavior, and endure stresses that might be placed on them by 
coalition strategies.  The second set, External System Events are dynamic and variable.  
With respect to belief systems and public policies, the framework distinguishes core 
from secondary elements.  Coalitions are assumed to organize around common core 
beliefs, such as the proper scope of governmental versus market activity and the proper 
distribution of authority among levels of government.  Since these core beliefs are 
hypothesized to be relatively stable over periods of a decade or more, so too is coalition 
composition.12  The concepts of Relatively Stable Parameters and External System 
Events and some of the hypotheses around coalition change and timeframes are the most 
relevant as applied to the MPP theoretic framework for the Dissertation.   
 
The Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM) 
 
A focus of the MPP, bargaining between actors, resembles that described by 
Graham Allison in the Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM) applied to the Cuban Missile 
                                                
11 Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, An Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment, 
Chapter 6 in Paul A. Sabatier (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 
117.  Also see Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy 
Coalition Approach (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993). 
12 Paul A. Sabatier.  Toward Better Theories of the Policy Process.  Political Science and Politics, Vol. 
24, No. 2 (June 1991), 147  156. 
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Crisis in The Essence of Decision.13  Allison writes, Happenings in foreign affairs are 
understood, according to the bureaucratic politics model, neither as choices nor as 
outputs.  Instead, what happens is categorized as outcomes of various overlapping 
bargaining games among players arranged hierarchically in the national government.14  
While much of the work using the BPM was applied to foreign affairs, some basic 
concepts are applied here to the Macro Public Policy Framework.  The MPP operates 
roughly on Allisons idea, [i]mportant government decisions or actions emerge as 
collages composed of individual acts, outcomes of minor and major games, and foul-ups.  
Outcomes that could never have been chosen by an actor and would never have emerged 
from bargaining in a single game over the issue are fabricated piece by piece.  
Understanding of the outcome requires that it be disaggregated. 
 
THE MACRO PUBLIC POLICY FRAMEWORK 
 
The Macro Public Policy Framework (MPP) accounts for bargaining not just 
between levels of government but also between actors in the public policy sphere.  It 
recognizes stable societal factors and external events that change over time.  In addition, 
it explicitly addresses the punctuations and incremental reform that occur over time.  
Figure 3 is a chart to help visualize the Macro Public Policy Framework.  It has a 
dynamic component of interactions between policy actors, including all levels of 
government.  So the U.S. Congress, the President, and U.S. Supreme Court are matched 
at the state level by the state legislatures, the Governors, and the state Supreme Courts.  
Similar local government actors -- including city councils, mayors, and local courts -- are 
also involved.   
While the executive and legislative branches are within the bargaining arena, the 
courts are held outside of the bargaining zone, but their decisions affect these 
interactions.  While scholars have commented on the Supreme Courts agenda setting, 
                                                
13 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Second 
Edition (New York, Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers, 1999). 
14 Allison, Graham T.  Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.  The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Sep., 1969), 689  718. 
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negotiating, and political bargaining activities within its Chambers,15 the focus here will 
be on the Federal Courts decisions and their effects on the public policy bargaining 
arena.  The Courts area is called The Judicial Wing.   
The remaining policy actors are split into two camps.  They are represented in the 
diagram as Non and Quasi- Governmental Policy Subsystem Actors (NQG) and Other 
Actors.  The NQG are mostly non-government actors.  This is complicated by one 
exception.  Organizations such as the Administration on Aging play a type of dual role, 
particularly in nursing home oversight.  The ombudsman program and Area Agencies on 
Aging are both patient advocates and wings of the government.  These mostly non-
governmental actors are part of the negotiations and play a considerable role in political 
bargaining in the U.S. system.  Representatives of business interests play a particularly 
large role in these negotiations.   
A group of Other Actors are placed outside of the negotiating sphere including 
the media, policy researchers, and analysts.  It is recognized that the causal relationship 
between those negotiating and this group goes both ways  they influence each other  
but that these actors are not themselves typically the negotiators.  Therefore, they are 
removed from the bargaining zone. 
The MPP Framework also adheres to the theory that there are relatively stable 
parameters and external events that affect the environment surrounding the policy 
bargaining process and the policy subsystem(s), as does the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF).  The MPP includes a few additional parameters and external events 
other than the ACF.  The relatively stable parameters include: 
• History and traditional role of federal, state, and local governments, as 
well as private institutions in the area; 
• Institutional structures, norms, and history; 
• Fundamental sociocultural values and social structure; 
• Attributes of the problem area; 
• Method of distribution and level of resources; and 
• Basic constitutional structure and rules. 
                                                
15 See H.W. Perry, Deciding to Decide (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991). 
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External events include: 
• Demographic shifts in a society; 
• World events that change focus or direction of the nation; 
• Socioeconomic condition shifts on the international and domestic levels; 
• Public opinion shifts; 
• Systemic governing coalition transitions; and 
• Policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems. 
 
The Bargaining Arena in the Macro Public Policy Theory (MPP) 
 
Policy actors interact and bargain policy within a policy subsystem.  Policy 
subsystems are particular areas of public policy inquiry.  Subsystems tend to overlap with 
others, particularly if they are defined as subsets of larger areas.  For example, in this 
case, we recognize that there is a Medicaid subsystem, but also that it is subsumed within 
two others: (1) the Health Care for Low Income Americans Policy Subsystem and (2) the 
Welfare Policy Subsystem.  Also, it overlaps with two other subsystems: (1) The 
Disability Initiatives Policy Subsystem and (2) the Retirement and Pension Initiatives 
Policy Subsystem.  These subsystems are depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Inclusive and Overlapping Subsystems 
 
 
 
The Medicaid 
Subsystem 
The Welfare 
Subsystem 
The Disability 
Subsystem 
Health Care for  
Low-Income Americans 
Subsystem 
The Retirement and 
Pension Initiatives 
Subsystem 
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There are times when bargaining between actors takes place on several different 
topics at one time.  For example, Congressional members, the President, and the Supreme 
Court may make a single decision that affects a wide range of topics.  Likewise, elected 
officials may make bargains that trade issues in completely different arenas.  At the same 
time, the Medicaid debate includes actors that are specific to that topic area.  Even though 
certain actors are particular to the Medicaid debate, it is important to recognize external 
influences and trades with other policy issue areas.   
 The Macro Public Policy (MPP) Framework assumes that policy bargaining 
results in very different outcomes than any of the players rationally planned at the onset 
of the process.  It suggests that often times, in sorting out the winners and losers from a 
conflict and consensus process in public policy, there is the recognition that no one got 
what they wanted but instead got the negotiated conclusion -- the end result.   
Consequently, the democratic process does not guarantee that actors will 
maximize their take, but that a result works well enough for enactment.  Choices that 
are made during the process are resultants that were not necessarily planned by any of the 
participants, but instead the result of an intentionally checked government of limited 
powers.  As Charles Lindblom writes in Democracy and Market System, the only way to 
claim that bargaining is not useful is to claim that government is not useful, for in the 
U.S. governing is bargaining. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The conceptual framework for this work targets Political Economy -- Institutional 
Economics on one side and a group of political science theories, particularly well-suited 
for the research questions of this work, called the Macro Public Policy Framework 
(MPP).  The meeting of these two traditions addresses the need for the best of both 
economic and political considerations in the unpacking of Medicaid policy bargains over 
a long-span of time.  This conceptual framework emphasizes policy bargaining and is 
particularly well applied to studies of federalism since federalism necessitates bargaining 
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between governments.  Particular punctuations or points in time are chosen for study 
across the Medicaid timeline, emphasizing those policy bargains that affected the federal 
and state relationship in the program the most.  Examples of primary policy bargains in 
Medicaid federalism are listed in Figures in the Introduction and in the Summary and 
Conclusions Chapter. 
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2. MEDICAID FEDERALISM AS 
DIALECTICAL DEBATE:  
ARE THERE NATURAL INSTITUTIONAL 
STRENGTHS OF DIFFERENT LEVELS OF 
GOVERNMENT IN MEDICAID? 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The primary purpose of this chapter is to provide a grounding of the federalism 
theoretic scholarship for the entire investigation in The Medicaid Evolution on Medicaid 
federalism.  This second chapter in Part I, Medicaid Federalism As Dialectical Debate 
is intended to work with the first theory chapter, Conceptual Framework for The 
Medicaid Evolution, to set the theory in place for Parts II and Part III, dynamic 
investigations of actual policy bargains in Medicaid federalism.  Part I sets the stage by 
outlining the policy and federalism theory behind The Medicaid Evolution.  Parts II and 
III roll the tape. 
This chapter reviews the material as a dialectical debate, the pros and cons 
provided in a full range of academic scholarship for the federal government versus state 
governments controlling the financing, administration, and policymaking in Medicaid.  
The work of constitutional scholars, public finance and fiscal federalism experts, political 
federalism theorists and a whole range of material is encapsulated in this chapter.  It 
provides a footing for understanding the federalism -- and the policy bargaining that 
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shapes this constitutional compact -- behind the most impressive example of this 
institution in American social policy -- the Medicaid program. 
 
PRAGMATIC FEDERALISM AND VALUES 
 
 Over time an impressive number of definitions of Federalism have emerged: 
Competitive, Cooperative, Dual, Creative, New, and, of course, Constitutional.  The 
enduring American institution evolves over time and also has pluralistic applications.  
While federalism itself is enshrined in the United States Constitution, the nature of the 
relationships between the Federal and State governments takes on different characteristics 
with the actors involved, the policy at hand, and the era of government.  During the 
evolution of Medicaid, Pragmatic Federalism has been a particularly relevant model.  
Pragmatic Federalism refers to the instrumental nature of the institution when actors use 
federalism in order to attain more closely cherished values.  For example, an actor may 
really want to minimize the role of government altogether but will advocate for 
devolution of a program to state or local governments because it is believed this will 
reduce its reach.  At the same time, there may be cases where federalization of a program 
is desired in order to weaken a program.  In a Pragmatic Federalism tradition, switching 
between governments is done strategically in order to accomplish other goals and less so 
due to a belief that a particular level of government is fundamentally the right 
government to address an initiative 
If there were a clear answer regarding which level of government, and which 
grant structure, best organized the Medicaid program, then the matter would not be such a 
contested policy issue.  It is left to the policy bargaining arena precisely because groups 
have such divergent views about its solution.  There is not a set formula that dictates what 
level of government would best perform the various functions of Medicaid, whether 
financial, administrative, policy decision making, or enforcement.  As in all areas of 
policy, coalitions espouse different values regarding entitlements, rights, the role of the 
budget process, and federalism itself.  These differences are in part a reflection of 
  30
divergence on core distributive justice values such as equity, equality, need, and 
allocative and technical efficiency.  It also reflects differences with regard to beliefs on 
the role of redistribution and regulation in social and health security, the proper role of 
the state, and on how vital tenets of democracy are achieved.  Between two people who 
demand that individual freedom is mandatory for democracy, one may insist that the 
federal government only support basic infrastructure needs and a national defense while 
another demands the federal government ensure a basic minimum safety net because a 
life in abject poverty --or without access to proper health care -- is not freedom at all.   
Pragmatic federalism is the reason that Ronald Reagan, the anti-government 
President, used the federal power to protect business interests and why Advocates sought 
decentralization to state courts of the controversial same-sex marriage legality issue.  
Actors are using federalism instrumentally to place political and policy debates in the 
arena where they believe they have the best chance of either winning, improving their 
policy position, or mitigating losses. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHS OF DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT 
AND GRANT MODELS 
 
Having established an argument for Pragmatic Federalism, there are particular 
institutional strengths of grant models and arguments for greater involvement by one 
level of government in Medicaid or the other.  The results of a meta-analysis, conducted 
by the author, on the key arguments in favor of state generated reform and control, as 
well as in favor of federal reform are considered here.  Also, a meta-analysis that 
considers the benefits and drawbacks of the current open matching grant structure and an 
alternative, aggregate block granting, is presented.  The idea is to utilize the strength of 
dozens of studies in order to understand if there are institutional strengths of different 
levels of government performing functions in Medicaid or of particular grant models in 
structuring the Medicaid program.   
The strength of meta-analyses is that it is possible to gather the power behind the 
work of dozens of researchers who conducted individual studies or their own meta-
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analyses into a unified set of findings.  This meta-analysis is structured in this chapter as 
a dialectical policy debate.  Policy dialectics are often presented in reviews of policy 
debates, even if they are not so called.  Oftentimes, academic journals will let an expert 
from one perspective present an article on an issue and publish this side-by-side with the 
opinion of an expert from a very different worldview.  The point is to generate conflict by 
presenting two different perspectives.  Each pole is defined in terms of how it differs 
from the other and the debate is simplified to a one versus the other perspective instead of 
allowing for the multitude of worldviews and all the contingent policy variations -- that 
are possible.  Think-tanks, newspapers, the television media  all use policy dialectics to 
investigate thorny policy issues, particularly where widely divergent core values translate 
into wide differences of opinion on future policy paths for specific programs, as with 
Medicaid.  Originating with the philosopher Hegel, dialectics as applied to policy science 
means that the original plan, the thesis, and an alternate plan, the anti-thesis, can 
potentially be combined through negotiation into a policy synthesis.1  The meta-analyses 
presented here are structured in a policy dialectic framework to compare and contrast 
opposing worldviews. 
A few caveats, to the degree that cash welfare examples are provided, it should be 
noted that the health arena involves many private interests, provider networks, and 
insurers that make it fundamentally different.  Health also differs fundamentally from 
other policy subsystems such as Education.  Finally, it should be noted that many of these 
findings are pro-federal or pro-state in aggregate, whereas Medicaid program functions 
can be parsed.  For example, a possibility is federalizing long-term care, or at least 
removing it from state budgets.  Also, it is possible to change the current federal/state 
financing and administrative framework by having the federal government finance 
Medicaid completely but the state contracted for administration.2  Who performs which 
functions, then, can be parsed.  
                                                
1 For Hegel see Phenomenology of Mind, 2nd Edn Transl. by J.B. Baillie, (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, 1964).  For a very interesting consideration of policy dialectics in social science, see Ian I. Mitroff 
and Richard O. Mason, Creating A Dialectical Social Science (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 
1981). 
2 A final possibility is re-designing Medicare to finance long-term care. 
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Key Arguments in Favor of Federal Reform and Control 
 
Equality and Justice Arguments 
 
The history of the Civil Rights era left a painful memory of the injustice that left a 
distrust of state governments and courts.  Federal rights of action in federal courts are 
important for Medicaid beneficiaries and providers so that there is a higher power to rule 
in the case of allegations of unjust eligibility determinations, service denials, or low 
payments.  This argument supports a role for the federal government judicially, 
legislatively, and administratively in the Medicaid program.  Answering the claim that 
this is a concern of the past and not the present, Paul Peterson writes States have never 
been known for their ability to protect the interests of the disadvantaged.  For all of the 
modernization of state politics that has supposedly occurred, state legislatures still seem 
to deserve this reputation.3   
Equality arguments -- particularly those in favor of equalizing benefits and 
services for beneficiaries and payment schemes for providers -- are exceptionally strong 
in favor of federal organization of Medicaid.  Justice as fairness, a Rawlsian concept, can 
be applied here in a public policy context.4  If we made public policy choices without 
knowing what standing or place we had in life  our income, our health status, the state or 
locality in which we resided, family details -- then we may be apt to desire a more 
uniform eligibility and benefit structure than currently exist in the Medicaid program.  A 
more uniform program would mean less state variation, higher minimum eligibility or 
benefit standards, removal of requirements that eligibles fit into particular categories or 
have particular health conditions in order to qualify, or even federalization of financing 
                                                
3 Paul Peterson, The Price of Federalism (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 146. 
4 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).  
Original Copyright in 1971 and sixth printing in 2003. 
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and administration of the program altogether.  Perhaps a Medicare-type structure could 
be adopted, for example.5   
In these examples, horizontal equity in policy choice  state action creating 
similar situations between like situated people  is more fully achieved by the federal 
level of government than by state governments.  After all, federalism is inequality.6  
Taxpayers are also prone to Medicaid horizontal inequalities.  If people are paying higher 
taxes for either the same or a lower level of Medicaid program between states, there is 
horizontal inequality between taxpayers, as well.7   
State fiscal capacity variations also disadvantages poor states in Medicaid, 
regardless of attempts by the federal government to equalize its match.  The Federal 
Medical Assistance Program (FMAP) matching formula provides a higher match to states 
the lower their per capita income.  Matching rates vary from 50% to 83%.  This is an 
example of the federal government attempting to create vertical equity, meaning it is 
attempting to equalize a policy situation by treating states unequally.  Since some states 
are poorer than others, an unequal match to disadvantaged states is intended to equalize 
the policy scenario.   
In Medicaid, poorer states have to pay more per capita to cover a proportionately 
larger Medicaid population.  Since the state is poorer, more people qualify for Medicaid, 
and since the state is poorer, they have less tax revenues with which to dedicate to the 
Medicaid program.  This means that they generate less financial help from the federal 
government because they can afford to dedicate less of their own state funds.  State funds 
are dedicated first and there is no cap.  The federal government, then, matches this 
amount.  So, state funds drive how much federal money is invested in their own state 
Medicaid program.  People living in poorer states, then, are working with less for their 
                                                
5 See Marilyn Moon, Making Medicaid A National Program: Medicare As A Model, in Federalism & 
Health Policy, eds. John Holahan, Alan Weil, and Joshua M. Wiener (Washington, D.C.: The Urban 
Institute Press, 2003), 325 - 360.  
6 This refers to the conclusion by Aaron Wildavsky that federalism means inequality  Further, 
uniformity is antithetical to federalism. In Robertson and Judd (1989), 378. 
7 See Thomas W. Grannemann and Mark V. Pauly for a discussion of this phenomenon in Medicaid 
horizontal inequality, Controlling Medicaid Costs: Federalism, Competition, and Choice (Washington, 
D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982). 
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Medicaid programs even though their states are investing, percentage-wise, as much or 
more than other states.  Even with the current matching formula calibrated to provide a 
greater match to states with less per capita income, state fiscal capacity differences are 
still pronounced than and inequity still exists.  Federalizing the financial component of 
the program removes the inequality created by differences in state fiscal and tax capacity.   
  
Federal Policy Decision Making Recognizes Medicaids Distributional 
Importance to a Vital National Economy 
  
Medicaid is as much a distributional as a redistributional program.  Private 
business interest is high, particularly by the nursing home industry but also by some 
physicians  who made the program a cottage industry directly after enactment  and 
managed care companies in the modern era.  The health sector provides a major subsidy 
to private business, whether or not interests are satisfied with payment levels.  This is a 
reason why comparisons to other countries health costs, which have been used to support 
a hypothesis that the U.S. system is prohibitively expensive, compares apples to oranges.  
Government financed health expenditure in the U.S., including Medicaid, supports 
private business and is a contributor to a healthy, vibrant economic sector.   
While covering populations, the U.S. welfare state interweaves with private 
industry so that the money spent in the public sector supports, subsidizes, and invests in 
business.  The policy bargaining allows for a great deal of leeway in investment  some 
would call them give aways -- to private industry.  It is difficult to get private industry 
to sign on for particular public initiatives without sweeteners in the bargaining process.  
Therefore, some portion of costs spent on healthcare, and on Medicaid, is due to the 
distributional importance of the program.   
Given that many health industries are national in scope, and cross state boundaries 
effortlessly and continuously, national level regulation simplifies rules for business.8  A 
reason to further federalize political and policy decision making is that distributional 
                                                
8 A similar argument is made in Peterson, Price, 128. 
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decisions made at the federal level are part of a healthy, vibrant national economic 
system that recognizes the health sector as serving plural interests.9 
 
The Federal Government Handles the Re-distributional and Administrative 
Aspects of Medicaid Better Than Decentralized Governments 
 
The federal government is best to organize redistributional programs.10  
Redistribution is best handled by the federal government because it can develop strategies 
for addressing differences in state fiscal capacity; for addressing price variations in local 
health markets; or for dealing with potentially necessary differentials for groups of people 
or individuals.  Higher level governments, since they incorporate the smaller level ones, 
are capable of correcting for various differentials between players and so can at least try 
to mitigate these differences.  In the case of Medicaid, although the match does not 
remove state fiscal capacity differences, it does mitigate them.   
 Organizing redistributive programs at the federal level also helps prevent 
problems with mobility, meaning flight of wealthy taxpayers out of regions where poor 
people reside.  Tiebout, Oates, and many others have produced important empirical work 
showing the effects of this race to the bottom, when taxes for decentralized social 
programs are organized at the local  or subsidiary government  level.11  To the degree 
that local governments fund social programs, wealthy individuals may flee from the area 
 that political unit  in order to escape paying taxes on services they will never use.  If 
taxed at the federal level with the federal government feeding that funding back into the 
                                                
9 The textbook public finance view also supports distributional decision making at the federal, as opposed 
to decentralized, levels of government.  See, for example, Richard W. Tresch, Public Finance: A Normative 
Theory, 2nd Edition (San Diego, Academic Press, 2002), 835 and 841.  Public sector economists have 
provided a variety of answers to this, none entirely satisfactory (Why not let the national government do 
everything?)  In considering them, keep in mind that each answer attempts to justify a role for lower level 
governments only with respect to the standard allocational or efficiency questions.  Almost everyone 
concedes the distributional question to the national government.  Social welfare issues are largely absent in 
lower level, or local, government decision making in the federalism literature.  On 841, The literature on 
the optimal structure of a federalist system of governments is virtually unanimous in assigning decisions on 
income distribution to the national government. 
10 Wallace Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, Journal of Economic Literature Vol. XXXVII 
(September 1999): 1121. 
11 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, The Journal of Political Economy 64, no. 5 
(Oct. 1956): 416 - 424; and Oates, An Essay, 1120 - 1149. 
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re-distributive program, this incentive to move is removed.  Organizing financing of 
programs at the state level does not mitigate the race to the bottom to the same extent as 
federal redistribution. 
 Due to the strength of the federal government in redistributional matters, Alice 
Rivlin in Reviving the American Dream suggested that states contribute to the federal 
government for certain initiatives so that the federal government could then use its 
redistributional strengths in administration.  In this case, the administrative strength of the 
federal government is funded by states helping to finance the programs by upward 
financial contributions.  Rivlins work did not specify Medicaid per se, but it recognized 
the power of the federal government in yet another area  Administration.   
 
Federal Taxation More Progressive Than State Taxation 
 
Federal taxation is more progressive than state taxation and so the federal 
government funding the program is preferable.  As further evidence of the strength of the 
federal government in redistributive efforts, what state would prefer to finance Medicaid 
wholly independently?  The financial issue, then, is not whether the federal government 
should finance a large part of the Medicaid program in its current structure -- this is 
settled. 
 
The Federal Government is More Administratively Cost-Effective and 
Rationalized Than 50 Separate State Governments 
 
As Fishman writes in Running In Place, It is not particularly likely that 50 state 
programs would result in less bureaucracy than one national one.12  Administrative costs 
are lower with fewer governments involved.  The number of associations, and therefore 
                                                
12 Eliot Fishman, Running in Place: How the Medicaid Model Falls Short, and What to Do about It, A 
Century Foundation Report in The Devolution Revolution Series (New York, NY: The Century Foundation 
Press, 2002), 46. 
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transaction costs, are lower with one level of government involved than with 50 plus the 
national government.13   
In addition to administrative cost-effectiveness, Medicaid would be more 
rationalized if federalized.  A Committee on Federalism and National Purpose advocated 
a greater separation of responsibilities among governments.  According to the 
Committees proposals, health and welfare would be federalized while other functions 
would be more fully decentralized.14  According to this view, Medicaid would be more 
fully federalized and other programs more fully decentralized because this line-drawing 
creates clearer boundaries and responsibilities.  This mitigates confusion regarding 
enrollment and benefit eligibility.  Medicaids rules are so multitudinous and overlap so 
many jurisdicitons that potential eligibles and state caseworkers often cannot begin to 
determine who is eligible.  An argument in favor of federalization of the Medicaid 
program is rationalization, simplification, and administrative cost-effectiveness and 
efficiency.  Also, many federal programs tend to be inflation-adjusted over time, 
providing beneficiaries the same level of benefits from year to year, whereas state 
programs tend not to be, leaving beneficiaries with diminishing benefits. 
 
Effects of Lack of Health Coverage Crosses Geographic Boundaries 
 
State and local governments are not well suited to deal with externalities in many 
types of social policy.15  Lack of access to Medicaid  and lack of access to health 
insurance generally -- contributes to lack of disease prevention, delays in diagnosis and 
treatment, and bloated costs from more complex conditions due to delays in diagnosis 
and treatment.  These problems cross geographic boundaries and are national problems.  
Disease spreads across state lines.  To the degree that health providers and insurers are 
                                                
13 Similar to argument made in Cashin, Sheryll D., Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: 
Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, The Columbia Law Review 99 (April 1999): 596. 
14 Peterson, Price, 186. 
15 See generally Ronald C. Fisher, State and Local Public Finance (Chicago: Irwin); and Tresch, Public 
Finance. 
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part of larger companies that cross state lines, the explosive costs that result from not 
diagnosing and treating health conditions early is shifted across state boundaries.   
Also, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) found that uninsurance is the sixth leading 
cause of death.16  If uninsurance leads to death in some groups more prominently than 
others, first, this is immoral and wrong.  Next, it is to be assumed that this group of 
peoples productive power is lost, their potential energy extinguished, their potential 
contributions to the political system gone.  Externalities  bad effects from the system  
cross state boundaries.  Organizing administration and policy decision making at the 
federal level captures these externalities and addresses them as a nation.   
 
Federal Political Structures Are More Amenable To Fair Deliberation of Medicaid 
Issues 
 
Health policy affects federal more than state elections.  Voters take health policy 
more into account when electing federal than state government officials.  Since this is the 
case, organizing Medicaid at the federal level means that elected officials will be held 
more closely accountable for policy choices than if the program is organized at a level 
where voters do not consider health policy to the same degree in voting. 
According to many, federal politics is more likely to protect the poor, and to cover 
the poor across the country in a more similar, fair way, than state politics.17  Placing 
redistributive decision making at the level of state majoritarian politics will work in the 
middle-income voters favor over the poor when they vie for scarce public dollars.  
Although Medicaid serves both the middle-class and the poor, federal involvement 
introduces fairer institutional structures for the poor.  They are less politically hamstrung 
at the very beginning, by the institutional rules that govern decision making.  Also, to the 
                                                
16 Institute of Medicine (IOM), Care Without Coverage: Too Little, Too Late (Washington, D.C.: IOM, 
May 2002).  Consider Marwicks findings, as well.  For example, uninsured patients with breast cancer 
have a 30% to 50% greater chance of dying than patients with private insurance coverage.  Uninsured 
patients with colon cancer have a 50% to 60% higher mortality rate than those with private insurance.  
Finally, there is a 37% higher mortality rate among uninsured accident victims than among those who were 
privately insured.  See C. Marwick, For the Uninsured, Health Problems Are More Serious, Journal of 
the National Cancer Institute, July 3, 2002.   
17 Peterson, Price, 146.  A variant of this argument is presented in Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform. 
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degree that a state is represented more by rural than urban voters, state organized 
programs adversely affect city-dwellers.18  This same argument can be applied to many 
groups and minority interests.  Greater aggregation means that plural interests are 
considered more effectively in policy choices, which is particularly important for people 
with low-incomes. 
Finally, state and local governments, research has found, are more susceptible to 
interest group capture,19 meaning that major policy decision making at that level is more 
susceptible to non-democratic influence and power monied interest politics.  This is 
highly unlikely to benefit the poor.  In a related argument, business leaders while 
displaying an ability to work towards community financial improvement have not 
displayed as much tenacity in effectively addressing tangled issues of indigence and 
medical necessity on a broad scale.20 
 
The Federal, Not State Governments, Encourage Localism and Closeness to The 
People 
 
Federalism may not encourage and in fact discourages decentralization to local 
government.21  The Federal Government contributes more to localism than state 
governments despite the prevalent belief that decentralization to states brings programs 
closer to the people and matches needs better to resources expended.  Local needs, then, 
are better addressed in cooperation between the federal and local governments then 
between state and local governments.  Also, many citizens are more attuned to federal 
than state politics.   
Frank Crosss The Folly of Federalism reviews several pathologies in common 
understanding of federalism that describes states as the level of government closest to the 
people.  He argues, True decentralization does not involve decision making at the level 
of state governmentsThe most populous states are very large in size and tantamount to 
                                                
18 Many authors including Cashin refer to the Tyranny of the Suburban Voters. 
19 Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, 577. 
20 Peterson, Price, 36. 
21 Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, Cardozo Law Review 24 (November 2002): 1. 
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central governments.  Their decision making largely sacrifices the benefits of 
decentralization, because these states are seeking to govern a diverse population that will 
have very heterogeneous preferencesThe real virtues of decentralization are 
attributable to local, not state, governance.22   
Localism is not federalism, and state governments are not the closest governments 
to the people.  According to Rubin and Feeley in Federalism: Some Notes on a National 
Neurosis: There is simply no reason why an immediate political unit would be more 
favorable to local units than the nations central authority.23  Cross concludes, Indeed, 
both theory and experience suggest that states will be less amenable to decentralized 
localism, with all of its benefits.24   
 
Key Arguments in Favor of State-Generated Reform 
 
Experimentation After Federal Involvement Fails 
 
One reason in favor of devolving a program to state governments is because the 
federal government has not done a good job during its tenure running a program.  At one 
point in the AFDC block granting debate, for example, Governor Tommy Thompson of 
Wisconsin delivered a compelling argument to fellow Governors at the National 
Governors Association that with no proven solutions, the best possible tact was to leave 
the difficult reform questions to the states.  In other words, in the absence of knowing the 
effective policy solution, the default he argued was with state governments, who at the 
time were enjoying some victories in the cash income support area.25  In an important 
book on Medicaid structural questions, Grannemann and Pauly reiterate this argument 
regarding Medicaid cost containment in the early 1980s: 
                                                
22 Cross, Folly, 34-35. 
23 Edward L. Rubin and Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, UCLA L. Rev 
41 (1994): 916, according to the original source Cross, Folly, in Footnote #191 and #5. 
24 Cross, Folly, 33. 
25 David Ellwood, Discussion, in John Kincaid, The Devolution Tortoise and the Centralization Hare, 
New England Economic Review (May/June 1998): 44-45. 
  41
 
At the moment, therefore, there is no basis for trying to direct states to trim their 
Medicaid programs in any particular way.  With the prevailing uncertainty about 
what is best, giving states the flexibility to experiment and adapt their cost 
controlling efforts to local circumstances, and to develop incentives for 
physicians and patients to control costs, may be the most sensible policy. 26 
 
This is an argument, based not on theory but on humility, as James Q. Wilson 
articulated: In a recent article Wilson argued that we know so little about the tangle of 
pathologies that produce welfare dependency that we may as well turn welfare over to the 
state and local governments.  We do not know what to do at the federal level, so we may 
as well turn it over to the states and see if they can do better than we have to date.27  
Grannemann and Paulys work suggests that the signals may, at least be clearer and 
reactions quicker, for states in the face of this uncertainty.28  The greater the uncertainty 
of what level of government finances or administers Medicaid more effectively, the more 
costly it is to insist on national uniformity.29 
 
Governments Closer to the People Identify Needs Better and Match Resources to 
Those Needs Better 
 
Localities can target needs better than central governments and so provide more 
efficient amounts, types, and combinations of services.30  Meeting heterogenous 
preferences enhances welfare.31  Paul Peterson in the Price of Federalism described this 
phenomenon is a slightly different way,  economic signals to the national government 
indicating the relative efficiency of its policies are not as clear or as rapidly conveyed as 
                                                
26 Thomas W. Grannemann and Mark V. Pauly, Controlling Medicaid Costs: Federalism, Competition, and 
Choice (Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982), 18 - 19. 
27 David Beam, Discussion, in John Kincaid.  The Devolution Tortoise and the Centralization Hare, 
New England Economic Review (May/June 1998): 43. 
28 Grannemann, Controlling Medicaid Costs, 34 - 35. 
29 See Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, in Footnote #112, The greater the uncertainty about what 
works and what doesnt, and the greater the ability and willingness of states to share information, the more 
valuable are state-level policy innovations and the more costly is any requirement of national uniformity. 
30 For an argument along these lines, see the section The economic case for decentralized government, in 
Wallace Oates, Fiscal Federalism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), 11 - 13.   
31 Cross,Folly, (November 2002): 51. 
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signals available to local governmentsAs a result, the national government receives 
less information from the marketplace about the effectiveness of its policy choices. 
 
State Governments Are More Apt At Taking Into Account Market Differentials 
 
Health delivery is a decidedly local enterprise.  The U.S. medical system has 
differing local medical prices, structures of local delivery systems, maturation and 
penetration of managed care, and other variants depending on market and geographic 
areas.  Given this, a mechanism for taking these into account is wise.  A completely 
federalized program may be less apt at this than one that involves states.32 
 
State Involvement in Medicaid Encourages Competitive Federalism 
 
Competitive Federalism provides market solutions.  This argument was 
developed by Thomas Dye in American Federalism: Competition Among Governments in 
his conceptualization that efficiency, maximization of personal objectives, and societal 
progress result from competition.33 Innovation, then, is encouraged by decentralization.  
This is also expressed in the idea of states as laboratories, where states test ideas that can 
either be implemented by the national government or other states.  Vice versa, there are 
also examples of national policies that are borrowed and implemented by the states. 
 
States Involved To The Degree Medicaid Is A Local Public Good 
 
To the degree that Medicaid is considered a local public good, instead of a 
national public good, individuals are not going to be as willing to pay taxes for someone 
in another area or political unit who requires Medicaid.34  In theory, people would prefer 
to move to an area with a lower tax burden.  To the degree that Medicaid is considered a 
                                                
32 Grannemann, Controlling Medicaid Costs, 95. 
33 Thomas R. Dye, American Federalism: Competition Among Governments (Lexington, Massachusetts: 
Lexington Books, 1990), 14. 
34 A variant of this idea is expressed in Grannemann, 36 - 37. 
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local public good, or to the extent people are willing to help neighbors in their own 
community but not every Medicaid recipient across the country, taxpayers may consider 
a national financing system unfair.  The general understanding will be that fairness to 
taxpayers is abrogated by having to pay taxes to support it on a national level.  Also, to 
the extent that the public good has localized effects, public finance theory favors 
decentralized provision on grounds of economic efficiency.  Finally, to the degree that 
the local public good is highly price inelastic, there are potential welfare gains from 
decentralized finance. 35 
 
Political Participation and Democracy Strengthened By State Involvement 
 
Civic political participation and influence increases as level of government 
decreases.36  In the Supreme Courts Garcia decision37 Justice Powell writes that state 
and local governments are more efficient because they are more accessible and 
democratically responsive than the federal level.38 
 
State Involvement Better Protects Basic Liberties and Freedoms 
 
Involving decentralized governments in Medicaid helps to protect basic liberties 
and freedoms.  The additional points of access to community, local, and state political 
participation allows citizens to work within the democratic political system towards 
change in the Medicaid program more effectively than if the program were wholly 
federal.39  This works to protect basic liberties and freedoms of individuals. 
 
                                                
35 Oates, An Essay, 1122 - 1123.   
36 Oates, An Essay, 1138. 
37 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 
1016 (1985). 
38 Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, (1999): Footnote #98, see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 576-77 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
39 See Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Rethinking Federalism, The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Autumn, 1997): 43  64, particularly 44 and 54. 
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INTERGOVERNMENTAL GRANTS: THE FINANCING INSTRUMENT THAT 
BRIDGES GOVERNMENTS 
 
Just as federalism is a negotiation between governments, intergovernmental grants 
are a means to achieve this bargain.  The benefits of federal and state rule can be 
combined in one program using intergovernmental grants as a bridge.40  The power of the 
possibilities of negotiation between governments using grants has evolved over time, but 
part of this evolution was overcoming questions of their constitutionality.41   
The unique feature of intergovernmental grants is their ability to juxtapose so 
many of the positives described in the last section from every level of government into 
one program.  Political bargainers rely on these instruments in order to broker deals by 
trading interests through the structure of the grant.  Richard Nathan writes: A grant-in-
aid is the product of a political bargaining process, not just in Washington where the 
grant is created, but also at the state and local levels where it is executed.  One way to 
think about this process is that there is a horizontal policy bargaining process, which 
consists of decision-making about policy goals and instruments for the country as a 
whole, and a vertical dimension, involving the way in which a particular grant is defined 
and executed by individual recipient jurisdictions.42   
Intergovernmental grants, then, make it possible to combine interests on both 
sides of the federalism debate.  It is possible for the federal government to redistribute 
and for local governments to match needs to services, all within the same program.  
Intergovernmental grants create a bridge where the dialectical debate is resolved through 
                                                
40  Much of the devolution literature misses what is now the central challenge in social policy, that is, that 
we as a society want both the advantages of federal rule and some of the advantages of state rule.  See 
David Ellwood, Discussion, in John Kincaid, The Devolution Tortoise and the Centralization Hare, 
New England Economic Review (May/June 1998): 45.   
41 The Constitutional challenge to intergovernmental grants was addressed in 1923.  During Massachusetts 
v. Mellon, a unanimous Court turned aside Massachusettss challenge to the Sheppard-Towner Act, which 
gave conditional grants to the states for maternal and infant health.  Massachusetts claimed that the law 
induced states to yield sovereign rights reserved to them.  The Court held that the states choice to accept 
the grants was voluntary and that there was no deprivation of a right that fell within judicial cognizance. 
See Martha Derthick, Keeping the Compound Republic: Essays on American Federalism (Washington, 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2001), 129. 
42 Richard P. Nathan, State and Local Governments under Federal Grants: Toward a Predictive Theory, 
Political Science Quarterly (Spring 1983): 48. 
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combining Medicaid functions among different levels of government.  In general, 
intergovernmental grants are purported to internalize spillover benefits of other 
jurisdictions, encourage fiscal equalization across jurisdictions, and contribute to an 
improved overall tax system.  In fact, the veil hypothesis holds that intergovernmental 
grants are a veil for a federal tax cut.43  These fiscal benefits are matched by the ability 
of federal and state politicians to share responsibility for lawmaking and for federal and 
state administrators to share in policy setting, implementation, and enforcement. 
Past Medicaid federalism debates concentrated on the current grant structure, 
open matching grants, and the Medicaid reform proposal of block grants.  Block grants 
became the social policy reform model of choice for Reagan, Gingrich, and George W. 
Bush.  President Ford proposed block granting Medicaid but this proposal did not garner 
serious action.  The conversion of the income support program Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), which was financed through an open-matching grant, to the 
block-granted Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) in 1996 was a 
fundamental shift in American income support policy.  Continuing liberalization of  
Medicaid waivers and the addition of new waivers, for example HIFA waivers, to states 
has given state and local governments greater and greater discretion in decision making 
in the Medicaid program.  The strengths and weaknesses of block grants and a brief 
review of the reasons for staying with the status quo of open-matching grants are 
considered here. 
 These strengths and weaknesses are necessarily generalizations, but a caveat is 
offered that not all block grants are the same.  In a review of block grant politics, 
Timothy Conlan lists a number of items debated when past policymakers considered 
block grants including the division of money and authority among different levels of 
government, the total level of funding to be authorized, the extent and character of federal 
oversight, the range of eligible activities to be permitted, the specific programs to be 
consolidated, and the factors to be included in the allocation formula.44  For example, 
                                                
43 Oates, An Essay, 1129. 
44 Timothy Conlan, The Politics of Federal Block Grants: From Nixon to Reagan, Political Science 
Quarterly (Summer 1984): 258. 
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one 1995 proposal created several block grants from the Medicaid program, splitting it 
into several separate initiatives. 
 
Open - Matching Grants 
 
 One of the primary benefits of open matching grants is that they stimulate state 
spending in a program.  States contribute more to Medicaid than they would without this 
structure because with every dollar spent, they receive federal funds in return.  The more 
states spend, the more federal money they receive.  And, there is no limit.  This reduces 
the price of Medicaid for states.  Also, since it is targeted to Medicaid specifically, it is 
theoretically supposed to lower the unit cost or price of the supported services and limit 
the opportunities for the funds to leak into state or local tax relief.45  In truth, the 
Medicaid program has had instances where states have used the Disproportionate 
Hospital Payment system or provider tax schemes to maximize federal funding and those 
funds were used for other state purposes.  According to theory, though, the magnitude of 
the stimulative effects of open matching grants is quite large, much larger than the effect 
of unconditional grants on state and local spending.46 
 One reason for the dramatic expansion in Medicaid in the late 1980s was a series 
of mandates to expand coverage to include more low-income families.  Based on U.S. 
Census of Governments data on total welfare spending, Baicker has argued that states 
fiscal response to these mandates was to cut back on other welfare spending by an 
amount almost exactly equal to the extra cost of the mandates.  This result, if correct, 
suggests that the national government is highly constrained in its ability to incentivize 
states to expand coverage and increase spending on the needy.47 
                                                
45 Wallace E. Oates, The New Federalism: An Economists View. Chapter 7 in Studies in Fiscal 
Federalism (Aldershot England: Edward Elgar, 1991), 100.  Originally published as The New Federalism: 
An Economists View, Cato Journal 2, no. 2 (Fall 1982): 482. 
46 Wallace E. Oates, The New Federalism: An Economists View. Chapter 7 in Studies in Fiscal 
Federalism (Aldershot England: Edward Elgar, 1991), 100.  Originally published as The New Federalism: 
An Economists View, Cato Journal 2, no. 2 (Fall 1982): 482. 
47 Howard Chernick, Federal Grants and Social Welfare Spending: Do State Responses Matter? National 
Tax Journal LIII, no. 1: 148. 
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Aggregate Block Grants 
 
 Aggregate block granting Medicaid would convert the open matching grant 
structure to a lump-sum payment to states.  Block grants tend to shift more responsibility 
for programs to states and localities, and they tend to result in the federal government 
cutting its contribution to the block granted program.  Block grants are non-stimulative in 
terms of public budgets in that states are not induced to spend more on Medicaid.  Block 
grants offer much more flexibility to states to spend the funds according to their own 
priorities, in theory, than open matching grants.  Also, block grants are by definition 
capped so that there is a fixed amount given to states, which may help in planning for the 
federal government as well as with deficit reduction, budget balancing, and entitlement 
spending as a percentage of total national budget control.  In the past two and a half 
decades, deficit pressure has bolstered calls for block granting generally.  Paul Posner has 
researched this phenomenon in relation to unfunded mandates.  He writes, From a 
budgetary perspective, block grants have distinct advantages as a tool of cutback 
management.especially if states come to believe that cuts are inevitable, block grants 
offer the advantage of increased flexibility to manage the reductions.48   
 Interestingly, critics of block grants are numerous and their backgrounds varied.  
First, block grants are seen as buck passing when applied to programs without clear 
rationalized reasons for being block granted.  In the event of a block grant, many more of 
Medicaids challenges would be passed to states.  Federal elected and appointed officials, 
then, would not be responsible for these policy choices.  Some fiscal conservatives have 
claimed that this buck passing is a prescription for fiscal irresponsibility.  In short, the 
pain of taxing is separated from the joy of spending in a thinly disguised revenue 
sharing program.49   
 A strong argument in favor of block grants is that it removes the possibility of 
states using strategic games to maximize federal Medicaid funding, as it has done under 
                                                
48 Paul L. Posner and Margaret Wrightson, A Perennial but Unstable Tool of Government, Publius: The 
Journal of Federalism 26, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 92 
49 Posner, A Perennial, 94. 
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the open matching grant formula.50  At the same time though, the stimulative incentives 
of open matching grants are lost.  In other words, not only will the federal government 
reduce its contribution and cap spending on the Medicaid program, but, in the absence of 
the incentives of a matching grant, states will reduce their spending on Medicaid, as well.  
The marginal price of the Medicaid program will go up for states because the federal 
government is no longer giving the states funds for every dollar the states invest.51  
 A counter to this argument exists, as well.  It is not proven that all states have 
maintained their level of effort in the Medicaid program.  Some states who do not agree 
with federal goals for the Medicaid program may be substituting federal dollars for 
money they would have used on the program anyway.  Therefore, this represents a 
substitution of federal dollars for money that states would have spent on the program 
without federal involvement.52  Block grants (sometimes referred to as revenue sharing or 
power equalizing) are sometimes thought as a panacea for all that is wrong with the 
federal system.  The advantages, however, of national equity can be combined with those 
of state and local efficiency. 53   
                                                
50 Several interviewees and experts expressed this view that block granting Medicaid was the only way to 
stop state maximization of the federal open match via provider taxes and donations, Disproportionate Share 
Hospital Payments (DSH), Upper Payment Limits (UPLs), Intergovernmental Transfers (IGTs), and a 
whole host of state techniques.  In economic theoretic terms, Singh and Thomas (2001) convey the 
conceptual idea this way, The shift towards block grants is seen to increase efficiency through the 
elimination of the dead weight loss resulting from selective input subsidies, or attempts to convert 
contingent funds to an income supplement.  See Nirvikar Singh and Ravi Thomas, Matching Grants 
versus Block Grants With Imperfect Information, National Tax Journal XLII, no. 2 (2001): 191 
51 A similar phenomenon was hypothesized in welfare reform.  Howard Chernick writes in 1998, While 
the discussion of devolution and welfare reform in the U.S. has emphasized regulatory decentralization, 
paradoxically, the predicted fiscal effect of the block grants will be to further centralize re-distributional 
finance, as states reduce their own effort in response to the increase in the marginal price of redistribution.  
See Howard Chernick Fiscal Effects of Block Grants for the Needy: An Interpretation of the Evidence, 
International Tax and Public Finance 5 (1998): 228. 
52 As Hanson (1984) writes: This finding is consistent with Jennings (1982) conclusions about the mixed 
effects of fiscal incentives on state policymakers behavior.  It cannot be presumed that fiscal incentives  
like the progressive reimbursements that give poor states more bang for their bucks  will stimulate more 
liberal policies.  Some states will simply use these incentives to add to their own efforts, while others will 
use them to substitute for their own action.  Hence, equalizing resources will not equalize policies, unless 
the willingness of policymakers to use those resources for federally intended purposes is the same.  See 
Hanson, Russell L., Medicaid and The Politics of Redistribution, American Journal of Political Science 
28, no. 2 (May 1984): 328. 
53 Peterson, Price, 23. 
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 An expected substantial reduction in Medicaid spending, meaning cuts in 
eligibility and services, is a strong argument against a block grant structure.  In short, in 
the past expansions have been encouraged by the institutional structure of the matching 
grant.  Without this structure, reductions in coverage and eligibility are very likely.  
Howard Chernicks public finance research has supported this empirically, In contrast to 
the results on cash assistance, estimates from the Medicaid literature suggest a strong 
price response to federal matching subsidies.  The implication is that efforts to cap 
Medicaid, or convert it to a block grant, would lead to very large reductions in Medicaid 
spending.  Mandates to expand coverage under Medicaid, coupled with the price subsidy 
through federal matching, appear to have been effective at achieving their purpose.54  
An implicit lump-sum grant is transferred from the federal government to states through 
the current institutional design is the DSH program.   
Although the rules have been tightened in recent years, the use of provider taxes 
and donations and the DSH schemes to maximize federal funding can be seen as a lump 
sum payment to subsidize federal mandates.  Since the federal government has allowed 
this strategic maximization to continue, with some important reforms, it results in the 
federal government contributing more to state Medicaid programs than intended from its 
matching grant institutional design.  Instead Medicaid is really an open matching grant 
program with added on lump-sum grants to states who strategically maximize these tax, 
donation, and DSH systems to generate additional federal dollars. 
 Again, though, the question of how close state governments truly are to the people 
arises.  While it seems settled that the federal government is the right government to 
collect money to fund the Medicaid program, the question of what level of government 
makes political and policy decisions and administers the program is still in question.  If 
revenue sharing utilizes the strength of federal progressive taxation but then transfers the 
funds to state governments for their decision making and prioritization to set the 
framework for Medicaid, is this actually moving Medicaid away from  and not toward 
the people?  If localities and private carriers are involved through waivers or mandates by 
                                                
54 Chernick, Federal Grants, 150.  
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the federal government in Medicaid currently, would this improve with a block grant  or 
will many of the local entities currently involved be cut out of the program?  The 
arguments for decentralization that include bolstering civic and community participation 
and democratic ideals may in fact be hurt  not helped  by decentralization.  As Sheryll 
Cashin writes, replacing entitlements that enable beneficiaries to act for themselves with 
block grants actually moves away from the people and toward state government. 55   
The individual entitlement to Medicaid will end by shifting to an aggregate block 
grant structure, even if the state entitlement remains.  Federal rights of action will be 
severely restricted  if not eliminated  for beneficiaries and providers.  Block grants 
substantially alter Medicaid not just because of federal versus state considerations but 
because individuals will be much more dependent on states and their legal and policy 
decisions.  If there is a dispute, federal governments will be severely restricted in their 
ability to intercede given that the individual entitlement no longer exists at the federal 
level.  This, in fact, harms federalism since a main tenet of federalism is that different 
levels of government are involved precisely in order to protect individual rights and 
liberties. 
 Block grants also do not address the concern that out-of-state voters have for 
people who do not reside in their own states.56  One of the reasons that programs are 
organized on the federal level is because there is something gained by taxpayers all over 
the country from contributing to the care of people in need.  This may be called 
community responsibility or caring, beneficence, belief in the common good  but the 
main point is that someone who contributes to funding a program through federal 
taxation may want the federal government to ensure that this tax money is helping 
people.  If a federal taxpayer in Ohio disagrees with Floridas Medicaid eligibility 
determinations, block grants create a situation where taxpayers contribute to funding the 
program but are not able to voice objections to its institutional structure because they 
reside in a different state. 
                                                
55 Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, 13. 
56 A related argument is made in Grannemann, Controlling Medicaid Costs, in Chapter 4 Goals for a 
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 Finally, A Medicaid block grant will be disproportionately tough on poor states.  
Current differentials in states eligibility, benefits, and provider payment  already 
representing an uncomfortably large horizontal inequality  will become even more 
pronounced.57  Poor states will be less able to bridge the gap and make up for reduced 
federal funds due to their lower state fiscal capacity than wealthy states.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In the particular policy dialectic described in this chapter the Key Arguments in 
Favor of Federal Reform and Control are pitted against the Key Arguments in Favor of 
State-Generated Reform.  Scholars of many disciplines contributed to the defense of 
dozens of reasons why one level of government or another is better suited for controlling 
Medicaid decision making.  Pragmatic federalism means policy decision makers pick the 
argument that best defends the deeper values they are driven to achieve. 
 Even in light of this, there are particular institutional strengths of different levels 
of government.  Governments that are inclusive of others, such as the federal 
government, tend to be better for redistribution and particularly adept at enforcing certain 
types of equality.  Governments closer to the people tend to match resources to needs 
more effectively and to encourage competition.   
 This chapter provided a meta-analysis, pitting one view of federalism against 
another in a policy dialectic: Reasons for Federalizing Medicaid versus Reasons for 
Decentralizing Medicaids functions.  It also provided a meta-analysis of open-matching 
and block grant structures.  At the end of the day, the Medicaid program is truly a 
paradox.  It fills so many roles.  It builds on the strengths of its use, through an open-
matching grant structure, of federal, state, and local governments.  The following lists a 
few of the paradoxical twists of Medicaid federalism.  Medicaid is: 
 
                                                
57 Howard Chernick stipulates, for the economic reader, So long as the price elasticity of AFDC [in this 
case Medicaid] is greater than zero, block granting should in the long run increase benefit differentials. 
See Chernick, Fiscal Effects, 224. 
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• Not only a federal or state program, per se, but both; 
• Not simply a health program but historically lumped with cash income programs; 
• Not only acute or hospital based, but important for physicians, the long-term care 
industry, the mental health infrastructure, the dental profession, school based 
health, the aging network, and every aspect of the broader social milieu; 
• Vital as a health financier not only for those with low-incomes, but increasingly 
for the middle-class; 
• Not only a public program, but integral to many private business interests; it is 
also connected to Americas business competitiveness world-wide by its financial 
effects on heath system costs as a whole; 
• Not only a program for children and pregnant women but for the adult disabled 
and the elderly; and  
• A program where advocates for federalization often base their argument on 
individual rights and advocates of block granting or greater state flexibility also 
base their arguments on a different set of individual rights. 
 
In this paradox, arguments around Medicaid tend to be Rights versus Rights 
arguments; its just that the opposing factions are choosing to espouse different rights as 
integral to their own set of personal values.  Medicaid serves many distinct populations 
and is asked to do it all well.  To quote a scholarly paper, theres just something about 
Medicaid.58   
The programs federal and state relationship has resulted from innumerable policy 
bargains over its four plus decades.  The next two sections concentrate on some of the 
major moments or most influential policy bargains for Medicaid federalism.  The next 
part, Part II which includes Chapters 3 through 6 considers Medicaid in Retrospective.  
It is more historical in nature and progresses from the New Deal through the George H. 
W. Bush era.  Part III, comprised of Chapters 7 through 11, considers The Modern Era.  
Part III tends to focus in more intently on specific policy bargains, benefiting from 
                                                
58 Alan Weil, Theres Something About Medicaid, Health Affairs 22, no. 1 (Jan./Feb. 2003), 13 - 30. 
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interviews with the major players in Medicaid federalism policy bargaining from 1992 
through 2007. 
 Now, after Chapters 1 and 2, the theoretical cement is set.  We can now roll the 
tape and learn how the policy bargaining in Medicaid federalism actually plays out in the 
real world.  In Part II we have the benefit of the historical record and in Part III we have 
the benefit of extensive interviews with the most involved, dynamic, and thoughtful 
policy makers in Medicaid today. 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART II 
 
 Policy history provides a unique opportunity to study a particular phenomenon in 
a real life scenario.  While it is not possible to know precisely how a Medicaid policy 
bargain will unfold in the future, it is possible to understand trends, traps, and patterns 
from previous Medicaid federalism joists.  It is possible to understand a great deal about 
public policy deal making, the institution of federalism, and the evolution of the 
Medicaid program in the process.  Not all the trends, traps, and patterns will be helpful in 
the next policy bargain, but after studying enough bargains over enough eras, a great deal 
is learned about the coalitions involved and how the public policy in this area transpires. 
 Part II considers Medicaid in Retrospective.  The experts who know Medicaid 
best made it very clear during interviews that understanding Medicaid in 2007 is not 
possible without understanding the eras leading up to it.  This section is comprised of 
four chapters.  Chapter Three, The First Big Bang covers the thirty years prior to the 
enactment of Medicaid in 1965 in order to understand how the evolution of the Social 
Security Act, the Economic Bill of Rights, and the national health debates shaped 
Medicaid federalism.  There is no Medicaid without this history.  It sets up the following 
chapter on the LBJ Rights Era.   
While Medicaid tends not to be a policy area of major interest to Presidents, 
Lyndon Baines Johnson made his Medicare/Medicaid bill the first and foremost 
legislative priority after winning the Presidential election in 1964.  Possibly it was said 
best in his own words on a recorded phone conversation from the LBJ Presidential 
archives, --  but Id just say this that there is not anything that has happened in my six 
months or that will happen in my whole term in my judgment that will mean more to us 
as a party or me or you as individuals than this piece of legislation 
[Medicaid/Medicare].1  The prioritization by the President was paramount to its passage 
                                                
1 Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Wilbur Mills, June 9, 1964, Tape WH6406.03, 
Program No. 12, Citation No. 3642, Tapes and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings, LBJ 
PL. 
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-- and after forty years of benefiting from that Presidential choice, the victories of these 
programs are two of many pillars to his legacy.   
Chapter 5 covers the Watershed Years of the 1970s.  A profound era, the 
Nixon/Ford national health proposals were never embraced by Congressional Democrats, 
even though in todays terms the Nixon offer appears in many ways comparable to 
President Clintons 1993-94 proposal.  The Medicaid program is forever tied to national 
health reform proposals.  There is no escaping that a proposal for national health reform 
is a proposal for Medicaid reform.  During the Nixon era, the FAP proposals also resulted 
in the creation of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, a very important 
eligibility category for Medicaid.  In general though, this watershed era was marked by 
multiple profound changes.  The effects of the Congressional Budget Act would remain 
latent for some years.  In fact, though, this Nixon era reform -- put in play to curb his 
power -- revolutionized Medicaid and entitlement policy bargaining. 
Chapter 6, the final chapter of Part II, covers the 1980s and early 1990s.  
Medicaid federalisms twists and turns in this era were marked by state financing 
mechanisms where states attempted to maximize their federal match.  In many ways, the 
federal response to, in their view, these games, was the strongest support for block 
granting Medicaid.  First proposed by President Ford, capping Medicaid expenditures 
was a staple of the Reagan OMB machine.  Another method of control, also proposed, 
was federalization.  Once federalized, the program could be shaped by the Administration 
as it saw fit.  With the benefit of hindsight, Chapter 6 in fact covers The Budget Era -- 
a time when reining in entitlement spending, restructuring the budget rules in favor of the 
party in power, and rewinding The Great Society were priorities.  Medicaid, in the face of 
it all, expanded. 
One of the most endearing qualities of Medicaid is its ability to survive in the 
toughest conditions and thrive when asked to do so much for so many different types of 
extremely complex medical predicaments.  This all comes at a price though.  And Part II 
sets up the history which leads to The Modern Era (1992 - 2007).  The largest health 
program in the country, today Medicaid spends more than $350 billion a year, serving 
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well over 50 million people.  The program that was referred to as an afterthought 
during the LBJ era still in 2007 operates under most Congressional staffs radar screens.  
Part II reviews its policy history and the federal and state struggles up until The Modern 
Era. 
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3. THE FIRST BIG BANG, 1935:  
LEADING TO MEDICAID ENACTMENT -- 
POLICY BARGAINS FROM THE NEW DEAL 
TO KERR MILLS  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter begins at Medicaids enactment in 1965 in order to connect this 
event backwards to FDRs New Deal.  The first and second big bangs in American social 
policy, there was never again such institutional fire branding as first with the creation of 
the Social Security Act in the mid 1930s and then the addition of the health programs, 
Medicaid and Medicare, in 1965.  Connecting the two Administrations there was an 
adherence to creative federalism.  Both Democratic Presidents and their Administrations 
believed in the power of all levels of government to work with private industry in the 
hope of achieving great outcomes.  Many of the dedicated and talented staff that worked 
on the New Deal played key roles in the Great Society.  The institutional economists of 
the New Deal and the Great Society were simpatico.  It was not until after the New Deal, 
that the American welfare state lent its ear more forcefully to the neoclassicists. 
The FDR Administration thus forged cash income programs on a shared federal-
state model that Medicaid, in the LBJ era, would be modeled upon.  The importance of 
the time period leading up to the enactment of the predecessor programs to Medicaid, 
particularly Kerr Mills in the early 1960s, cannot be overstated.  This chapter also 
examines policy bargains through Trumans, Eisenhowers, as well as President John F. 
Kennedys Administrations.  It illustrates the importance of national health reform 
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debates in the eventual development of the 1950 medical vendor payment programs, 
Kerr-Mills, and, finally, Medicaid. 
The first couple of sections of this chapter begin with the enactment of Medicaid 
and then link back to FDR and the initiation of the Social Security Act (SSA).  
Eventually, Medicaid would be Title XIX of the SSA.  This chapter is intended to review 
Medicaid's precursor debates, and the policy bargains that shaped them.  Not a program 
that was developed suddenly.  The history behind how Medicaid evolved into being is 
important in explaining where we stand in 2007.  This chapter tells that story and 
introduces the next chapter which focuses on enactment. 
 
CONNECTING BACKWARDS:  
HOW CREATIVE FEDERALISM AND MEDICAID POLICY BARGAINING 
STEM FROM FDRS FIRST BIG BANG 
 
 Any study in political negotiation  and in this case a study of policy 
bargainingcertainly does well to begin with the Johnson Presidency.1  A giant in 
legislative bargaining, President Johnson urged his intended audience in a speech on the 
Federal Governments Relations With State and Local Government And The Private 
Sector, Perhaps you can help.  Dont just complain.  Develop better doctrine.  Tell my 
successor how it should be done.  Urge the universities to study these relationships 
systematically.  Get beyond rhetoric and examine the machinery by which the 
relationships are mediated.2  As President Johnson intimates, the entire policy system is 
mediated and the enactment of Medicaid is no different.  
 The enactment of Medicaid in 1965 is often reported in texts focusing on the 
enactment of Medicare.  Tied together in the first bill of the new Congress, it was a three-
pronged approach combining means-tested coverage for all age groups in Medicaid, 
social insurance for hospital care for those over 65 in what would eventually become 
                                                
1 A multitude of texts chronicle President Johnsons legendary legislative bargaining acumen.  For recent 
texts, see Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Master of The Senate (New York: Knopf, 2002) 
and also Randall B. Woods, LBJ Architect of American Ambition (New York: Free Press, 2006). 
2 Notes for Speech, Notes for Speech on the Federal Governments Relations With State and Local 
Government and the Private Sector, no date provided, Office Files of Harry McPherson: Creative 
Federalism, Box 55, Office Files of the White House Aides (hereafter OFWHA), LBJ Presidential Library 
(hereafter, LBJ PL), 8. 
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known as Medicare Part A, and voluntary supplemental coverage for those over 65 in 
Medicare Part B.  Many enactment accounts describe the linking of three different 
Medicare financing approaches into one final bill in March 1965 as a surprise.  The idea 
is often described as a work of legislative genius on the part of Wilbur Mills, but the 
record shows that combinations of legislation had been proposed before.  Possibly not, 
however, with the breadth of scope and coverage of the final enactment legislation.  
Medicaid is often described as a sleeper program.  It was not widely debated, as 
Medicare had been, viciously at times, since Truman scaled back his national health 
insurance proposals to limited coverage of only the elderly in 1952.  In fact, the vast 
majority of hearings and discussion prior to enactment targeted Medicare.  Medicaid was 
considered an expansion of Kerr-Mills or of cash welfare and comprised little of the pre-
enactment debate.  The link with cash welfare stemmed from the nominal payments to 
individuals for medical services that, in fact, were linked with income maintenance 
payments since the New Deal.  The Kerr-Mills program, enacted only five years earlier in 
1960, was a means-tested program for the elderly, with select care for the disabled and 
blind added in 1962.  Thus, in the White House papers at the time, Medicaid was referred 
to repeatedly as the Kerr-Mills Extension and is not systematically referred to by its 
own name until post-enactment. 
 
CREATIVE FEDERALISM 
 
Creative Federalism  the Johnson era brand of federalismespoused a 
combination of cooperative federalism among not just the various levels of government, 
but also with the private sector.  Much of the Administration directed legislation linked 
the national government directly with local governments, including the Economic 
Opportunity Act, the Model Cities Act, and the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act.3  As Johnson believed, the hope of the future lies in the creative interplay between 
                                                
3 Notes for Speech, Notes for Speech on the Federal Governments Relations With State and Local 
Government and the Private Sector, no date provided, Office Files of Harry McPherson: Creative 
Federalism, Box 55, OFWHA, LBJ PL, 6. 
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the Federal Government, State and local governments and the private sector- an interplay 
that preserves the autonomy of the non-federal elements.  We are faced with problems of 
great complexity and magnitude.  The resources of talent and energy and institutional 
strength to cope with those problems is widely dispersed throughout the various segments 
of our society.  When the nation is in need it is unthinkable that we would not find ways 
in which all segments could collaborate to move us toward a better future.4   
In this way, creative federalism insisted that not to use all forms of 
decentralization, including privatization, meant squandering scarce resources.  All points 
of influence  and thus all points of decision makingwere utilized to affect goals.  To 
not use these resources was to let go of bottled energy.  As one Administration document 
explained, A foreigner once described the United States as the greatest outburst of 
human energy the world had ever seen.  It is true that our kind of society is a great 
releaser of energy, and chiefly for two reasons, the driving effort to unshackle human 
potential and the tradition of dispersing power and initiative.5   
Creative federalism was infused with an ethic of community and of individual 
participation.  Johnson encouraged listeners, this is a self-governing society, and you 
too must be preoccupied with statecraft.  It should be exhilarating to you to know that our 
system is still evolving and that you can insure the healthy course of its evolution.6  
Citizens were called to be active participants in creative federalism.  Also, creative 
federalism was not talked about in simple dichotomies of decentralization versus 
centralization or cooperation versus competition, instead it was a fusion of these 
concepts.  The Congressional Record records Senator Muskie on March 25, 1966:  
Creative Federalism, as I see it, involves both cooperation and competition of ideas and 
performance between all levels of government, between Government and private 
                                                
4 Notes for Speech, Notes for Speech on the Federal Governments Relations With State and Local 
Government and the Private Sector, no date provided, Office Files of Harry McPherson: Creative 
Federalism, Box 55, OFWHA, LBJ PL, 8. 
5 Draft Speech, The Choices Before Us, 10/2/67, Office Files of Harry McPherson: Creative Federalism, 
Box 55, OFWHA, LBJ PL, 26. 
6 Notes for Speech, Notes for Speech on the Federal Governments Relations With State and Local 
Government and the Private Sector, no date provided, Office Files of Harry McPherson, Box 55, 
OFWHA, LBJ PL, 8. 
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organizations, and between individualsIts primary reliance is on joint effort, joint 
planning, and joint programs with State and local jurisdictions, rather than on direct 
federal action.  This is symbolized most vividly by the expansion of the grant-in-aid 
device in Great Society programs.7  Creative Federalism was shown particularly through 
use of grant-in-aid mechanisms that transferred funds from the federal to decentralized 
governments.  Medicaid, according to this reading then, was an expression of Creative 
Federalism, although it was modeled on the AFDC cash welfare model to which it had 
such close ties. 
Wilbur Cohen did not label Creative Federalism as a solely 1960s phenomenon 
that occurred in tandem with the Civil Rights and Great Society era alone.  According to 
Cohen,  
The great believer in creative federalism was Franklin D. Roosevelt, because 
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933 could have federalized or nationalized anything he 
wanted.  Theres no question that at the bottom of the depression if Franklin D. 
Roosevelt wanted to create all national banks, have a single national financial 
system, had wanted to have a national system of Social Security and health 
insurance, he could have gotten it.  I dont say it would be Constitutional, but the 
country was in such broken-down condition and the States and localities were so 
unable to do anything that the man who should get credit for creating federalism 
is Franklin D. Roosevelt.  Because by building upon federal grants and aid for 
Social Security, he opened the door to the whole federal-state relationship which 
is now so diverse and so embedded.  We would have a different political system 
today in my opinion if Franklin D. Roosevelt had made the decision to consider 
the states as sub-sovereignties of the federal government.  But having been 
governor of New York, he was sensitive to the use of the states; and although 
many of the people who opposed him politically in 1936 and 1940 thought of 
him as a great radical, both in his use of the federal-state system and his use of 
Social Security, he was the great conservator of creative federalism and the 
private economy and the role of the states in our political system.8   
 
Indeed, it was President Roosevelts New Deal that constructed a dichotomous 
American social policy system constructing a cash welfare system via the grant-in-aid 
mechanism on the one hand juxtaposed against a federal social insurance system for 
                                                
7 Congressional Record -- Senate (p 6500), The Challenge of Creative Federalism, I. Intergovernmental 
Relations: What It Is About, March 25, 1966, FG 604 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations (2 of 2), Box 369, EX FG 600/Task Force/Urban Problems, WHCF, LBJ PL. 
8 Transcript, Wilbur J. Cohen Oral History Interview, December 8, 1968, by David G. McComb, Tape #1, 
Oral History Collection, LBJ PL, 22 - 23.  
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retirement, commonly referred to as Social Security.  The remainder of this chapter will 
connect the first big bang in American Social Policy, FDRs New Deal, to the Great 
Society that birthed Medicaid. 
 
HEALTH INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR FORMATION: FDR, WORLD WAR II, 
AND THE NEW DEAL 
 
In 1934 The Committee on Economic Security suggested that a study be 
conducted on the practicability of national health insurance.  According to the 
Committees staff director, Edwin Witte, that little line was responsible for so many 
telegrams to the members of Congress that the entire Social Security program seemed 
endangered.9  A comprehensive health financing measure was not included in the Social 
Security Act.   
Although not discussed as a major provision of the New Deal, there were nominal 
health payments for medical care made through the public assistance programs of the 
Social Security Act.  While there was no provision for Federal matching of costs of 
medical care as such, such costs could be included in the maintenance payments to an 
individual or family.10  If the cost of needed medical care was included in a recipients 
payment, the amount was matchable from Federal funds in the same way as costs for 
food and shelter.  The individuals total payment was subject to State and Federal 
matching maximums per month per recipient.11  From the enactment of the Social 
Security Act, health related payments were a Federal-State joint endeavor.  Also, medical 
payments were not independent and separate as a social need.  Instead, they were 
subsidiary and enveloped within cash welfare.  The federal cost sharing for these nominal 
                                                
9 Newsarticle, Folder: Printed Material; Box Number 4, Personal Papers of Wilbur J. Cohen, LBJ PL.  
Originally cited as Richard Harris, Annals of Legislation, Medicare, 1 ~ All Very Hegelian, The New 
Yorker, July 2, 1966, 31. 
10 U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, History and Evolution of Medicaid, Chap. 1 in 
Medicaid Lessons for National Health Insurance, Allen D. Spiegel and Simon Podair (eds.) (Rockville, 
Maryland: Aspens Systems, 1975), 5.  
11 U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, History and Evolution of Medicaid, Chap. 1 in 
Medicaid Lessons for National Health Insurance, Allen D. Spiegel and Simon Podair (eds.)  (Rockville, 
Maryland: Aspens Systems, 1975), 5. 
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payments were increased in 1939, 1946, and 1948, but remained limited and, of course, 
the care varied widely in nature and scope from state to state.12 
In 1935, President Roosevelt appointed an Interdepartmental Committee to 
Coordinate Health and Welfare Activities, and in 1938, its report entitled A National 
Health Program, was presented to a Presidential sponsored National Health Conference.  
The report recommended federal health insurance, and, over the animated opposition to 
the AMAs representative at the meeting, it was endorsed by the conferees.13  On 
February 28, 1939, Senator Robert F. Wagner, Sr. of North Carolina introduced the first 
of what would be many bills translating the conferences report into a National Health 
Bill.14   
The Senate trio Wagner-Murray-Dingell proposed many versions of the national 
health provision bills over several years.  The 1939 version was organized around state-
operated health and welfare services, whereas a 1943 version relied much more heavily 
on the federal government.15  Monte Poen, who chronicled Medicares Truman years, 
argues that the experience of the second World War solidified the increased acceptance 
of federal initiative in social and health programs.  Connecting the war effort with these 
initiatives Senator Wagner quipped in 1944, We could not win this war with 48 state 
commanders; we cannot win the peace with 48 separate economic programs.16  World 
War II, while separate from the social policy penumbra, combined with The Great 
Depression to change the acceptability of federal government involvement in domestic 
affairs.  Labor in some cases came to support the federalization trend, while it is not clear 
whether this was an additional cause of or an effect of increased federal involvement.  At 
the same time, they utilized collective bargaining increasingly to attain benefits for 
                                                
12 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), Intergovernmental Problems in 
Medicaid, Commission Report A-33, (Washington, D.C.: ACIR, September 1968), 4. 
13 Newsarticle, Folder: Printed Material; Box Number 4, Personal Papers of Wilbur J. Cohen, LBJ PL.  
Originally cited as Richard Harris, Annals of Legislation, Medicare, 1 ~ All Very Hegelian, The New 
Yorker, July 2, 1966, 38. 
14 Newsarticle, Folder: Printed Material; Box Number 4, Personal Papers of Wilbur J. Cohen, LBJ PL.  
Originally cited as Richard Harris, Annals of Legislation, Medicare, 1 ~ All Very Hegelian, The New 
Yorker, July 2, 1966, 38. 
15 Monte M. Poen, Harry S. Truman Versus the Medical Lobby: The Genesis of Medicare.  (Columbia, 
Missouri: University of Missouri, 32. (Hereafter Poen, Harry S. Truman). 
16 Poen, Harry S. Truman, 33. 
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workers and their families.  Also, post-1937 Supreme Court decisions supported the 
federalization trend, as well.17   
There is, however, an altogether different reading of the effect of World War II on 
the health financing area.  This reading suggests that social insurance as a method of 
financing full health coverage was successfully linked by opponents of social insurance 
to Germany during this time period.  Since Bismarck adopted social insurance to finance 
health in the late 1800s, social insurance as a financing mechanism for health insurance 
was  these opponents maintainedGerman.  While the overall trend during this time 
period was toward greater federal involvement, specifics about this involvement  from 
financing mechanisms to potential populations to be coveredwere being successfully 
manipulated in the public opinion arena.  The term socialized medicine was coined by 
opponents of broad coverage solutions and repeatedly used to entrap proponents of 
comprehensive rights-based health coverage.  The socialized medicine trap was set 
particularly to ensnare proposals where the federal government  as opposed to state and 
local governments  had a greater role in either financing or administration. 
The federalism debate, then, became infused with a fear of loss of control.  
Federalism questions are not often fought along the lines of What is the best level of 
government to finance or run the program? but instead about What level of government 
and which group of people will control the program?  In the end, in many policy areas 
there is evidence supporting each level of governments claim (or lack of a claim, as the 
case may be) for organizing various components or functions on that level.  So, the policy 
evidence, if needed, can be produced to support the claims of all sides of the policy 
debate.  The issue, then, becomes how the policy evolution unfolds.  If states, or 
alternatively localities, take responsibility for the program, this primarily means that their 
own strengths, weaknesses, values, beliefs, customs, mores, and web of power 
relationships will come into play during major program related decisions.  Whether or not 
this is a good thing, depends on what one believes about a states or localitys values, 
beliefs, and web of relationships.  There will be winners and losers in the program 
                                                
17 Poen, Harry S. Truman, 32. 
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decisions.  Depending on ones place, you may prefer that the federal, state, or local 
government make the choices that you are going to live with.  
 
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE, MEDICAL VENDOR PAYMENTS, AND 
THEIR INTERACTION WITH CIVIL RIGHTS DURING TRUMANS 
PRESIDENCY 
 
During Trumans Presidency, entrenched interests were committed to ensuring 
some level of control over any future health program.  At this time, the American Dental 
Association, the American Pharmaceutical Association, Blue Cross-Blue Shield 
commissions, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the American Legion, the Farm Bureau 
Federation, the National Grange, the Health Insurance Council, and the Health and 
Accident Underwriters Conference joined the AMA against an overarching government 
framework in health.18  Some of these interests believed that they would be better able to 
influence the program at more decentralized levels of government.  A policy dialectic in 
health policy reform re-appeared.  The Wagner-Murray-Dingell bills were pitted 
consistently against an altogether different paradigm for addressing health care financing.  
In 1947 --again in 1949 -- the Taft proposals19 stood as alternatives to the Wagner-
Murray-Dingell approach.  In 1947 Taft joined with other Republicans for their own 
National Health Bill.20  It offered a medical welfare system for the nations indigent that 
would be financed through federal grants and administered entirely by the participating 
states.21  A primary argument against the Taft model of national health reform was 
voiced by Senator Wagner: Adequate medical services on the basis of need, not ability 
to pay, is the birthright of every American It is a matter of right, not charity.22  The 
policy dialectic was set: Rights-Based Wagner Democrats versus Indigent-Only Charity 
Taft Republicans. 
                                                
18 Margaret Greenfield, Health Insurance for the Aged: The 1965 Program for Medicare, Its History and a 
Summary of Other Provisions of P.L. 89-97 (University of California, Berkeley: Institute of Governmental 
Studies, January 1966), 110. 
19 The Taft Bills are often referred to as the earliest precursors of what eventually would be the Medicaid 
program. 
20 S. 545, 80th Congress, 1rst Session. 
21 Poen, Harry S. Truman, 96. 
22 Poen, Harry S. Truman, 97. 
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Leading up to the 1948 re-election campaign the Truman administration 
considered compromise, in the form of a catastrophic health plan, in order to bring 
conservative Southern Democrats on-board for the re-election bid.23  The hard-line on 
comprehensive, rights-based health insurance was unpopular with this segment of the 
party.   The Civil Rights debate proved more divisive.  A parallel policy issue, in the 
sense that its progression was co-evolving along with health reform, their two separate 
tracks criss-crossed and coalitions against Civil Rights greatly resembled the coalitions 
against national health reform.  The anti-union, anti-urban, voting element that lined 
up almost to a man with the Republicans to block floor action on the Wagner-Murray-
Dingell bills,24 also opposed civil rights advances.  After Truman narrowly won re-
election, the Congress returned bitterly divided.  In 1949, even though several health 
reform plans were presented, only one was enacted, an expansion of the Hill-Burton Act 
of 1946.25  Given the AMAs derision of federal intervention in medicine, it is ironic that 
thousands of physicians benefited from the infusion of federal dollars into the 
construction and expansion of hospitals nation-wide through Hill-Burton and its 
subsequent expansions.26 
The next year in 1950, the first major revision of the Social Security Act since 
1939 unfolded, after a year and a half of Congressional compromise and debate.  Old age 
and survivors insurance coverage was expanded to include about 10 million additional 
workers, and OASI payments were increased by an average of 80 percent.27  A provision 
to expand OASI to include individuals who were disabled was defeated, in part due to 
concerted efforts by the American Medical Association which claimed that to initiate a 
                                                
23 Poen, Harry S. Truman, 227. 
24 Poen, Harry S. Truman, 225. 
25 The Hill-Burton Act of 1946.  Grants were added for research on hospital utilization in 1949; for 
construction of nursing homes, diagnostic and treatment centers, rehabilitation and chronic disease facilities 
(1954); to give hospitals the option of accepting a long-term loan instead of a grant (1958); for constructing 
out-of-hospital community health facilities (1961); for hospital modernization; and for urban services 
developed through regional, metropolitan, or local area plans (1964).  For more information see Rosemary 
Stevens, American Medicine and The Public Interest (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 
1998), 510.  (Hereafter Stevens, American Medicine.) 
26 Newsarticle, Folder: Printed Material; Box Number 4, Personal Papers of Wilbur J. Cohen, LBJ PL.  
Originally cited as Richard Harris, Annals of Legislation, Medicare III ~ We Do Not Compromise, The 
New Yorker, July 16, 1966, 68. 
27 Poen, Harry S. Truman, 185.   
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Federal disability program would represent another step toward wholesale nationalization 
of medical care and the socialization of the practice of medicine.28   
In terms of the future Medicaid program, the particularly vital reform from the 
1950 SSA Amendments was the creation of a medical vendor payment program for 
public assistance recipients that had federal financial support.  A State could submit a 
plan for making vendor payments on behalf of recipients of assistance under one or more 
of the Federal-State public assistance programs for a content of care defined by the 
State.29  This action foretold the future Medicaid program which would be a vendor 
payment program.  The issue of whether to make payments directly to needy individuals 
or only to providers would, in the future, be another contested policy issue with 
significant ramifications. 
While the particulars of these OASI and medical vendor payment provisions were 
being solidified, the national health financing debate co-evolved.  President Truman was 
unable to mobilize on national health reform as the conflict in Korea erupted.  Again, as it 
had after World War II, the pressures of war contributed to the downsizing of efforts to 
enact health reform.  In the policy prioritization scheme of a President, war always 
trumps health care institutional structural reform.  This did not stop the President from 
using failure of national health insurance in the election politics of the 1950 
Congressional races.30  In doing so, he, possibly inadvertently, sacrificed the policy itself 
in the hopes of political gain.  By using the inability to attain health reform to accuse 
Republicans politically, the policy issue itself diminished further.  The emphasis on its 
failure made it less likely to become policy reality.  More directly, the Democratic party 
suffered losses in candidates who had emphasized health reform during the 1950 
campaign.  The Party distanced itself from the comprehensive version of the Truman 
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health plan after these results.31  The AMA sharply reduced its lobbying budget to fight 
Trumans health insurance initiatives given the dimming light of comprehensive 
reform.32   
By 1952, with another Presidential election politics again in play, Truman batted 
along party lines by establishing a Commission to Study the health reform issue.  While 
the Commission helped clarify the policy issue, as well, interim reports were produced 
that the Administration hoped would cast Republicans in poor light.33  The U.S. 
Presidents Commission on the Health Needs of the Nation in 1952, also known as The 
Magnuson Commission, concurred with the President that there was a need for greater 
federal government involvement in health.  The proposed solution differed, however, 
from Trumans insistence on national health insurance.  Instead the Commission  called 
for a cooperative federal-state program wherein each state would establish its own health 
insurance plan (subject to the approval of a federal agency) with federal matching funds 
providing the payments for those who could not afford the premiums.34   
This proposal was seen as clearly between the Wagner and Taft proposals.  Once 
again, when the country looked for a consensus on the macro national health policy 
debate, a dialectic formed and the solution was somewhere in the middle of the two 
opposing proposals.  Shortly before Truman left office, he accepted the compromise 
position put forth by the Commission.  Acceptance of this compromise strategy was a 
vital point in the evolution of the federal role in American Medicine.  With the election 
results settled, this action was important on many levels.  It is a notable event when a 
President, having held so tightly to a policy position of federally funded comprehensive 
coverage as a matter of right, finally formally accepts a compromise solution.  It is 
symbolic in that there is a realization that the ideal will not  or cannot  be achieved in 
the current political climate.  The Commander in Chief sends the official signal that a 
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lesser option is acceptable.  Also, given that a primary premise behind Trumans original 
position was that health care was a right, any compromise seemed to lessen what had 
been presented as a principle, or truth, that could not be subdivided into lots and traded as 
bargaining chips.  If health care is a right, then how can a right be compromised? 
Looking back, shortly before FDRs death, he enunciated the Economic Bill of 
Rights demanding a basic health package for all Americans.  President Truman had 
accepted the mantle and was a leader of the national health insurance effort.  Now, post-
election on January 9, he compromised  not in a re-election ploy, as in 1948, but with 
the election settled and just the future role of a citizen ahead.  In his last health-related 
transmittal to Congress he  conceded that its proposal to give federal grants-in-aid to 
establish private, state-sponsored plans was probably the best solution to the nations 
health needs.35  The future would tell if this compromise was a beneficial recalibration 
or a deleterious concession. 
 
THE EISENHOWER ERA: KERR-MILLS, CATASTROPHIC CARE 
PROPOSALS, FAITH IN STATES, AND HEALTH PROVISION AND THE 
PRICE OF FREEDOM 
 
During the 1952 Presidential campaign, future President Eisenhower had 
maintained that government should provide only indigent medical care.36  In many 
respects the AMA enjoyed entrée to the White House during this time period.  In 1956, 
against the AMAs strident resistance, the Democratic-controlled Congress added 
disability for those 50 and older to Social Security.  This was the first contact of a semi-
medically related area with social insurance in any significant way.37  In 1956, 1958, and 
again in 1960 the federal payments in the state-run medical vendor system were 
expanded.  At this time, the interests that benefited from publicly sponsored care began to 
assert themselves separately from those interest groups that did better in a privately 
sponsored model.  For example, in 1955 an American Hospital Association Commission 
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determined, It does not seem likely that voluntary prepayment can on any broad scale 
cover such groups as the nonworking aged, the unemployed, or the low income groups 
without assistance from government.  Another interest, the American Nurses 
Association, in 1958 supported a Medicare-type model.   
President Eisenhowers Administration continued to look for ways that the federal 
government could assist private enterprise in the health area.  The Administration 
believed that privately financed care was the optimal solution to the nations health 
needs.  The federalism question was posed in terms of What is the role of the federal 
government in assisting private insurance companies to expand coverage?  Previously, 
legislation was proposed for the federal government to purchase private health insurance 
for citizens.  In 1949, this had been a leading source of debate and counter debate.38  In 
1954, Eisenhower proposed a reinsurance plan to protect private health insurance 
companies from abnormal losses, thereby enabling them to broaden their benefits and 
coverage.39  Two years later the Administration devised a plan for relaxation of the 
antitrust laws to permit insurance companies to pool their resources and efforts in order to 
extend coverage.40  Both proposals were easily defeated. 
In response to the reinsurance plans defeat, Eisenhower was prophetic, There is 
nothing to be gained by shutting our eyes to the fact that all of our people are not getting 
the kind of medical care to which they are entitled.  I do not believe there is any use in 
shutting our eyes to the fact that the American people are going to get that medical care 
in some form or other.41  Interestingly, Eisenhower invoked the concept of entitlement, 
even though his preferences were towards privately sponsored care for the majority and 
state-sponsored care only for the indigent, preferably with a key role for states.   
The insurance industry had been noncommittal to the 1954 reinsurance proposal 
and the AMA flatly opposed it.  Even this measure was dubbed to be the opening wedge 
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tosocialized medicine.42  By taking such a scorched earth stance on this relatively 
mild provision, organized medicine drew a line in the sand that later became untenable.   
 
The Emergence of Aging As Its Own Distinct Policy Force 
 
While it may well be described as a paradigm shift, the importance of the issue of 
aging at this time may also be described as a resurgence.  During the Ham and Eggs era 
several social movements including the Bonus Marchers, the Townsend Movement, and 
the Epic Campaign advocated pension and other types of reforms.43  National attention 
was focused on this aging demographic as a political force.  In the middle of the 
Eisenhower area, the evolution of aging as its own distinct area of interdisciplinary and 
interrelated concerns was well established.  Eisenhower established the Federal Council 
on Aging in 1956.  In the health area, there was a surfacing of discussions for an only 
over 65 health plan that had taken place in the Federal Security Agency since at least 
1950.  AFL-CIO prioritized health insurance for retired persons that year as their primary 
objective.44   
The momentum behind some federal action in the health area  particularly for 
those over 65-- pushed into the 1960 Presidential election campaign, but there was still a 
void to be filled.  No iterative measures had been accepted by organized medicine; no 
fence had yet been constructed.   The Democrats, also, had not yet struck any deals and 
so, the future of American health financing reform, was still wide open.  
 
Election Politics and The Kerr Mills Compromise 
 
With a void needing to be filled regarding the federal role in health provision and 
the AFL-CIO on a mission to design an over 65 health care package, the bill that 
eventually led to Medicare was first prepared.  Wilbur Cohen and Isidore Falk wrote the 
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bill, the AFL-CIO sponsored it, and Ways and Means committee member Aime Forand 
of Rhode Island was convinced to sponsor what would become known as the Forand bill.   
The American Dental Association, the American Hospital Association, and the 
American Nursing Homes Association joined with the AMA in a highly publicized series 
of arguments against the measure.  Particularly involved were state and county medical 
societies, which arranged debates and panel discussions, in what became an orchestrated 
version of participatory democracy  the special interest sponsored variety.  To call this 
participatory democracy, though, may be a stretch.  Reports of intimidation, threats, and 
propaganda surfaced, resulting in embarrassment and sometimes anger when members of 
Congress were apprised.45   
The strategy though resulted in a few difficult policy lessons.  First, encouraging 
participation by citizens may result in them deciding that they are for a proposal that 
the events were designed to make them against.  Sometimes people do not think or do 
as they are told  especially in the face of coercion.  Finally, once a debate is put into 
play, the originator cannot always control where the path of the reform ends up.  
Congressman Forand commented, I want to pay tribute to the AMA for the great 
assistance they have given me in publicizing this bill of mine.They have done more 
than I ever could have done.46  
As the 1960 Presidential election neared, health politics was once again a 
determining factor.  The missile gap, Castro, and the Cuban people were more dramatic 
election issues, but once Democratic Candidate John F. Kennedy gave a fiery speech at 
the State Fair Grounds in Detroit embracing the Forand proposal in March, the Medicare 
die was cast.47  Edward T. Chase wrote, The determination of our next President may be 
                                                
45 Newsarticle, Folder: Printed Material; Box Number 4, Personal Papers of Wilbur J. Cohen, LBJ PL.  
Originally cited as Richard Harris, Annals of Legislation, Medicare II ~ More Than A Lot of Statistics, 
The New Yorker, July 9, 1966, 64. 
46 Sundquist, Politics and Policy, 298 - 299. 
47 Later, it was revealed that Kennedy aides had been working with Wilbur Cohen on Medicare as an 
election issue since at least 1958.  Cohen helped Kennedy with a cadre of issues including aid to dependent 
children and unemployment insurance reforms.  For more, see Sheri I. David, With Dignity: The Search for 
Medicare and Medicaid (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985), 20.   
  74
profoundly affected by the debate.48  On March 31, the Ways and Means Committee 
voted 17-8 against the Forand proposal.  The bills momentum was not stopped by this 
set-back.  
After a series of pleadings from the Republican candidate Richard Nixon, the 
Eisenhower Administration finally proposed a counter bill.  In many ways more 
comprehensive than Forand, the Administration proposal was based on matching grants 
from federal and state governments to be used to subsidize insurance policies for the 
elderly poor that would actually be written by commercial carriers.49  Large deductibles 
and copayments would be required.   
The New Yorker reported that the bill had few supporters, Governor Rockefeller 
said that it was fiscally irresponsible and cumbersome to administer; the A.F.L  C.I.O. 
said that it was hopeless on every score; the A.M.A. denounced it as government 
interference; Senator Goldwater called it socialized medicine; and Vice President Nixon 
declined to comment on it at all.  The President, on the other hand, stood up for the 
measure.  Eisenhower had to defend his proposal because it was more expensive: I am 
against compulsory medicine and that is exactly what I am against, and I dont care if that 
does cost the Treasury a little bit more money thereBut after all, the price of freedom is 
not always measured just in dollars.50 
In this argument, President Eisenhower, invokes a liberty argument in support of a 
joint federal-state program.  While Democrats entitlement based arguments supported a 
greater federal role and the use of social insurance, the Republican President equated 
freedom, justice, rights, entitlement to both federal and state governments enabling the 
private sector.  Government directed care was to be used as a back-stop measure for the 
indigent.  Also, the Republican measure was more comprehensive and more costly, both 
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in contrast to traditional notions of fiscal conservatism.  Another striking product of this 
Republican proposal was that the Party went on record with a federal health plan.  A 
principled stand against all federal plans was no longer viable given that they were now 
on the record in support of one.  In terms of bargaining, this moved the Republicans 
further into a viable range of compromise with the Democrats.  Long poles apart on this 
issue, the Eisenhower plan moved their minimum acceptable point of negotiation much 
closer to that of the Democrats minimum negotiable point.  A resolution to years of 
debate on the topic seemed much more likely. 
On June 3, the Ways and Means Committee again rejected the Forand proposal, 
17-8.  Chairman Mills, with his own Arkansas re-election politics and powerful state 
medical lobby in mind, then proposed another measure to extend the Old Age Assistance 
program so that the federal government could make unlimited matching grants to states 
for medical care specifically targeted at the elderly poor.  The proposal maintained a 
great deal of state flexibility.  The Mills Bill passed the Ways and Means Committee and 
easily received full House approval three weeks later. 51   On the Senate side, Senator 
Kerr of Oklahoma called Wilbur Cohen at The University of Michigan.  While Cohen 
had helped design the Forand proposal, he had not written the Mills bill.  Senator Kerr 
invited Cohen to design a counter to the Mills plan.  This proposition apparently 
presented no conflict of interest in the Social Security experts mind.  He later told an 
interviewer, 
 
Then during that time Senator Kerr called upon me to help him with the 
formulation of the Kerr-Mills Bill.  While I was doing that, I would go around 
and see Sorenson [John F. Kennedys aide] and tell him that while I was working 
with Kerr, that was only one aspect to my interest --- I was equally concerned 
about Medicare.  Now at that time most people felt the Kerr-Mills was the 
substitute for Medicare.  It was my position that you ought to have both of them.  
And I was the only one who believed that.  I finally sold both Kennedy and Kerr 
that position.52 
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Senator Kerrs final plan was designed with his own re-election campaign in 
mind.  According to a Kerr biographer, his health reform alternative to Presidential 
Candidate Kennedy was intended to distance himself from the Democratic Catholic since 
Kerr was running in a state of Baptist and Methodist voters.53  He also asked Cohen to 
defer to his state of Oklahoma during the drafting of the bill.  The end result was, in fact, 
very favorable to both Oklahoma and Mills beloved Arkansas. 
During the progression of the eventual compromise in the form of Kerr-Mills, 
several additional plans were put forward.  In addition to the Forand and the 
Administrations bill, which was sometimes referred to as the Flemming Plan, ten other 
essentially similar bills were introduced; more notable proposals included the Kennedy-
Anderson bill, The McNamara bill, and the Javits bill (a modification of the 
Administrations bill to subsidize private insurance policies).54  The threat of a Social 
Security based health care bill apparently became real enough to opponents that the AMA 
placed a full-page add in several city papers urging the Senate to pass the Mills bill.55  
This was ironic given that Kerr met with AMA officials only weeks before and they were 
still citing reports that there was no need for federal involvement in health care for the 
aged.  On August 23, the Kennedy-Anderson bill failed after a notable effort by Vice 
President Nixon to gather votes so that its passage and subsequent Eisenhower veto 
would not be a major campaign issue.  Kerrs bill passed the Senate easily, 91  2.56  Two 
days later the conference committee accepted the Kerr bill almost intact.  In mid-
September, President Eisenhower signed Kerr-Mills into law.  For the time being, the 
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social insurance method of financing health was trumped by a matching grant program.  
Kerr-Mills was the precursor to Medicaid and Medicare.  The future programs would 
each share characteristics of Kerr-Mills. 
 
Kerr-Mills Enactment and The Policy Choice of an Open Matching Grant 
 
In the Kerr-Mills enactment, the choice of a matching grant financing method was 
a very important policy choice and one rooted in political, not just policy, maneuvering.  
On the policy issue, there was a measure of genuine concern by both Mills and Kerr 
regarding the financial soundness in the long-term of social insurance financing for 
health.  At that time, the health program was considered an add-on to Social Security and 
the financing structure would be achieved through an increase of the Social Security tax.  
Arguably, the decision for a matching grant form of financing for Kerr-Mills was largely 
political.  The federal-state relationship and matching grant format was established due to 
four primary factors:  
1) Political Expediency  Senator Kerr and Congressman Mills could get it through 
Congress and still win re-election in their home states.  Grant-in-aid programs are 
generally politically popular because federal funds are transferred to the states. 
2) Potential for state wind falls -- A grant-in-aid program provides at least the 
possibility that previously state-only costs can now, in part, be transferred to the 
federal government.  Also Kerr and Mills had the legislation designed in a way 
that was favorable to Oklahoma and Arkansas;  
3) Powerful interests were pacified -- Powerful interests were pacified by the 
prospect of a federal  state arrangement due to their ability to influence state and 
local decision makers more so than national ones.  In many respects, this desire 
for state control stemmed from fears that restrictive payment systems would be 
designed by the federal government; and  
4) History and precedence  Kerr-Mills was an expansion of the public assistance 
medical vendor payment programs.  These were an expansion of nominal medical 
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payments through the federal-state public assistance programs, an arrangement 
introduced in the New-Deal. 
 
These factors combined with the fact that Kerr-Mills was in many ways an 
expansion of the medical vendor payment system and not a new reform, so that Kerr-
Mills easily passed Congress.  Wilbur Cohen, who was the architect of this legislation, 
was very well aware of the federal-state role in public assistance programs and how 
nominal medical payments were first provided through these programs in 1936.  Having 
played a role in social policy development since the New Deal, the 1950 creation of the 
medical vendor payment system through the public assistance programs was intimately 
familiar to him.  Medical vendor payments were expanded in 1956 and 1958.  Cohens 
philosophy in social policy development was in his own words one of gradualism, taking 
what you can get, adding on a piece at a time.  In short, Time magazine called him the 
salami slicer.57  Cohen commented, in a biography of his life, that this reflected his 
view of the evolution of social legislation; to take a bit and a time and digest it.58  
While some accounts of Kerr-Mills enactment highlighted the positive aspects of 
the potential of the program, other news accounts report that no one was truly happy with 
it.  In a classic review of the politics leading up to Medicaids enactment, Robert and 
Rosemary Stevens concluded that the federal role in the program benefited many players: 
Kerr-Mills was perhaps less a means of increasing aid to the elderly than it was a means 
for shifting the burden of that aid from others to the federal government.  The many 
counties in the United States subsidizing medical relief could look upon Kerr-Mills as a 
golden egg of additional state support; hospitals and doctors could view it as a means of 
reducing their own private charitable contributions to medical care to the indigent by its 
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introduction of more realistic fees for welfare patients who were elderly; and the states 
had the pleasant prospect of expanded federal funding.59 The New York Times reported a 
critics observation that it would do more to relieve the county hospitals of their charity 
cases then to help the elderly.60   
On the other hand, the Wall Street Journal quoted a government official, 
Congress couldnt reconcile its conflicting viewpoints, so it passed the buck to the 
states.61  From one perspective, the ability to transfer costs to the federal government 
appeared to benefit the states, but from another, responsibility was dumped onto the 
states.  The back and forth of Medicaid federalism was taking its first steps. 
 
Kerr Mills State Directed Implementation 
 
For all the back and forth regarding who won and who lost from Kerr-Mills, all 
players were remarkably drab about its implementation.  By the time Eisenhower left 
office, only five states had programs in operation.62  The specifics about the program, 
however, strongly foreshadowed the eventual Medicaid program.  Of particular 
importance, was the creation of the Medical Aged Assistance (MAA) category.  The 
MAA classification established a concept of medical indigence that allowed for 
medical assistance eligibility if an elderly persons medical bills were sufficiently high in 
view of their income.  The MAA provision was new, created by Cohen and Kerr for this 
legislation.  In existence before the 1960 legislation, the OAA medical vendor payment 
programs federal share was increased by the Kerr-Mills legislation.63 
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The MAA matching rate was more generous to states than that of OAA, and states 
transferred many of their aged to the MAA category.64  Even in this early version of the 
program, the joint federal-state structure translated into gaming, cost shifting, and fiscal 
substitution by states.  In 1962, MAA was expanded to the over aged 21 blind and 
disabled persons whose medical bills were prohibitively high and whose incomes could 
not support these high medical payments.65  The MAA program created the medically 
needy grouping.  While the MAA was comprised of individuals not eligible for public 
assistance, it was run by state welfare agencies66 and, at the federal administrative level, 
Kerr-Mills was administered by the Bureau of Public Assistance, the federal welfare 
agency.  The signals from federal and state government was that this was a welfare 
program, through and through. 
The federal requirements on the states were sparse, and during implementation 
states made the majority of the decisions.  The first decision completely up to the states 
was whether or not to participate at all.  By the end of 1962, 28 states had MAA 
programs.67  One claim was that the wealthy states were shifting costs they were already 
paying onto the Federal Government.  During Ways and Means Hearings Congressman 
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Burke stated that seven states comprised 90% of federal funds.68  Another source claimed 
that as few as three states  New York, California, and Michigan -- were receiving 90% 
of the federal funds.69   While the exact data differ, the take-away point is that a majority 
of federal Kerr-Mills funds were generated by very few states investment. 
Poor states could not afford to participate, even with a generous federal match. 
While Georgia in 1961 and Mississippi in 1964 authorized programs, state money was 
never appropriated to operationalize the program.  Even with a match of as much as 80%, 
this did not change the fact that states had to ante their own funds in order to receive any 
federal money at all.  It was not a federal give away.  Many states found it difficult to 
generate federal support because they had to first contribute themselves.  In House Ways 
and Means Committee Hearings, Governor Edmund Brown from a wealthy state, 
California, commented that extending MAA into a comprehensive program would 
bankrupt the State and county governments.70  This evidence provided mixed evidence 
about the degree to which Kerr-Mills was buck passing by the feds or an opportunity 
for cost shifting by the states. 
The states were far from happy with the arrangement.  Prior to enactment, at a 
Governors conference, 30-11 had voted for the social insurance financing method over a 
                                                
68 U.S. House of Representatives, Box No. Y6493, RG 287, Publication of the Federal Government 
(Congress: Committees of Congress) House.  Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, Eighty-
Eighth Congress, First and Second Sessions on H.R. 3920, November 19, 1963, Center for Legislative 
Archives, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter CLA/NA). 
69 Newsarticle, Folder: Printed Material; Box Number 4, Personal Papers of Wilbur J. Cohen, LBJ PL.  
Originally cited as Richard Harris, Annals of Legislation, Medicare III ~ We Do Not Compromise, The 
New Yorker, July 16, 1966, 59.  Still a third source, Stevens, Welfare Medicine, 33, claimed that five states 
 New York, California, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania  with 31 percent of the countrys 
aged, received 62% of federal MAA monies.  The source for this figure is Testimony of Wilbur Cohen, 
Senate, U.S. Congress, Social Security, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on H.R. 6675, 
89th Congress, 1rst Session, 1965, 166 from the CLA/NA, Washington, D.C..  A fourth source from the 
House of Representatives, Box No. Y6493, RG 287, Publication of the Federal Government (Congress: 
Committees of Congress) House Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, Eighty-Eighth 
Congress, First and Second Sessions on H.R. 3920, November 19, 1963, CLA/NA. Testimony by HEW 
Secretary Celebrezze For example, 73 percent of the funds expended in September 1963 under MAA went 
to just five States  five of the industrialized, financially better off States which have within their borders 
only 33 percent of the Nations aged population. 
70 House of Representatives, U.S. Congress, Committee on Ways and Means, Medical Care for the Aged, 
Hearings, 88th Congress, 1rst and 2nd Session, 1963  64, p. 31, CLA/NA.  Also, Stevens, Welfare 
Medicine, 34. 
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grant-in-aid program.71  Many states implemented programs very slowly, if at all.  In the 
final analysis, Kerr-Mills differentially affected states primarily depending on a states 
fiscal capacity.  States did not necessarily consider themselves winners from the Kerr-
Mills arrangement.  Also, Republicans did not consider Kerr-Mills an achievement.  
Nixon thought it most inadequate.72 
 
THE KING-ANDERSON PROPOSAL, NOW DEFINED IN TERMS OF KERR-
MILLS 
 
In 1961, President Kennedy continued to pursue King-Anderson, a social 
insurance approach to addressing the health needs of the aged.  In the meantime, in cash 
welfare developments, the Public Welfare Amendments of 1962 authorized waivers of 
federal requirements for public assistance experiment or demonstration projects.  
According to an overview by Cohen and Ball, 
 
Congress recognized the need for the development of new methods and for 
experimentation to better meet the complex and social and economic problems in 
the public assistance programs.  Accordingly, it authorized the Secretary to waive 
any of the requirements from State plans in States that desire to carry on an 
experimental, pilot, or demonstration project likely to assist in promoting the 
objectives of the programs.73 
 
A monumental development that received little fanfare, waivers of federal 
requirements in the future Medicaid program would later provide a major wrinkle to 
Medicaid federalism.  With regard to policy bargaining, in the continuing King-Anderson 
debates on Capitol Hill, instead of the void that existed during the Truman and 
Eisenhower era national health debates, the void was filled with Kerr-Mills.  Instead of 
                                                
71 Sundquist, Politics and Policy, 305. 
72 Eugene Feingold, Medicare: Policy and Politics (San Francisco, CA: Chandler, 1966), 113. (Hereafter, 
Feingold, Medicare) 
73 Bulletin, Wilbur J. Cohen and Robert M. Ball, Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Oct. 1962, Folder 
Title: Volume I, Part XVII, Social and Rehabilitation Service (1 of 2), Box No. 9, Administrative History 
Collection, LBJ PL.  From section, Waiver of State Plan Requirements for Demonstration Projects, 13.  
Reprinted from the Social Security Bulletin, October 1962, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare, Social Security Administration, 3 - 16. 
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King-Anderson being debated as a program absent any other, it was debated in 
comparison to Kerr-Mills.  In November 1963 the questioning in a House Ways and 
Means Committee Hearing between HEW Under-Secretary Nestingen and Congressman 
Collier eventually turned to Kerr-Mills: 
 
Mr. Collier: I realize there is a basic limitation in the expenditure of tax funds, be it 
at the city, county, State, or Federal level, but here we are dealing with a problem that 
we regard as a priority problem.  Therefore, if it is a priority problem and I am 
prepared to say that it is in many cases, then it would seem to me that the fund 
problem should be treated on the basis of the priority that it demands. 
 
Nestingen: I might say, Mr. Collier, inherent in the problem of helping to assure 
adequate coverage for health costs of the aged through the Kerr-Mills legislation is 
some thing you have touched on inferentially that merits commentThere is priority 
on this particular problem in varying degrees in varying parts of the country. In some 
States they say, We dont need Kerr-Mills.  We will handle it through the vendor 
payments of OAA.  In other States they say they will take care of it by MAA on a 
more limited basis as compared to other States.  In addition to that you have the 
problem of biennial sessions of the legislature and competing pressures for use of 
funds each time a legislature meetsYou find a varying composition of the 
legislative bodies at succeeding sessions.  As you find these varying circumstances 
arising through 50 different jurisdictions, you are finding 50 different answers being 
given and those answers varying from one legislative session to another as a good 
possibilityIf we are to have an answer to this problem on a national basis, as we 
believe must be the case, the King-Anderson bill provides the best mechanism for an 
answer on a national basis.74 
 
During Kennedys New Frontier, the King-Anderson Bill was presented as a 
program of prepayment for health costs with absolute freedom of choice guaranteed.  
                                                
74 U.S. House of Representatives, Box No. Y6493, RG 287, Publication of the Federal Government 
(Congress: Committees of Congress) House.  Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, Eighty-
Eighth Congress, First and Second Sessions on H.R. 3920, November 19, 1963, CLA/NA. 
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Every person will choose his own doctor and hospital.75  The stage was set for 
beneficiary rights to be established from the beginning  at least for the social insurance 
component.  Equality of opportunity would be institutionalized in the new program 
through the freedom to choose doctors and hospitals.  This, at least, was the path that 
President Kennedy intended.  With a policy agenda including domestic issues as vital as 
Civil Rights and on the international front as perilous as The Cuban Missile Crisis, 
President Kennedy was still engaged on health care.  He had a history as a United States 
Senator working for national health reform.  When Kennedy was assassinated in 
November 1963, there was a fundamental shift in American public policy.  In terms of 
progressive policy, the second big bang in American social policy was about to take 
place.  Creative Federalism, if begun under FDR, was finalized by LBJ.   
 
CONCLUSION: FROM THE NEW DEAL FEDERAL-STATE NOMINAL 
HEALTH PAYMENTS TO KERR-MILLS 
 
 President Roosevelt and the New Deal established institutional frameworks for 
every facet of American life.  While a national health reform was not enacted, the Social 
Security Act provided the institutional design for any future reform.  Creative federalism, 
also an FDR concept, would be the driving force behind the design of many future 
programs, including Medicaid.  Presidents Eisenhower and Truman also left their stamp 
on the progression of national health reform.  Looking back at events that changed the 
landscape of social policy, FDRs Economic Bill of Rights resounded a courageous 
message -- health care is a right. 
 At this point, the importance of the United States Congress and Ways and Means 
Committee Chairman Wilbur Mills power was paramount in shaping the Social Security 
Act through frequent SSA Amendments that altered American social policy regularly.  
Also, the work of so many dedicated government administrators like Wilbur Cohen who 
fashioned the framework for Kerr-Mills, the predecessor to the Medicaid program, was a 
                                                
75 Theodore R. Marmor, The Politics of Medicare, 2nd ed. (Hawthorne, New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 
2000), 31. 
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policy shaping force of the era.  Only now, no one could foresee a presidential 
assassination that would stop the world.  The Great Society and the LBJ era, the topic of 
the next chapter, were at hand. 
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4. THE SECOND BIG BANG, 1965: 
THE LBJ RIGHTS ERA 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Medicaid, as part of the agreement that also established both Medicares Hospital 
Insurance, Part A, and Supplemental Medical Insurance, Part B, in 1965, was hardly 
debated prior to enactment.  What today is a larger program than Medicare, both in terms 
of number of people served and cost of the program,1 Medicaid received consideration in 
a very small number of Congressional hearings prior to enactment.  According to the New 
York Times, a total of five Congressional hearings were held on the program prior to 
enactment.  A primary review by the author of the Legislative files of that era in the 
National Archives did not even turn up that much Congressional debate and discussion.2   
On the national level, Presidential prioritization in late 1963 was given to the 
Civil Rights legislation and in the House Ways and Means Committee to the Tax Bill.  
The prioritization of Civil Rights was in part a response to Civil Rights protest and unrest 
                                                
1 The most recent estimates state that Medicaid serves 47 million recipients at a combined cost to federal 
and state governments of $350 billion.  Medicare, on the other hand, serves 45 million beneficiaries at a 
cost of $300 billion.  Recent estimates of the astronomical cost of the 2004 Medicare prescription drug 
benefit, nearly three times the original projection, may once again place Medicare as the second most costly 
American social policy program behind Social Security (OASDI).  Until then, Medicaid holds that spot. 
2 According to The New York Times, Ironically, the sweeping program was largely ignored by legislators, 
and the public as it was being developed.  Four legislative hearings on it were held last year and one Senate 
hearing on it was held last March 23.  Newsarticle, Broadened Program of Medical Aid for Needy Flares 
as Major Political Issue Upstate, New York Times, 6/28/66, Folder: Medicare, Box 379, Panzer, OFWHA, 
LBJ PL.  The author reviewed the files at the Center for Legislative Archives, National Archives. 
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in the spring and summer of 1963.  Setting the stage, the Truman and Kennedy 
Administrations had taken key stands at critical points.  Public opinion in parts of the 
country was turning sour as racial violence was increasingly televised.  In terms of 
Medicaid politics, the Civil Rights struggle was hugely influential in several aspects.  
Several other co-evolutionary political, economic, and policy-related areas played a 
major role in the enactment of Medicaid and in the language that comprised the statute. 
This chapter concentrates on the 1965 enactment of Medicaid and its intertwining 
fraternal twin, Medicare, along with the all-important Medicaid revisions in the 1967 
Amendments.  Medicaid was not the same program after 1967.  Only two years after 
becoming Title XIX of the Social Security Act, it was re-drawn in profound ways.  Also, 
after the 1967 SSA Amendments, an upsurge in hostilities in Vietnam further constrained 
funding for social policy initiatives.  Medicaid, then, had a tumultuous beginning with its 
original and program design principles almost immediately questioned and re-designed.  
Possibly the most important reform in Medicaid until the DRA of 2005, the SSA 
Amendments in 1967 were driven by the expenses of just a couple of states in the first 
year of the programs implementation.  As a final note introducing the LBJ chapter, this 
was an era where opportunity, entitlement, and civil rights were prioritized.  This chapter 
sets up the crater of the Nixon era.  While the next chapter considers just what happened 
in the 1970s, here we focus on Great Society liberalism -- and how Medicaid began.  LBJ 
reigned over The Rights Era. 
 
CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERALISM, AND HEALTH REFORM 
 
There is a link between the legacy of racism in the South and desire of state 
governments to control decision making in social programs.  Opposition by southern 
interests made it very difficult to get a comprehensive health financing approach through 
Congress due to the power of Southern Congressmen, particularly as Committee 
Chairmen.  There was a history linking health policy reform and racial politics.  For 
example, during Trumans Presidency, those opposed to his defense of civil rights voted 
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in a block against him on national health insurance bills, known as the Wagner-Murray-
Dingell bills.3  Later, during the Kerr-Mills debate  a predecessor program of Medicaid 
and Medicare-- it was reported that two Southern Senators did not approve of bypassing 
the Senate Finance Committee because it provided a precedent for bypassing the 
Judiciary Committee on Civil Rights legislation.4  Finally, during the Kennedy 
Administration, in the summer and fall of 1963 a backlog of legislation was not acted on.  
Among the many reasons purported was that this was a bargaining strategy by Southern 
Democrats.  They were backlogging legislation, even appropriations, so that Civil Rights 
proponents would have more pressure when choosing between a long-filibuster on Civil 
Rights and various important legislation.5   
When the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964, as expected there was a 
fundamental shift in how the Civil Rights issue affected the health reform debate.  Prior 
to this time, opponents strategies revolved around how to prevent  or at least stonewall 
 the actual legislative reform.  Concurrently, the Warren Court was acting to enforce 
Civil Rights principles and also established a template for rights that many groups co-
opted for themselves.  Disability rights were in part established using this template.6 
Likewise, the Warren Court began to lean towards a newfound stance in Public 
Assistance law where property rights were linked with public assistance benefits.7  After 
Medicaid was enacted, this extension of rights-based notions of public assistance 
extended to that program.8 
                                                
3 Poen, Harry S. Truman, 225. 
4 This concern was attributed to Richard Russell of Georgia and Lister Hall of Alabama.  See Feingold, 
Medicare, 124. 
5 Feingold, Medicare 128. 
6 Consequently, in 1990 the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) was modeled on the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. 
7 See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, The Yale Law Journal 73, no. 5 (April 1964): 733 - 787; and 
Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, The Yale Law 
Journal 74, no. 7 (June 1965): 1245 - 1257; Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term, 
Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, Harvard Law Review 83 (1969): 
7 - 59; and Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls Theory 
of Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 121 (1972 - 1973): 962 - 1019. 
8 Timothy Stolzfus Jost, The Tenuous Nature of the Medicaid Entitlement; Federal Rights Remain Under 
Threat and Must Be Strengthened, Health Affairs 22, no. 1 (January - February 2003); and T. Jost, 
Disentitlement?: The Threats Facing Our Public Health Programs and a Rights-Based Response (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003). (Hereafter, Jost, Disentitlement) 
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The fear of federal power was proven warranted after Medicaid and Medicares 
enactment in 1965.  The federal government insisted on desegregation of hospitals where 
federal funding was being spent.  In fact, federal officials did follow-through on its 
desegregation rules.  These rules proved important for desegregating Southern hospitals, 
as well as hospitals in some Northern cities and metropolitan areas that had adopted 
separatist policies.  Medicaid is particularly responsible for providing health coverage to 
many people who did not previously have access to the health care system, but this 
legislation is also responsible for desegregation in health facilities nationwide.9 
As Wilbur Cohen reminisced ten years after enactment: there is one point that 
doesnt come out very much.  The Medicare and Medicaid programs, on July 1, 1966, 
resulted in tearing down all the signs White and Colored throughout the South.  In one 
day, twenty-four hours, in the nursing homes and in the hospitals, the offices of private 
physicians, in the cafeterias, at the drinking fountains, White and Colored signs were 
taken down.  Now I am not saying that that was the beginning of the end of all 
discrimination, but few people realize that that was done without any visible or notable 
ideological opposition in the South.  It came instantaneously and was accepted.  And 
while Senators would argue with me when I was Secretary about education, not a single 
Southern Senator that I know of ever raised a question with me about the implementation 
of desegregation in connection with Medicare or Medicaid.  And I think that notable and 
important contribution is extremely important and is an overlooked accomplishment of 
the Great Society.10  
 
                                                
9 Wilbur Cohen, From Medicare to National Health Insurance, Chapter 8 in David C. Warner (ed.), 
Toward New Human Rights: The Social Policies of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations (Austin, 
Texas: The LBJ School of Public Affairs, 1977), 150. 
10 Wilbur J. Cohen Statements in Part V: Education and Health.  In Jordan, Barbara and Rostow, Elspeth 
(eds.), The Great Society: A Twenty Year Critique (Austin, Texas: The Lyndon Baines Johnson School of 
Public Affairs and The Lyndon Baines Johnson Library 1986), 104 5.  
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LEGISLATIVE BARGAINING ACUMEN WITHIN THE WHITE HOUSE AND 
EXECUTIVE RANKS 
 
Other than setting the Presidential Agenda, LBJ contributed to the eventual 
passage of the Medicaid and Medicare package by his remarkable legislative bargaining 
acumen.  Having presided so mightily over the Senate and from years of Congressional 
Service, he was indeed a pre-eminent legislative bargainer.  LBJ needed no time from 
when he took office to establish ties, form relationships and bonds, build up his 
knowledge on Congressional procedures and processes, and learn the ways things work 
on the other side of Pennsylvania Avenue.  In fact, he had re-written many of those rules 
himself.  In one example, he suggests that Medicare proponents take an extreme position 
in order to end up in the middle with a compromise they can live with.  Prior to the 1964 
election, in a conversation with Larry OBrien, his legislative affairs lead, he references 
the Ribicoff proposal, which would have allowed for a choice by beneficiaries of either 
cash or health care: 
 
LBJ: My feeling is without having touched any of the bases very strongly 
 they ought to have Anderson really go to bat, slug it out, all the way with all the 
chips instack move in on King-Anderson go to conference and then be willing 
to be reasonableand I would say if we can put that on in this billId be prepared 
to have nothing rather than not have Medicare.but ahIf we can put it on in the 
Senate with King-Anderson and then Id go to conference.  Id let Wilbur scare the 
living hell out of the doctors and everybody else.and then he could come up with a 
compromise and say, well you can make your choice between getting this extra 
money and having health insurance, and I think you can establish the first health 
insurance that way if you can get it over. 
 
OBrien: Now I feel I havent walked in yet but I feel that if I get a strong view 
that will be. Clint Anderson and the leadership that we could move with the 
Ribicoff proposal and go into conference with that. 
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LBJ: Well if you move that and you get a take out youll have nothing to trade off.  If 
you move in with King-Anderson you can trade for Ribicoff. 
 
OBrien: Well, thats the pitch Ill make    [portion of tape not able to decipher] 
 
LBJ: Ill tell you thisWilbur Mills will take your pants off unless you have 
something to trade forand you havent have the guts on that side to do it.  
Anderson wont be on the conference. Youll have a man against it; it will be Bird; it 
will be Smathers; it will be Russell Long.  But, if they could go in there with King-
Anderson to support and then come back with Ribicoff, thats what I would try to do.  
But you be your own judge 
 
OBrien: Ill play it that way and see 
 
LBJ understood other politicians electoral political realities.  When a politician 
takes a policy position, they have to be careful if, when, and how they switch to another 
one.  Wilbur Mills, for example, openly discussed with the President the fact that since, 
early on in the negotiations, he and others had taken a stance against King-Anderson, 
they would not be able to vote for King-Anderson unless it was re-designed as an 
alternative.11  In several conversations, Congressmen discussed similar concerns with the 
President as if he were one of their own  an inside member  as opposed to resenting the 
imposition from the Executive Branch on such matters.  In addition, many of the 
Presidents staff had 30 years of experience in bargaining Social Security reform.  At 
times, they were helping write legislation, as Congressional insiders and at other times 
they played the traditional Agency Administrator or Presidential Advisor role.  They too 
were on the inside, often asked to help draft legislation or offer alternatives to members 
of Congress, as opposed to being thought of as outsiders.   
                                                
11 Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Wilbur Mills, June 11, 1964, Tape 
WH6406.06, Program No. 2, Citation No. 3686, Tapes and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and 
Meetings, LBJ PL.  
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Health Financing and Election Cycle Politics   
 
Prior to the election in 1964, the Senate passed Medicare  the first time in either 
House of Congress.  Even with this success though, there was Democratic insecurity 
about the ability to see a provision through the full Congress.  The health care provision 
was included in a broader Social Security package.  There was concern by the Democrats 
that passing Social Security provisions including an increase in the Social Security 
payroll tax would, give them [Republicans] what they want which is something to bar 
health care.12  The fear was that without a health reform attached, if the [Social 
Security] increase becomes operative Medical Care is lost for all time.13  Since at that 
time, Medicare was to be financed by the Social Security payroll tax, it was feared that an 
increase in that tax without Medicare would inch it closer to an invisible ceiling on that 
tax of 10%.14  This had long been considered the practical upper bound of the payroll tax.  
Also, the inability to pass Medicare was increasingly viewed by Democrats as an election 
issue that would help them with the Presidential and Congressional races.  As it had been 
used so many times in Presidential elections in the past, the failure of national health 
reform once again was suggested as a way to beat the opposition.  As Senator George 
Smathers advised the President: 
 
Goldwater is against this Social Security thing youre for it now, if its held up, 
its blocked, and defeated in the Senate by Williams at the last minute in an effort to 
get out by John Williams and Dirkson and a couple of fellaswhy youre off the 
hook and Ill tell you this, its a lot better issue.I campaigned on this in62 and 
when they find out what theyre not going to get under this Social Security and 
theyre not going to get free teeth and theyre not going to get freeTheyre not 
                                                
12 Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Senator Clinton Anderson, September 24, 
1964, Tape: WH6409.15, Program No. 12, Citation No. 5688, Tapes and Transcripts of Telephone 
Conversations and Meetings, LBJ PL. 
13Memo, Mike Manatos to Larry OBrien, August 14, 1964, Folder: LE/IS1 2/21/64 - 9/10/64, Box 75, 
WHCF LE, LBJ PL.  Stapled to a Memo from Larry O Brien to the President, August 14, 1964. 
14 See Sundquist, Politics and Policy, 317. 
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going to get free hospitals and theyre not going to get free hospitalization and 
theyre not going to get $90 to start with every time, and boy, when you tell them 
that they think that somebody has taken them to the cleaners..and I really think 
its a helluva lot better issue Labor has had to repeal the Taft-Hartley bill as an 
issue for years, and its a helluva better issue [if not passed, for election gains] than 
it is a fact on the books and I think we oughta keep it that way because I dont 
think that youre going to come out with it anyway this time.  What Im trying to 
suggest to Mansfield just discretely is that why dont you blame the Republicans that 
you dont pass a Social Security Bill.15   
 
Also as a Presidential Aide Bill Moyers memo relayed with regard to Goldwaters 
vote against the health care plan, I dont think you should be kicking Goldwater, but this 
is a great opportunity for us to beat him to death among these older people if we just play 
it right.16  Senator Albert Gore, Sr. also relayed his beliefs that the election results would 
provide a mandate from the people on the health care bill.17  The results of the election 
were resounding.  The 89th Congress would be the most heavily Democratic Congress 
since Franklin Roosevelts 1936 sweep.18 
The 1964 election success for the Democrats proved instrumental in ushering in 
The Great Society.  Wilbur Cohen would later recount when asked the reason LBJ was 
able to get through so many proposals that President Kennedy could not, I think it was 
primarily because Barry Goldwater ran against Johnson.  In other words, it was the 
election.19  Barry Goldwaters legislative history included being one of only two 
Senators to vote against the passage of Kerr-Mills.  The New York Times in 1966 agreed, 
                                                
15 Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Senator George Smathers, August 1, 1964, 
Tape WH6408.01, Program No. 4, Citation No. 4604, Tapes and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations 
and Meetings, LBJ PL. 
16 Memo, Bill Moyers to the President, September 2, 1964, Folder LE/IS1 2/21/64  9/10/64, WHCF, Box 
75, LBJ PL. 
17 Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Albert Gore, Sr., October 2, 1964, Tape 
WH6410.01, Program No. 4; Citation No. 5804, Tapes and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and 
Meetings, LBJ PL.   
18 Feingold, Medicare, 137. 
19 Transcript, Wilbur J. Cohen Oral History Interview, March 2, 1969, by David G. McComb, Tape #3, 
Oral History Collection, LBJ PL, 26.  
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The Presidential election of 1964, giving the voters a clear ideological choice, produced 
the greatest popular landslide of this century, which weakened the conservatives, 
strengthened the liberals, broke the power of the conservative Republican-Southern 
Democrat coalition in the House of Representatives, and created a majority for social and 
economic measures that had been blocked for a generation.  In short, quite an echo.20 
 
TOBACCO VOTE TRADING 
 
Early in 1964, the politics of another health issue intersected with health reform 
bargaining.  Just as other issues, such as war, macroeconomic policy, and civil rights 
intersected with this policy debate and affected agenda setting, the politics of big tobacco 
involved the same national legislators and many of the same lobbyists and state officials.   
As reported by The New Yorker, the Surgeon General released a report in January 1964 
that attributed various forms of cancer to cigarette smoking.  The next month, a 10 
million dollar contribution was made by the six leading cigarette manufacturers to the 
AMA to establish a tobacco-research institute to study the health consequences of 
smoking.  After this arrangement, there were charges that The A.M.A. has made a deal 
with the tobacco industryto get tobacco- state congressmen to vote against Medicare.  
The AMA opposed a Federal Trade Commission order that cigarette packages and 
cigarette advertisements carry a warning about the hazards of smoking.  According to the 
AMA, More than 90 million persons in the United States use tobacco in some 
formLong-standing social customs and practices are established in the use of tobacco; 
the economic lives of tobacco growers, processors, merchants are entwined in the 
industry; and local, state, and the federal governments are the recipients of and dependent 
upon many millions of dollars of tax revenue.  The claim was that tobacco state 
                                                
20Newsarticle, by James Reston, Washington: The Goldwater Congress, New York Times, October 19, 
1966, Folder: LE/IS1 3/1/65  5/31/65, Box No. 75, WHCF LE, LBJ PL.  The article goes on to say, This 
change was not produced by a massive switch in the Democratic majority.  The Democrats made a net gain 
of only 38 seats in the House.  The decisive difference was that so many of the Republican conservatives, 
closely identified with Goldwaters philosophy, were replaced by Democratic liberals who then furnished 
the margin to put over the social legislation that had been blocked for a quarter of a century. 
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legislators were being courted for an alliance against the social insurance --or federal 
government focused-- health reform plan.  
In the past opponents to federal involvement in health financing often used the 
socialized medicine claim and later in the debate shifted their strategy to claims that the 
proposed federal social insurance system was not comprehensive enough.  In fact, since 
Eisenhower --albeit in a charity model -- the joint federal-state plans, while more limited 
in terms of the scope of people eligible, did provide a more comprehensive scope of 
benefits.  At some point in the debate though, the argument appeared that states and local 
governments had historically been responsible for taking care of people who could not 
afford health care.  It should continue this way because this was how things had been 
done in the past.   
Oddly, in the 1990s it would be state Medicaid programs which would be 
reimbursed for tobaccos effects and it would be Medicaid that was supported in the 
upcoming 1965 debate by the AMA.  From any direction one looks at the issue, there is 
at least the cause for suspicion that votes were traded.  One has to wonder, though, if 
tobacco state Congressmen would have voted against federally sponsored health 
financing plans regardless.  In the summer of 1964, Representative Watts from a district 
in western Kentucky, took back a proxy he had originally intended to be used in support 
of a Medicare plan.  With that proxy, Chairman Mills on the Ways and Means Committee 
could have passed a House version of Medicare in 1964.  The New York Post reported 
that The alliance between the tobacco industry and the American Medical Association 
caused the defeat of the Medicare program in the House Ways and Means Committee. 
 
MANAGED CARE 
 
As part of the debate, the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. appeared before the 
Ways and Means Committee in February 1965 in order to advocate for a place for a 
managed care model plan in the new legislation.  They argued that this could assist in 
holding down hospital utilization, and hence costs. And to avoid adversely affecting 
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plans of our type and their members.21  According to a subsequent letter, As we 
understand it from the Chairman the major problem is the Departments continuing 
insistence that it does not know how the proposal can be administered.  It seems to us that 
this is a solvable problem, and we plan to pursue it further with HEW.22  While Kaiser 
did not broker a clear role for managed care at that time, the future would prove much 
different. 
When the details of provider payment were being negotiated after enactment, 
HEW bargainers defended choice of minimizing the role of managed care by arguing that 
it interfered with the rights of other interests involved.  As Judy Feder writes with regard 
to Medicare politics at the time, In contrast to the hospitals, whose satisfaction Medicare 
officials found essential, GPPPs [Group Practice Prepayment Plans] were a small number 
of providers whose cooperation with the program was relatively inconsequential.  
Medicare did not need them; they needed Medicare.  To administrators developing a 
reimbursement system for all sorts of medical care institutions, GPPPs appeared one 
more interest group seeking all they could get.  Unlike the nations hospitals, the GPPPs 
lacked the support of the medical establishmentTheir demands would interfere with the 
rights of that establishment.23 
The Group Health Association of America in 1968 reported that 20 states had 
serious restrictions in their laws with reference to group practice, particularly prepaid 
group practice.  In 1968, the ACIR recommended that In order to broaden the health 
service options available to Title 19 beneficiaries and possibly to reduce the cost of this 
program, the States should strike the Constitutional and Legislative shackles that impede 
                                                
21 Letter, From Edgar F. Kaiser, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. to The Honorable Wilbur D. Mills, 
March 5, 1965, Folder: LE/IS1 3/1/65  5/31/65 (2 of 2), Box 75, WHCF LE, LBJ PL. 
22 Letter, From Lloyd N. Cutler (Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering) to Douglass Cater, March 6, 1965, Folder: 
LE/IS1 3/1/65  5/31/65 (2 of 2), Box 75, WHCF LE, LBJ PL. 
23 According to the HIBAC MinutesWe do not believe that it is possible under the law to adopt 
administrative procedures or that it would be desirable to amend the law to allow the adoption of 
administrative procedures, that would dilute these rights of beneficiaries, physicians, and providers.  In 
Judith M. Feder, Medicare: The Politics of Federal Hospital Insurance (Lexington, Massachusetts: 
Lexington Books, 1977), 86  87.  (Hereafter, Feder, Medicare: The Politics) 
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the organization and expansion of group practice.24  States had established their own 
blocks to managed care infiltration.  Since HEW did not explicitly embrace managed care 
at the time of enactment, ACIR was suggesting it as a possible panacea to the cost 
problem. 
 
MEDICAID ENACTMENT  THE SLEEPER PROGRAM 
 
The eventual proposal to combine three separate legislative proposals into one in 
March 1965 is described by some sources as a show-stopping moment  a flash of 
brilliance.  Wilbur Cohen is reported to have said Like everyone else in the room, I was 
stunned by Mills strategy.  It was the most brilliant legislative move Id seen in thirty 
years.25  The plan combined the Democrats King Anderson bill, the AMAs Eldercare 
proposal  which was basically a revision of Kerr-Mills, and the Republican Byrnes Bill.  
These three proposals were the eventual Medicare Part A, Medicaid, and Medicare Part 
B.  In a memo for the President, Wilbur Cohen described the three measures as: 
1. The basic provisions of the Administrations King-Anderson bill to be 
financed through social security, 
2. A supplemental and expanded Kerr-Mills program along the lines of the 
Administrations Child Health and Medical Assistance Act, and 
3. A voluntary supplementary system of health benefits which would be 
subsidized in part from general revenues and in part from voluntary 
deductions from the individuals social security benefits.26 
 
                                                
24 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), Intergovernmental Problems in 
Medicaid, Commission Report A-33, (Washington, D.C.:ACIR, September 1968), 72. 
25 Newsarticle, Folder: Printed Material; Box Number 4, Personal Papers of Wilbur J. Cohen, LBJ PL.  
Originally cited as Richard Harris, Annals of Legislation, Medicare IV~A Sacred Trust, The New Yorker, 
July 23, 1966, 40. 
26 Memo, From Wilbur J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of HEW to the President, March 2, 1965, Subject: 
Hospital Insurance for the Aged Through Social Security: Developments Today at the Executive Session 
of the House Ways and Means Committee, Folder: LE/IS1 3/1/65  5/31/65, Box 75, WHCF LE, LBJ PL. 
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In the memo Cohen continued, The effect of this ingenious plan is, as Mr. Mills 
told me, to make it almost certain that nobody will vote against the bill when it comes on 
the floor of the House.  In another source, Cohen explained, The doctors couldnt 
complain, because they had been carping about Medicares shortcomings and about its 
being compulsory.  And the Republicans couldnt complain, because it was their own 
idea.  In effect, Mills had taken the A.M.A.s ammunition, put it in the Republicans gun, 
and blown both of them off the map.27   
For all the reported adulation regarding the plan, it was not the first time that 
proposals were made to combine at least two of the proposals into one legislative bill.  
Possibly, part of the success of the combination of the three legislative proposals into one 
was the timing.   Also, a weakness of all measures up to that point was that they all 
seemed in some major way insufficient.  From the Senate side, around the same time 
Wilbur Mills was presenting his three-pronged approach, Senator Abe Ribicoff was 
penning a letter to the President about his concerns on the Administrations proposal.  He 
wrote, Medicare in its present form is going to disillusion millions of the nations 
elderly.  Too many believe all of their medical bills will be paid, not just the hospital and 
related charges actually covered up to prescribed limits.  Details are not easily explained 
to the public.  When elderly people find that they still have to pay for doctors, drugs, and 
long-term convalescent care, they are going to be disappointed at what was not done, 
rather than pleased with what was done.  He continued, The full effect of this 
disillusionment will be felt in the two years preceding the 1968 election.  And later, As 
a general approach, I suggest that some package of benefits be added on top of the King-
Anderson package.  The supplemental package could provide doctors services, drugs 
and extensive hospital care.  It could be offered on a voluntary basis to those who want it.  
It could be financed partly by the beneficiary, partly be general revenues, and partly by 
the states.28   
                                                
27 Newsarticle, Folder: Printed Material; Box Number 4, Personal Papers of Wilbur J. Cohen, LBJ PL.  
Originally cited as Richard Harris, Annals of Legislation, Medicare IV~A Sacred Trust, The New Yorker, 
July 23, 1966, 40. 
28 Letter, From Abe Ribicoff (United States Senate Committee on Finance) to the President, March 3, 1965, 
Folder: LE/IS1 3/1/65  5/31/65, Box 75, WHCF LE, LBJ PL. 
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Cohen made clear that The great limitation of the Kerr-Mills approach is the 
inability of the States to put up their share of the funds.  This point is completely 
concurred in by the Republican leaders who have endorsed the Byrnes bill which does 
not involve State financial participation.29 
The change in the composition of the Committee, which was more heavily 
Democrat and so more sympathetic to King-Anderson may have played a role in the 
difference in perception to a proposal for multi-layering of existing bills.  Also, it is not 
clear why it would be assumed that a proposal to combine three different plans was void 
of the possibility of criticism or retreat on the part of all parties.  In fact, Republicans and 
Democrats supported the proposal, but a major interest in the debate, the AMA, opposed 
the three-pronged approach.30  In any event, the passage of Medicaid was very much seen 
as an extension of the Kerr-Mills program and was far overshadowed by the debates 
regarding the other two prongs in the three-pronged plan. 
The brilliance of the maneuver was attributed to its bridging of two polar 
strategies of dealing with the same program  providing health coverage to the elderly.  
As Kermit Gordon, Director of the Bureau of the Budget,31 would later conclude: It was, 
as you remember, a kind of series of compromises, mainly in the House and Means 
Committee, and a last minute shotgun marriage of a Democratic plan and a Republican 
plan.32  Instead of forcing a choice between the values incorporated in both plans, 
Chairman Mills agreed to utilize them both, thus bringing both sides of this policy debate 
into the winners group.  He sought a win/win solution.  Medicaid was added on as the 
bottom layer  support for those near indigence -- of what some at the time referred to as 
                                                
29 Memo, From Wilbur J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of HEW to the Honorable Jack Valenti, Subject: 
Letter from Senator Ribicoff, March 4, 1965, Folder: LE/IS1 3/1/65  5/31/65, Box 75, WHCF LE, LBJ 
PL. 
30 As Wilbur Cohen wrote Douglass Cater on March 10, 1965, Obviously, the AMA is shocked and 
opposed to the tentative action of Chairman Mills with the overwhelming support of both Republicans and 
Democrats on the Ways and Means Committee to approve the Presidents social security financed proposal 
plus a voluntary insurance plan for covering physicians services.  Memo, From Wilbur J. Cohen, Assistant 
Secretary of HEW for Honorable Douglass Cater, Subject: Health Insurance and Social Security Bill, 
March 10, 1965, Folder: LE/IS1 3/1/65  5/31/65, Box 75, WHCF LE, LBJ PL. 
31 Today the then Bureau of the Budget is named the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
32 Transcript, Kermit Gordon Oral History Interview, April 8, 1969 by David McComb, Tape #1 of 1, Oral 
History Collection, LBJ PL. 
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the three-layer cake.  Interestingly, it is the one measure that was accepted and 
supported by the AMA.  A massive public relations and advertising campaign was waged 
against the other provisions and in favor of the Kerr-Mills-esque provision.  Called 
Eldercare, it emphasized state administrative predominance and so left much of the 
important decision making at the level that state medical societies had their greatest 
influence. 
As the Congressional Quarterly reported in 1965, 
In its last-ditch stand against Medicare legislation the AMA switched its major 
argument against the program, in previous years anti-Medicare advertising had 
stressed that the plan would lead the country down the road to socialized 
medicine.  In 1965 the AMA apparently decided that its most effective argument 
against the bill was not that it would go too far, but that it would accomplish too 
little..Building on the idea of more comprehensive coverage, the AMA in 
January mobilized an intensive campaign of newspaper and television advertising 
attacking the Administration bill and proposing a new, alternative eldercare 
plan. 
The eldercare plan was introduced Jan. 27 in the House (HR 3727, 3728) by 
Ways and Means Committee members Thomas B. Curtis (R Mo.) and Sydney 
Herlong Jr. (D Fla.) and Jan. 28 in the Senate (S 820) by John G. Tower (R 
Texas).  It called for a voluntary medical insurance program which would be 
available to persons over 65 only if their state government signed up for the 
program.  The coverage would vary, since it would depend upon the private 
insurance policy contracted for by each state, but it would include hospital, 
doctor and drug costs.33 
 
After the enactment of the final package an AMA representative was reported to 
have said, I never thought wed end up spending several million dollars in advertising to 
expand the bill.34  In the strategy to argue for a more comprehensive bill, the AMA had 
hoped to bolster the argument that their federal-state initiative provided a more 
comprehensive package.  In supporting the language of expansion and 
comprehensiveness, however, the AMA inadvertently proved their case all too well.  
Instead of moving the debate in favor of Eldercare, they bolstered the case for enacting 
both the Administrations Bill and the Republicans Byrnes Bill.  As Wilbur Cohen wrote 
                                                
33 1965 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 248  249.  (Hereafter CQ Almanac) 
34 Newsarticle, Folder: Printed Material; Box Number 4, Personal Papers of Wilbur J. Cohen, LBJ PL.  
Originally cited as Richard Harris, Annals of Legislation, Medicare IV~A Sacred Trust, The New Yorker, 
July 23, 1966, 40.   
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to Douglass Cater at the time, As Chairman Mills has said to me the Committee action is 
in large part due to the attack the AMA has made on the limitations of the Administration 
proposal.35  By many accounts, the AMAs principled hard-edged stand and faulty 
tactics hastened and broadened the legislation.36  The fence that was put around the 
program would be self-imposed by Chairman Mills. 
The only part of the three-pronged approach that may have still been questioned 
was the expansion of Kerr-Mills  the AMA plan.  One argument for the enactment of 
Medicaid as a third piece to this legislative tour-de-force was that Chairman Mills wanted 
to build a fence around the social insurance aspects of the plan.  By creating Medicaid 
which included provisions to provide some care to populations in all age groups, Mills 
hoped to keep social insurance fenced in for the 65 and over population only.  If an 
indigent health care plan existed for those of all age groups, it would be more difficult to 
claim that there was a stark need for expanding social insurance to additional age 
groups.37 
 
Prioritization of the Issue on the Presidential Agenda 
 
It was rumored that House Ways and Means Chairman Mills was considering 
bypassing passage of health reform in favor of a Kerr-Mills expansion in late Spring 
1964.38  Some Presidential staff wondered out loud if Chairman Mills was in cohorts with 
the American Medical Association (AMA) and that an expansion of Kerr-Mills would 
                                                
35 Memo, Wilbur J. Cohen to Honorable Douglass Cater, March 10, 1965, Folder: LE/IS1 3/1/65  5/31/65, 
WHCF LE, Box 75, LBJ PL. 
36 For example: After nearly two decades of struggle and controversy, million-dollar advertising drives, 
rallies, and political-action campaigns, the A.M.A.s crusade failed, the Medical World News observed in 
June.  And in the opinion of many knowledgeable people in Washington, the A.M.A.s own strategy of 
uncompromising resistance contributed to the dimensions of the defeat.  This was reported in LBJ 
Presidential Library, Personal Papers of Wilbur J. Cohen, Box Number 4, Folder: Printed Material; Harris, 
Richard.  Annals of Legislation, Harris, Medicare IV~A Sacred Trust, The New Yorker, July 23, 1966, 
56. 
37 This argument was made in the classic text documenting the enactment of Medicare by Marmor, The 
Politics of Medicare, 2nd ed. 
38 Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Larry O Brien, May 18, 1964, Tape 
WH6405.08, Program No. 1, Citation No. 3472, Tapes and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and 
Meetings, LBJ PL. 
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make him a hero to that interest group at the expense of an Administration backed 
proposal.39  The States though demanded reform.  Reportedly, The states could not bear 
the monetary burden that Kerr-Mills required.  They pressured their Congressman to 
find an alternative.40 
After the Tax bill business was complete in the House Ways and Means 
Committee, health reform stepped into the place of first priority for that committee.  In 
two conversations with Chairman Mills, President Johnson reiterated the importance of 
health reform several times: 
--but Ill tell you this the most important.. the single most popular thing is the bill 
youre working onno question in may mind about it41  
--  but Id just say this that there is not anything that has happened in my six months 
or that will happen in my whole term in my judgment that will mean more to us as 
a party or me or you as individuals than this piece of legislation42 
-- If you do that will do more for us this year than any other single thing that well 
doExcept your tax bill and thats already behind us But ahhhIt will be the 
most positive, affirmative, future thing that well have43 
-- Id rank it Number One. 44 
-- my judgment is that is by far the most popular thing that we have ever touched 
and will do us more good than all the other put togetherand Id put Taxes and 
                                                
39 Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Larry O Brien, June 22, 1964, Tape 
WH6406.12, Program No. 7, Citation No. 3804, Tapes and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and 
Meetings, LBJ PL. 
40 David, With Dignity, 47. 
41 Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Wilbur Mills, June 9, 1964, Tape WH6406.03, 
Program No. 12, Citation No. 3642, Tapes and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings, LBJ 
PL. 
42 Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Wilbur Mills, June 9, 1964, Tape WH6406.03, 
Program No. 12, Citation No. 3642, Tapes and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings, LBJ 
PL. 
43 Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Wilbur Mills, June 11, 1964, Tape 
WH6406.06, Program No. 2, Citation No. 3686, Tapes and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and 
Meetings, LBJ PL. 
44 Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Wilbur Mills, June 11, 1964, Tape: 
WH6406.06, Program No. 2, Citation No. 3686, Tapes and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and 
Meetings, LBJ PL. 
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Civil Rights and Poverty and Education billsall of which we will have passed I 
dont think there this one is comparison45 
--and if you get.. you get this moderate thing that youre talking aboutwell go to 
town and well improve as the years go onbut itll be the biggest day you ever 
had and you ever did for your countryI can tell you that and all these other 
things are important but thats the important one.46 
 
Procedurally, there were questions about how Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
would apply.47 The federal reach of Title VI was threatening to those who opposed this 
reform, and some states fought for greater autonomy in order to continue as they had in 
the pre-1964 past.  This stance during the Civil Rights era linked states rights in many 
peoples minds to morally corrupt, prejudicial, and small thinking.  In terms of the health 
reform debate, open consideration of the effects of the Act on any future health reforms 
reach were reportedly intentionally suppressed by the Administration.48  If the Civil 
Rights opposition did not question how a federal health program would incorporate Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act, then the Administration was not going to bring it to their 
attention. 
 
MEDICAIDS BASIC PROVISIONS AT ENACTMENT 
 
Federalism in the Medicaid program was a key feature from the start.  Even 
though the program was jointly administered, states were responsible for part of the 
                                                
45 Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Wilbur Mills, June 11, 1964, Tape: 
WH6406.06, Program No. 2, Citation No. 3686, Tapes and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and 
Meetings, LBJ PL. 
46Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson and Wilbur Mills, June 11, 1964, Tape 
WH6406.06, Program No. 3, Citation No. 3687, Tapes and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and 
Meetings, LBJ PL.  Telephone Conversation continues the conversation from Program No. 2 from the same 
tape number. 
47 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that No person in the United States shall, on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.  Report, 
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security Administration, Putting Medicare 
Into Effect, June 1966, Folder: IS1 3/24/66 - 6/16/66, Box 1, WHCF INSURANCE EX IS, LBJ PL. 
48 David, With Dignity, 198. 
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financing and for carrying out the day-to-day on-the-ground administrative duties.  
Deciding the framework of the program was first a federal responsibility, in that the 
statute dictated certain requirements.  Filling in the stipulations within the broad 
framework was the purview of the states.   
 
The Federal Government Sets Framework for Links Between States and Localities 
 
With regard to financing, local governments could be involved by states but only 
in the manner that the federal government said they could be.  The final provisions 
decided that local governments, under certain conditions, could share with the state 
government in providing the non-federal matching funds.49  Originally, the states were 
required to pay at least 40% of the non-federal share.   
The plan was that within 5 years, the state government would be required to pay 
the full non-federal share, except in the case of a federally acceptable tax equalization 
plan.  The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) performed an 
extensive review of Medicaids enactment.  In surveying state officials opinions they 
found that at least one state Governor expressed his view that this provision infringed on 
states rights.  Several state legislative leaders expressed this same sentiment in a number 
of different ways: 
! This is unwarranted meddling by the Federal Government in a matter which is 
and should continue to be a purely state and local matter. 
! Transferring non-federal share entirely to state will not guarantee funds being 
available. 
! The Federal Government dangles too many carrots.  We in [    ] cannot match all 
these Federal matching fund projects. 
                                                
49 1965 CQ Almanac, 267. 
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! Counties will exercise higher degree of surveillance if they share financially.50 
 
On the administrative side, certain state arrangements were restricted by the 
federal government.  For example, any state agency could be designated to administer the 
new program as long as the eligibility requirements were established by the agency 
administering the old-age assistance program.51  As long as eligibility was determined by 
welfare departments and the program relied on means testing, it was considered a welfare 
program. 
The relationship between the states and local governments changed in many 
respects during the transition from Kerr-Mills to Medicaid.  As Robert and Rosemary 
Stevens write, Once again, therefore, these provisions encouraged the notion of state 
rather than local responsibility.  Responsibility for welfare medicine was moving upward, 
from the county to the state.52  For example, in Ohio, before Medicaid was enacted, 
programs for all but the aged were county run and varied considerably between counties 
in scope.  Afterwards, Ohio extended the full scope of services to all public assistance 
categories.53  So, the enactment of Medicaid represented centralization  only it was 
centralization to the state, instead of the federal, level.   
Medicaid had many inequalities including large variabilities in eligibility and 
benefits between states (geographical inequality), the income notch effect (inequality 
between taxpayer and recipient), and categorical requirements (competition between 
groups of needy for Medicaid coverage).  But it also removed at least one type of 
inequality.  By consolidating five separate types of medical vendor payment programs, 
Medicaid provided uniformity in matching funds from the federal government between 
these five initiatives.  Also, even though overall costs skyrocketed, it should not be 
                                                
50 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), Intergovernmental Problems in 
Medicaid, Commission Report A-33, (Washington, D.C.: ACIR, September 1968), 39 - 40.  (Hereafter 
ACIR, Medicaid) 
51 1965 CQ Almanac, 267. 
52 Stevens, Welfare Medicine, 60. 
53 Report, Tax Foundation, Inc., Medicaid: State Programs After Two Years, June 1968, Folder: 
Medicaid (Title XIX) Book 2 [Removed from binder  Folder (of 2)], Box 64, Personal Papers of Wilbur J. 
Cohen, LBJ PL, 19.  (Hereafter Tax Foundation, Medicaid) 
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assumed that all states recorded increases in recipients upon Medicaids enactment.  In 
fact, during post enactment decision making, some states actually reduced the number of 
eligibles for the program.54   
The enactment of Medicaid also changed the nature of the MAA program, which 
became voluntary for states and also could be extended beyond the elderly to other 
categorical groups.  Initially, at least 12 states elected to establish only the basic Medicaid 
program, excluding the previous MAA group.55  Medicaid was on the one hand a reform 
that fundamentally changed the rules established before in Kerr-Mills, while at the same 
time it was a consolidation of five previous programs into one.  In relation to localities, 
more than half of the reporting states indicated that the state had assumed a larger share 
of non-federal medical assistance costs than before Title 19.56 
 
Link with Medicares Provider Payment 
 
Oddly, though, just as Medicaids evolution connected it to state welfare 
departments and the cash income program, Medicaids co-evolution with Medicare 
would link it intrinsically to this social insurance initiative, as well.  Because the 
Medicaid program was enacted in the three-part legislative coup that also created 
Medicare, the payment mechanisms between Medicaid were directly related to Medicare.  
This was particularly noteworthy from a policy bargaining perspective.  When the 
Medicare package was bargained, a primary reason for excluding physician payment 
from the social insurance financed part of the package was because of extreme opposition 
on the part of the AMA.  Also, the AMA was hotly opposed to any pre-payment, 
capitation payment methodology.  In order to avoid this battle altogether, the King-
                                                
54 From ACIR, Medicaid, 30 The Tax Foundations State survey in the Fall of 1967 found that in the first 
year of implementation, Title 19 had a wide range of effects on the number of people receiving public 
assistance medical care.  Estimates of changes in coverage ranged all the way from declines in four states 
(Maine, Oregon, Utah, and West Virginia) to a more than doubling in five (Conn., Delaware, Michigan, 
Montana, and OK).  Also see Tax Foundation, Medicaid.   
55 Tax Foundation, Medicaid, 23. 
56 Tax Foundation, Medicaid, 59. 
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Anderson versions presented during the maneuvering in early 1965 did not include 
physicians services at all.   
This, in turn, spurned concerns on the part of many players including Chairman 
Mills on the House side and Senator Ribicoff on the Senate side that the enactment of a 
King-Anderson type measure could actually be used against the Democrats in future 
elections given that the benefits were so limited.  In a conversation with the President 
after the three-way approach was devised, Wilbur Cohen answered LBJ on this point: 
 
LBJ: Now how do we knowdoes he [the doctor] charge what he wants to? 
 
Cohen: No, he cant quite charge what he wants to because this has been put in a 
separate separate fund.  And what the Secretary of HEW would have to do is 
make some kind of agreement with somebody like Blue Shield lets say.  It 
would be their responsibilityunder the way the Chairman has provided the 
billthat they would regulate the fees in effect of the doctor.  Because what he 
tried to do is to be sure that the government wasnt regulating the fees directly.  
They shouldnt deal with the individual doctor.  And the bill provides that the 
doctor could only charge only the reasonable charge but this intermediary the 
Blue Shield would have to do all the policing so that the government wouldnt 
have its long hand 
 
LBJ: Alright thats good 57 
 
 Physicians payments were not removed from the social insurance component 
from the program because this was the optimum policy arrangement; it was removed in 
order to make the whole package viable for passage.58  This mattered for Medicaid 
                                                
57 Telephone Conversation between Lyndon B. Johnson, Wilbur Cohen, John McCormack, Wilbur Mills, 
and Carl Albert, March 23, 1965, Tape: WH6503.11, Program No. 9, Citation No.:7141, Tapes and 
Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings, LBJ PL. 
58 As Lawrence R. Jacobs observed in The Health of Nations, 153: They fully anticipated that the great 
majority of physicians would oppose any Medicare bill, no matter how carefully designed.  Accordingly, 
they narrowed Medicares scope in order to blunt the AMAs potential appeal to the public; as a high 
ranking HEW administrator explained, avoiding payments to physiciansmakes the AMA opposition less 
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because this arrangement bartered through this series of events -- extended to Medicaid 
by adoption of many of Medicares payment mechanisms.  Instead of creating different 
Medicaid provider payment mechanisms, many of these were co-opted from Medicare. 
If Kerr-Mills had been extended or Medicaid enacted without the concurrent 
creation of Medicare, the payment mechanisms may have been completely different.  As 
they were, Inpatient Hospital Care was to be reimbursed on a reasonable cost basis  
not on a statewide fee schedule.59  The language for service providers other than hospitals 
was that they were to provide such safeguards as may be necessary to assume 
thatsuch care and services will be provided in a manner consistent with simplicity of 
administration and the best interests of the recipients.   With regard to physician 
payment, by 1967, 15 states paid physicians according to their usual and customary 
fees.  This was the Medicare language for physician payment that had been co-opted for 
the Medicaid program.  Medical assistance programs physician payments increased five-
fold between 1965 and 1969.60  Medicaid did not require that nursing homes be 
reimbursed on a reasonable cost basis.  Still, nursing home construction quickened after 
Medicaid passage.  Also, quality standards were more stringent on the federal level than 
they had been under Kerr-Mills in many states.  Expenditures on publicly financed 
nursing home care more than doubled between Fiscal Years 1966 and 1968.61  The link 
between Medicaid and Medicare, particularly in hospital payment policy, was seen as 
                                                                                                                                            
relevant.  To make interest group criticism less relevant, Medicares coverage was limited to focus on 
hospital costs and exclude doctor services.  And later on p. 234, In the fragmented American state, 
though, politicians and policy experts compromised Medicares organizational integrity in order to 
circumvent the publics enduring suspicion of the state; introducing a massive and visible change in the 
states organizational capacity was inconceivable.  Lacking the administrative competence possessed by 
their British counterparts, American policymakers built a major new state program without the presence of 
a major state; indeed, they willingly ceded control over Medicares cost and administration to non-state 
bodies.  Lawrence R. Jacobs, The Health of Nations: Public Opinion and the Making of American and 
British Health Policy (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993). (Hereafter, Jacobs, Health of 
Nations) 
59 Rosemary Stevens and Robert Stevens, Medicaid: Anatomy of a Dilemma, Law and Contemporary 
Problems 35 (1970), 381.  (Hereafter, Stevens, Medicaid: Anatomy) 
60 Stevens, Medicaid: Anatomy, 382, 384, 385. 
61 Stevens, Medicaid: Anatomy, 383. 
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deleterious and extremely prohibitive cost-wise by many states.62  This federal 
requirement was funded, in part, by state dollars.   
It seems as though states dissatisfaction would have been offset somewhat by the 
lifting of many people off of state Kerr-Mills program roles by Medicare and enabling 
states that had not fully adopted Kerr-Mills initiatives to embrace Medicaid.63  The 
enactment of Medicare would seem to provide fiscal relief to states in this regard, but the 
cost escalation proved so severe that this was hardly mentioned by states in the aftermath 
of Medicaids enactment.  Another aspect of this is that the Medicaid program paid the 
Medicare deductibles and co-insurance for many people who were eligible for both 
Medicaid and Medicare.64 
 
As one scholar reviewing the Medicare enactment wrote,  
 
In effect, congressional and administration officials decided to sign a check to 
cover specified services for the elderly but declined to interfere with the practice 
of medicine in order to control the amount on the check and the quality of care it 
purchased.  All reasonable changes would be covered and oversight would be left 
to private bodies sympathetic to providers.  The decision, then, by Mills, 
Johnson, and other policymakers in favor of a weak hierarchy and specialization 
continued the American states tradition of weak administrative capacity.65 
 
In addition  in another effect of the simultaneous enactment -- it was accepted 
that just as Medicare would embrace private intermediaries in coordinating provider 
payment, so Medicaid would allow for the use of private carriers for the same purpose in 
that program.  In the aftermath of the cost escalation of the program in the first couple of 
                                                
62 ACIR, Medicaid, 50 - 52. 
63 HEW Secretary Celebrezze had expressed this hope in a November 1963 hearing, With a basic program 
of hospital insurance under social security, many additional States, relieved of what would otherwise be a 
very heavy burden on their general revenues, would be able to afford an MAA program as a supplement to 
social security, and the States which now have inadequate medical programs will be able improve them.  
House of Representatives, November 18, 1963, RG 287, Publications of the Federal Government, 
(Congress: Committees of Congress) House.  Ways and Means Committee, 1884  Beginning: Y4 .W36 
M46/3/pt1, Ending: Y4. W36: pt M46/11, Box No. Y6493.  Hearings before the Committee on Ways and 
Means House of Representatives, Eighty-Eighth Congress, First and Second Sessions on H.R. 3920, 
CLA/NA. 
64Tax Foundation, Medicaid, Footnote #7, 23. 
65 Lawrence Jacobs, The Health of Nations, 153. 
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years, the California legislature considered limiting the reach of private carriers in the 
Medicaid program in order to establish some modicum of control over costs.66  Other 
states considered adding fiscal intermediaries in order to quicken and streamline billing 
processes. 
HEW did explain the link between Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement,  By 
July 1967 the Medicare program already had been in operation for a year and a half and 
payment for hospital care was being made on the basis of the reimbursement formula 
which had been developed by the Bureau of Health Insurance of Social Security 
Administration.  The proposal to adopt the Social Security Administration method was 
supported by a desire for uniformity among programs operated within the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare.  Even those hospitals which opposed the use of the 
Social Security method felt that it would be burdensome for them to employ still another 
method for a different program within its institution.  Approximately, 6,700 hospitals of 
the 7,000 hospitals in the United States are participating in Title 18.67 
 
Hospitals 
 
As early as 1962 during the Kennedy Administration, the American Hospital 
Association (AHA) was able to bargain for the utilization of private organizations such as 
Blue Cross in administering benefits for the Medicare program.68  In terms of Medicaid 
directly, hospitals benefited because previously state and local government hospitals now 
received infusions of some federal monies for those now covered by the Medicaid  and 
Medicare  programs.  Some people who previously were served free were now 
insured through one of these government programs.  Also, through Medicaid, the federal 
government shared in costs for tuberculosis and mental care in approved hospitals.69  
                                                
66 Tax Foundation, Medicaid, 36. 
67 ACIR, Medicaid, 74. 
68 Sundquist, Politics and Policy, 312. 
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After Medicaid was enacted, the inflation in hospital costs became a substantial problem, 
as well.70 
 
Medicaid Equal Opportunity 
 
Reflecting the values fostered by The Warren Court Era and The Great Society, 
the 1965 version of Medicaid aspired towards Equal Opportunity.  Medicaid recipients 
were to receive care from the same physicians, in the same hospitals, under the same 
conditions and payment policies as people with other sources as payers.  There was no 
second-class.  One of the most important provisions in this regard was the 
Comprehensiveness Provision, Section 1903(e).  It stated:  
 
The Secretary shall not make payments under the preceding provisions of this 
section to any State unless the State makes a satisfactory showing that it is 
making efforts in the direction of broadening the scope of the care and services 
made available under the plan and in the direction of liberalizing the eligibility 
requirements for medical assistance, with a view toward furnishing by July 1, 
1975, comprehensive care and services to substantially all individuals would 
meet the plans eligibility standards with respect to income and resources, 
including services to enable such individuals to attain or retain independence or 
self-care. 71 
 
 On one level this is an effort, in the long-term, to remove the categorical 
requirements in the Medicaid program.  All individuals below the income and resource 
requirements were to receive care.  On another level, benefits were supposed to be 
expanded to a comprehensive level.  In a third dimension, the services are not those 
restricted to health care, but included supportive services.  Section 1903(e) was repealed 
a few years later, but its intent haunts the current Medicaid program.  When Medicaid 
was first drawn, it had high ideals. 
                                                
70 Tax Foundation, Medicaid, 27 - 28. 
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 One of the early principles of the program was the Free choice principle, meaning 
that Medicaid recipients had a right to choose an individual physician, a physician from a 
group practice, or a physician from a prepaid group practice medical care program.72  
They found that in comparison to pre-19 medical assistance programs, the real reform 
was not in the scope of medical services offered to those receiving the most generous aid, 
but in the extension of comparable services to other groups, who in some instances had 
received only minimum medical assistance.  Another aspect of the federal-state structure 
of Medicaid was that it was so confusing to both recipients, citizens, and providers that 
very few people really understood who was eligible, in what state, and under what 
conditions. 
 
HIGH COSTS AND FRAUD LEAD TO MEDICAID RECALIBRATION 
THROUGH THE 1967 SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS 
 
 After Medicaid was enacted, the primary story in the aftermath was of very high 
costs.  Oddly, while cutting back the Medicaid program in many ways, the Social 
Security Amendments of 1967 also provided for the largest benefit increase for the 
retirement program in Social Security history.73  Between 1965 and 1967, state 
expenditures for medical assistance payments ranged from an increase of 371 percent in 
Delaware to a decrease of 15% in West Virginia.  New York had to increase payments 
for medical bills by $487,238,000 during the period, while West Virginia decreased 
payments by $1,751,000.74  As the Congressional Quarterly Almanac reported: Since 
the states themselves could define the medically needy, there arose differences in income 
specifications among the states.  New York, for example, initially defined as medically 
                                                
72 ACIR, Medicaid, 14.  Beginning July 1, 1969, states must allow Medicaid recipients free choice among 
qualified practitioners, medical facilities, and community pharmacies.  The free choice principle includes 
the right to choose a qualified group of physicians organized in group practice, as well as to choose a 
qualified physician.  Group practice covers not only a voluntary association of three or more physicians 
working as a team, but also a consumer-sponsored, prepaid, group practice medical care program. 
73 Memo, Wilbur J. Cohen, Under Secretary of HEW for the President, Social Security Bill 
Developments, November 4, 1967, Folder: LE/WE6 9/1/67, Box 164, WHCF Legislation EX (LE/WE), 
LBJ PL. 
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needy and eligible for Medicaid a family of four with an annual net income of $6,850.  
The figure later was lowered to $6,000 and still later to $5,300, but still remained one of 
the highest of any state.  Median -- $3,500 for a family of four.75  In 1967 the Social 
Security Amendments took several steps to limit the ability of the states to define the 
medically needy, in addition to many other types of amendments. 
The Wall Street summed up the sentiment in an August 8, 1967 article, How do 
you begin the broadest and perhaps one of the most expensive government medical 
programs in the nations history?  Start with a total lack of preparedness, move quickly 
into Chaos, add a little apathy and then stir up some fights with the doctors, dentists, and 
pharmacists.  Much of the trouble with Medicaid, say both its administrators and critics, 
stems from the fact that almost from its inception it has been a spur of the moment 
program with few of those involved realizing its vastness.  
As the Tax Foundation concluded, In a period of less than two years after 
Medicaid became effective, the rate of medical assistance payments in all states 
approximately doubled from their 1965 level.  The bulk of the rise was in the 35 states 
that were operating Title 19 programs by September 1967; these states dispensed nine-
tenths of all public assistance medical payments.  It is clear that Medicaid programs, as 
expected, increased these costs far more rapidly than they would have risen otherwise.  In 
the Title 19 states, the expansion over pre-Medicaid experience was nearly five times as 
great as in the other states (105 percent as compared to 23 percent).  When overall costs 
increased, variability between states increased as well.76   
The cost increase was particularly striking in two states: New York and 
California.  The decisions made by New Yorks legislature in enacting that states 
Medicaid program were so generous that the federal share was more than had been 
projected by the federal government for the entire country.  Due to their wealth, New 
York and California could afford a state share that was more substantial than many other 
states.  The disparities and inequality that this introduced between states was pronounced.  
                                                
75 1969 CQ Almanac, 201. 
76 The States ranked in the top four in increased costs between 1965 and 1967 were 1) NY; 2) CA; 3) 
Mass.; and 4) OK.  Tax Foundation, Medicaid, 33. 
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Even with a slightly more generous federal match for poorer states than Kerr-Mills, the 
re-distributive formula did not close the gap between wealthy and poor states.  Another 
factor for federal-state programs is that since, in general, state taxes are more regressive 
than the federal income tax, the state share is derived from a relatively regressive tax 
structure.  State funding then is more heavily placed on the poor in order to fund a 
program that is for a selective group of the poor.  There are in fact people who cannot 
afford health insurance paying taxes to support the Medicaid program. 
In California, Medi-Cal was launched on March 1, 1966, to provide a 
comprehensive range of services to an estimated 13 percent of the states population.77  
The California Governor at the time was Ronald Reagan.  The same Governor who in 
1962 had advocated against proposed Medicare proposals saying, one of the traditional 
methods of imposing statism or Socialism on a people has been by way of medicine.78  
In 1967 the U.S. News and World Report stated that the country was waiting to see the 
outcome of Reagans stand against the burgeoning Medi-Cal program since this was the 
first cutback attempted.79  Governor Reagan sponsored a conference for the states on 
Medicaid cost increases.  At least from the LBJ Administrations perspective the 
conference was judged a failure.  Cohen wrote in a memo at the time, the general 
consensus was that Californias troubles grew out of their own administration of the 
program, not from the basic nature of the program itself.80  According to Cohen, some 
state representatives at the meeting identified a primary problem with Medicaid: the 
present program forgets the person who is too old for dependent child care, too young for 
old age support, insufficiently disabled to qualify for the program, and able to see.  In 
the light of these drawbacks some state representatives considered ways of providing and 
                                                
77 This was a reported 2.5 million people.  Tax Foundation, Medicaid, 35. 
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Originally cited as Richard Harris.  Annals of Legislation, Medicare III ~ We Do Not Compromise, The 
New Yorker, July 16, 1966, 54. 
79 Newsarticle, Medicaid in the Billions  Getting Out of Hand?, U.S. News &World Report, October 16, 
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paying for health care.  In this case, some states wanted flexibility in order to experiment 
for providing a more inclusive program instead of a more restricted one.81   
Herein lied another dilemma in Medicaid federalism  the dilemma provoked by 
the differences in what states would do with additional flexibility.  Some states use 
flexibility to provide fuller coverage, to experiment in progressive directions, to do more 
with less  while at the same time, other states, if given this same flexibility, struggle to 
maintain the minimum standards that the federal government sets.  In Californias case, 
the state legislature acted and the result was large increases in eligibility that the state 
could apparently not maintain.  Governor Reagan, in a move as the top executive official 
in the state, ordered drastic curtailment of services. 
In 1968 the California state legislation considered several proposals for reducing 
costs, including:  
(1) contracting physicians services out on a capitated basis; 
(2) providing local tax relief by state assumption of costs of the program; 
(3) trying a cost-sharing arrangement with recipients; 
(4) controlling utilization of medical procedures; 
(5) increasing fraud control; and 
(6) replacing Medi-Cal private financial intermediaries with states paying providers.82 
 
In New York, expectations regarding the Medicaid program cost-wise were not 
realized.  New Yorks state legislature expected that the federal Medicaid share would 
increase by $114 million and decrease the state and local share by $78 million.  The 
actual outcome was quite different, and costs increased sharply for all three levels of 
government.83  What was possibly the most remarkable part of New Yorks response was 
that the Governor recommended to the 1968 legislature that a payroll-tax funded 
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82 Tax Foundation, Medicaid, 36. 
83 Tax Foundation, Medicaid, 37. 
  116
compulsory health insurance plan be enacted.  It did not receive approval.84  In the face of 
over-budget Medicaid costs, one of the best alternatives appeared to be a comprehensive 
solution to health care for the state.  Once again, questions of Medicaid resulted in a 
comprehensive plan solution  at least by some key decision-makers.  Part of the turn to a 
comprehensive solution, at least on the Governors part, was the scope of New Yorks 
Medicaid program.  Initially, about one third of the states population was eligible.85  
Another source had the number eligible as high as 45% of the population, some 8 million 
people.86   
Another option, also supported by the Governor, was federal financing of welfare 
programs.  For Medicaid, that meant suggesting that the federal government find an 
alternative for providing health care, and, at the same time, saving states from 
increasingly poor budget situations.87  This would prove true for Medicaid repeatedly in 
the future.  States that struggled to support Medicaid would respond by becoming 
supporters of federal  not state  solutions.  Also, Medicaid reform proposals sometimes 
took the form of suggestions for comprehensive national reform, comprehensive 
coordinated health planning efforts among communities, or other reforms that 
fundamentally changed the health financing system altogether  as opposed to just 
changing Medicaid. 
In light of the staggering reach of Medicaid after the New York legislature acted, 
local medical societies were rebuffed.  The Erie County Medical Society demanded 
repeal.  The Suffolk County Medical Society labeled Medicaid socialized medicine, 
designed to deprive physicians of their constitutional rights to practice medicine in a free 
society.88  Once again, the Socialized Medicine claim was used when physicians 
disagreed with the extent of the programs reach, the comprehensiveness of its scope, or 
the payment arrangement particulars.  This time, though, the claim was levied not during 
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enactment bargaining, but after both federal and state legislatures had acted.  The 
Socialized Medicine claim was used to roll back legislative actions during subsequent 
implementation and enforcement stages, as well in future re-thinking of statutes by 
legislatures.   
In New York, there was a reported effect on municipalities taxes of the Medicaid 
legislation.  Around 28 municipalities raised their sales tax and practically all 62 counties 
raised their property tax  citing Medicaid as a reason.  At this point, it is unclear if 
Medicaid was scapegoated as the reason for tax increases.  Given the increases in 
eligibility, though, it is reasonable to assume that the local governments were truly 
suffering in New York due to the increased cost pressing on a relatively regressive tax 
structure.  The clash between taxpayer and beneficiary rights in New York State was very 
real.  In many cases, additional taxes were paid by lower-income people who themselves 
did not have adequate medical care but did not qualify for Medicaid for one reason or 
another.  The extent to which this rights holder clash -- taxpayer versus beneficiary --
extended to other states is unclear, although one source reports that one out of every three 
states was forced to raise taxes in part because of Medicaid.89 
The cost situation in Medicaid was caused by the interaction of two factors.  For 
one, the federal-state relationship made it difficult to accurately project costs.  Secondly, 
private entities were able to bargain for concessions in order to get the 
Medicaid/Medicare package through that provided few cost control mechanisms and, in 
fact, encouraged cost escalation.  While states did not attribute state tax increases totally 
to the Medicaid cost increase, some indicated that it may have played a factor.90  Local 
tax increases in New York were attributed to an expansive Medicaid program that 
covered additional populations not matched by the federal government.  The Tax 
Foundation reported that According to press reports, 29 of the states in 62 counties in 
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had been imposed to date solely in support of the Medicaid program, but several indicated that recent tax 
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the past year or so have enacted local sales taxes or raised property taxes, primarily to 
meet the cost of Medicaid.91 
Another area where Medicare and Medicaid hospital payments overlapped was in 
the post-enactment negotiations of reimbursement for hospitals capital costs.  As Somers 
and Somers wrote at the time, Most observers of the long reimbursement negotiations 
agree that the hospitals drive to increase funds for capital formation colored and 
complicated every major dispute on payment.  It intruded upon consideration of items, 
where it seemed relevant and where it did not, and proved to be the hospitals most 
effective weapon in obtaining various liberalizations.92  Basically, the provisions 
regarding adjustment of hospital payment to account for depreciation was extended from 
Medicare to Medicaid, and the allowance of this on the part of Medicare was a post-
enactment bargain between HEW bureaucrats and private interests. 
In a review of the bureaucratic policy bargaining with the hospitals, Judy Feder 
writes in Medicare: The Politics of Federal Hospital Insurance: Their [the Hospitals] 
primary objective was to obtain additional revenue in two areas: (1) the definition of 
Medicare payments for depreciation on buildings and equipment; and (2) the inclusion of 
a return on equity as an allowable cost.93  The policy bargaining about this issue had 
expansive consequences, and the tack of placating business interests was later questioned.  
Did the government negotiators give away too much?  In analyzing this, one can ask if 
this strategy of turning potential enemies into allies was worth the trade-off in cost 
escalation that resulted not just for the program bargained for  Medicare  but also for 
the program that copied so many of its provisions  Medicaid. 
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 The end result was that the two areas were lumped together, as Feder writes, as 
the justification for a plus factor in reimbursement, that is, the addition to each 
hospitals Medicare reimbursement of 2% of its identified allowable cost.94 
Feder continues: 
 
Their feeling, according to a senior SSA official, was that the hospitals would 
have to go along with whatever the department promulgated.  But theres a real 
difference in launching a program with the help of the hospitals as opposed to 
against them.  To an administrator, that difference makes all the difference in the 
world.  A BHI official expressed a similar point of view: The hospitals were not 
our adversaries; we were all in the same lifeboat together.95 
 
 Those who negotiated the terms of the arrangement with the hospitals were 
reportedly confident that re-negotiations would minimize or even negate these initial 
give-aways.  As history showed though, the compromises proved to be much more 
resilient.  Gradualism did not move in the direction of correcting for past transgressions 
towards cost-push inflation in Medicaid hospital payment.  The bargain stuck and 
Medicaids evolution of hospital payment was not progressive  from the point of view of 
someone who believed that greater federal control meant greater cost control.  Feder 
argues that the Social Security Administrations continuing concern with political balance 
actually led to these policies entrenchment,96 and not a gradual progression towards the 
government negotiators most-preferred policy solution.   
 This example is just one that shows the difficulties of policy bargaining for 
government negotiators.  If a compromise is reached, they may be giving away more than 
they want and will not be able to make-up for the sweetener.  If they do not 
compromise, they may alienate key interests and create hostile relationships.  Given that 
federal administrators in the health field will have multiple successive interactions with 
these interests, poor relationships are costly in and of themselves.  This dilemma, The 
Compromise Trap, is one of the key traps in American social policy.   
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The Compromise Trap is when a deal is brokered by government negotiators 
through a deal that in the long-run hems in progressive reform efforts.  Federal 
negotiators give too much in a give and take conflict resolution, thinking that their 
compromising is the best negotiating style for that particular situation.  Sometimes 
giving away the farm due to lack of thought about strategy or negotiating skill, 
sometimes trying too hard to please the people on the other side of the negotiating table 
whom they will work with in the future, sometimes wanting a resolution to an issue very 
much or negotiation fatigue.  Regardless of the reason, The Compromise Trap is one 
policy bargaining phenomenon to watch for in social policy negotiations.    
 In Social Insecurity, one aspect of this phenomenon is considered.  After a new 
program, like Medicaid, is enacted, the Federal agency staff develops relationships with 
private interests and state administrators that result in accommodation in many instances.  
In other words, if people in the federal agency work with the same people in state 
agencies or private business day in and day out, they develop associations and a type of 
civic community with those individuals that may transcend other relationships or interests 
 even interests of beneficiaries.  With regard to the close relationships between federal 
and state administrators, the term vertical functional autocracies was dubbed to 
describe how even state Governors lose power in the face of strong relationships between 
civil servants at different levels of government.97 
 Another explanation is that compromises during times of genuine policy reform 
are more intransigent  and stick more  than the policy entrepreneurs of The New Deal 
and The Great Society realized.  In fact, policy negotiators today still make bargains 
where they give up more than most beneficiaries would like using the defense that they 
can gain back some of the losses after ensuring enactment.  At a 2004 LBJ School of 
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Public Affairs Conference, Big Choices: The Future of Health Insurance for Older 
Americans, David Certner the Director of Federal Affairs for AARP spoke of AARPs 
acceptance of the proposed Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit even though they did not 
agree with some of the features, particularly the overly advantageous arrangements with 
drug plans.  The reasoning was that after so many years and rounds of negotiations on a 
Medicare prescription drug benefit, they wanted to get something in place and work to 
improve that, instead of starting from scratch and having to start rolling the boulder up 
the hill again.98  The U.S. system of government encourages this because its extensive 
system of checks and balances makes it exceedingly difficult to get any major legislation 
through, on any terms. 
 In terms of negotiations after enactment, then, there are a few rules with regard to 
bureaucratic behavior.  In negotiating the details of programs, agencies may (1) attempt 
to preserve a status quo99 or (2) attempt to preserve positive relationships regardless of 
costs.  The further implementation of these policy agreements by states, by fiscal 
intermediaries and carriers, and by providers themselves involves yet another level of 
policy bargaining. 
 
1967 Amendments 
 
In a historical link between medical indigence and cash welfare payment levels in 
the states, the 1967 Social Security Amendments established a number of Medicaid 
cutbacks in waves.  By July 1, 1968, the Federal Government would only provide 
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matching funds to a state up to a ceiling where a medically indigent person earned 150% 
of the states AFDC income standard.  By July 1, 1969, this ceiling would be lowered to 
140%, and by January 1, 1970, it would be lowered even more to 133 1/3%.100  
Interestingly, while the 1967 Amendments were an embodiment of Congressional 
limitation on the states, the ceiling was tied to states own AFDC levels.  As is typically 
the case with shared federal-state programs, states could self-fund anything above and 
beyond the federal limits, and, of course, states could chose to raise their AFDC levels. 
The result was that eight states (CA, DE, KY, MD, NY, OK, PA, and RI) reduced 
eligibility to the 150% level.  In effect, Pennsylvania avoided the cutback by raising its 
maximum AFDC payment levels.  Two other states (CT and IL) imposed cutbacks by 
January 1969 and a third (IA) imposed a cutback to reach the 133 1/3% level by July 
1968.101  Other important revisions from the 1967 Amendments included: 
♦ Authorization to the Secretary of HEW to approve new reimbursement 
methods proposed by the states that had promise to increase efficiency 
without reducing quality.102  
♦ Allowed a state to establish different income levels for eligibility under 
Medicaid based on variations in the cost of housing in urban and rural parts of 
a state.103 
♦ Stipulated that only nursing homes meeting certain specifications could be 
used for public assistance recipients under Medicaid.  Permitted federal 
matching for Medicaid beneficiaries in ICFs.104  The newly-invented category 
of intermediate care facilities was expected to remove part of nursing home 
expenditures from Medicaid.105 
                                                
100 1967 CQ Almanac, 895. 
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♦ Required states to make sure that unnecessary services were not provided 
under Medicaid  and to assure that payments did not exceed reasonable 
charges, including payments for drugs.106 
♦ Authorized the Secretary of HEW to approve experiments with new ways of 
reimbursement that promise more efficient methods of providing medical care 
and services without adversely affecting their quality.107   
 
The waiver authority, beginning in 1962 with the general Social Security Act 
authority targeted Medicaid reimbursement specifically in 1967.  In many ways, 1967 set 
the rules for Medicaid.  The enactment in 1965 had established a very strong foundation 
for national health insurance.  The 1967 amendments began to unravel a few of those 
original commitments.  Those original commitments have continued to unravel ever 
since. 
 
MEDICAID IMPLEMENTATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
 
 One of the truly remarkable things about the enactment of Medicaid was the civil 
rights implications in health care nationwide.  As Wilbur Cohen remarked at a LBJ 
School of Public Affairs conference in 1976, But there is one other very important 
contribution of Medicare and Medicaid which has not received public notice -- the virtual 
dismantling of segregation in hospitals, physicians offices, waterfountains, restrooms, 
and lunchrooms in hospitals which said For White Only came tumbling down 
overnight.  There was very little resistance.  There was no legal opposition.  A major and 
monumental change in the way health care was administered to black men, women, and 
children was implemented without a serious challenge.  If Medicare and Medicaid had 
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not made another single contribution, this result would be sufficient to enshrine it as one 
of the most significant social reforms of the decade.108   
 The record shows that the transition was more arduous, in at least some Southern 
hospitals, and not quite as overnight as this last quote implies.  In a June 25, 1966 White 
House memo it is suggested that military hospitals be used in communities with Civil 
Rights Act Title VI problems.  The compliance percentages of those communities with 
low compliance with Title VI are listed in Chart 1. 
 
Chart 1: States With Title VI Hospital Compliance Problems 
Alabama  Mobile (less than 20%); Birmingham (40%); Montgomery (21%); 
Florida  Jacksonville (44%); 
Georgia  Atlanta (20%); and Columbus (less than 50%); 
Louisiana  Baton Rouge (less than 50%); and Shreveport (less than 50%); 
Mississippi  Jackson (30%); and Meridian (less than 20%); 
North Carolina  Charlotte (55%); and Greensborough (less than 50%); 
South Carolina  Columbia (less than 50%); 
Tennessee  Knoxville (less than 20%).109 
 
 Even with these initial compliance problems, though, the Administrator in charge 
of administering Medicare at the time remembered, In fact one of the really bright 
chapters in the Medicare story is that literally hundreds and hundreds of hospitals 
throughout the South in a period of a few months, for the first time in their history made 
medical care in their hospitals available to blacks on the same basis as to whites.  They 
added Negro doctors to their staffs and desegregated generally.110 
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 Later in the Medicaid payment debate, physicians attempted to change the rules 
so that they received payment directly from patients instead of through the Medicaid 
program.  As Douglass Cater wrote to the President, Neither Secretary Gardner nor 
Wilbur Cohen believe this is justified.  The point out that it will contribute to medical 
cost inflation.  It would also permit racial discrimination since Title VI is not enforceable 
when the patient is billed directly.  Administration officials had a vital reason to keep 
patients out of the payment cycle  enforcement of Title VI.111 
 
THE LBJ RIGHTS ERA SUNSET: ESCALATION OF VIETNAM, KIDDICARE  
 
 During LBJs Presidency, the escalation of hostilities in Vietnam made action on 
domestic issues increasingly difficult.  In an oral history, former HEW Secretary Wilbur 
Cohen was asked about increasing difficulty due to the Viet Nam situation?  He 
responded, Yes, I found it so, not so much in the legislative aspect, but in the getting of 
appropriations to implement it.  Later in the interview, the interviewer asked, Did the 
President express any regret about this in regard to his domestic program?  Cohens 
response, Yes.  In my discussions with him particularly during November and December 
and January of 1968 - 69, when I was proposing getting so much greater appropriations 
requests, he expressed the deep regret that he couldnt do it.112   
In late 1965, staff countered questions regarding the effects of the war.  For 
example, Harry C. McPherson, Jr. said Charlie Schultze is cool to the idea of a traveling 
circus of senior officials explaining the new programs across the country.  His reasons 
are: a) this has the inevitable consequence of stimulating interesting programs we cannot 
adequately finance; b) raising hopes and then crushing them because of budgetary 
limitations is worse than leaving the public in the dark about the new programs.  These 
are persuasive considerations.  The only counter-argument I can make is that we are not 
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closing the door on the Great Society; we are just muting our welcome to it because of 
Vietnam.113   
The post-Medicaid cutback 1968 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations report mentioned Vietnam several times in justifying Medicaid cutbacks.  The 
report states, We recognize and understand the fiscal conditions that led Congress and 
the Administration in 1967 to impose a cutback on Federal participation in the care of the 
medically needy and thus move away from the goal set by Section 1903(e).Yet we 
believe that this action as the result of concern over the unanticipated escalation of the 
Title 19 budget and the unrelenting fiscal pressure from other public demands, 
particularly military requirements.114  In some sense, fiscal capacity limitations is often 
mentioned as a reason to keep social programs financed at the federal level, but, as 
Vietnam demonstrated, this does not protect social programs financially from the costs 
that war impose on federal budgets.  Placing social programs firmly at the federal level of 
financing does not protect them from the primary concern of the Federal Executive and 
Legislative Wings: Protecting the country and its interests in war. 
 In 1968, HEW Secretary Cohen proposed a social insurance financed health 
program for children to President Johnson.  Called Kiddy Care, Cohen explained that it 
was just too big of a bite to take on the remainder of one hundred and eighty additional 
people.  However, Kiddy Care represents to me not only an establishment of a new 
system of priorities by directing our attention now to children in the new generation as 
against the aged, but at the same time it helps you to swing into an evolutionary process 
where over a course of time you could end up with a more comprehensive program than 
you have today.115   
The Bureau of the Budget was opposed to the measure.  They wrote to the 
President, About 4 million births would be covered each year.  But only about 1 million 
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of the 4 million are not now adequately covered by private medical insurance, group 
practice, or their own resources.  In other words, under the proposed program, we would 
be spending $3 on those who dont need the help to get $1 to those who do.  You are 
aware of how difficult it is to get higher taxes.  And this will soon apply to payroll taxes 
as well  since they are already scheduled to rise steeply over the next decade.  Why 
burden the tax system with $4 worth of hard-to-get taxes in order to get $1 of medical 
care where it is really needed?116  The argument used by the Bureau of the Budget was 
the same as was repetitively argued and continues to be in the modern era.  The primary 
question in American social policy has been whether to broadly cover entire populations 
with social insurance financing versus whether to target particular populations, means-
test, and only provide services to those who can find care in no other way.   
The problem faced here has continued to plague health financing expansions into 
the modern era.  When new reforms to cover people without health insurance incurs cost 
shifting to the government for populations that already have some form of health 
financing, it generally stops the reform.  The only way to overcome this hurdle would be 
to eat the additional cost of covering people who already have access to health 
financing who also make the eligibility cutoffs in order to cover everyone else who does 
not have access to health financing. 
 In another repeating policy debate in health care, that of rights versus costs, the 
Bureau of the Budget questioned the expense of Kiddicare.  They wrote to the President, 
Medical costs are already rising at 9-10% per year.  Putting this additional load on the 
system will accelerate this problem  which can become a major national issue.  On the 
other hand, a carefully targeted program, aimed at the much smaller group in real need of 
it, could much more easily be handled by the system.117  In conclusion, they suggested 
to finance this effort through Medicaid and to liberalize Medicaid to increase the federal 
                                                
116 Memo, Charles L. Schultze, Director Bureau of the Budget, for the President, Subject: Insured Medical 
Care for Mothers and Children (Kiddicare), January 3, 1968, Folder: LE/WE6 9/1/67, Box 164, WHCF 
Legislation EX (LE/WE), LBJ PL. 
117 Memo, Charles L. Schultze, Director Bureau of the Budget, for the President, Subject: Insured Medical 
Care for Mothers and Children (Kiddicare), January 3, 1968, Folder: LE/WE6 9/1/67, Box 164, WHCF 
Legislation EX (LE/WE), LBJ PL. 
  128
contribution for maternal and child health costs.118  Almost as soon as Medicaid was 
enacted, a trend began to allocate  even push off  responsibilities to the Medicaid 
program that were too costly, too complex, too difficult for any other possible health 
financing solution.  Medicaid became a catch-all net that was asked to meet multiple, 
incredibly challenging social problems  including health and supportive services.  The 
Bureau of the Budget may not have realized it at the time, but Medicaid would take on 
this role for the next 40 years.  It was asked to do multiple different tasks and to do them 
well.  The states, of course, were partly caught in the whirlwind, for they were asked to 
finance, in part, this program.  Another outcome, though, social insurance was not 
expanded from the elderly to kids.  Wilbur Cohens attempt to add populations to the 
social insurance financed group did not materialize. 
 
The Rights Versus Costs Dilemma 
 
Since the beginning of the Medicaid program costs have tempered rights.  The 
Medicaid program began with a provision requiring comprehensive care and services to 
substantially all individuals who were financially eligible for services by July 1, 1975.  
Section 1903(e) of Title XIX (Medicaid) restricted HEW from making Medicaid 
payments to states unless states showed efforts in the direction of broadening the scope 
of care and services and in the direction of liberalizing the eligibility requirements for 
medical assistance, with a view toward furnishing by July 1, 1975, comprehensive care 
and services to substantially all individuals who meet the plans eligibility standards with 
respect to income and resources, including services to enable such individuals to attain or 
retain independence or self-care.119  By 1967, New York states projected federal share 
for that states Medicaid program superseded the amount projected for the entire country.  
This spearheaded several restrictive changes in the program by the U.S. Congress 
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including a direct eligibility link to cash welfare, then called Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC).   
The original idea behind Medicaid, which was enacted in 1965, was towards 
expansion and full coverage regardless of categorical distinctions  or as the section read 
with a view toward furnishing by July 1, 1975 comprehensive care and services to 
substantially all individuals who were financially eligible for services.  Instead, 
however, expansion gave way to cost concerns.  Wilbur Cohen recounted: We know it 
wasnt possible in 1965 to put cost controls in it.  It would have never passed Congress.  
That would have been federal control, which was the whole political issue at the time.120  
So cost controls were not introduced in order to assure passage of the initial legislation.  
Even with a financing arrangement structured around federalism, with the federal 
government sharing the costs with the states of the original principle of Comprehensive 
Care in Medicaid, the provision did not survive.  In 1969, the comprehensive services 
provision was postponed from 1975 until 1977.121  In 1970, the 1977 deadline for 
comprehensive services was deleted altogether.122  This path to the right to healthcare 
via the Medicaid program was not preserved, even with the benefit of federalism, with 
costs being dispersed between governments. 
In March 1968 President Johnson sent to Congress a message on health in which 
he relayed that health care costs of the country would double and costs for an average 
American family would double in seven years.  Action was needed.  He asked Congress 
for authority to change the hospital reimbursement systems  a cost and cost-plus system 
at the time.  He was denied.123  Cost savings would have to be generated from other 
retractions. 
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There were other paths to a right to healthcare via the Medicaid program.  The 
Medicaid program, however, then exposed subtleties  or perhaps not so subtle 
characteristics  of its entitlement.  The entitlement was subject to the countrys financial 
status of the time.  Therefore, rights were variable.  These were not the rights of the 14th 
Amendment, per se, where the federal government placed protections from 
discriminations of different types as above most cost benefit analysis.  There would be no 
discrimination regarding particular protected groups.  The Warren Court made this clear.  
Medicaid  and more generally Welfare  Rights at one point in the Warren Court era 
were made stronger by decisions that identified poverty as a suspect classification or 
fundamental interest under the 14th Amendments Equal Protection and Due Process 
clauses.   
This trend was not continued in the Burger Court era.  Without Constitutional 
backing, courts tended to defer to legislative policy decisions in specialized areas of 
social policy where administrative expertise was often considered necessary to spend 
limited resources.  Medicaid thus was subject to the will of the majority and health 
provision left as the provision of a generous legislature instead of a basic minimum 
right.  Minimum health provision was subjected to cost constraints and thereby  even 
though an entitlement  not one with revered Constitutional status or even the consensus 
that health protection was a natural right. 
This decision, in part, was based on the fact that determining minimum health 
package for all American was  and remains  a daunting task.  The expenses could be 
astronomical.  In fact the expenditure of GNP could surpass 100% and even continue 
from there in an upward direction.  The definition of this minimum would mean the 
federal government was rationing  not just health services  but life itself.  These 
decisions seemed best to leave to Adam Smiths invisible hand in the market and to the 
political bargaining that is politics version of the invisible hand.  This line of thinking 
was described by the legal scholar Cass Sunstein: Regulatory legislation of the 1960s and 
1970s has often been indifferent to cost, on the theory that no price tag should be put on 
life and health, which are inalienable rights.  He continues, No sensible regulatory 
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program, however, can be indifferent to cost.  Regulatory expenditures, if sufficiently 
high, will endanger the economy, increase unemployment and poverty, and eventually 
risk both life and health as a result.124   
As the Stevens recounts in the classic Welfare Medicine, which was first written 
in the early 1970s, Medicaid would rise and fall according to fiscal rather than 
humanitarian objectives.  The Medicaid entitlement to individuals was weak,125 so weak 
that it was balanced against costs as a matter of course.  In fact, costs often cause 
retractions or restriction in the entitlement.  It was not the entitlement of strict scrutiny or 
a fundamental interest of the 14th Amendment.  It was also not the entitlement of social 
insurance programs  earned and paid for.  Finally, it was not the entitlement of strictly 
federal means-tested programs (SSI, Food Stamps) which clearly involved the federal 
courts in disputes with agencies.  The interaction of federalism, means-testing, and 
categorical distinctions in the Medicaid program created a very weak individual 
entitlement indeed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The enactment of Medicaid -- and Medicare -- was the great shock wave in 
American health policy.  The year 1965 is the year America got its version of a national 
health effort.  Business and distributional interests would play a key role in bargaining 
the institutional structure of Medicaid and Medicare.  For in the U.S., the private business 
infrastructure buoys the government health programs -- and in time, this arrangement has 
become reciprocal.   
It is no accident that creative federalism was at the heart of the Medicaid compact.  
This was FDRs federalism, and it was LBJs brand of federalism too.  A big believer in 
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gradualism, Wilbur Cohen fashioned Medicaid to be a possible basis for national health 
reform.  Wilbur Mills, the powerful Ways and Means Committee Chairman, would later 
comment that the Medicaid open matching structure was not a policy reform he agreed 
with in retrospect.  He was leery of its inflationary propensity.  Nonetheless, a 
monumental shock wave for Medicaid was the 1967 Social Security Amendments.  
Severely restructuring the original Medicaid compact, one of the countrys foremost 
Medicaid experts called these 1967 amendments the deal with the devil.126  After New 
York and California structured programs that would spend as much for their states as was 
projected for funding the entire Medicaid program, the Medicaid rules were re-written.  
This was the beginning of the re-structuring of the original principles of the 
Medicaid program.  States indigent care populations far outstripped the newly 
constructed Medicaid boundaries after the 1967 re-working.127  The momentum tipped 
toward an eventual reneging on the promise for states to try to cover all their indigent 
populations, first postponing the Comprehensiveness Provision in 1969 and then 
dismissing it altogether in 1970.   
And now, in the flanks awaited a whole new team of policy professionals -- 
waiting to re-fashion the American welfare state in their own way.  President Nixon was 
both progressive and conservative.  An anomaly and a fascinating study of the American 
welfare state are his Administrations negotiations around its agenda for reform.  This is 
the topic of the next chapter.  Medicaid was caught in the maelstrom and, at times, was 
addressed specifically by an Administration that had impressive plans for the American 
welfare state.  The next chapter investigates the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administration 
eras in terms of Medicaid federalism, the policy bargaining that shaped it, and all of the 
macro forces that pressured its development.
                                                
126 Interview with Author, October 31, 2006. 
127 Interview with Author, October 31, 2006. 
  133
 
 
5. THE WATERSHED YEARS, NEW 
FEDERALISM, AND PROPOSALS FOR A NEW 
FEDERAL ROLE IN  
MEDICAID 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Nixon years are among the most intriguing in American social policy history.  
Nixons domestic agenda included proposals for a federal minimum income, national 
health insurance, and a renewed role for the federal government towards the Medicaid 
population.  These policy positions, with no information regarding the specifics, point to 
a seemingly progressive, even liberal, social policy agenda.  Nevertheless, President 
Nixon espoused a New Federalism and a social policy agenda claiming to be antithetical 
to LBJs War on Poverty.  His use of the federal government in social policy supported 
the development of localized private entities, particularly prepaid capitated arrangements 
such as health maintenance organizations, and worked towards uniform standards linked 
with personal responsibility.  He often turned to the rhetoric of equal opportunity in 
collaboration with his numerous federal cost and price control measures.  By the end of 
his term, he had proposed and fought for major structural Medicaid, national health, and 
social policy reform.   
The Nixon era is instrumental in Medicaid policy history for a number of reasons.  
First, the Medicaid law in 1965 was written relatively quickly with very little debate, 
meaning that it was intended that regulation -- or future statutory action -- would further 
define the main precepts behind the program.  The original major precepts were 
expansionary, embraced equal opportunity for those with low incomes in the broader 
health care marketplace, and tied provider payment --particularly for Medicaid hospital 
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care -- to Medicare payment rates.  Instead of further defining Medicaid in expansionary 
terms, the succeeding amendments had limited the program.  During the Nixon era, many 
of the original precepts were abrogated themselves and incremental reform leaned 
towards greater experimentation by states, use of prepaid capitated care, and reductions in 
provider payment for Medicaid services. 
Nixon started his Presidency claiming in his first inaugural address  I ask you to 
share with me today the majesty of the moment1 and ended his Presidency claiming I 
am not a crook.  In between was one of the greatest pushes for a new federal role in 
Medicaid, social policy, and national health reform in the countrys history.  In particular, 
the possibilities for national health reform would not be as imminent again until President 
Clintons national health reform proposal in 1993-94.  Nixon, as Clinton also would 
claim later, presented the most striking welfare state renewal since the New Deal.  The 
epic nature of his national health proposal -- including the parallel federal Medicaid 
reform --  combined with the seriousness with which it was considered lends this effort a 
near big bang status in American social policy.  This chapter reviews the major policy 
bargains, policy environmental factors, and co-evolutionary policy streams that structured 
this watershed era.  
   
NIXON POLICY -- AND HIS SOCIAL WELFARE AGENDA 
 
Nixon policy positions were greatly affected by intense medical price inflation.  
Medicaid costs increased three times more than the number of people served between 
1968 and 1970.2  Also, by 1970, the number of people who received Federally aided 
medical assistance doubled from 1965.3  President Nixons messages regarding health 
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embraced both the language of cost control and of equal opportunity.  He supported the 
inclusion of medical prices in the Economic Stabilization program4 and spoke eloquently 
of the need for equal opportunity regarding financial access in health care.5  Even while 
seemingly identifying victories on equal opportunity from the 1960s as models of what 
he wanted to accomplish in the health area, he was largely critical of many Great Society 
initiatives.6  Regarding the 1965 enactment of Medicare and Medicaid, he repeatedly 
blamed the architects for ignoring the laws of supply and demand.  Repeatedly 
throughout his Presidency he derided the social planners of the Great Society for the 
medical inflation that far outpaced other prices.  It does little goodto increase the 
demand for care unless we also increase the supply.This axiom was ignored when 
Medicaid and Medicare were created -- and the nation paid a high price for that error.7 
The Presidents policy positions and priorities have been described as ironic, 
contradictory, even schizophrenic.  At the very least, President Nixons policy views 
cannot be cleanly pinpointed on the ideological spectrum.  In biographies attempting to 
grasp Nixons Presidency, it is offered that Nixons compassionate conservatism was 
never communicated effectively to the public and also that welfare matters absorbed 
more of his interest than any other domestic issue.8  Perhaps, the message is clearest in 
his own memoirs: I wanted to be an activist President in domestic policy, but I wanted 
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to be certain that the things we did had a chance of working.  Nixons Federal 
Assistance Plan (FAP) for cash welfare families failed but the debates around the 
initiative introduced language and thought on minimum income proposals and use of the 
federal government to standardize benefits across states.  After the Nixon Presidency, the 
tally card read victories scored in creating a minimum income for the blind, elderly and 
disabled via the new Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program and a revolutionized 
Food Stamp program.  Unintended spin-offs included the Earned Income Tax Credit, 
which was neatly hidden in a massive tax bill by Senator Long after Nixon had already 
left office9 and a monumental change in the institutional rules governing the budget, 
instigated by Nixons impoundment of federal funds. 
 
THE WATERSHED ERA 
 
Shortly after winning a razor-close election, Nixon quipped: its time to get 
down to the nut-cutting.10  The 1970s mark a watershed era in American policy.11  If one 
year was pinpointed as the turnaround, when the cover was closed on a previous era and 
the book opened on the new age, it was 1974.  In entitlement bargaining, including for 
Medicaid, the apex of the turnaround is marked by enactment of the Congressional 
Budget and Impoundment Control Act (P.L. 93-344).  Importantly, 1974 marks the 
resignation of President Nixon following the culmination of the Watergate Scandal.  The 
Budget Revolution was also instigated by the Presidents decisions to impound billions 
of federal dollars appropriated by Congress.12   
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Via the Budget Act, the institutional rules that shaped social policy bargaining 
were re-written, the Congressional Budget Office created, and Congressional Committee 
responsibilities surrounding the budget re-designed.  Pre-1974, many social legislation 
initiatives were part of amendments to the Social Security Act.  After the rule changes in 
1974-- not fully effectuated until 1980 and 1981 when Reconciliation was further 
defined-- social policy legislation was more often than not enacted in Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation (OBRA) bills.  This institutional rule change -- as mundane the details 
may seem -- marks the most fundamental shift in how American social policy is 
negotiated in history.     
Other major shifts of the era include the ideological trajectory of the Supreme 
Court moving substantially to the right with four new Nixon appointees.  New 
Constitutional welfare rights were no longer a viable possibility.13  Second, in addition to 
Congress imposing deep limits on Executive power with the enactment of the 
aforementioned Congressional Budget Act of 1974, it also began providing guidance and 
earmarks to federal agencies with greater intensity.  The early 1970s also marks a 
transformation in the rules of the United States Congress, discussed in more detail later in 
this section.  Medicaids pre-eminent House Ways and Means Committee was stripped of 
a great deal of deference via numerous rule changes, which culminated with Wilbur 
Mills resignation.  Hence, the exit in 1975 of the man who sponsored Kerr-Mills, the 
predecessor to Medicaid, and who had included Medicaid in the three-pronged 1965 
enactment.  Medicaids jurisdiction was transferred in 1975 to the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee, thus separating it from Medicare Part A, which remained under 
the jurisdiction of Ways and Means.   
Numerous retirements of institutional economists and administrators who had 
institutional knowledge back to the New Deal added to the tectonic shift of the mid-
1970s.  Finally, inflation and the economic trajectory began to undermine social policy 
initiatives, until finally President Ford in 1975 decided to carefully watch any costly new 
federal commitments.  As if this all was not enough, there was a paradigm shift of major 
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proportions in macro-economic thought around the 1974-75 recession, discussed in the 
next part.  On the Revenue side, tax policy also was going through a metamorphosis, with 
negotiations emphasizing efficiency moreso than redistribution or economic justice.14  
More generally, citizen faith in the State to solve social problems was tarnished by the 
Watergate scandal.  In aggregate, American political economy was never the same.  A 
neoliberalism was gaining ground on social democracy in many advanced democracies.  
The ground was fertile for a new wave of thinking, for the Me Generation, out of which 
would sprout Reagan-Thatcherism.15  Federalism would be used instrumentally in wholly 
new ways in this new era -- shaped by the institutional rule changes of the Nixon era.  
Medicaid, far from being part of the block granting efforts of Nixons New Federalism, 
instead was part of the social welfare state deemed in need of federal intervention, 
standardization, and equal opportunity. 
 
Changes in Macro-Economics and Changing of the Guard in Administration 
 
As Walt Rostow observed, the economy in the early 1970s experienced a turning 
pointa break as sharp as those of the 1790s, 1840s, 1890s, and 1930s.16  From the 
post-war boom of the 1940s until the late 1960s, the economy had surged, only to begin a 
descent in the 1970s.  The 1974-75 recession included inflation and stagnation -- 
stagflation.  Instead of inflation or recession, as conventional theory, including 
neoclassical Keynesianism the 1970s thus brought inflation with recession.17  This 
created an environment of tectonic shift in macroeconomic theorizing.  As Rosenof 
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recounts: The dissonance of the 1970s broke apart the neoclassical Keynesian synthesis 
of the boom decades and sent economists flying in various directions.18  Further, he 
writes, The recession of 1974-75, linked to inflation, triggered the sense that a new era 
was at hand.19  The new era was fertile ground for what would lead to Reaganomics.  It 
led to the resurgence of interest in planning and subsequent industrial policy and to a 
period of great influence of monetarism and a vogue of jejune supply-side economics.20 
Generally, in administrative dealings, there was a vital sea change in expertise, as 
well.  The New Dealers, many of them economists, were trained in a tradition that 
considered historicity, political, social, and cultural climate changes in their design and 
implementation of the 1935 Social Security Act.  Prior to the Nixon era, the link to 
FDRs Administration was evident; many Administration appointees had institutional 
memories that went back that far.  Also, there was an important link to the University of 
Wisconsin, where many New Deal economists had been trained.  Many of these experts 
proceeded to play a major role in administrative policy development and Social Security 
Act politics through the Great Society era, as well.   
When Nixon took office, this marked the official retirement -- in official 
government -- of many of these experts, including Wilbur Cohen who had played a major 
role in orchestrating Medicaids passage in 1965.  In 1973, the Social Security 
Administration was further cleared of experts from an earlier era.  Notably, Robert Ball 
resigned as Social Security Commissioner in 1973.21  In combination with the retirement 
of Wilbur Mills, many institutional economists who had orchestrated SSA development 
to that point were in the past. 
With the retirement, optional or de-facto by Nixons Presidential victory, of many 
of these experts, a link to the New Deal and Great Society past was breached.  The 
Administrative capacity and knowledge base of the Social Security Administration and 
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) agencys links to the Reform past were 
diminished.  The new appointees represented a different epoch and many of the 
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economists of this era emphasized static neoclassical economics, now the dominant 
paradigm in universities.  A final trend in Administrative responsibilities that contributed 
to the watershed moment of the mid-1970s was the continuing de-emphasis of the 
Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) and also the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) in 
favor of reliance on the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  The reliance on 
OMB would become particularly salient in 1981, but indeed it had already been well 
under way before the watershed 1970s. 
 
Congressional Power Shift 
 
 In the early 1970s a series of rule changes in the United States Congress critically 
affected social policy bargaining.  Through enactment of the Congressional Budget Act, 
Congress had wrestled power from the Executive.  They also began making much more 
specific instructions in legislation to federal agencies.22  Also, in part stemming from 
Watergate, accountability was a new catch phrase.  The Budget Act of 1974 had created 
the Senate Budget Committee, created the Congressional Budget Office, and re-organized 
the power structure in Congress.  Also, the massive class of Freshman Democrats in the 
94th Congress -- comprising 75 new House members -- further instigated rules reforms 
that had been brewing for many years.23  In 1975, Democrats removed three sitting 
chairs, pressured another into resigning, and weakened the House Ways and Means 
Committee.24   
For Medicaid, the Ways and Means Committee, so instrumental in its enactment 
and evolution up until that point, went through a major transformation.  The progenitor of 
                                                
22 Allen Schick in The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, and Process (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
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Medicaid, Wilbur Mills decided after reclaiming his Congressional seat in the 1974 
election that he would not seek re-election in his now customary post of Chairman of the 
Ways and Means Committee.  Scandal involving an evening swim with an exotic dancer 
in Washington, D.C.s Tidal Basin had made national news followed shortly thereafter by 
an appearance with the same dancer in a Boston night club.25  The changing institutional 
rules of the United States Congress coincided with the end of the Congressional career of 
one of the most influential tax and social policy legislators in American history.  
After 1975, Committee appointees were made by the Democratic Steering and 
Policy Committee instead of Ways and Means; Ways and Means was required to have at 
least six subcommittees making it more difficult for the full committee to keep 
controversial items off the congressional agenda; the Committee was enlarged; most 
markups were held in open as opposed to closed sessions; most bills were considered 
under a limited rule that permitted designated floor amendments instead of the 
preferential closed rule enjoyed previously by Ways and Means.26  Vitally for Medicaid, 
Energy and Commerce took complete jurisdiction over Medicaid and partial jurisdiction 
over Medicare Part B.  Both were previously under complete jurisdiction of the Ways and 
Means Committee.27  In combination with the new budget rules, a new time in Medicaid 
policy bargaining had begun.   
 Also, the nature of Democratic party was changing.  A contingent of The 
Watergate Babies, the freshman Democrats, affiliated more with suburban voters than 
with the Reform Politics of the partys recent past.  As James Blanchard (D-MI) said, 
Clearly we dont think of ourselves as New Dealers at all -- or proponents of the Great 
Society either.28  Organized labor also began to split into different factions outside of the 
centralized oversight of the AFL-CIO.29  The Democrats reform wing was splintering.  
Julian Zelizer summarizes the discernable change in at least a faction of the party, In the 
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minds of many Watergate Babies, suburban voters were not always enthusiastic about the 
interests of organized labor, were skeptical about welfare, and were eager to limit 
taxes.30 
 
COST CONTROL 
  
The Nixon Administration had inherited a Medicaid program without many built-
in cost control mechanisms.  In the 1970s, the federalism shift in Medicaid was embodied 
in the federal role in cost control.  While during enactment, the federal government was 
kept out of cost control because this would have been federal control, in the Nixon era, 
Congressional hearings repeatedly pounded the point that there had to be stronger federal 
direction in order to control federal costs.  States also wanted federalization.  While 
there were, indeed, continuing requests from states for more flexibility in state 
administration, that was primarily to cut costs; there were few advocates of states rights 
pressing for returning welfare medicine to the states..The states were, rather, pressing 
for federalization.31 
The Nixon Administration appeared at times to approach cost control as an 
obsession and at other times as an afterthought.  The Nixon era was filled with 
idiosyncrasies, many of which indicated mixes of ideologies, policy responses, and even 
seemingly contradictory policy.  At times, rising costs were used as a primary argument 
for aggressive reform, whereas at other times as the major defense for a guarded policy 
response.   In general, though, a discernible shift was evident in the policy drift towards 
cost trumping redistribution concerns.  Whereas, it had been resolved that redistribution 
was best placed at the federal level, the role of the federal government in holding down 
costs was being re-defined.  A general wage-price freeze was instituted by the Nixon 
Administration in August 1971 and re-defined in December limiting doctors fees to 
annual increases of 2.5% and hospital charges to increases of 6%.32    
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Cost control was not solely the province of the federal government, as states 
began to establish certificate of need programs.  By the end of 1972, 20 states required 
medical institutions, usually both hospitals and nursing homes, to get state approval for 
construction projects and other large capital investments.33  Some states also ventured 
into regulation of hospital rates -- some for Medicaid beneficiaries only and some for all 
payers.  While mandatory rate regulation did not truly gain steam until the Ford era, it 
began in New York in 1971.34   In 1974 The National Health Planning and Resource 
Development Act established as the foundation of a new planning system some 200 
Health Systems Agencies (HSAs).35  Also in 1974, ERISA (Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act) legislation transformed health policy federalism when it superseded 
state power to regulate self-insured health insurance policies.  Instrumental federalism 
was at work -- even in the age of New Federalism. 
At the same time that cost control was pursued, regulation multiplied.  The new 
block grants and general revenue sharing of the Nixon era distributed federal influence 
into communities in ways that amplified federal power since many localities were 
exposed to this influence for the first time.  The net result was that Federal expenditures 
for many domestic functions were increased dramatically, and an unprecedented federal 
intergovernmental regulatory presence was institutionalized.36  With this, the irony of 
the Nixon Administration again was in play.  While increased regulation may increase 
costs; regulation also can structure cost control mechanisms. 
 
Managed Care 
 
The Social Security Amendments of 1970 made health maintenance organizations 
an option for both Medicaid and Medicare.  Further, the HMO Act of 1973 took steps to 
encourage the growth of managed care -- another example of federal law pre-empting 
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state laws when it serves a federal purpose.  The Nixon Administrations interest in 
managed care was defended on both cost and equity grounds, marking again the bridge it 
played between the Great Society and Reagan eras.  On the one hand, HMOS provided 
cost containment via capitation and on the other they instituted a one-class medical 
system with Medicaid and private beneficiaries in indistinguishable settings.37  More 
often then not though the Nixon defense of managed care was on efficiency and cost 
grounds.  In another juxtaposition, Nixons Administration recast what had been a 
fluffy far-left concept into a conservative one.   
The McNerney Taskforce on Medicaid in 1970 endorsed the innovative 
approach of the Administrations Health Maintenance Organization proposal to provide 
an option for Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries to elect to receive health services 
through a single organization that provides coordinated services financed through prepaid 
capitation.38 Some states picked up the mantle on managed care.  The State of 
Washington began contracting with GroupHealth in 1970.39  In 1972 various regional 
operations of Kaiser-Permanente were accepting Medicaid enrollments in three different 
states.40  Finally, Governors Ronald Reagan and Nelson Rockefeller also pushed the 
HMO concept at the state level.41 
 
Medicaid Fraud 
 
 In addition to cost inflation, enactment of Medicaid had resulted in major 
problems with fraud and unscrupulous medical practitioners maximizing their profits 
through wrangling the federal and state payment systems.  Reports were rampant in the 
media and the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), the investigative arm of the 
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Congress, found its own examples.  The Associated Physicians of Cook County Hospital, 
a non-profit Chicago association of doctors and teachers, had billed the Government a 
total of $1.6 million within a year.  The GAO witnesses reported that in 129 out of 747 
cases of billing by the Association there was no evidence that any medical service had 
been performed.42  HEW Under-Secretary Veneman pointed the finger at federalism for 
lack of oversight and accountability: Federal officials have been lax in not seeing to it 
that states establish and employee effective controls on utilization and costs, and states 
have been unwilling to assume the responsibility on their own.43  For many doctors, 
Medicaid and Medicare were a lucrative source of added income; for a few, the programs 
were a goldmine.44 
 
RIGHTS ADJUDICATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY CASES 
 
 The late 1960s and early 1970s proved to be a time of contrasts in rights 
adjudication.  While substantive welfare rights were never found in the Constitution, 
procedural and statutory cases in federal courts did expand public assistance programs.  
Since Medicaid eligibility was linked directly to the AFDC programs, many of these 
cases had direct relevance for the Medicaid program.  Also, many of the precedents set in 
cash program cases extended to other similarly structured means-tested programs, of 
which Medicaid was one.  Two major findings from this era are that a distinction was 
maintained between Economic Matters and Individual Rights, the former being the 
province of legislatures and executive power and the latter being in the arena of the 
courts.45  
While these seminal cases in welfare rights provide an important framework for 
understanding the evolution of institutional rules and interbranch relationships during the 
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Nixon era, another vital development during this era was the establishment via case law 
of federal rights of action for Medicaid recipients -- both in Constitutional and in Social 
Security Act statutory claims.  According to Timothy Jost, Unlike the Medicare statute, 
the Medicaid statute does not explicitly provide for federal judicial review of Medicaid 
eligibility or claims decisions.  Nevertheless, almost from the outset, the federal courts 
have allowed Medicaid beneficiaries to challenge state Medicaid decisions under 42 
U.S.C. section 1983, a Reconstruction-era civil rights law.46  Between 1968 and 1975, 
the Supreme Court decided 18 cases involving the AFDC program that firmly established 
the right of welfare recipients under federal/state programs, including Medicaid, to 
remedies in the federal courts.47  A series of several Social Security Act cases moved 
towards establishing that Section 1983 provided the cause of action for suits challenging 
violations of the Social Security Act.48 
 
Welfare Rights As They Relate to Medicaid Federalism 
 
The area of welfare rights adjudication shifted with the Nixon Administration.  
The tenor of the Supreme Court was dramatically altered to the conservative right by the 
narrow Republican Presidential victory.  Nixon appointed Warren Burger as the New 
Chief Justice in 1969; Harry Blackmun in 1970; and Lewis Powell and William 
Rehnquist in 1972.49  The change in the make-up of the court, no doubt, affected the 
majorities in future cases and re-cast the ideological make-up of the Court.  However, 
some scholars have noted that this change is not the about-face that it may seem in 
welfare rights adjudication.  While there was definitely a change in ideology, in 
leadership, and in political pressures, some have noted that the judicial pathways that 
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failed to find a substantive right to welfare in the Constitution were set long ago.50  In 
short, liberal justices had set the pathways for these findings by discrediting natural law 
ideas in the past. 
The 1970 Goldberg v. Kelly decision51 recognized the constitutional rights of 
welfare recipients to notice and predetermination hearings, established welfare benefits as 
statutory entitlements and expressly rejected the argument that public assistance 
benefits were a privilege and not a right.52  The Court also famously quoted a Yale 
Law Journal Article by Charles Reich in its decision, which outlined an argument that 
used the language of classicism -- an argument based on property rights -- to defend the 
poor.  By linking public assistance to property, classical property rights arguments were 
co-opted for use by the poor.  This case was an important precedent for establishing the 
right for Medicaid recipients to notification and hearing prior to dismissal of benefits.  
There were some procedural rights for welfare recipients in the Constitution.  The case 
for substantive Constitutional rights was seriously hindered two weeks later in Dandridge 
v. Williams.  The Courts conclusion: the intractable economic, social, and even 
philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the 
business of the Court.53  Federal substantive rights for welfare recipients would become 
the pervue of Statutory cases, with serious Constitutional challenges relegated to cases 
linked with other vital interests.  For example, a line of cases challenged the use of 
federal Medicaid funding for abortion.  
Key to federalism issues, the 1973 San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez case was 
the death knell for the idea that the Constitution protects social and economic rights.54  
The Supreme Court reversed a District Court decision that found wealth a suspect 
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classification and education a fundamental interest in the claim that the Texas school 
financing framework, with its reliance on wide differentials between localities in 
education financing based on local tax revenues, and thus wealth of districts, was 
discrimination under Equal Protection.55  The Court found generally regarding this line of 
cases that The lesson of these cases [is that it] is not the province of this Court to create 
substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing [equal protection].56  
The Rodriguez decision was particularly important for Medicaid because it involved a 
policy situation, in Education, where local fiscal capacity affected differentials in quality 
of services.  The Court did not intervene despite these disadvantages by geography.  In 
the opposite direction, State courts have often found that local education financing 
disparities due to differentials in local tax capacity are against their state constitutions.57  
This has opened up the possibility that similar challenges to intra-state differentials in 
Medicaid eligibility and benefits could be successful. 
 
NIXONS FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN AND NEW FEDERALISM -- 
AT ODDS OR IN SYNC? 
 
For much of his Presidency, Nixon prioritized welfare reform as his Number One 
Domestic Priority.  During this era, Medicaid reform was linked to and sprouted from 
Welfare reform.  When Medicaid reform was proposed, it was part of the income 
maintenance reform addendums.  On August 8, 1969 in a national television address, 
President Nixon outlined his idea for a national income floor that would be graduated as a 
familys income rose so that employment would not completely cut-off benefits.  The 
negative income tax concept was proposed by conservative scholars, Milton and Rose 
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Friedman, in the 1962 book Capitalism and Freedom.58  This inspired multimillion-
dollar field experiments in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s to measure its effects 
on labor supply.59  A major consideration in the debate of how to structure a minimum 
income requirement is federalism: should the federal government administer a national 
benefit or require a minimum benefit but leave the states in charge to provide a greater 
effort if they so chose.60  Many of these same federalism questions soon would be the 
focus of proposed Medicaid reform. 
Support of national involvement in cash welfare programs was built on economic 
theory regarding marginal rates of taxation and their effects on work incentives.  This 
incentive by welfare recipients to seek employment was one reason that the national 
influence towards uniformity received support from conservatives.  Liberals embraced 
the concept because the federal minimum was seen to raise overall welfare expenditures, 
as well as raise the floor in many states.  Interestingly, in Nixon speeches on his 
minimum floor proposal for the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
population, he cites both of these as support for his plan. 
This embrace of national minimum standards introduces a baffling character when 
matched with his New Federalism.  In the same speeches in which he vowed to regain 
control of our national destiny by returning a greater share of control to State and local 
governments he proposed minimum national standards for income levels.61  He 
seemingly embraced federal control via regulation, cost controls, and national 
comprehensive planning while at the same time establishing a New Federalism policy 
agenda.  Nixons New Federalism included: Proposals to group over one hundred 
categorical grant programs into a small number of block grants; Revenue sharing that 
used the progressive federal income tax to transfer funds to state and local governments; 
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Management reforms to improve program coordination; and Nationalizing public sector 
responsibilities where this would improve performance -- including AFDC and Medicaid.  
Supposedly suspicious of fat national government, Nixons Administration 
oversaw the greatest expansion of Federal regulation of state and local governments up 
until that point in American history.62  Even in comparison to the Great Society era, 
Timothy Conlan in his review of American federalism writes,  
 
By nearly every measure, real and relative, the greatest increases in spending for 
individuals occurred during the Nixon administration.  Entitlement spending -- 
including both direct payments to individuals and grants for individuals -- more 
than doubled during this period.  Even in constant dollars, spending for such 
programs rose 76 percent between 1969 and 1974.  Still larger increases occurred 
in programs targeted at the poor.  Food stamp outlays multiplied tenfold during 
this period.  Housing assistance to the poor was up five times.  The Medicaid 
budget more than doubled.  In contrast to the 1960s, entitlement spending relative 
to other federal outlays and the national economy as a whole also increased 
sharply.63 
 
Sorting out Nixons New Federalism in light of his seemingly progressive ideas 
for the American welfare state involves addressing the incongruence of some policy 
positions.  In attempting to sort out the irony, one explanation is that Nixon favored 
rationalization of government which included federalization of functions when this 
proved more efficient.  In describing his notions of federalism, Nixon said, If we put 
more power in more places, we can make government more creative in more places.64  
This faith in the creative uses of federalism to improve government performance is 
reminiscent of LBJs creative federalism, and from a similar philosophic thread as FDRs 
embrace of state governments in certain initiatives, particularly cash welfare.   
In other words, Nixons rationalization of government roles placed several major 
initiatives of the welfare state clearly in the federal jurisdiction.  As Conlan explains, 
Thus the Nixon administration sought to decentralize Federal involvement in some 
traditional state and local fields -- community development, education, and manpower 
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training -- and at the same time proposed a complete national assumption of the costs of 
income maintenance, on the grounds that a more uniform, effective, and equitable 
welfare system could best be achieved through greater nationalization.65  Rationalization 
of government functions has often been used as reasoning by conservatives to justify 
decentralization of the welfare state -- or at least devolution, some would say buck-
passing -- to state governments.  Nixons use of creative federalism to organize welfare 
state functions at the federal level is, then, an intriguing puzzle. 
In the end, the attempt to instill uniformity in the nations welfare system did not 
standardize incomes for mothers and children.  Although the Plan was modified, 
additional opposition came from liberals and the National Welfare Rights Organization.  
They charged that benefits were set too low and work requirements were to onerous.66 
The provisions for the aged, blind, and disabled did introduce federalization of a 
minimum floor via the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.  Also, the Food 
Stamp program was revolutionized even though FAP did not materialize.  By 1974, 
Food Stamps constituted a form of minimum national income, albeit at a very low 
level.67 Another byproduct of the FAP debates involved the eventual Earned Income 
Tax Credit (EITC) program.  In a spin-off, EITC was neatly tucked into a large tax bill 
after Nixon left office. 
 
MEDICAID BARGAINING IN THE NIXON ERA, 1969 - 1972 
 
Proposals for Medicaid reform in the Nixon era were attached to his number one 
domestic priority -- welfare reform.  During Senate debates on Nixons Federal 
Assistance Program (FAP), the notch effect in the Medicaid program became a major 
negotiating hurdle.  The Senate Finance Committee sent the FAP back to the White 
House to work out the glitches in the notch effect with Medicaid, Food Stamps, and other 
welfare programs that were connected to income maintenance.  The Medicaid reform 
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proposal, called the Family Health Insurance Plan (FHIP), was unveiled by Nixon in 
February 1971, and was shaped to work with his minimum income proposal.  So, 
Medicaid reform was inextricably linked to cash welfare reform. 
Other reforms in the Medicaid program were proceeding while the 
Administrations structural overhaul was incubating.  Many of these incremental changes 
were targeted at reducing costs.  In 1969 Congress enacted legislation (PL 91-56) that 
permitted states to cut back on nonbasic Medicaid services such as dentistry as long as 
the state could show it was trying to control costs and also postponed Section 1903(e), 
the Comprehensive Care requirement, an original principle behind the Medicaid 
program.68  Also HEW regulation was established to limit payments to states for medical 
practitioners to the 75th percentile of January 1969 customary charges.69  Several 
associations included the Health Insurance Association of American (HIAA) called for 
prospective reimbursement to hospitals.70  Finally, the use of Utilization Review and Peer 
Service Review Organizations (PSROs) in medical legislation to control both quality and 
costs presented new battles regarding who would oversee medical institutions at the local 
level. 
After the House, with an income floor of $2,400, easily passed the Family 
Assistance Plan, the Senate sent the measure back to the White House after only three 
days of deliberations.  The Committee had proposed that the formulas for the other social 
welfare programs be revised so that benefits would taper off gradually as income 
increased.71  An example of a mother of three in New York City with no income was 
particularly poignant in showing that increased earnings under the current FAP proposal 
would in some cases be deleterious to the family because Medicaid and food stamp 
eligibility would be lost.  As John J. Williams (R - Del.) stated on July 23, Is this a 
proper (work) incentive?  If a man earns $5,000 and his boss offers him a $1,000 raise, 
hed better spit in his eye because hell end up $5 worse off.72  The dreaded notch 
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effect was corrected on the income side of the FAP proposal but not in Medicaid, food 
stamps, or public housing. 
In a statement entitled Statement Announcing Extensions of Welfare Reform 
Proposals, the Medicaid reform was first announced on June 10, 1970.73  Lumped into a 
group called Welfare Reform Proposals, Nixon proposed basic amendments to the 
Family Assistance Act of 1970.  The most important proposal I make today is to reform 
the Medicaid program.  Medicaid is plagued by serious faults.  Costs are mounting 
beyond reason.  Services vary considerably from State to State.  Benefits are only 
remotely related to Family resources.  Eligibility may terminate abruptly as a family 
moves off welfare, often losing more in medical benefits than it gains in income.74  
Described as part of the Administrations income strategy against poverty, more details 
were promised at the beginning of the next Congress.  Still, in the meantime, there was a 
revised bill sent back to Senate Finance that meshed Medicaid, food stamp and housing 
programs with the welfare system.75 
Less than a week after the health proposals were initially announced by the 
Administration, the American Medical Association (AMA) and the National Medical 
Association (NMA) debuted Medicredit, a structural reform plan that was tied to the 
federal income tax.  Those with $300 or less in income tax --assumed to be the Medicaid 
population-- would be able to purchase private health insurance at government expense.  
Those with higher incomes would receive Federal tax credits on a sliding scale to help 
pay for the costs of health insurance premiums.76   
 Meanwhile, in Senate Finance Committee Testimony the Secretary of HEW, 
Elliot L. Richardson, provided more information on the Administrations Medicaid 
reform ideas.  His introduction into the Medicaid area of his testimony emphasized the 
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need for significant New Federal initiativesin the health field, stating further this 
[A]dministration is committed to the reform of the [M]edicaid program.  He continued,   
We believe that this [Family Health Insurance Proposal]will effectively integrate the 
Nations major health program for the poor with the proposed family assistance program 
-- FAP.  This strategy will fundamentally restructure the medical program for families 
with children.77  He pointed out as a weakness of Medicaid the serious geographic and 
other inequities resulting from state by state variation where a disproportionate share of 
Federal matching funds has been spentin only a few of our States.  Also, The sudden 
death loss of Medicaid benefits when income reaches a specified level -- the so-called 
notch problem -- is an unacceptable defect in the current structure of Medicaid.78 
 
Less Critical Changes -- In The Meantime Medicaid Reform 
 
Secretary Richardson reported to Senate Finance what he termed as less critical 
changes for the Medicaid program.  As intermediate steps prior to Medicaid reform, the 
Secretary suggested greater federal financing of state-run utilization review and other 
surveillance.  He reiterated Nixons suggestions for increased matching for selected 
outpatient services and decreased federal matching for some institutional services in 
order to encourage the former.79  This was intended to increase use of Intermediate Care 
facilities and home health services and decrease nursing home utilization.  Finally he 
suggested that Congress make changes in title XIX to authorize the States to conduct 
experiments on a statewide, area wide, county, city, or neighborhood basis.  We are 
interested in encouraging experiments with  the use of different combinations of 
benefits and different types of benefit packages for different population groups, and 
limited use of co-payments and deductibles for medically needy.  The Secretary thus 
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supported intra-category benefit differentials and cost sharing -- striking at two 
fundamental principles of the original Medicaid design. 
Originally, states were required to provide equal medical care to all persons in the 
broad classes of recipients -- the categorically needy or the medically needy, for 
example.80  While providing care to those who were medically needy was at each states 
option, once a state decided to have medically needy coverage then they must provide 
equal treatment.  Secretary Richardsons suggestion went against the original grain 
regarding patient cost sharing.  The 1965 law prohibited states from exacting any 
deduction, cost sharing or similar chargewith respect to inpatient hospital services, 
while requiring that charges for other services be reasonably related to the recipients 
income and resources.81  Finally, the Secretary called for the allowance of 
experimentation in managed care and pre-paid capitation methods, as well as allowance 
for State discretion in provider payment.  Previously, hospital payment, mirrored that of 
Medicares reasonable cost.82   
The call for increased state experimentation -- within HEW oversight -- 
overshadowed the eventual progression of state Medicaid waivers of federal requirements 
as a primary aspect of Medicaid federalism.  Broad SSA 1115 were allowed from 1962 -- 
and were not specific only to the Medicaid program, allowing for broad based state 
experimentation.  Secretary Richardson proposed though a whole series of targeted 
experimentation by states that foreshadowed the future of the program.  In fact, the 
serious geographic and other differentials in state-by-state programs that the Secretary 
targeted for correction would only become more pronounced in the future when state and 
local experimentation exploded through the evolution of Medicaid waivers of various 
types, and forms.  This waiver revolution was in the future -- and so these two ideals, 
greater geographic equity and state experimentation -- did not seem overly contradictory 
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at the time.  These would become the type of dilemmas that Medicaids federalism would 
create and deepen over decades. 
 
Health Maintenance Organizations and Medicaid Federalism 
 
While the welfare reform appeared to be floundering, the Administrations 
attempts to bolster use of managed care were moving forward.  The Task Force on 
Medicaid and related programs, also called the McNerney Commission, in 1970 endorsed 
the innovative approach of the Administrations Health Maintenance Organization 
proposal to provide an option for Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries to elect to receive 
health services through a single organization that provides coordinated services financed 
through prepaid capitation.83   
The support of health maintenance organizations fit well into the New Federalism 
and Cost Control themes.  Localized delivery organizations could be pre-paid and 
potentially offer more comprehensive benefits than alternate insurance products.  Of 
course, the federal government was stepping in to encourage growth of these local 
entities, but the real irony was the degree to which Republicans were coddling the 
managed care concept.   Previously considered part of the bastion of liberal notions of 
utopian health delivery, President Nixon and, notably California Governor Ronald 
Reagan, were encouraging the growth of prepaid arrangements.  While at the same time 
embracing managed care, the McNerney Taskforce also recommended converting 
Medicaid to a program with a uniform minimum level of health benefits financed 100 
percent by Federal funds, with a further Federal matching with States for certain types of 
supplementary benefits and for individuals not covered under the minimum plan.84 
Federal financing of Medicaid was not antithetical to the use of managed care entities for 
health care delivery at the local level. 
Flexible, decentralized, local networks -- these were all characteristics of 
managed care that lent themselves to New Federalism.  At the same time, managed care 
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was being pushed for those with low-incomes as well as the general population, meaning 
that this delivery method may be the great equalizer.  Possibly, HMOs represented the 
way to finally provide equal opportunity to the poor in the health arena, since the delivery 
networks would be the same for the employed and those with low-incomes.  Equal 
opportunity was matched with assured quality and the prioritization of preventive 
medicine for all managed care beneficiaries.  Thus, managed care seemed to grasp the 
qualities of New Federalism, Cost Control, and Compassionate Conservatism at the 
same time. 
 
FAP Within The Broader Social Security Bill Goes Nowhere 
 
In the Senate Finance Committee, the Committee rejected welfare reform on 
November 20, 1970 by a 10-6 vote and the bill was dropped shortly thereafter  -- even 
though the Nixon Administration attempted to compromise with Senate liberals.85  
Advocates for income recipients thought the work provisions were too harsh and the 
Federal floor was too low at $1,600 to a family of four with no income.  There were 
suggestions in testimony by several advocates that the minimum floor at least be brought 
in line with the Federal Poverty Level.  Others held that the minimum federal floor -- and 
consequent guarantee of federal funds -- would help states with oppressive income 
program costs.  Finally, fiscal conservatives maintained that the plan, as structured, was 
too costly for the federal government.  So, on one side of the spectrum, beneficiary 
advocates demanded a greater minimum amount, while on the other side, a coalition held 
that the aggregate proposal was too great an expense for the federal government.  The 
only ones in favor of the proposal appeared to be the Administration and those who 
hoped it would help states with their own costs.  In testimony, some Governors and 
mayors asked that the federal government take even greater financing responsibility for 
welfare programs.   
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Nixons Formal Proposals on Health Care and the Family Health Insurance Plan 
 
In his 1971 State of the Union Nixon presented four great goals, the most 
important was welfare reform.  Another was health: I will propose a program to 
insure that no American family will be prevented from obtaining basic medical care by 
inability to pay.86  As promised, Nixon outlined his proposals on February 18, 1971 for 
health reform.  His plan for the health sector was broader than one program.  He had a 
multi-faceted health strategy that ranged from initiatives to finding a cure for cancer to 
supporting state systems for monitoring new building of health facilities to a national 
insurance plan.  The National Health Insurance Partnership emphasized partnership not 
paternalism and insurance not nationalized health care.  These distinctions were 
particularly important to understanding the nuances of Nixons mechanism for realizing 
equal opportunity and economic rights in health.  He emphasized four changes for this 
Partnership -- all in the insurance market.  First, he called for greater coverage of 
outpatient, home, and physicians office care by plans.  Second, he pinpointed greater 
coverage of catastrophic costs.  Third, the President singled out a need for greater access 
to health maintenance organizations, and fourth, he highlighted a priority for greater 
access for the poor to the medical system. 87   
He outlined two different initiatives, the National Health Insurance Standards Act 
and the Family Health Insurance Plan (FHIP).  The former would require employers to 
provide basic health insurance coverage for their employees and the latter would meet 
the special needs of poor families who would not be covered by the proposed National 
Health Insurance Standards Act.  The National Health Insurance effort was likened to 
similar actions to assure workers a minimum wage, to provide them with disability and 
retirement benefits, and to set occupational health and safety standards.  The President 
                                                
86 Richard Nixon Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 22, 1971, Item #26, 
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1971 (Washington D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1972), 53. 
87 President Nixons February 18, 1971 message to Congress on health insurance, 1971 CQ Almanac, 38A. 
  159
admonished, Now we should go one step further and guarantee that all workers will 
receive adequate health insurance protection.88 
The FHIP was designed for welfare families -- those covered by the current 
AFDC population who were also the target of FAP.  The aged poor, the blind, and the 
disabled would continue under Medicaid.  Reform was needed Because it [Medicaid] is 
not a national program, its benefits vary widely from State to State it excludes the 
working poor. Benefits can suddenly be cut off when family income rises ever so 
slightlyAnd provides an incentive for poor families to stay on the welfare rolls.  States 
would be relieved of what Nixon termed a considerable burden.89  Also, the eligibility 
ceiling for FHIP would be $5,000 for a family of four and would not have the abrupt 
cutoff of benefits.  This $5,000 ceiling was increased through policy bargaining later, but 
still included a sliding scale on which premium levels were based.  Local committees 
would serve as contractors to the Federal Government to ensure that adequate care was 
being provided.90 
Nixon adhered to the broad principles of cost control, equality of opportunity, and 
quality of care while belying a faith in the private insurance industry to provide the 
practical mechanism for realization of greater principles.  Some saw this faith in the 
insurance industry as misguided, suggesting that the real benefactors of the Presidents 
plan was the insurance industry and not the American people.   
Nixon had at an earlier point likened his welfare state agenda to the type of 
profound change enacted in Roosevelts 1935 Social Security Act.  In his defense of a 
national health partnership his economic rights language seemed to reflect the New Deal 
Presidents Second Bill of Rights precepts.91  Just as our National Government has 
moved to provide equal opportunity in areas such as education, employment and voting, 
so we must now work to expand the opportunity for all citizens to obtain a decent 
standard of medical care.  We must do all we can to remove any racial, economic, social 
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or geographic barriers which now prevent any of our citizens from obtaining adequate 
health protection.  For without good health, no man can fully utilize other opportunities.  
At the end of his speech he went further, quoting Gandhi, It is health which is real 
wealth, and not pieces of gold and silver.92 
Repeatedly, in policy practice and rhetoric, Nixon connected health security to 
income security.  He also emphasized geographic barriers to equal opportunity.  The 
same President who described the essence of the New Federalism as helping regain 
control of our national destiny by returning a greater share of control to State and local 
governments and to the people93 also decried that Medicaid had not accomplished its 
goals because its benefits vary widely from State-to-State and it is not a truly national 
program.94   
If this is seemingly contradictory, it is all Nixon.  With policy positions that were 
contradictory, Nixon was in fact using federalism as an instrumental tool not as the ends.  
The devil is in the details.  Like many in his party, he spoke of returning power to the 
states and localities -- of the arrogance of the patronizing idea that government in 
Washington, D.C. is inevitably more wise.than government at the local or State 
level.95  Nixons use of federalism as an instrumental agent meant that he could pick and 
chose which aspects of federal power he wanted to utilize in order to achieve his partys 
own values.  He believed in national minimums, in the federal government moving to 
ensure this minimal level of uniformity, but he flatly shut the door on nationalized 
health care.  In a similar way he had denied categorically ever wanting a guaranteed 
income which he said assured everyone a minimum income regardless of whether or 
not he was willing to work.96  A right without any responsibilities was different than a 
basic minimum income for those in need.  In health, he disagreed with a nationalized 
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system where local hospital budgets and fee schedules were set by Federal personnel and 
taking other steps which could easily lead to the complete Federal domination of all of 
American medicine.97  Instead, he wanted a national partnership not a nationalized 
health system.  The devil is surely in the details. 
The Medicaid reform was not passed in 1971, nor was any national health reform 
including a national partnership.  There were several competing proposals though 
including the AMAs Medicredit and also The Health Security Act, sponsored jointly by 
Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) as S3 and Rep. Martha Griffiths (D-Mich.) as 
HR22.98  The AFL-CIO, the United Health Workers, and others supported this plan.  It 
proposed a comprehensive national health insurance system for all Americans financed 
partially from increased taxes and partially from federal general revenues.  Medicare 
would be abolished and Medicaid would not pay for services covered under the national 
health plan.  In this way, the Medicaid population would become more indistinguishable 
from people who were employed.99 
Critics of the Administration plan claimed that there were too many differences 
between the two schemes -- one for the employed and the other for the poor.  By 
bifurcating the health insurance program for the employee from the FHIP, the 
Administration had left itself open to the criticism that there existed substantial 
inequalities between the two plans.  Critics threw flak at the Administration plan, 
claiming it would not cut costs. 
 
Rationalized Federalism: The States Take One Piece, Feds Take the Other 
 
The Welfare reform provisions, the White House Priority Number One, were 
removed by House and Senate conferees in the groundbreaking Social Security bill in 
1972.  The provisions provided for a partial federal takeover of welfare but many state 
officials during the Congressional testimony called for greater national administration for 
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public welfare.  Some spoke of welfare generally, including implicitly the medical 
component.  Others made this understanding explicit.  As Preston Smith, the Governor of 
Texas proposed, the Federal Government should completely take over the funding and 
operation of the welfare and medical assistance programs and states will have primary 
responsibility for providing human and social services to citizens.100   
Federalism in American social policy has involved countless suggestions of how 
to change key structural components of programs: from means tested to social insurance; 
from matching to closed grant; from state discretion to federal minimum requirements.  
Another reform method repeatedly proposed has been trades of entire programs within 
the social safety network to different levels of government -- or trades of entire policy 
areas.   
This type of bargaining, Ill take Medicaid, if you take Food Stamps sometimes 
attempts to trade according to broad issue areas.  For example, the hypothetical 
proposition, health lends itself better to the Federal Government and income assistance to 
the states.  Sometimes, the trading is arbitrary, recognizing that there are drawbacks to 
any arrangement and so we may as well flip a coin of which level of government runs 
which program.  At other times, though, the reform suggestions combine Medicaid, 
income maintenance, and food stamps into a broad group of social welfare programs that 
should remain connected.  And the suggested trade is with other distinct policy 
subsystems entirely, such as Community Services or Environmental Policy. 
 
Incremental Changes Comprise Biggest Reform Since 1965 Enactment 
 
By the fall of 1972, no action was taken on the big bang health proposals but 
the incremental changes that did pass in the 1972 Amendments were quite significant in 
their own right.  As Wilbur Mills proclaimed, This bill still contains the most far-
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reaching provisions of any Social Security bill since we passed Medicare in 1965.101  
The new provisions most pertinent to Medicaid federalism include: 
! Medicare was expanded to the disabled and also to those with end 
stage renal disease;  
! Medicaids Comprehensive Care provision, Section 1903 (e), was 
removed;  
! The Medicaid program was extended to intermediate care facilities 
(ICFs), ICFS for the mentally retarded (ICF-MRs), and Mental 
Hospitals for beneficiaries under age 22;  
! States were allowed to waive Federal statewideness and 
comparability provisions for Medicaid recipients so that states could 
(with HEW approval) provide more generous health services than 
those in the state Medicaid plan through prepaid comprehensive health 
programs;102 
! State experiments with provider prospective payment systems were 
allowed;  
! Section 1902(d) -- the maintenance of effort requirement -- was 
repealed -- so that states could reduce expenditures on Medicaid from 
year to year;  
! States were allowed to define reasonable costs for Medicaid 
inpatient care separate from the Medicare definition; and  
! The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program -- further 
establishing what would be a key Medicaid constituency defined by 
Federal minimum criteria -- was created.103   
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While these provisions were profound, the original intent of the proposal was 
much greater.  In fact, the breadth of the Administrations social policy agenda had been 
considered the most ambitious since 1935, the year the Social Security Act was created.  
Some, however, were unimpressed with the results of the bill, HR1, which had opened 
the 92nd Congress.  Robert Price (R - Texas) left little ambiguity of his opinion of the 
bill, describing it as an emasculated, mangled and toothless shadow of the original 
proposal. 104 
 
The Federal Government Backs Off of Comprehensive Care and Statewideness 
Requirements 
 
 Notably, the provision from the original Medicaid legislation, section 1903(e), 
requiring states to progress towards comprehensive Medicaid coverage was finally 
repealed after having been postponed previously to a 1977 deadline.  This provision 
required that states make efforts in the direction of broadening the scope of the care and 
services available under the plan and in the directions of liberalizing the eligibility 
requirements, with the goal of providing comprehensive care.105  The provision was 
used in the 1967 Congressional hearings by New York State representatives while 
explaining their decision-making where one state program surpassed the cost projected 
originally for the entire federal Medicaid effort.  As New Yorks George K. Wyman 
stated, In fact New York is the only State which has met the 1975 deadline established 
by Congress in Title XIX which requires all States by that time to have provided 
comprehensive medical care for all needy persons.106   
The original principles behind Medicaid were slowly being dismantled and re-
defined.  This marked a reneging of the original principle that states would be expected 
eventually to use Medicaid to provide coverage to all in need.  A major hit for welfare 
medicine advocates, this ideal was never re-instituted.  The Wyman testimony showed 
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the dilemma.  Adhering to states definitions of what they thought 1903(e) 
comprehensive care meant broke the federal bank.  The federal role of redistribution was 
again hitting against its role for a newly forming federal role in cost control.  By allowing 
for state discretion in defining comprehensive care, the open financing of the Medicaid 
program seemed limitless. 
Other major principles of Medicaid, the Statewideness and Comparability 
provisions, were also compromised.  In the case of Medicaid, with HEWs permission, 
states could waive the Statewideness and Comparability provisions in order to provide 
more comprehensive services through prepaid plans than in their State Medicaid plan.  
Payments to HMOs were allowed for both the Medicaid and the Medicare programs.  In 
combination with de-linking of Medicaid to Medicare payment levels by allowing states 
to determine their own definition of reasonable cost and by the allowance of 
experiments in provider prospective payment, Medicaid was increasingly becoming a 
program for state experimentation -- but mostly for cost control methods.  The federal 
rules were changing to prioritize state discretion where it would control costs and not 
where it would expand eligibility or services.  State flexibility was allowed by the federal 
government when it would increasingly privatize through the use of HMOs and limit 
payments to providers through the development of prospective and pre-paid payment 
systems.  Benefits and eligibility were controlled more strongly by the federal 
government through ceilings in the optional medically needy population coverage to 133 
1/3% AFDC levels and mandated coverage of ICF institutions.   
With the removal of Comprehensive Care in favor of cost concerns and also of 
Statewideness provisions in favor of State innovation in prepaid health plans, Medicaid 
was relinquishing its original intent.  In combination with the 1967 Amendments placing 
a ceiling on medically needy eligibility according to states AFDC limits and the 1969 
legislation that allowed states to cutback on Medicaid services, the trend was towards 
greater state discretion -- which was proven to mean retrenchment.  In general, cost 
control as a precept was embraced.  When expansions were allowed by the Federal 
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Government, it was often through a profound change in another social policy program, 
like SSI, or because there was a possibility it would lead to lower costs. 
Traditionally covered by state dollars, Medicaid was expanded to allow Medicaid 
coverage of intermediate care facilities (ICFs), ICFs for the mentally retarded (ICF-MRs) 
and Mental Hospitals for beneficiaries under age 22.  The reason for the inclusion in 
Medicaid of these traditionally state financed institutions was that quality would be 
increased by inclusion under the federal umbrella.  The federal government was 
necessary to ensure quality standards for particularly vulnerable groups.  As time would 
tell, this federally mandated expansion would increase Medicaid costs in years to come, 
both for states and for the federal government.  However, at this point, the inclusion of 
intermediate care facilities in the Medicaid program would open up the possibility for 
transferring inpatient hospital and nursing home patients to less-costly intermediate care 
settings.  The change helped states by providing a federal match for these services, but it 
also worked to transform Medicaid in the direction President Nixon had wanted, away 
from overutilization of acute care facilities and towards other care settings.107 
 
The Silent Bang: The Supplemental Security Income Program Enacted 
 
Even though the famous portion of HR1, Title IV -- the FAP -- was denied, a little 
known provision in Title III of HR1 survived.  This marked the passage of the nations 
first minimum income program.  As recorded by Burke and Burke in Nixons Good 
Deed: Except for the few persons who engineered it and for governors, who anticipated 
savings from its federally paid floor for the aged, blind, and disabled, few knew what was 
in Title III of HR1.  Most persons never even read the antiseptic title, Assistance for the 
Aged, Blind, and Disabled.  This title was replaced in the closing months of the 
debateby the protective but bland phrase, Supplemental Security Income.108 
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SSI saved Social Security because minimum incomes of the elderly poor could be 
buttressed without extending the benefit to all Social Security beneficiaries.  This would 
constitute a windfall for Social Security beneficiaries and would cost the worker huge 
sums through the regressive payroll tax.109  The plan was supported by the Holy Trinity: 
President Richard Nixon, House Ways and Means Chairman Wilbur Mills, and Senate 
Finance Committee Chairman Russell Long.  Assisting passage was the fact that Social 
Security benefits supplemented the cash assistance payments and also that the provision 
helped the deserving poor. 
For Medicaid, the passage of SSI -- even if the reasoning was connected to the 
Social Security social insurance-based retirement program -- meant that this population 
would be defined by a national minimum standard.  For this population, Medicaid 
eligibility was largely uniform regardless of state of residence.110  SSI was built from 
three previous cash assistance programs (AB, OAA, and APTD), and Medicaid was 
extended to all previous cash assistance recipients.  Even though the original provision 
allowed states to exclude those who became eligible for cash assistance only as a result of 
the new legislation, in practice many states would offer Medicaid eligibility to these new 
enrollees.111  This instituted a fundamental shift in Medicaid politics, linking SSI 
recipients Medicaid eligibility to federal standards while the AFDC population remained 
to a large extent contingent on the states AFDC vastly differing eligibility policies.112   
With all the hoopla over a major restructuring of the Medicaid program -- or an 
even more vast re-engineering of the health insurance system for all Americans -- one of 
the great shifts in Medicaid policy occurred in silence.  Unplanned -- the serendipitous 
collection of events resulted in attempting to enact a Family Assistance Plan.  Then, 
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interconnected with that effort, the enactment of SSI resulted from an attempt to 
undergird the Social Security retirement program.  As reported, when the historic law 
was enacted, politicians ignored it and most newspapers failed to report it.  It is probable 
that many members of Congress who voted for it did not realize what they had 
accomplished.113  Was the enactment of SSI a historic event?  Yes, but for Medicaid as 
well as for income maintenance. 
 
State Experiments on Payment Systems 
 
In the 1970s, state experiments were important for cost control efforts in 
Medicaid, but these experiments proved fruitful for the health care system generally as 
many of the models developed in these demonstrations were co-opted by Medicare.  For 
example, the New Jersey experiment with DRGs served as a forerunner for the Medicare 
Prospective Payment System (PPS).  Also, prior to Medicare implementing a relative 
value scale (RVS) for physician payment, several Medicaid states had already adopted 
physician fee schedules, most notably Californias RVS system.114  State experiments had 
proven important for states own cost control, as examples to other states, and, also, as 
small testing grounds for nationally implemented Medicare reforms.   So, Medicare lent 
its methodologies to Medicaid -- through Medicaids original use of many of Medicares 
statutory definitions, while Medicaid was in fact serving its role as a laboratory given 
its state orientation. 
 
MEDICAID BARGAINING IN THE NIXON ERA:  
THE 93rd CONGRESS -- 1973 and 1974 
 
By the end of the 92nd Congress, the Administration admitted that its original 
health proposal left too many gaps in coverage and sent the whole package back to the 
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Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) Department for re-working.  HEW Secretary 
Weinberger promised a new plan by January 1974 after postponing the date several 
times.  Employers would bear most of the cost for standard coverage of their workers 
while the government would pay for the same coverage of the poor.115  This assurance 
was important because a major stumbling block to negotiations in the previous round was 
that the FHIP did not provide similar coverage to the poor as the employee health 
insurance plan provided for its recipients.   
Many previous proposals for national health reform were reintroduced.  The 
AMAs Medicredit proposal, S444 and HR2222, included a provision to cover the entire 
cost of insurance for long-term illness.  It called for a structural financing reform, not a 
health system overhaul.  The Kennedy/Griffiths plan, S3 and HR22, on the other hand 
proposed a compulsory system run by the federal government with no copayments and 
broad benefits.  Considered disastrous by some and saintly by others -- it would 
restructure the system instead of building on the existing one.  It was maligned by critics 
alleging its prohibitive costs, and the typical reverberations against too much federal 
influence and federal meddling in local care were aimed at this proposal.  In an early 
version of what today has become known as a Medicare for All Proposal, Sen. Jacob 
Javits (R - N.Y.) sponsored S915 that promised to expand the federal Medicare program 
to eventually cover all U.S. residents with compulsory participation.  Another proposal, 
pre-dating the Medicare Catastrophic Care Act of the late 1980s, Senator Russell Long 
(D - La.) sponsored S1416 and then teamed with Rep. Ribicoff on (D - Conn.) S2513. 
Both were versions of catastrophic illness plans.  The latter version proposed to replace 
Medicaid with a new federally financed program covering the poor.116  Importantly, the 
general trend among the proposals was that even those who did not support the 
Administrations FHIP were in favor of federal financing, albeit via different 
mechanisms, of the Medicaid population.  States were very much in favor of full federal 
financing of Medicaid.   
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While the Ways and Means Committee had prioritized several other initiatives 
above national health reform in 1973, the Administration continued to re-work its own 
plan.  In related legislation, the HMO Act of 1973 took steps to encourage the growth of 
managed care.  It prepared the way for national health insurance and the FHIP to rely on 
the private market for insurance by correcting perceived deficiencies in that market ahead 
of time.  The HMO Act pre-empted state laws in order to attain federal ends, yet another 
example of instrumental federalism that increased federal power during the Nixon era.   
Incremental changes were in the works but mostly connected to other social 
policy reform that had tainted Medicaid eligibility in some way.  One of the great lessons 
regarding Medicaid federalism is the profound effect that other social policy, tax, and 
budget legislation has had on Medicaid itself.  While 1972 saw the enactment of SSI, the 
future still held the 1974 Congressional Budget Act -- which would profoundly alter how 
entitlements were bargained.  Neither one of these were primarily Medicaid bills but both 
would substantially affect Medicaid and the relationship between the federal and state 
governments.   
In 1973, the incremental changes in the Medicaid program were mostly related to 
other social policy reforms.  A bill signed by the President on January 3, 1974, HR11333 
(PL 93-233), made SSI recipients eligible for federal-state Medicaid benefits.  The Social 
Security increase bill, HR 7445 (PL 93-66), protected certain groups of Medicaid 
recipients from loss of eligibility as the result of the switch to federal welfare support 
under the SSI program in 1974.  It also extended an existing law allowing Medicaid 
recipients to continue to receive benefits even though a 20 percent Social Security benefit 
increase in 1972 raised their incomes above Medicaid eligibility levels.117  In the wake of 
the indexation of Social Security (OASDI) Benefits in 1972, many other social policy 
programs followed -- including Medicaid in 1973.118 
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The Year the President Resigned and Health Reform was Priority Number One -- 
1974 
 
On January 30, 1974, the President reintroduced a new, improved comprehensive 
health insurance proposal during the 1974 State of the Union Address.  This time around 
was different for national health reform, it seemed.  Reform was in the air.  It was 
imminent.  The posturing over the past few years would finally result in compromise.  
The Ways and Means Committee had its dance card cleared in 1973 and now prioritized 
national health reform.  President Nixon at certain points in 1974 named national health 
insurance his top domestic priority.  Since prioritization of a policy item is critical to the 
bargaining that results in enactment, prospects looked bright. 
In his State of the Union Address, much of the language was recycled from the 
1971 - 1972 debates, the new plan again called for partnership not paternalism, requiring 
doctors to work for their patients, not for the Federal Government.  More details provided 
a week later in a Special Message to Congress on February 6, 1974 sounded familiar as 
well, reiterating the need for economic rights in health.  He suggested three parts to his 
Comprehensive Health Insurance Plan (CHIP): Employee Health Insurance, an improved 
Medicare Plan, and a Assisted Health Insurance plan covering low-income persons and 
those not eligible for the other two programs.119 
Whereas the previous Medicaid reform plan had established different minimum 
benefits from the national health insurance plan for the general population, this time there 
were no differences in the minimum benefits between the two programs.120  Major bills 
included a re-introduced AMA Medicredit proposal and the Long-Ribicoff Catastrophic 
medical bill with federal assistance for the poor.  Senator Kennedy, though, had switched 
his support to join a compromise bill with Wilbur Mills.  Organized labor considered this 
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a retreat and backed the broader Griffiths-Corman bill, which Kennedy previously had 
sponsored.121 
The crunch in 1974 between multiple plans resulted in the lesson that pluralism 
can kill reform.  Pluralism can also kill compromise.  Almost every member of the Ways 
and Means Committee was backing one or more of various and conflicting health 
insurance bills.  On May 20, the President in a national radio address emphasized that this 
was his number one domestic priority.  Vice President Ford also iterated in a number of 
speeches the need for compromise on health reform.  The main differences between the 
Administration plan and the Kennedy-Mills plan were the extent of federal power, cost 
control, and encouragement of private market competition.  April Ways and Means 
hearings on the issue were centered on issues of Medicaid federalism.   
During the debate, Secretary Weinberger stood firm that the federal role in health 
insurance should be limited, meaning that states should be given a major administrative 
role in their plan.   Mills -- whose Kerr-Mills plan had been the predecessor of Medicaid -
- retorted that many states were incapable of running the program well.  The Kennedy-
Mills bill would set up an independent Social Security Administration to run the program, 
would limit the role of private insurance carriers to intermediaries as in Medicare, and 
would be financed by a new payroll tax.  The Administration plan, according to Mills, 
would not tell states a tinkers thing about how to get the job done.  Weinberger 
retorted that the states could do the job with federal guidance.  After all, they did perform 
this function in the Medicaid program.  Mills, the Chairman that oversaw the drafting and 
enactment of Medicaid, responded: Youre going to have a hard job proving to me that 
the states run Medicaid better than the federal government administers Medicare.122  
Sadly, Mills would later call Medicaid the most expensive mistake of his career due to 
the extreme rise in physician fees and the liberal definitions many states uses in designing 
the medically indigent.123    
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The Ways and Means completed its hearing July 9 with differing perceptions of 
the role of federalism in health care playing a major point of disagreement between 
various proposals.  At this point, though, the impetus for health reform had weakened 
substantially in the face of Watergate.  The Presidents policy positions did not matter in 
the face of impeachment proceedings and his priorities on policy were no longer pressing.  
Even though several factions were ready for compromise, impeachment proceedings and 
other business took precedence.  The events around President Nixons resignation in 
August 1974 are well chronicled in other texts.  The remarkable thing in terms of 
Medicaid, which was of course linked to the national health debates, was how quickly the 
mantle of reform was picked up by President Ford. 
Only four days after President Nixon resigned, President Ford called for national 
health insurance legislation in his August 12 address to Congress.  The Ways and Means 
Committee began marking up a compromise bill, not sponsored by anyone, at the 
Chairmans direction on August 19, 1974 -- only a week and a half after Nixons 
resignation.  On August 20 and 21, various aspects of the compromise were voted on 
with splits of 12-12 and 12-13 and 12-11 on various combinations.  As was Mills 
tradition, he would not go to the floor until there was greater consensus within his own 
Committee.124  In a critical decision, Chairman Mills decided to turn to tax legislation 
given the lack of consensus on a health bill.  There was no further Congressional action 
on health until after the elections, when a landslide election placed 75 Freshman 
Democrats into the House.  Some of The Watergate Babies shied away from Great 
Society principles,125 but en masse there was substantial backing of the labor-backed 
health proposal.126  In fact, 54 Congressmen who had supported the AMAs Medicredit 
proposal either retired or were defeated, seemingly opening the door to national health 
reform.127   
This point was an important tipping point for health reform, including all 
interconnected reforms proposed for the Medicaid population.  With 75 newbie 
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Democrats recently elected, President Ford re-iterated his call for national health 
insurance prior to the conclusion of the 73rd Congress post-election session.  At this 
point, the left may have made a tragic strategic error.  Supporters of the labor-backed 
Griffiths-Corman bill decided to submerge negotiations until 1975 when they felt they 
would be in the drivers seat in policy negotiations given the November election results.  
It was a rational decision given how the make-up of the Congress had changed and also 
that post-election Congressional activity is often a lame-duck undertaking.  In many 
ways, it was this decision to wait for a more powerful hand at the negotiating table that 
may have cost the country health reform.  It is often reported that Watergate and the 
Nixon connection marked the end of health reform.  In fact, President Ford had called for 
reform and compromise was pushed by many players in the debate.  The potential for 
national health reform did not end in August with President Nixons resignation. 
President Ford had called for national health reform.  As Democrats postponed 
reform in favor of tax legislation and then postponed reform again in order to take 
advantage of electoral cycles, this left the door open for any unknown external factor to 
stop reform.  In this case, the economy tanked.  When President Fords budget was 
submitted in 1975, he asked that no new federal initiatives be undertaken given the 
economy.  He did not repeat his call for national health reform given inflation.  The 
following year, in 1976 he only suggested Medicare expansion of catastrophic health 
costs.128  Again, national health reform was lost.  While Watergate certainly tinged the 
proceedings, the timing was off, labor wanted to wait for a more definitive hand at the 
table, and Chairman Mills was not satisfied with the closeness of the Ways and Means 
Committee votes to take any package to the floor.  The next opportunity for a big bang 
in health, the likes of which would be compared to the 1935 Social Security Act, would 
not occur again for twenty years -- until the 1993 - 94 Clinton Plan. 
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FORD PROPOSES BLOCK GRANTING MEDICAID 
 
During the Ford era, legislation was proposed to provide health insurance to 
unemployed workers but did not go past the committee stage.  There was increasing 
committee conflict over jurisdictional claims to health issues.  Notably, 1975 is the year 
that Medicaids jurisdiction moved from the House Ways and Means Committee to the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee.   
Fords federalism initiatives emphasized substituting block grants for categorical 
grants, only Fords block grant efforts included Medicaid -- notably absent from the 
Nixon block grant proposals.  On February 25, 1976 in a message to Congress Ford 
posted the following request, I am asking Congress to enact the Financial Assistance for 
Health Care Act which will consolidate Medicaid and 15 categorical Federal health 
programs into a $10 billion block grant to the States.  I am proposing that future Federal 
funding for this new program be increased annually in increments of $500 million plus 
the amounts needed after 1980 to ensure that no State will in the future receive less under 
this proposal than it received in fiscal year 1976.129   
The ambitious proposal was scheduled to be the largest ever established by the 
Federal Government, larger even than the general revenue-sharing program.130  Congress 
extended a number of categorical health programs but did not hold legislative hearings on 
the Ford proposal.  Politically, categorical grants were ways for individual Congressional 
members to take credit with constituents for attaining funding for favorite programs.  If 
these categorical programs were consolidated into a block grant, legislators would not be 
able to take credit with constituents for these categorical grant initiatives.  Even though 
the Medicaid block grant proposal was ignored, Ford had formally introduced the concept 
of block granting to Medicaid.  Nixons Medicaid proposals had remained clearly outside 
of the block granting realm.  He had wanted to convert categorical grants for education, 
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law enforcement, rural community development, and transportation131 -- but not 
Medicaid. 
 
CARTER AND THE BUILDUP TO THE 1980 BUDGET PROCESS 
 
Once again, issues surrounding Medicaid were wrapped with national health 
insurance and with Presidential prioritization of income assistance.  A pattern was 
forming within several different eras of the Medicaid program.  Medicaid reform and 
national health reform mirrored one another.  In the event of national health reform, 
Medicaid reform would be unnecessary -- but if national health reform was stymied, yet 
again -- then the Administration would need to consider concrete Medicaid reform 
suggestions.  Also, income assistance was seemingly continuously on the reform agenda.  
The traditional links with Medicaid -- where AFDC and Medicaid were administered in 
many states by the same agency; where the 1967 amendments had chained optional 
medically needy Medicaid eligibility to AFDC eligibility; and where medical assistance 
payments since the 1930s originally were coupled as add-ons to cash welfare payments -- 
meant that these two were intertwined for the long-term. 
President Carters campaign called for welfare change and national health reform.  
On August 6, the campaign promises for income assistance overhaul was met when he 
presented his plan for the welfare system.  The Program for Better Jobs and Income 
(PBJI), Carters income assistance plan, replaced AFDC, SSI, and Food Stamps with a 
flat cash payment to families.  It was intended to relieve financial pressure on states but 
not transfer funding completely to the federal government.  As the Nixon FAP had, it 
called for uniform national criteria for welfare benefits.  Carters HEW included 
Medicaid in its definition of income assistance programs.  The chain between medical 
assistance and income assistance remained intact.   
States expressed fears that following the PBJI reform, they would be the 
governments stuck with huge Medicaid populations and costs stemming from the 
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combination of the income assistance programs -- including programs with current 
substantial federal funding -- into one unified group.  In the face of the PBJI proposal, 
Carter officials simply did not deal with Medicaid in its proposal, hoping for a national 
health insurance plan.  In a vague response to states concerns, Executive officials 
claimed that states would decide who was eligible for Medicaid in the unlikely event that 
national health reform was not yet a reality.  PBJI participants would not have automatic 
eligibility for Medicaid.132 
On April 25, 1977, President Carter in a message to Congress proposed legislation 
to limit hospital cost increases to 9 per cent in fiscal 1978.  National health insurance, a 
campaign favorite, was the next step after hospital cost containment.  The response was 
lukewarm from Congress while the hospital industry was clear in its opposition.  They 
were still recovering from the lifting of President Nixons economic stabilization 
program in the early 1970s when hospital costs exploded.  Hospital cost inflation between 
1974 to 1975 was the largest jump in history according to the Presidents Council on 
Wage and Price Stability (COWPS).133  Carter defended his plan, which was largely in 
response to projections for increases in Medicaid and Medicare hospital payments over 
20%: For the federal budget, rising health spending has meant a tripling of health 
outlays over the last eight years.134   
In short, Carters hospital cost ceilings were defeated during his tenure -- all 
striking disappointments to the President.  By the end of the 95th Congress, they were 
considered buried,135 only to be resurrected in 1979 and buried again.  The only 
plausible hospital cost containment reform by the end of the year were Medicaid and 
Medicare specific limits.  By then, HEW had already moved administratively to adopt 
some Medicaid and Medicare measures.136  On July 29, 1978, the President issued a 
statement of general principles on national health insurance, directing HEW to develop a 
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national health reform plan for 1979.137 President Carter finally announced his national 
health plan on June 12, 1979; it included a provision for combining Medicaid and 
Medicare into a new federal program, HealthCare.138 
Chairman Russell B. Long (D-La.), who had repeatedly proposed catastrophic 
care plans throughout his career, again agitated for one very early in 1979.  In short, 
catastrophic care became a competing national health reform plan.  In order to garner 
conservative and moderate support, Longs version (S 351) eliminated the provisions to 
federalize Medicaid in order to create uniform national eligibility standards and benefits.  
Ribicoff, who had co-sponsored the plan since 1971, introduced a second bill (S 350) 
including Medicaid federalization.139  There was qualified support for catastrophic care 
proposals from many camps including the Administration, if cost control and improved 
benefits for the poor and elderly were part of the package.  This, the Administration 
claimed, would be the first phase of national health reform.  The AFL-CIO flatly 
rejected catastrophic coverage, however, fearing it would prevent broader national health 
reform.  Meanwhile, medical and insurance industry spokesman expressed support for an 
all-federal Medicaid program.140   
The House also passed the Child Health Assurance Bill (CHAP), HR 4962, which 
was designed to replace one of the existing Medicaid programs for children, the Early 
and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) program, with a broader 
CHAP bill.141  Fiscal conservatives had attempted to change CHAP from an open-ended 
entitlement to an authorization with fixed ceilings, but the House did not support this 
change to the legislation.142  Senator Long delayed Senate floor action on CHAP, 
considering it part of a broader national health insurance action.143  Medicaid reform was 
thus caught in the juggernaut of national health reform -- once again. 
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THE HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION CREATED, 1977 
 
Also of note was the creation of a new agency, the Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA).  Medicaid was organized and linked to the federal-state means-
tested cash welfare programs in the Social and Rehabilitative Services Administration.  
Medicare was organized within the Social Security Administration (SSA) along with the 
Social Security (OASDI) program, so that federal social insurance funded initiatives were 
organized together in the same agency.   
In 1977, both Medicaid and Medicare moved to the Health Care Financing 
Administration, with an emphasis on organizing health financing programs together 
instead of organizing programs according to federal-state means tested initiatives in one 
Administration and social insurance financed programs in a different Administration.  
According to an account by the first HCFA Administrator, Robert A. Derzon, Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) Secretary Joe Califano was spearheading the integration 
campaign, albeit quietly, on orders from Jimmy Carter, who had been persuaded by 
transition staff that the two programs should be integrated administratively, without input 
from legislators, even though legislation had been introduced in 1976.  The failure to 
include Congress ultimately annoyed some committee staffers and legislators.144  Part of 
the reason for creating HCFA was the belief by Secretary Califano that a unified HCFA 
would moderate cost inflation.145 
 
BUDGET RECONCILIATION COMES OF AGE, 1980 
 
 When Ronald Reagan won the Presidential election in 1980, the door slammed on 
national health reform.  Before Carter left office, though, the 1980 budget process 
ushered in extremely important precedents for how entitlements would be bargained in 
the Reagan era.  Carter ushered in The Budget Era during the 1980 budget process.  The 
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rules and mores of the budget game, and thus entitlement bargaining, were about to go 
through a revolution.  Reconciliation became the vehicle by which entitlement and health 
provisions were bargained.  As one HHS lobbyist claimed, the 1980 reconciliation 
measure was the largest health bill enacted by the 96th Congress.146 
 The spending cuts effectuated using Reconciliation were modest, 147 but the 
process that was put into play during Carters final budget was profound.  By accepting 
the revolutionary use of Reconciliation and the new budget process to re-assess and 
control entitlements, the stage was set for even greater changes in budget processes and 
behavior for the Reagan era.148   In one bill, more than 80 Medicare and Medicaid 
provisions were agreed to.149  In the largest conference in the history of the Congress to 
that point,150 Reconciliation became a mechanism for mass entitlement reform.  There 
was praise for the process in that it was the first coherent effort any Congress had made 
to bring this so-called uncontrollable spending under control and also it helped 
lawmakers fashion a new legislative tool for future years to save on entitlement 
programs.  Criticisms were prophetic.  As Barber Conable Jr. (R-N.Y.) stated: I am 
deeply disturbed that it [Reconciliation] seems to have become a new mechanism for 
holding the government hostage, agglomerating a lot of very important substantive issues 
in the name of reconciliation, and being accepted only because we are under great fiscal 
pressure at this point in our budget process.151 
 In reviewing the evolution of the United States Budget, White and Wildavsky 
have summarized the vital role of the 1980 budget process in setting up the future Reagan 
reforms: Without the 1980 reconciliation as precedents committing Democrats to the 
procedure, that of 1981 might not have occurred.  The experience of 1980 also 
foreshadowed the rules battles, scorekeeping problems and rider vulnerability that would 
                                                
146 1980 CQ Almanac, 459. 
147 Ippolito, Uncertain Legacies, 247. 
148 Joseph White and Aaron Wildavsky, The Deficit and the Public Interest: The Search For Responsible 
Budgeting in the 1980s (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989; first paperback publication 
1991), 61 - 64.  Citations are to the paperback version.  (Hereafter White, The Deficit and the Public 
Interest) 
149 1980 CQ Almanac, 130. 
150 1980 CQ Almanac, 130. 
151 1980 CQ Almanac, 130. 
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make reconciliation a mixed blessing for budgeters.152  They further note, It matters 
that the military buildup and reconciliation preceded Reagan because otherwise one could 
not explain why, in 1981, the Speaker allowed reconciliation to happen with so little fight 
over defense.153  Soon, the OMB and David Stockman would further redefine the rules 
of the game, particularly of behavior and norms of the process, in the U.S. budget 
process.  This would have profound effects on entitlement, and Medicaid, bargaining.  
Carters 1980 use of reconciliation had ushered in the next great year in policy bargaining 
-- 1981. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The Nixon watershed era was a profound crater in American history.  In social 
policy, the debates around attempts at national health reform, Medicaid reform, and 
welfare reform were now part of the national psyche.  Those discussions moved forward 
how we all as Americans thought about these issues and the opposing sides in those 
debates.  It also displayed examples of how a reform left can stop national health reform 
because it is waiting to gain more concessions -- on an already pretty good deal -- after 
an election cycle.  After the Presidency switched to President Ford, he was behind 
reform.  The economy tanked though and reform was again lost.   
 Medicaid reform, debated on its own merits on occasion, was also chained to the 
discussions around welfare reform and the FAP discussion.  For Medicaid, the enactment 
of the Supplemental Security Income Program -- a reform stemming from the FAP debate 
-- was the profound change.  The country was about to enter another profound era.  This 
one would change how Medicaid was negotiated, how federalism was bargained, and 
how Congress functioned.  The Budget Era and Reconciliation procedures would 
structure most Medicaid and social policy discussions in the United States Congress from 
1981 forward.  Hardly a Medicaid reform after 1981 was not contained within or began 
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within a budget process.  Ironically, the 1980s, as the next chapter will discuss, was also a 
decade of Medicaid expansion.  Although below the radar screen of most Congressional 
watchers, Medicaid policy entrepreneurs worked through the budget process to effectuate 
real, lasting, and expansionary movements in Medicaid.  The next chapter reviews the era 
of Medicaid federalism from President Reagan through President George H.W. Bush. 
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6. REAGANS BUDGET REVOLUTION, 
SECOND WAVE OF NEW FEDERALISM, AND 
THE MEDICAID EXPLOSION 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 If the twelve years of Republican control of the White House from 1980 until 
1992 could be characterized in one phrase it would be The Budget Era.  The rules of 
the entitlement bargaining game were transformed.  The game was simply played 
differently after 1981.  Reagans new federalism was trumped by his interest in big 
business, and Medicaid was not one of the sacred group of protected social programs 
picked out by the Administration.  This era saw a rise in the role and importance of the 
OMB.   
 If any public policy scholars are interested in incrementalism at its best -- the apex 
of successful gradualism, it is a must to study Medicaid in the 1980s.  While the budget 
process was bent on contracting entitlements, certain House Ways and Means and Senate 
Finance members and staff expanded Medicaid over 30 times.  At the time Medicaid was 
not considered a big-ticket item.  In retrospect, it is a study in arduous building of what 
today in 2007 is a profoundly important health financing initiative.  Medicaid is health 
insurance for millions of Americans.  Medicaid is long-term care financing.  And, finally, 
Medicaid is pivotal to Americas next major paradigm shift in the aging of our population 
and the generational issues engendered by aging as a dominant public policy issue.  This 
chapter investigates The Budget Era, and sets the stage for Part III of The Medicaid 
Evolution, a section comprised of five chapters that focuses on The Modern Era in the 
largest health program in the United States. 
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MEDICAID COSTS: THE PERPETUAL UPWARD SPIRAL  
 
Following the trend from the Nixon era, the federal government showed itself as 
the first line of defense against the high costs of health and government health programs.  
While in the 1960s, equal opportunity and social justice were often associated with 
federal involvement -- as a mitigator, a defender, a champion -- against unjust state and 
local governments, today the federal government was the hammer behind deficit 
reduction.  Of course, it was its own deficit that it had to tame.  The economic aspects of 
Ronald Reagans presidency became synonymous with issues surrounding the federal 
deficit, and there were claims that he intentionally drove up the deficit in order to force 
budget cuts in social programs.  The oddity during the Reagan era was surely the 
Medicaid program.  Beforehand, there would be no rational prediction for the tumult of 
the 1980s.   
In fact, Medicaid was singular among major programs of the American welfare 
state by the end of the Reagan era -- singled out because of its multiple expansions.  
These occurred after the first few years of Reagans Administration, after several failed 
structural reform suggestions that would cap or restrict Medicaids costs.  The States and 
providers who benefited from the program were leery of reforms that would disadvantage 
them.  These trends turned though in 1984 toward use of the Reconciliation process for 
Medicaid expansion.  Between 1984 and 1990, Medicaid eligibility was extended 31 
times.  Of these 31 eligibility expansions, 19 were mandatory on state governments.1  
Beyond that, its character changed, as it grew into its own -- away from its historical 
connections with the AFDC cash welfare program -- new Medicaid expansions were 
defined more often with the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) than within the confines of state 
controlled AFDC eligibility levels.  Still, for those whose Medicaid eligibility was linked 
with AFDC, key reductions in the early 1980s in the AFDC program also reduced 
Medicaid eligibility for this particular group.  This later time period, one during which 
the federal government was supposed to be the hammer, had one darling.  Strangely, it 
                                                
1 Jean Donavan Gilman, Medicaid and the Costs of Federalism, 1984 - 1992 (New York: Garland, 1998),. 
58.  (Hereafter Gilman, Medicaid and the Costs of Federalism) 
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was Medicaid, and many commentators suspected that it had something to do with 
federalism. 
Given the state and federal combined financing responsibility for the program, 
expanding it by one dollar would, on average, only increase federal expenditures by a 
little more than half of that.  States paid a little less than half of the cost of Medicaid, 
regardless of if those costs were incurred because of mandatory expansions by the federal 
government or because of state decision making to draw down federal money for optional 
coverage.  While federalism is not, by far, the only explanation for these expansions 
during a time of supposed retrenchment, it makes sense that in policy bargains 
regarding expansions, a winning reason for going ahead was that some of the cost could 
be pushed off onto the states.  In fact, by the end of the deluge, states were drowning.  
In 1989 and 1990, the National Governors Association (NGA) formally requested an end 
to Medicaid mandates through a series of powerful letters signed by the State Governors. 
The group most often targeted for expansions during this era was pregnant women 
and children, a group accounting for approximately 22% of Medicaid expenditure growth 
between 1985 and 1990.2  While not by any means an expensive group to cover in 
comparison to the elderly and disabled Medicaid beneficiaries, the sheer numbers of new 
children enrolled made waves in the expenditure pool.  Costs for children enrolled in 
Medicaid grew from $4.4 billion in 1984 to $13.2 billion in 1991.3  So, during an era 
when the federal government was synonymous with domestic cost control, the Medicaid 
program grew substantially -- in absolute terms.  From 1981 to 1992, spending for 
Medicaid increased more than fourfold, expanding from $27.7 billion to $112.9 billion.4  
At its apex, Medicaid expenditures, in just one year, from 1991 to 1992, grew by over 
28%.5  Breaking these costs down, another major contributor was inpatient hospital 
spending, which exploded during the late 1980s.   
Federalism was the major contributor to this spurt, as special financing schemes 
and state maximization mechanisms in the Medicaid program were employed by many 
                                                
2 Gilman, Medicaid and The Costs of Federalism, 73. 
3 Gilman, Medicaid and The Costs of Federalism, 73. 
4 Coughlin, Medicaid Since 1980, 2. 
5 Coughlin, Medicaid Since 1980, xv. 
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states to combat mandates and cuts in other federal funding.  This is discussed in much 
more detail in a later section.  In general, the Reagan/Bush era -- described as an era of 
retrenchment in the American welfare state -- is not considered historically as one of 
shifting the American welfare state either to reverse or, less judgmentally, the opposite 
direction of the 1960s -- or of the historical trajectory of the 1930s.  In his review of the 
time period, Paul Pierson concludes, Although Reagans reforms at least pushed in the 
desired direction, it remains true that none of the core social-policy functions of the 
Federal Government were transferred to the states.  If Reagan succeeded in halting the 50 
- year trend toward a nationalization of social policy, he did not reverse it.6   
In short, Reagan slowed, possibly stopped, the general progression, but as the 
review of Nixon showed, the fundamental watershed moment in American policy had 
already taken place.  The Reagan era occurred after the bump -- the big punctuation 
had happened.  The lesson here though is that where there is a titanic punctuation, there 
may very well be an aftershock.  In this case, it was profound.  The aftershock to the 
Nixon/Ford era Watershed was OBRA 1981.  Assisted by the final Carter budget 
negotiation, the institutions of policy bargaining were re-defined yet again.  This time 
though, it was mostly through behavior, mores, and attitudes of the White House and the 
newly omnipotent OMB.  Key institutional rule changes to the budget process happened 
because of actions by policy negotiators that filled in the colors of the 1974 Budget 
process.  Reconciliation had been dormant but the 1981 OBRA constructed the 
architecture of what would become one of the most powerful institutional policy tools of 
the modern era.  For Medicaid, no one could have predicted at that time that the 
instrument designed to cut entitlements would be skillfully fashioned to expand this one 
federal/state joint initiative.  During the budget era, health care expansion was only 
possible where the financing structure embraced federalism.  The efforts at federal 
welfare state retrenchment unwittingly leaned on Medicaid when times were tough.  
 
 
                                                
6 Paul Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994, repr. 1996 and 1997), 157 - 158. 
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REAGANS NEW FEDERALISM -- THE SECOND WAVE 
 
 While the Nixon era marked a New Federalism directed by a Republican 
President, his Administration left the country more centralized than he found it.  
President Reagan was committed that his federalism, the second wave of New 
Federalism, would stick.  In contradistinction with Nixon, Reagans New Federalism, in 
combination with Congressional backing, reduced federal aid to the states and eliminated 
general revenue sharing.7  In the legislative blockbuster year of 1981, Congress 
consolidated 57 education, health, and community service programs into seven block 
grants, while reducing their funding by 25% in the process.8  The New Federalism 
consolidated 21 health programs into four block grants, leaving states with less 
discretion, greater responsibility, less funding, and sharply rising health costs.9   
The Reagan era further engrained the conceptual framework that block grants 
were an instrument of implementing conservative ideology and not a neutral 
administrative tool.10  As will be discussed, states creative financing within Medicaid 
bolstered dangerously faltering state budgets in the face of the 1982 and 1991 recessions 
that increased unemployment and, thus, Medicaid rolls.11  Special financing mechanisms 
and transference of state functions to Medicaid in order to draw the federal match -- and 
also to replace state with federal funding -- flourished during the twelve years spanning 
the Reagan and G.H.W. Bush Presidencies.  Former CMS heads shared with the author 
that there is no way to account for those funds, and it is widely considered that states used 
                                                
7  William T. Gormley, An Evolutionary Approach to Federalism in the U.S., Paper Presented at the 6th 
National Public Management Conference, Bloomington, Indiana, October 19, 2001, 8. (Hereafter Gormley, 
An Evolutionary Approach) 
8 1991 CQ Almanac, 56.  Also see 1981 CQ Almanac, 463. 
9 Drew E. Altman. and Douglas Morgan, The Role of State and Local Government in Health , Health 
Affairs, 22-24.  (Hereafter Altman, The Role of State and Local) 
10 Conlan, Timothy, The Politics of Federal Block Grants: From Nixon to Reagan Political Science 
Quarterly (Summer 1984) 270.  (Hereafter, Conlan, The Politics of Federal Block Grants) 
11 Thad Kousser, The Politics of Discretionary Medicaid Spending, 1980  1993, Journal of Health 
Politics, Policy and Law 27, no. 4 (August 2002), 649. 
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the additional federal money generated on several aspects of state budgets beyond 
health.12   
 The interactions of the Nixon era created but were not shaped by Reconciliation.  
By 1980, Reconciliation was taking form -- and in fact by 1981 it transformed American 
Public Policy adjudication.  Federalism scholar Timothy Conlan describes how the 
budget was no longer developed through the traditional painstaking and incremental 
work of the appropriations subcommittees, but in a single, massive, ad hoc amendment 
pasted together in a scramble of last-minute negotiations.  House members voted on 
Amendments [Gramm-Latta II] with very little information on what they were voting on 
and in a frenzy.13  The substantive policy discussions regarding effects of program 
changes on beneficiaries were largely replaced by bottom-line budget and cost estimates.  
As will be discussed, Medicaid was expanded several times in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
It bucked the apriori theory that Reconciliation would result in massive budget cuts in the 
program. 
 Reagans New Federalism reversed a trend from earlier Presidencies, LBJ and 
Nixon, by redirecting previously local government directed funds to the states.  In fact, 
47 of the 77 domestic programs consolidated into block grants by President Reagan had 
previously delivered funds directly to local governments.14   This suggests that the 
Reagan era also represented -- at least in this dimension -- centralization of sorts, only the 
centralizing force was from local to state governments.15  Having said that, Reagan was 
not pro-state at all costs.  In the face of conflicts between business and state interests, 
Reagan more often than not used federal power to support business interests against state 
regulation.16  His Administration also highly prioritized conservative moral values when 
                                                
12 Interview with Author, August 30, 2006. 
13 Conlan, The Politics of Federal Block Grants, 266. 
14 Altman, The Role of State and Local, 22. 
15 For more considerations of this see Michael S. Sparer, Devolution of Power: An Interim Report Card, 
Health Affairs (May/June 1998), 7 - 16. 
16 Robertson and Judd write, Reagans policies were more about decentralization than of less government.  
The fight for states rights stopped at a point where business interests were threatened, 377.  Also see 
Gormley, An Evolutionary Approach. 
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in competition with other interests and used federal government power to further these 
conservative moral values.   
In health, Reagan accelerated the process of utilizing federal power for cost 
control, possibly unwittingly setting the infrastructure in place for federal oversight in 
many other endeavors in the health area -- even for future national health reform efforts 
which he surely would not have supported.17  Political and policy actors do not always 
know the chains that they send into action.  After the fact reviews of the 1980s by fiscal 
federalism expert Howard Chernick and others have since concluded that the idea of a 
conservative drift in welfare policy during this period is not supported.18 
 
THE FUNDAMENTAL RESTRUCTURING OF THE BUDGET PROCESS IN 
RELATION TO MEDICAID BARGAINING 
 
 The transformation wrought upon the American welfare state in 1981 was 
pronounced, in particular due to the grand entrance of Reconciliation in the budget 
process.  Entitlements, by definition at odds with cost control, supposedly would be at 
least tamed by the process.  Part of the 1974 budget reforms, it was not until 1980 when 
Carter and Congressional Democrats utilized the process for moderate cost control that 
Reconciliation was introduced.  This institutional reform had a long hibernation period 
before being utilized.  In 1980, the use of Reconciliation resulted in alterations for the 
next year.  Reconciliation was moved to the beginning of the budget calendar year and 
instructions for authorizing committees were moved to the first budget resolution from a 
previous process of including them in a second budget resolution.19   
While Carter and Congressional Democrats introduced Reconciliation, Reagan 
and his OMB sharpened their sword to use it as a monumental bargaining instrument.  
The Reagan Administration, under OMB Director David Stockmans direction, 
                                                
17 Gary M. Klass in Explaining America and the Welfare State: An Alternative Theory, British Journal of 
Political Science 15, no. 4 (October 1985), 427 - 450 goes as far as to say this establishes the principles 
upon which a nation health insurance system would some day rest. 
18 Howard Chernick, Fiscal Effects of Block Grants for the Needy: An Interpretation of the Evidence, 
International Tax and Public Finance (1998), 221.  Chernick cites two studies: Moffitt (comparing 1960 to 
1984) and Craig (from 1966 to 1989). 
19 Gilman, Medicaid and the Costs of Federalism, 121. 
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spearheaded a reconciliation effort that affected more than 200 programs, including 
entitlements and reduced Fiscal 1982 outlays by more than $35 billion.20   In his textbook 
account of the federal budget process, Allen Schick notes: 
Reagans budget was often based on unrealistically buoyant economic 
assumptions and on dead on arrival proposals to cut deeply into domestic 
programsReagan legitimized unrealistic budgeting as a tool of Presidential 
power.  Although Congress made many changes in his budget, the revenue and 
spending outcomes were closer to his preferences than they would have been had 
he sent us a realistic budget.  But the presidents tactical gains came at a high 
cost -- they made the budget into more of a bargaining chip and undermined its 
status as an authoritative guide to national policy.21 
  
The strategic game of budgeting sustained a substantial shift.  Those involved in 
the 1980 Reconciliation actions were nonplussed by the Reagan Administrations use of 
it.  To them, it represented a club.  Chairman of the House Rules Committee, Richard M. 
Bolling called it the most brutal and blunt instrument used by a president in an attempt 
to control the budget process since Nixon used impoundment.  One of the principal 
architects of the 1974 Budget Act, Bolling held that the Reagan Administration was 
guilty of the most excessive use of presidential power and license.22     
Reconciliation introduces a stark contrast between macro budgeting decisions and 
micro policy substance.  The massive budget bills required an up or down vote on the 
entire measure, left very little time for debate about the substance of particular parts of 
the bill, substantially altered Committee dynamics and influence, and emphasized 
concentration on the bottom line budget features as opposed to specifics regarding 
substantive policies and the populations affected.  Its frame was a macro budget one, 
even though the micro policy reforms enacted via the process were enacted just as they 
would if hundreds of hours of debate had been spent on each micro policy.  
Reconciliation charges one set of committees with setting aggregate budget goals and 
another set of committees with deciding where the reforms and cuts would be.  
Inevitably, conflicts arose.   
                                                
20 Ippolito, Uncertain Legacies, 247. 
21 Schick, The Federal Budget, 92. 
22 Ippolito, Uncertain Legacies, 247. 
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Major Medicaid-Related Reforms of OBRA 1981 
 
 The mix and match of the 1981 OBRA set in motion a number of trajectories that 
lasted in the 1990s and beyond.  First, freedom-of-choice and home and community-
based services waiver authorities were created, introducing additional state flexibility. 23  
Four health block grants --- shifting to the states responsibility for 19 health programs 
formerly run by the federal government -- were supposed to provide greater flexibility.  
Instead, funding was reduced by 25 percent, requiring major reductions in services, and a 
number of constraining federal conditions were linked to the use of the block grant 
funds.24  Block grants do not necessarily equal greater state flexibility.  The health related 
block grants were in many areas -- preventive health, maternal and child health, mental 
health -- that states successfully transferred costs to the federally matched Medicaid 
program after the substantial cuts.  Just because there are cuts in one area of the budget 
does not mean states will not find a way to receive federal funding.  The list of Medicaid 
changes in OBRA 1981 include: 
! temporarily cut the federal matching share of Medicaid payments over 
the next three years;  
! gave the states greater flexibility in defining their medically needy 
populations -- for those states choosing this option (this was later 
retracted in TEFRA);  
! altered a requirement that states not contract with HMOS in which 
Medicaid and Medicare enrollees made up more than 50 percent of 
coverage by raising the limit to 75%;  
! unlinked Medicaid hospital reimbursement from Medicares 
reasonable cost methodology, which is discussed more in a later 
section; 
                                                
23 Schneider, Medicaid Source Book, 516. 
24 1981 CQ Almanac, 483. 
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! initially introduced the DSH program, discussed in more detail in a 
later section;25 
!  enacted new waiver authority of federal Medicaid requirements for 
states, including the ability for states to apply for permission to require 
Medicaid recipients to enroll in managed care; and 
! reduced eligibility for welfare benefits.26 
  
Medicaid Cap and Swap Proposals -- 1981 and 1982 
  
OBRA 1981 was also the scene of a bitter debate over a Presidential proposal to 
place a hard cap on the Medicaid program.  The proposal involved the federal share of 
the program and the proposed limit capped Medicaid spending to 5% more than it spent 
in 1981.  The matching formula would still operate in the Medicaid program,27 but the 
percentage increase in federal spending would have a ceiling thus creating a closed 
matching grant program as opposed to an open matching one.  In fiscal federalism theory, 
there are numerous deadweight losses associated with closed matching grant structures.  
The OMB held that a cap was the only way to control Medicaid costs.  States, regardless 
of Governors party affiliation, stood against the cap.   
An important constituency in Medicaid bargaining, the States, are also a 
bargaining entity that United States Congressional members have a true interest in 
collaborating with because of their own state level elections.  Beyond the argument that 
states would suffer financially under the proposed arrangement, they also feared a 
precedent of caps in other welfare programs.28  An alternate plan in the U.S. Senate 
Finance Committee would have capped growth of federal Medicaid spending by 9% and 
reduced the overall federal match in the program.29  This proposal also failed. 
                                                
25 1981 CQ Almanac, 477 - 478. 
26 Coughlin, Medicaid Since 1980, 149. 
27 Grannemann, Controlling Medicaid Costs, 46. 
28 1981 CQ Almanac, 478 - 479. 
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 During the OBRA 81 negotiation process, the Energy and Commerce 
Committee, the Congressional House Committee that oversees Medicaid, was the only 
committee that did not recommend reconciliation savings.30  In a tug of war between two 
packages from this Committee to include in the final bill, the Broyhill Amendment or the 
Dingell (D- Mich.) package, a series of shotgun deals were made.  The proposed Broyhill 
Amendment set a Medicaid cap and contained a number of other controversial reforms on 
Amtrak, Conrail, and low-energy assistance.31  In order to rescue the Broyhill 
substitute, OMB Director David Stockman recalled in his memoirs he rented, bought, 
traded, or begged.  As he wrote, What deals they were.  They ranged from things that 
turned my stomach to things that made me only faintly ill, from reviving the sugar quota 
program to exempting state-owned cotton warehouses in Georgia from the new 
inspection user fee.32  Even after all of this negotiating successfully cleared the way for 
the Broyhill Amendment to be included in the final bill, Congressional Quarterly 
reported at the time, The GOP leadership finally decided to pull the Broyhill 
amendment; the Dingell package thus was included in the final bill by default.33  In 
Stockmans account, he writes: Without even checking with the White House, they [GOP 
leaders] huddled briefly on the floor and decided to dump the Broyhill amendment 
entirely -- and with it the Medicaid cap . that only hours earlier they had won the right 
to offer.34  In this round, the Medicaid Cap proposal was thus defeated.  Similar savings 
were implemented, however, via a series of temporary federal matching rate reductions 
over three years. 
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31 1981 CQ Almanac, 264. 
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State Waivers of Federal Medicaid Law -- The New Tool of the Executive in 
Medicaid Policy 
 
In order to help the States meet the spending limits, OBRA 81 included a variety 
of provisions to increase State flexibility, perhaps the most important of which were the 
establishment of the section 1915(b) and 1915(c) waiver programs (freedom-of-choice 
and home and community-based services).35  These waivers would be extremely 
important in the future evolution of the federal and state relationship in Medicaid.  As 
part of these provisions, states could apply for a waiver and then require Medicaid 
beneficiaries to enroll in managed care plans.  
The new ability for states to require individuals to enroll in managed care after 
receiving a waiver eventually erupted into questions of the role of managed care as state 
actors.  Resembling other privatization of state functions debates that are prevalent in 
public finance policy, they introduced new dilemmas in Medicaid federalism regarding 
requiring managed care participation.  Again, the major original precepts of the Medicaid 
program were being re-written.   
 
REAGANS NEW FEDERALISM SWAP PROPOSAL, CLOSED MATCHING 
GRANT CAP, AND PARTIAL PROGRAM BLOCK GRANT PROPOSALS 
 
 By the 1982 State of the Union, President Reagan attempted a different approach 
to Medicaid structural reform.  This one entailed rationalized federalism -- a clean cut of 
various social programs to either the federal or the state government, but no longer shared 
responsibility.  As the State of the Union explained, A maze of interlocking jurisdictions 
and levels of government confronts average citizens in trying to solve even the simplest 
of problems.  They do not know where to turn for answers, who to hold accountable, who 
to praise, who to blame, who to vote for or against.  The main reason for this is the 
overpowering growth of Federal grants-in-aid programs during the past few decades.36  
Later in President Reagans description of his New Federalism initiative, he outlined the 
                                                
35 Schneider, Medicaid Source Book, 34. 
36 President Reagans State of the Union Speech to Congress, January 26, 1982.  1982 CQ Almanac, 5E. 
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proposition: Starting in fiscal 1984, the Federal Government will assume full 
responsibility for the cost of the rapidly growing Medicaid program to go along with its 
existing responsibility for Medicare.  As part of a financially equal swap, the States will 
simultaneously take full responsibility for aid to families with dependent children and 
food stamps.37  Congress never seriously considered these New Federalism Initiatives, 
and the President did not submit legislation in order to see the plan through.38 
 As for Governors, they were fully supportive of at least one aspect of the plan -- 
the transfer of Medicaid fully to the Federal Government.  The New Federalism initiative 
was a non-starter with the Governors because they also wanted the Federal 
Government to assume the AFDC and Food Stamps programs in addition to Medicaid.  
Governor Lamar Alexander from Tennessee summed up his ideas of rationalized 
federalism: Most governors would prefer that the national government took AFDC, food 
stamps and Medicaid and give us an even amount in programs of a more everyday 
concern like sewers.  Others suggested the federal government take on the three 
programs and swap to states even greater responsibility for education.39  A re-package 
proposal to remove the long-term care portion of Medicaid from this federalization swap 
and instead fund long-term care through a block grant to the states also sank.40  In a third 
attempt at major structural reform, the closed matching grant cap was resurrected in 1985 
in the Reagan budget.41  Based on the ideas President Reagan had first proposed in 1981, 
it was a non-starter.  Swap attempts, closed matching grant caps, partial program block 
grants -- all Reagan proposals, all went nowhere.  Among the reasons for the failure were 
that states consistently bargained with the Oval Office against the measure.  Even 
Reagans Secretary of Health Schweiker reportedly struck a deal with the President prior 
to taking the Cabinet Post against a block grant approach to Medicaid.42 
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Series of Medicaid Eligibility Extensions Using Reconciliation 
 
 Ironically, the development of the Reconciliation process further into the decade 
was met with a convergence of policy forces expanding eligibility and reducing 
inequality in Medicaid.  In each year between 1984 and 1990, Congress passed at least 
one major piece of legislation that required, or allowed, states to either expand Medicaid 
eligibility or services.43  By 1990, 31 eligibility expansions had been enacted by 
Congress, 19 of them mandatory on state governments.44  An important trend during this 
six-year time period was counter-intuitive, in that both the federal and state governments 
expanded Medicaid in order to contain costs.  The Federal Government through the open 
matching grant structure shared the costs of expansions with states, and the states 
transferred to Medicaid the costs of non-federally funded state functions and other areas 
of state budgets. 
Inequality was reduced, primarily with greater centralization of eligibility 
requirements to a federal norm, thus mitigating the vast differentials in states Medicaid 
eligibility.  Between 1979 and 1991 interstate differences in Medicaid coverage, 
measured relative to the poverty population, fell by about one-half.45  This reduction in 
inequality is particularly related to the expansions of coverage for pregnant women, 
infants, and children to the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) instead of the states AFDC 
eligibility rules which differed by state.  Also, expansions of Medicaid to low-income 
Medicare beneficiaries, the dual eligibles, also reduced overall inequality because 
eligibility is linked to federal criteria. 
 At first, some states, particularly southern states which had high incidence of low-
birth weight babies and high infant mortality rates, were proponents of the Medicaid 
expansions for pregnant women and children.46  With time, states through the NGA acted 
in unison against further expansions.  For Medicare and Medicaid dual eligibles, even 
though the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic Care Act was largely repealed the following year, 
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the Medicaid expansions survived.  In 1991, these were in fact expanded to the near 
poor.  By 1989 and 1990, the States -- a very powerful Medicaid constituency -- acted in 
unison against further expansions.  The NGA has called several times since then for the 
transfer of funding for covering dual eligibles to the federally funded Medicare program. 
Medicaid eligibles include several disparate groups of constituencies, some of 
whom do not vote frequently, particularly children who cannot vote, or do not hold 
substantial political or electoral capital.  Where there is overlap with more politically 
powerful groups, Dual Medicare/Medicaid eligibles and SSI recipients for example, there 
is a more substantial power set at the bargaining table in Medicaid negotiations than with 
other less powerfully connected Medicaid populations.  Providers also benefit from 
Medicaids distributional effects, particularly nursing homes and hospitals.  In fact, the 
governments distributive role in Medicaid is as vital as its redistributive role.  
Medicaids lynchpin role in hospital payment was a major supporting argument -- in 
addition to States protestations --  against block granting Medicaid in the Reagan era.47  
As one 1980s study reported, That Medicaid funding plays a crucial role in keeping 
many hospitals from closing was an argument made again and again by hospital 
administrators who testified in opposition to Reagans proposed cap on 
Medicaid.Medicaid was saved from the Reagan ax by an exceptionally strong coalition 
of support that came to its rescue.  The coalition consisted of neither Medicaid recipients 
or the AMA.48 
Reconciliation encouraged expansions because the budget process involves must 
pass legislation, limited debate compared to other legislation, and is generally more 
protected from amendments and presidential vetoes than other legislation.49  While both 
Presidents Reagan and G.H.W. Bush threatened vetoes of entire budget bills due to 
Medicaid expansions -- further heightening the programs importance in overall 
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American public policy adjudication -- the formers threats were not taken seriously 
while the latters were respected and greater Medicaid extensions were tabled.50   
Medicaids federal/state structure contributed heavily to it being a preferential 
program in the face of budget bottom lines, which were now enforced by Reconciliation.  
The fact that states would pay part of the bill for these expansions, made them possible.  
If the federal government endured all of the costs, it would further break the budget.  
Stockman wrote of the required a frontal assault on the American welfare state.51  In 
fact, many of the drastic social safety net cuts of OBRA 81 in later years resulted in 
States transferring functions to Medicaid where federal funding was cut and 
maximizing Medicaid funding to pay for other State budget cuts.  
Reagan, his OMB, and Congress also pushed through the largest tax cut in history 
to that point a couple of days before OBRA 81 passed.  The OBRA 81 maneuvers were 
tied to the Administrations need to find room for this tax cut.  Administration 
language of the protected Sacred Seven social safety net programs was considered by 
detractors as a veneer to mask the numerous domestic cuts.  By identifying a protected 
social safety net, the Administration hoped to not appear as draconian to those in both 
parties who would object.  Future years resulted in tax increases, but the history-setting 
tax cut in 1981 further set Reagans legacy as a man who wanted to reduce Big 
Government. 
Amidst proposals to change the Federal matching percentages permanently either 
by dropping the minimum matching rate or by reducing it only for particular services as a 
disincentive, the federal reforms that did succeed were expansions that increased states 
responsibilities.  Medicaids federal/state structure -- unwittingly -- in combination with 
the new Reconciliation, made it the program to dump on, to expand, to transfer 
responsibilities previously either federal only or state only.  In fact, the buck passing 
went both ways -- the Feds passed on its responsibilities to the federal/state program and 
states transferred their previously state-only functions to the federal/state program.  
                                                
50 Gilman, Medicaid and the Costs of Federalism, 124 - 125. 
51 Stockman, The Triumph of Politics, 8. 
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Medicaids interdependence of governmental levels, the intertwining of their 
accountability, again was clear. 
Bills resulting in Medicaid expansions during this time period include: DEFRA 
(1984 Budget Reconciliation -- PL 98-369); COBRA (1986 Budget Reconciliation -- PL 
99-272); the Fiscal 1987 Budget Reconciliation (OBRA 86 -- PL -99-509); the Fiscal 
1988 and 1989 Budget Reconciliation (OBRA 87 -- PL 100 - 203); the 1988 Medicare 
Catastrophic Coverage Act (PL 100 - 360); the Fiscal 1990 Budget Reconciliation 
(OBRA 89 -- PL 101-239); and the Fiscal 1991 Budget Reconciliation (PL 101 - 508).52 
Other legislation extending Medicaid eligibility in the time period included the 1986 
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), and again the 1986 OBRA legislation, 
which expanded Medicaid coverage to newly legalized aliens and undocumented persons 
who otherwise would not have been entitled to Medicaid.53  In addition to this legislation, 
a number of disabled SSI children were made eligible for Medicaid by the 1990 U.S. 
Supreme Court decision Sullivan v. Zebley, which required the Social Security Act to 
conduct retroactive eligibility determinations back to 1980 for disabled children.  This 
decision alone added 125,000 new SSI recipients.54  In 1991, a new regulation extended 
presumptive disability for persons with HIV, greatly facilitating access to Medicaid for 
more individuals.55   
While Federalism, Reconciliation processes, and initial State and provider support 
encouraged Medicaid expansions, an additional force behind Medicaid expansions was 
the entrepreneurial activities of Congressman Henry Waxman.  As one author concludes, 
Waxman played a critical role in facilitating the repeated expansion of Medicaid from 
1984 to 1990.  As the policy entrepreneur, he choreographed the strategy of 
incrementalism and persistence that exploited the political and institutional circumstances 
of those years.  His own personal and political resources as chair of the powerful 
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Subcommittee on Health of the HECC [House Energy and Commerce Committee], as 
possessor of sizable financial resources through his PAC, and as a skillful and tenacious 
negotiator enabled him to exert extraordinary influence over the policy process in the 
House and in conference committee.56   
This evidence suggests that while federalism is an important component of these 
expansions, it is not the sole contributing factor.  Several forces, including federalism, 
pushed Medicaid expansions from 1984 to 1991.  In fact, the interaction between these 
factors created the environment for these expansions.  Reconciliation in combination with 
the role of federalism in Medicaid in combination with the activities of an effective 
policy entrepreneur all interacted in a dynamic trio that holds considerable explanatory 
power of the Medicaid expansions from 1984 to 1991. 
 Revolutions in the institutional rules of the Budget Process itself also favored 
Medicaid expansion.  The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (GRH), officially the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, set a goal to balance the budget in 
five years by setting annual deficit targets and using sequestration -- automatic across the 
board cuts -- in the event these targets were not met.  In all rules, though, there are 
exceptions and in Gramm-Rudmans case, Medicaid was exempt from the sequestration 
process, meaning Congress could increase spending in this program without invoking the 
harsh enforcement instrument.  This encouraged the Medicaid expansions from 1985 to 
1990.  Also, the one-year budget targets of Gramm-Rudman meant that costs of Medicaid 
could be hidden from the next years budget by programming the costs to take effect 
after the one-year time horizon.  These budget gimmicks took many different forms of 
moving around costs.57 
 By 1990, the environment created by Gramm-Rudman was altered substantially 
again by the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA).  BEA established new budget enforcement 
rules that lessened the appeal to expand Medicaid.  As Gilman found, BEA removed the 
annual reconciliation bill and its one-year targets from the agenda, forcing advocates of 
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program expansions to be explicit about the long-term costs of such program changes.58  
BEA separated the budget into Entitlement, Social Security, and Discretionary spending, 
making it impossible for an entitlement program like Medicaid to squeeze out extra 
dollars from the budgets of discretionary programs.59  The primary feature of the BEA 
was the Pay As You Go or PAYGO rules.  It required that no program extensions were 
allowed unless they were accompanied by commensurate adjustments in revenues or cuts 
in other programs.60  BEA required the sum of entitlement and revenue legislation 
enacted in a congressional session be deficit neutral.61  In the case of the BEA, 
Medicaid legislation could cause a sequestration, if an eligibility or benefit expansion 
were not offset by increased revenues or spending cuts.  However, Medicaid along with a 
number of other programs targeted at low-income persons was exempted from 
sequestration in the event of a breach in the pay-as-you-go requirement.62  Since BEA 
resulted in a three-year budget agreement, in 1991 and 1992 Congress did not enact 
reconciliation bills, thus the avenue for further Medicaid expansions was thwarted.63 
 
PROVIDER PAYMENT RULES REWORKING AND SUBSEQUENT FEDERAL 
COURT ADJUDICATION 
 
 In the early 1980s, both nursing home and inpatient hospital provider payment 
changed substantially.  The Boren Amendment was enacted and then amended to 
effectuate some of the most long-lasting and important changes in provider payment 
related to Medicaid federalism.  The Boren Amendment was enacted in two parts.  First, 
OBRA 1980 established criteria for payment to skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) and 
intermediate care facilities (ICFs).  In the second stage, OBRA 1981 added hospitals.64   
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Nursing Homes and Intermediate Care Facilities 
 
In 1972 via influential amendments to Medicaid, Title XIX of the Social Security 
Act (P.L 92- 603), it was required that a reasonable cost-related basis be used in setting 
SNF and ICF payment rates.  ICFs were included in Medicaid in 1972.  In short, states 
had a choice -- adopt Medicares principles of retrospective reasonable cost 
reimbursement or have alternative payment structures approved by the Secretary of 
HEW.65  By 1980, there was concern that the HEW approval process and also 
adjudication by the courts was herding states in the direction of Medicares cost based 
reimbursement methods -- thus in an inflationary direction.  This instigated the Boren 
Amendment for SNFs and ICFs in OBRA 1980.66   
 
Inpatient Hospitals 
 
The path for hospital payment to Boren was different.  Driving all the way back to 
Medicaid and Medicare joint enactment in the three pronged beginning of Americas 
health financing sisters, states were required -- not encouraged, but required -- to use 
Medicares retrospective cost based payment for hospitals67 except in cases where a state 
had a broad based 1115 Social Security Waivers from the federal government.   
Importantly, this meant that Medicaids hospital payment had been inextricably 
linked with that of the original Medicare hospital payment bargain between hospital 
administrators and government negotiators.  In order to move the joint 
Medicare/Medicaid bill through the enactment and implementation process, government 
bargainers had allowed hospitals to be paid according to principles of their own 
making.68   
                                                                                                                                            
Responsibilities, Priorities, and Dollars (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 1993), 84. (Hereafter 
Anderson, Medicaid Payment Policy) 
65 Anderson, Medicaid Payment Policy, 84 - 85. 
66 Anderson, Medicaid Payment Policy, 84 - 85. 
67 Schneider, Medicaid Source Book, 307.  
68 Feder, Medicare: The Politics, 82. 
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As Judy Feder explained regarding the bureaucratic appeasement, In fact, 
officials in SSAs [Social Security Administration] Bureau of Health Insurance did 
consider the impact of payment policy on Medicare costs, both in the short and long run, 
and developed payment principles consistent with their view of cost effectiveness and the 
public interest.  When these proposals failed to satisfy hospital demands, however, SSAs 
preeminent concern with hospital cooperation, reinforced by the consultation process, led 
to a compromise that contributed to and legitimized the excessive expenditures BHI [the 
Bureau of Health Insurance] had tried to avoid.69   
In this way, Medicare hospital payment was not rationalized from the beginning 
to structure a cost-effective payment instrument.  Instead, the federal government did a 
classic look away, allowing hospital executives to drive the design of payment 
mechanisms in order for government officials to get them on board in support of 
enactment.  Medicaid hospital payment, through the requirement to follow Medicares 
structure, was subject to the same system. 
By 1981, the Boren amendment eliminated this statutory requirement that 
Medicaid hospital payment to individual hospitals resemble Medicare methodology.  
There was still an important, somewhat vague range, within which states were to stay 
with regard to how they structured payment methodologies.  For example with regard to 
ceilings, Medicaid regulations established that the aggregate amount spent by a State for 
inpatient services during a year not exceed the aggregate amount which would have been 
spent if the State had used the current Medicare system.70  Also, payments could not 
exceed the hospitals customary charges to the public.71  Finally, States payment rates 
had to "be sufficient to attract enough providers so that covered services [would] be as 
available to Medicaid beneficiaries as they [were] to the general population.72   
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States or Providers -- Who Benefited from Boren? 
 
The OBRA 1981 wording stipulated that rates must be reasonable and adequate 
to meet the costs that must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities 
to provide care and services in conformity with applicable State and Federal laws, 
regulations, and quality and safety standards.73  The reasonable and adequate phrasing 
provided fodder for providers to claim that state payments were inadequate in future line 
drawing court cases.  On the other hand, the language requiring efficiently and 
economically operated facilities gave states the leeway to institute new methodologies 
that would cut costs.  Many states replaced their retrospective cost based systems with 
prospective payment methodologies.   
Until 1981, state Medicaid programs were required to reimburse hospitals 
according to Medicare methodologies.74  This meant that Boren would most probably 
result in more cost effective state-directed methodologies.  There were a number of 
convoluting factors that confused the conclusion of the policy winner from Boren, 
including changes to Medicare payment methodology in 1983, caps on aggregate 
Medicaid inpatient hospital expenditures by state tied to the potential aggregate Medicare 
spending, and disproportionate share hospital payments.   
The Amendment trumpeted to be pro-state was written in ambiguous terms.  
Anderson and Scanlon explain:  The Boren Amendment sets a federal standard for 
determining the reasonableness of payment rates to hospitals and nursing homes in the 
Medicaid program.  Originally, enacted in 1980 to affirm the states prerogative to pursue 
cost containment in setting nursing home payment rates, and amended a year later to 
encourage similar action regarding hospitals, it has been used repeatedly in recent years 
as the basis for lawsuits challenging some states payment rates to both hospitals and 
nursing homes.  While the payment rates of Medicaid programs have frequently been 
                                                                                                                                            
services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affirmed by courts, there is increasing concern that the vague and imprecise language of 
the Boren Amendment makes it difficult for the states to defend policies that fall within 
the range of their discretion.75 
 
State 1115 Waivers for Provider Payment Experiments 
 
Since states were required to utilize Medicare hospital payment methodology, the 
federal government had passed on or lent states these methodologies.  In addition to 
inheriting Medicares institutional rules regarding hospital payment, states also inherited 
its weaknesses.  In order to address these weaknesses, waivers of federal requirements in 
payment systems were allowed.  Waivers allowed experiments, as instruments of 
Laboratory Federalism, where federal legislation was exempted for states committed to 
testing new methodologies.   
Beginning in the 1970s, all-payer systems were approved as Demonstrations by 
the Secretary in order to test paying uniform rates to all insurers and payers in the State -- 
including both Medicaid and Medicare.76  The New Jersey experiment involved 
development of Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs).77  In a classic example of the 
purported benefits of states acting as laboratories of testing and learning, the New 
Jersey DRG system would serve as the model for the 1983 enactment of a prospective 
payment system (PPS) for Medicare.78  Just as the states had previously borrowed 
knowledge from the federal government, so the states now offered lessons to the federal 
government.  Federalism provides lessons both ways and is, therefore, endogenous. 
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Provider Federal Rights of Action 
 
The 1990 decision Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association initiated the right of 
Medicaid providers to proceed directly into federal court to contest payment rates.79  In 
a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court decided that providers do have a right to sue state 
Medicaid officials under section 1983 authority.  Earlier, providers had obtained 
judgments that state payments were inadequate.80  By mid-1991, cases had been filed by 
hospitals, nursing homes, or both in 29 states resulting in court orders or settlements that 
altered states reimbursement systems.81   
In the Wilder case, the Court acted despite ongoing questions in cases hinging on 
policy regarding the ability of the judiciary to intervene where policy expertise weighed 
in the decision, traditionally the seat of administrative agencies.  The Wilder v. Virginia 
Hospital Association was an extension of a Reconstruction-era civil rights law that the 
federal courts used to allow Medicaid beneficiaries to dispute state Medicaid rulings.  
Now after Wilder, providers could bring section 1983 suits, as well as beneficiaries.  An 
individual right to Medicaid entitlement had been established in a line of cases including 
King v. Smith and Maine v. Thiboutot.  In a fascinating turn, the work of the LBJ era 
OEO based legal services lawyers to attain federal rights of action for welfare 
beneficiaries were used in 1990 to defend providers rights of action.   
The policy lesson of the use of beneficiary right of action being extended to 
providers is that activists reform precedents are often used later for completely alternate 
ends by other major players in the system.  There is no guarantee how reform 
mechanisms will be used, to what ends, or by which coalition on the ideological spectrum 
                                                
79 Jost, Disentitlement, 44. 
80 Examples for hospitals include: in Pennsylvania in Temple University v. White 729 F. Supp. 1093 (E.D. 
Pa. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 873 (1992); in Michigan in Michigan Hospital Association v. Babcock 
(736 F.Supp. 759, 1990); in Colorado in Amisub Inc. V. Colorado (879 F2d 789, 10th Circuit, 1989); in 
Washington in Multicare Medical Center v. State of Washington, (W.D. Wa. C88-421Z, 1991).  For 
nursing homes, examples include Pinnacle Nursing Home v. Axelrod (719 F. Supp 1173), revd. in part on 
other grounds, 928 F.2d 1306, (2d Cir. 1991); Health Care Association of Michigan v. Babcock (W.D.Mi, 
K89-50063 CA, 1990.  See Schneider, Medicaid Source Book, 309 for additional information. 
81 Schneider, Medicaid Source Book, 42. 
  207
once a mechanism is developed or once the reform is activated.  Not only can actors not 
always control the stream of reform once it is set in motion, once an instrumental tool is 
developed, it can be used by others for wholly different ends.  In this particular case, 
though, this lesson is overstated.  In fact, some interviewees emphasized how providers in 
many cases were launching law suits on behalf of beneficiaries.  If providers are not 
compensated adequately, they cannot participate in the Medicaid program.  In turn, there 
are fewer providers to provide access and choice to Medicaid beneficiaries.  Also, after 
Wilder, providers had a reason to fight for beneficiaries entitlement rights because these 
were now inextricably tied to providers rights for adequate reimbursement based on 
access.82   
 The Supreme Court in 1990 did not appear to reflect the ambiguity that was 
affiliated with who was the real benefactor of the Boren Amendment -- States or 
Providers.  While initially, states were the beneficiaries because they were no longer tied 
in Medicaid hospital payment to what at that time was a retrospective cost based 
Medicare payment system, in more recent years hospitals had obtained court judgments 
establishing inadequacy of states Medicaid payment schemes.83  In the Wilder case, the 
Court wrote: There can be little doubt that health care providers are the intended 
beneficiaries of the Boren Amendment.  Further, the Court said that the Boren 
Amendment imposes a binding obligation on states participating in the Medicaid 
program to adopt reasonable and adequate rates and that this obligation is enforceable 
under Section 1983 by health care providers.84  
 
STATE FINANCING SCHEMES AND TRANSFERRING OF STATE 
FUNCTIONS TO MEDICAID 
 
In one of the most important trends of the 1980s, states began to use a number of 
various mechanisms in order to game or maximize the amount of federal funding via the 
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Medicaid program.  They also shifted many previously state funded functions to the 
Medicaid program, whenever possible.  By the early 1990s, these various schemes had 
changed the nature of the program substantially with federalism actively used as an 
instrument by states for transference of their own costs to the federal government via 
Medicaid.  Health programs were not the only state functions funded using these 
schemes, but in fact state functions in many policy areas were bolstered using these 
methods.  This was an example of how superiority of the federal government to 
mandate states in eligibility, benefits, payment levels, quality, and other regulatory 
requirements can be met with strategic manipulation from the states in the other direction 
to combat mandates and game federally designed structures. 
These schemes took several forms and continued to evolve well after the Reagan 
and G.H.W. Bush eras.  In general though there were two approaches: program 
expansions and state maximization schemes that evolved into important facets of 
Medicaid federalism.  Program expansions involved transferring state funded activities to 
the Medicaid program in order to reach federal matching funds.  Revenue expansions 
included various state schemes in order to replace state with federal dollars in funding the 
Medicaid program.  The second category of revenue practices included provider 
donations, provider taxes, intergovernmental transfers (IGTs), and Medicaid Upper 
Payment Limit (UPL) schemes.  Many times, these various federal funded maximization 
strategies employed by states involved utilizing the Disproportionate Share Hospital 
(DSH) program in combination with these methods, although there were also 
maximization efforts that included simply overpaying providers using DSH and getting 
kick-backs from the hospitals in return. 
 
The Feds Encourage DSH: The 1981, 1985, and 1987 OBRAs 
 
The 1981 OBRA made an effort to increase access to health care both for those 
covered by the Medicaid program and the uninsured.  In this effort, the statutory language 
included provisions whereby states were instructed to consider the special payment needs 
of hospitals that serve a disproportionately high share (DSH) of Medicaid and uninsured 
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patients.85  In short, OBRA 81 required that States Medicaid reimbursement systems 
take into account the situation of hospitals which serve a disproportionate number of 
low-income patients with special needs.86  There was a regulation capping aggregate 
Medicaid reimbursement at Medicare levels -- the so-called Upper Payment Limit.87  
States did not adopt DSH programs in large measure, and concerns regarding access to 
care for uncompensated care or uninsured individuals grew after the 1983 enactment of 
Medicares prospective payment system (PPS).  The PPS left fewer extra funds with 
providers in order to cover the care of those who were unable to pay providers.  In 
response to fears of limited access for both the uninsured and Medicaid patients, 
Congress acted again in 1985, prohibiting the Secretary from limiting States payments to 
disproportionate share hospitals -- thus creating a loophole in the Upper Payment Limit 
(The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, COBRA 85, P.L. 99-
272).88 
Before 1987, the designation of hospitals to receive DSH funding had been left to 
states.  In 1987 Congress amended the DSH provisions which included minimum criteria 
for defining a hospital as a DSH hospital effective July 1, 1988 (OBRA 87, P.L. 100-
203).89  Congress required states to submit a Medicaid plan amendment describing their 
DSH policy.90  Requirements were phased in over a three-year period and were fully 
effective for inpatient services on July 1, 1990.91 
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Provider Tax and Donation Programs 
 
At the same time that legislative changes were happening in the DSH area, there 
were several converging forces taking form.  Provider donations to state governments 
was one of these areas.  A second related area was states taxing providers -- not for 
general broad-based taxation purposes -- but in money circulating, or more pejoratively, 
money laundering arrangements, where the end result was eventually returning the taxed 
funds to providers and replacing state with federal dollars in funding the Medicaid 
program.  For most of the decade, regulation from the agency that administered Medicaid 
-- at that time called the Health Care Financing Administration or HCFA -- and not 
statutes from Congress are what organized activities in these two areas. 
HCFA regulation until 1985 allowed the use of provider donated funds -- also 
referred to as voluntary contributions -- for the costs of State administrative staff 
training.92  By 1985, a new regulation allowed private donations to finance the State share 
of Medicaid services or administrative spending within particular conditions.93  In 1986, 
West Virginia established the first provider donation program,94 thus utilizing this 
flexibility granted by the federal government.  Not having enough state funds to 
reimburse Medicaid services to hospitals, the state set up a system where hospitals 
donated money to the state government.  Returning the same funds, states would pay 
hospitals for Medicaid, drawing a federal Medicaid match by this action.  While the 
federal money generated by this roundabout transfer of funds did not fully compensate 
hospitals, it did result in some payment for services to Medicaid patients that would not 
have been available otherwise.95  In a bout of ambivalence and back and forth decision 
making by HCFA, these Federal matching funds were first approved and then later 
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denied.  Upon appeal, the denials were overturned and states again had access to these 
methods to generate federal matching funds.96 
The first provider tax program was utilized by Florida in 1984.  Working along 
the same lines as the provider donation program, states would tax providers, using the 
providers funds as the states share of Medicaid or DSH money in order to generate a 
federal match.97  Once the federal match was generated, states would pay back 
providers their tax exaction -- making the provider whole, or better off, at the end of the 
process and creating a situation where states were no longer paying their share of the 
Medicaid program.  Instead, they were utilizing their tax authority to draw down federal 
funds, allowing the federal government to pay an overall greater share of Medicaid than 
was intended and saving sparse state funds for wholly other purposes in the state budget.   
States, thus, were using the open matching structure that was instituted by the Federal 
Government in strategic ways to subvert it.  
This area of Medicaid policy in the 1980s and early 1990s comprised a great deal 
of back and forth decision making within the Administrative Agency that ran Medicaid, 
HCFA.  It also involved considerable bartering and play-by-play bantering between 
Congress, the White House, HCFA at the federal agency level, and states.  Not only were 
individual states involved in the submission of state plans, appeals, payments, and day-to-
day instructions that it received from HCFA, but the National Governors Association 
(NGA) played a key role in the actual bargaining with the major branches of government.   
 
Convergence of Several Policy Streams in Medicaid Federalism 
 
The environment surrounding these micro-level actions in Medicaid was, again, 
darkening.  In the late 1980s, recession was again threatening.  States economies were 
suffering, with searing effects particularly in states with the lowest tax capacity -- and 
often greater numbers of individuals meeting the federal mandated eligibility categories 
for Medicaid.  The great dragon -- the federal deficit -- continued as a focus in the budget 
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reconciliation bills, where now after the watershed of 1974-75 and the revisions of 1980-
81, a majority of social policy was negotiated.  Some Democrats had even gone as far as 
to claim that President Reagan had staged the spending pressure on social programs 
early on in his Presidency by pushing what was at that point the largest tax cut in 
history.98  Increases in defense spending to build up the Cold War stockpile in the arms 
race with the USSR was also cited as a rationalized choice made by President Reagan to 
foreclose other budget options.99  Following the stock market crash in October 1987, 
even greater pressure was put on deficit reduction in Presidential budgets in order to 
calm nervous financial markets.100   
In other social policy, the Medicare program was primed for a major reform in 
catastrophic health coverage -- affecting Medicaid in numerous ways including 
expansions in dual eligibles and also the introduction of new overlaps in both long-term 
care and pharmaceutical financing.  The 1988 Family Support Act spearheaded another 
major effort in cash welfare, AFDC, reform.  Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton co-chaired 
the National Governors Association welfare reform effort, forging relationships for 
Medicaid negotiations, saying We need to get a handle on the Medicaid mandates or 
else some of us are going to go broke.101  In 1988, the Bipartisan Pepper Commission, 
comprised of members of Congress and Reagan Administration appointees, was created 
to make recommendations on coverage for the uninsured and on long-term care.102  
Following major Medicare hospital payment reform in the early 1980s was major 
Medicare physician payment reform in the late 1980s.  By the time a new President took 
his oath of office, a number of policy trajectories had been set for a very active next few 
years in Medicaid bargaining.  George H.W. Bush was on the brink of proposing his own 
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ideas for Medicaid reform, as were a number of other prominent players in Medicaid 
politics. 
 In this environment, with these external forces pressing on the situation, the 
micro-Medicaid decisions proceeded.  By 1988, OMB and HCFA tried to have state 
donation and tax programs banned.103  HCFA worked to produce new regulations 
stemming the use of donations, a process interrupted when the U.S. Congress intervened -
- at least temporarily.  The legislation prohibited the Secretary from issuing final rules 
that would alter the use of voluntary contributions and provider-specific taxes before May 
1, 1989.104  The Congressional prohibition on more restrictive regulations at the agency 
level was extended a second time, to December 1990, by legislation.105  In a third move 
by Congress to stalwart the Executive, OBRA 90 permanently prohibited the Secretary 
from interfering with provider specific taxes except in very specific cases.106 
 
The Medicaid Financing Scheme Debate, Post 1990 
 
Over the next two years, the scenery in Medicaids political economy began to 
shift.  First, the use of state maximization schemes sharply increased.  DSH payments 
rose from $1.3 Billion in 1990 to $17.7 Billion in 1992.107  The link between DSH and 
provider donation and tax schemes was increasing DSH spending exorbitantly as the 
number of states participating in these maximization plans increased considerably.  In 
1990, six states had adopted tax and donation programs, whereas by 1992, 39 states 
had.108   
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In addition to these schemes, intergovernmental transfers were also being 
increasingly used by states to game or maximize state funding.  Federal rules stipulate 
that 40% of the nonfederal share of Medicaid expenses must be from state governments 
themselves; however, many states require local governments or entities to contribute to 
financing Medicaid.  By September 1991, 14 states required local governments to 
contribute to Medicaid according to disparate state criteria.  Intergovernmental transfers 
were increasingly used not only to contribute to the states match legitimately -- if you 
will -- but also in maneuvers to maximize federal funding and returning local 
governments contributions back to them in order to make them either whole or better 
off after the circular scheme was completed.  These maneuvers increasingly spilled over 
to local entities including, for example, local hospital districts, in Texas.109 
The gaming of federal matching rules is largely dependent on states 
willingness to participate in these schemes -- and so is not distributed equitably 
throughout the country.110  In a classic struggle for authority in a federalist system, states 
complained that the Federal Government had no authority to dictate how states collected 
revenues and the Federal Government, particularly the Executive, retorted that the open 
matching structure of the program was being fraudulently manipulated.111   
In order to further explain states choices in utilizing these strategies, many states 
cited the numerous federal mandates in eligibility since 1984 via various budget 
reconciliation measures and the need to find a way to pay for these unfunded 
mandates.112  Consistently, year after year Congress had required states to cover 
additional people, meaning that the federal Congress required states to pay their Medicaid 
share for these populations.  While some 31 federal expansions would occur during this 
time period, 19 would be mandatory -- without choice on the part of the states as to 
whether or not they would have prioritized this need considering their own financial 
situations.  These mandates were most severe on poor states that had much less fiscal 
capacity to collect additional revenues through taxes in order to cover the new federal 
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requirements.  With the severe increases in Medicaid spending, all states found the 
situation untenable.  Governor Michael N. Castle of Delaware summarized his states 
situation, In a year when my budget is going up by 1 percent, Medicaid is going up by 
25 percent.  The future outlook was frightening for many Governors.  Between 1990 and 
1995, Medicaid was projected to more than double.113  On February 5, 1990, the States 
Governors approved a policy statement asking Congress to grant them a two-year 
reprieve from the most recent Medicaid mandates in the Fiscal 1991 OBRA.  This 
eruption at the NGA annual meeting spanned Governors across the ideological spectrum 
and the countrys geographic regions.114  In 1989, a letter signed by 48 Governors had 
previously implored Congress to refrain from new mandates for two years.  Both letters 
were ignored.115 
 
The 1991 State Maximization Program Reforms 
 
 By the Fiscal 1991 budget-reconciliation bill, Congress authorized states to levy 
specific taxes on health care providers but postponed decision on voluntary contributions.  
States lobbied for voluntary contributions to be dealt with similarly.  On September 12, 
1991, HCFA regulations were scheduled to take effect on January 1, 1992 that would ban 
voluntary contributions outright and limit severely provider tax programs.116  HCFA 
Administrator, Dr. Gail Wilensky commented in a Congressional hearing, The 
requirement for a state share of payment has always acted as a restraint on the otherwise 
open-ended Medicaid program.117  This reflected the sentiment that although Medicaid 
was not under a capped or closed matching system, it did have several intermediate caps 
and this very instrumental de facto cap -- the limits that states were willing or able to 
invest in the program.  While states had many micro decisions in the Medicaid program, 
these aggregated to the sum of what the federal government would match.  These 
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schemes were subverting the natural cap built into the Medicaid structural financing 
system. 
 During the 1990 negotiations for the budget reconciliation bill (PL 101-508), a 
deal was brokered on these state payments that members of Congress in 1991 felt were 
broken by the Administration with these new January 1992 scheduled regulations.  
Again, Congress and the Administration were at odds in State Medicaid Financing.  
Several members of Congress reflected their own states concerns on this particular issue, 
interested in protecting their own state interests.  Congress said the ban on provider taxes 
did not follow the intent of the 1990 deal, even though the ban on voluntary contributions 
was part of that compact.   
This would devastate states, and at this point, even Republicans largely opted to 
protect their own states interests against the threatened federal regulatory action.  Many 
were torn -- split between fiscal conservatism and a desire to protect their own states 
financially.  Don Ritter, R-PA, intimated, This is troubling legislation, but added he 
would vote for it as a Pennsylvanian concerned about other Pennsylvanians.118  Even 
though Medicaid was just one of a myriad of decisions made in the 1990 budget 
reconciliation process, members remembered and held to this compromise.  In this case, 
many members stood by their States interests, thus reflecting that Medicaid is a factor in 
Congressional electoral politics.  At the state level, as a major budget item, Medicaid 
matters in electoral politics.  Members of the United States Congress respected this fact 
and despite a White House Policy Statement that included a veto threat, the House of 
Representatives passed HR3595 (PL 1023 - 234) by a 348-71 voting margin.  This 
blocked the Administrations revised rules, further limiting states discretion through 
September 30, 1992.119 
 At the time of the House vote, negotiations were underway between 
Administration officials and representatives of the National Governors Association 
(NGA).  Playing a major bargaining role in the eventual compromise that Congress 
would adopt, the NGA held that the House vote propelled their cause, anchoring their 
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position with the G.H.W. Bush Administration.  Only two days later, a tentative 
compromise was reached, which the Senate passed in a voice vote on November 26.120  
Before the conference report was cleared -- and indeed before the Senate had passed the 
compromise -- several deals were brokered by the Administration, saving what appeared 
to be a possible bail out on the deal by States.   
Not only Governors, but particularly members of Congress struck exceptions to 
the final legislation from the Administration including Democratic Finance Committee 
Chairman Lloyd Bentsen on behalf of Texas for their local hospital financing program, 
Democrat John D. Rockefeller for West Virginias tax program, and Majority Leader and 
Democrat George J. Mitchell on behalf of Maine.  The Thanksgiving break sped up the 
conclusion moreso than some were comfortable with, particularly Henry Waxman -- who 
after a string of successful entrepreneurial expansions in Medicaid over the past seven 
years was finally stymied in a negotiations process.121 
 The Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax Amendments of 
1991 was the first stand-alone Medicaid law enacted in the programs history.122  
Provisions included bans on provider donations for most reasons; requirements that 
provider taxes be broad-based across an entire class of providers; and that provider tax 
revenues be capped at 25 percent of state Medicaid spending.123  The Amendments also 
prohibited the Secretary from restricting State designations of DSHs [beyond restricting 
their use in provider tax programs]124, though setting limits on DSH payments.  
According to the legislation, during each fiscal year national aggregate DSH payments 
were limited to 12 percent of total Medicaid spending for that year.125  For FY 1993 and 
subsequent fiscal years, each State was to have its own DSH limit according to previous 
DSH spending.126  After January 1, 1996 states were given a choice of the 12 percent cap 
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or a new payment limit to be set by Congress.127  This important legislation also codified 
intergovernmental transfers which were previously stipulated in regulation.128 
 
Transfer of Financing of State-Only Functions to the Federal Government 
 
States also generated greater federal financing through the Medicaid match by 
transferring state functions to Medicaid and by expanding programs through their state 
discretion, particularly with waivers, to encompass traditionally state-dependent 
beneficiaries.  For example, beginning in the mid-1980s, states increasingly transferred 
patients out of state psychiatric hospitals and into the community, as adults age 22 to 64 
in institutions are generally ineligible for Medicaid.129  Also, states have used expanded 
Medicaid requirements under the EPSDT program for children as a means to make health 
screening and special education programs operated by school districts eligible for 
Medicaid reimbursement.130  The transference of some traditionally state-funded 
education costs to Medicaid is contradictory to the notion that Medicaid crowds out 
education spending in state budgets.  The 1981 OBRA also created freedom of choice 
and home and community service waivers, additional instruments for moving state 
functions to Medicaid.  Generally, maternal and child health and home care were areas 
that moved from state public health budgets to Medicaid in the 1980s -- both by federal 
and also independently by state actions.131 
This trend is particularly notable when restrictions in other programs place greater 
responsibilities on states.  When Reagans OMB steered multiple social welfare state cuts 
through budget reconciliation processes, some of these cuts in other social programs 
ended up as expansions in Medicaid programs when states had the option or the creative 
ability to make it happen.  In a series of interviews in 14 states, Gilbert Omenn found, It 
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should be acknowledged that those we interviewed in many states were frank to admit 
that the open-ended Medicaid match is an irresistible source of substitute funding for 
social services whose funding under Title XX was capped.132  During the budget 
reconciliation process in 1981, Title XX of the Social Security Act -- a social services 
block grant-- was reduced.133  Federal actions do not always have the intended effect in a 
federalist system.  When the Federal Government pushed on Title XX funding, the slack 
was picked up in the Medicaid program in states that were able to find ways for Medicaid 
to pay for these services.   
 
De Facto Medicaid Block Grant Add-On For States 
 
One perspective on the utilization of state financing schemes was that in the face 
of Reagan-era cuts in other programs, the open-matching grant in Medicaid was used as a 
source of regeneration.  Cuts in other programs were picked up by transference of 
functions, and funding streams, to Medicaid.  Medicaid, after all, had the benefit of 
preferential treatment in the budget process, not subject to the 1985 Gramm-Rudman 
sequestration and consistently expanded via the 1980s reconciliation processes.  Another 
perspective is that when the 1980s mandates pressed states, the state fiscal response was 
to cut back on other welfare spending by an amount almost exactly equal to the extra 
cost of the mandates.134  Probably both of these explanations have some credence.   
From a fiscal federalism perspective, the use of provider donations and taxes and 
intergovernmental transfers by states in combination with the DSH program with no real 
cost to the state creates a type of lump sum benefit for the state.  Use of these special 
financing mechanisms by states -- prominently in this era from the mid-1980s to the early 
1990s -- was a way for states to take charge in re-creating the federally determined 
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structure of the Medicaid financing system.  Albeit impossible for states to legislate 
changes in how Medicaid is structured from above, states did accomplish the magical feat 
of de-facto recreation from below.  By utilizing these maximization and transference 
strategies, states were receiving both federal matching funds for Medicaid and lump sum 
grants in the form of state funding replacement via special financing and transference 
activities.   
One reading on federal decision making in the face of this reworking of the 
federally determined institutional rules of the largest grant program to the American 
states is that of distant allowance.  Disproportionate shared funds, in addition to 
providing compensation for the uninsured in hospitals, was intentionally allowed to states 
by Congress as compensation for the costs of new Medicaid mandates.135  In his review 
of the issue in the National Tax Journal, Howard Chernick suggests that this exchange -- 
this intergovernmental fiscal relationship-- involves continuous bargaining over fiscal 
incentives to achieve new objectives.136  It also suggests, he concludes, we must pay 
careful attention to the way in which the fiscal relationship between the grantor and the 
grantee evolves over time.  While President Bushs, and President Reagans, attempts at 
block granting Medicaid did not materialize, there was a de facto lump sum or block 
grant added onto the Medicaid match during this time period.  Congress protected state 
interests, including Republicans who highly valued fiscal conservatism.  Even after 
acting in 1991, they did so in a way that left loopholes in the DSH and, to some extent, 
the provider tax legislation.  Only voluntary contributions were banned.  This was a way 
to provide a lump sum addition to the already open matching grant structure of Medicaid.  
When other aspects of federal funding to states were severely cut, Medicaid became a 
way to bolster state budgets during this time period.  Federal Legislators looked away 
because they believed states needed the added lump sum amount in order to cover the 
cost of Medicaid mandated expansions and for rejuvenation after other federal funding to 
states was cut. 
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THE G.H.W. BUSH ERA MEDICAID STRUCTURAL REFORM PROPOSALS 
 
The George H. W. Bush era staged a national debate on proposed overhauls to the 
United States health care system that set the groundwork for the infamous Clinton health 
plan and national health debates of 1993 and 1994.  In 1990, the U.S. Bipartisan 
Commission on Comprehensive Health Care, known as The Pepper Commission, 
proposed that a federal program replace Medicaids acute care component to cover all 
persons without employer-based or Medicare coverage.  In the proposed plan, the joint 
federal-state Medicaid program would continue to offer some long-term care services.137  
In 1990, the Americans With Disabilities (ADA) (PL 101-336) legislation passed 
Congress, setting the stage for future Medicaid adjudication and expansion of community 
based services for disabled individuals.  Based on the Civil Rights Act model, the ADA 
further exemplified that landmark Rights-based legislation did not stop at the 1960s.   
The ADA would also call into question the viability of a famous waiver proposed 
by the State of Oregon that limited benefits but expanded eligibility in Oregons 
Medicaid program through a waiver of federal requirements.  The Oregon legislature 
passed the plan in 1989 and the state completed it in 1991.  Officially, the G.H.W. Bush 
Administration rejected the Oregon petition for a federal waiver given concern that the 
states ranking of prioritized health care condition/treatments violated the ADA, which 
prohibited discrimination on the basis of health condition.138   
One state lobbying representative emphasized that the ADA was just one piece of 
why the Oregon waiver did not go through during the G.H.W. Administration.  Also, the 
ability of states to unilaterally remove Medicaid beneficiaries entitlement in a publicly 
financed program where you were entitled to benefits statutorily was in question.139  
Some stalwart Medicaid advocates like Henry Waxman (D-Calif.) and other Democratic 
leaders like Albert Gore, soon to be the Vice Presidential candidate, opposed the Oregon 
plan, as well.  Several disability advocacy groups also stood arms-locked against the idea 
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of ranking illness-treatment pairs and drawing a line at who would receive Medicaid 
services and who would not.140 
The health reform proposals of the G.H.W. Bush-era showed again the pluralistic 
nature of major national health reform in the United States.  There were so many 
proposals that coalitions were split and re-split, creating pockets of so few supporters 
behind each of the potential plans that none became frontrunners.  Changes to the 
Medicaid program were pronounced in these more comprehensive proposals, further 
reflecting that Medicaid reform is tied to national health reform.   
Also, the trend of incremental Medicaid reform either preceding or immediately 
following a major national health reform debate in the United States Congress is a trend 
to watch for.  Since national health reform is a big event that has never happened, the 
efforts are often followed by a portion of the ideas being implemented in a more limited 
fashion.  Oftentimes, this provides incremental progress after so much political energy 
has been spent on the national discussions. 
While some proposals are rolled into OBRA legislation, thus including it in the 
massive budget negotiations, others are designed as Medicaid reforms rolled into more 
comprehensive health efforts.  For example, Senator John Chafee (R-RI) proposed the 
MedAmerica Act of 1987 (S1139) that included the infant mortality amendments, 
similar to other proposed bills, in a much larger effort to update Medicaid.141  The Chafee 
bill proposed that states be able to receive federal funds for providing Medicaid coverage 
to all people with family incomes less than the federal poverty level.  People with 
incomes between 100 and 200 percent of the poverty level could buy into Medicaid.  The 
strategy in the Chafee bill was to restructure Medicaid so that income level, not 
categorical eligibility, would define eligibility.  The categorical eligibility rules -- fraught 
with inequalities based on its design, would be removed.142  
While the Chafee bill did not gain momentum, several other proposals also 
included the infant mortality amendments.  The plurality of similar thoughts on stemming 
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infant mortality resulted in these particular reform provisions being included in OBRA 
1987 (PL. 100-203).  While the categorical eligibility rules were not removed as the 
Chafee bill proposed, there were incremental moves to tie eligibility levels more closely 
to the federal poverty level and overall inequality was decreased between 1986 and 
1990.143   
In 1991 and 1992, a federalized Medicaid program, or a new public program for 
low-income persons, was part of a number of universal coverage proposals introduced in 
the 102nd Congress, while others would leave low-income coverage with the States, 
possibly with enhanced Federal funding.144  Federal action was thought not only to 
address issues of the uninsured, but also cost control.  As Congressional Quarterly 
reported, Congress took no action in 1991 to overhaul the health care system, pushing 
into 1992 a very loud cry for reform from both political parties.  More than three dozen 
healthcare proposals circulated during the first session of the 102nd Congress and it 
became increasingly difficult to boil them down into an approach with strong consensus 
backing.145  While none of the proposals were considered seriously, President Bushs 
plan would eliminate the open-ended entitlement status for most of the acute-care 
portions of Medicaid and convert these to a lump-sum grant.146  After at least three 
attempts at changing the structure of Medicaid financing -- for all or part of the program-- 
to a block grant in the Reagan era, the Bush Presidency also recommended a lump-sum 
approach.  The ball that started rolling with Fords go-nowhere proposition of block 
granting Medicaid, along with several other health programs, was now a regularly offered 
menu item in Medicaid reform talks. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Medicaid in the 1990s was a curious twist.  Caught in a newly evolving budget 
process, the program was expanded more than 30 times.  Intuition would suggest that the 
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pre-eminence of entitlement cutting in the new budget process would result in federal 
mandates to cut eligibility and benefits, but, in fact, Medicaid through Senate Finance and 
House Ways and Means member and staff ingenuity was expanded.  It was not until the 
PAYGO was actually used in the 1993 budget process that this tide stopped.  While 
barely visible on the broader public policy horizon, for anyone intrigued by Medicaid 
policy, the 1980s series of incremental reforms via budget negotiations is a study in 
unusually adept policy savvy. 
 The 1980s was an era of push and pull between the federal government and states 
on Medicaid state financing mechanisms, states maximizing the federal match, and states 
moving populations and services to Medicaid in what was termed the Medicaiding of 
state functions.  While these trends continue to the present day, they began in the mid-
1980s.  The policy battles between Federal officials in the G.H.W. Bush Health Care 
Financing Administration and Office of Management and Budget with states over these 
issues set pathways between federal and state governments.  Many of the lessons learned 
by these officials in the 1980s and early 1990s regarding creative state financing 
mechanisms -- provider tax and donation programs, DSH programs, school based 
financing, Upper Payment Limit (UPL) initiatives, intergovernmental grants, and a whole 
host of other mechanisms -- repeat today in 2007. 
 The Reagan Administration wanted badly to do something with Medicaid, to 
block grant it, to federalize it in exchange for transferring AFDC to the states, to cap and 
control it.  Medicaid was not one of the favored social safety net programs that the 
Reagan Administration protected in the face of so many other entitlement cuts.  And yet, 
headed into The Modern Era, Medicaid expanded.  The budget process continued to 
evolve itself.   
States began to experiment in the late 1980s and early 1990s with their own 
comprehensive universal health coverage attempts.  President George H.W. Bushs 
Administration and Congress worked through a number of national health reform 
proposals themselves.  All in time for the Kennedy generation to finally come of age.  As 
President Clinton took office, Medicaids Modern era (1992 - 2007) began with a 
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national health coverage discussion that set in motion dozens of streams of potential 
health reforms that evolved over the next 15 years.  This is the topic of the next part, Part 
III, which investigates The Modern Era and includes information from interviewing the 
major policy bargainers and elite decision makers in Medicaid politics during this time 
period. 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART III 
 
As the next chapters will discuss, the national discussion on the uninsured, those 
with low-incomes, and requisite subsidy approaches was vital to the entire 1993-1994 
national health debate.  Chapter 7 introduces this great national debate.  The following 
chapter briefly reviews two important waivers in the states of Oregon and Tennessee -- 
horizon-changing state directed initiatives in Medicaid federalism and the policy 
bargaining that shapes it.  Chapter 9 delves into greater detail on why the low-income and 
uninsured populations so severely leant on the overall design and policy bargaining 
decisions of the team stretching to enact national health reform.  It also reviews 
competing proposals during the near big bang health reform era of the early 1990s as they 
reflect on the Medicaid program.  Leaving analyses of the overall reform effort to other 
texts, this chapter concentrates on what the national discussion meant for Medicaid 
federalism.  Chapter 10 continues a more explicit discussion of how the 1992 - 1994 
arguments extended to two major debates on whether to block grant Medicaid in the mid-
1990s, as well as to statutory reforms in the 1997 Balanced Budget Act (BBA).  The 1997 
BBA, in combination with the 1996 welfare reform, was the most striking one-two punch 
in American social policy since the enactment of Medicaid and Medicare in 1965.  
Generated from discussions during the national health debate and the block grant debates, 
both the block granting of AFDC and the 1997 BBA leaned in a conservative direction.  
A final chapter in Part III, Chapter 11, considers how the 1990s policy discussions 
affected the major reforms in the G.W. Bush era -- particularly the 2005 Deficit 
Reduction Act (DRA).  Time will tell if the DRA, enacted in February 2006, has ushered 
in an entirely new era in Medicaid political economy. 
The major trend line in Medicaid policy bargaining in the 1990s was waiver 
negotiation reform.  The overriding storyline the first five years of the 21rst century is the 
transcendence of the Administrative state in Medicaid policy bargaining.  All in all, the 
end results by 2007 was a re-definition of the original principles of the Medicaid program 
(statewideness, comparability of benefits, no cost sharing, single-tier health system, 
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comprehensive coverage, and freedom of choice).  This is happening (1) in new state-
directed initiatives; (2) in states winning in defining and redefining state flexibility while 
maintaining federal funds; and (3) general acceptance of the beneficiary personal 
responsibility argument, effectuated by increased cost sharing provisions in the DRA.   
Neither the importance of budget reconciliation -- the overarching byline of the 
1980s -- nor rights adjudication -- the pressing force of the 1960s and early 1970s -- was 
missing in the modern era (1992 - 2007).  These continued to evolve, along with very 
influential changes, depending on majority party, in Congressional procedural rules.  The 
late 1990s adjudication interpreting the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) -- built on 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act -- reached Medicaid directly.  Federal court disability 
decisions, such as Olmstead, in the 1990s demanded court-directed Medicaid federalism 
reform.  The pluralism of the waiver process and the emergence of the Administrative 
state, however, were the major new storylines in Medicaid federalism.  Overarching the 
Medicaid policy bargaining environment was the umbrella of an ongoing tension as the 
legacy of the Great Society tangled with the Goldwater/Reagan/Gingrich mission to 
dismantle it.  The institution of Federalism was an instrument for both sides. 
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7. PRELUDE TO A NATIONAL DISCUSSION:  
THE MEDICAID AND STATE FEDERALISM 
ENVIRONMENT BEFORE THE NEAR BIG BANG 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1993, President Clintons list of policy priorities was ambitious and 
comparisons to the FDR era unabashed.  As the Congressional Quarterly reported at the 
time, Its effect was projected to be at least as sweeping, and like Roosevelts programs, 
its economic and social impact was expected to touch every American.1  The Clinton 
national health plan blueprint was scheduled for the Administrations first 100 days and 
passage was expected in the first year.2 -- a sentiment that played out differently than 
Roosevelts Hundred Days in which the country witnessed a presidential barrage of 
ideas and programs unlike anything known to American history.3  The national health 
plan was to bookend FDRs Social Security Act -- where national health coverage was 
absent.   
Franklin D. Roosevelt had made health security part of his Second Bill of 
Rights, a document that transformed how the United Nations approaches economic, 
social, and cultural rights within its umbrella of Human Rights.  President Clinton told a 
national audience on Nightline, What I feel the pressure to do is to at least pass the 
legislation and get the security in.  I want everybody to have their health security card so 
                                                
1 1993 CQ Almanac, 335. 
2 Hugh Heclo, The Clinton Health Plan: Historical Perspective, Health Affairs 88 (Spring 1995), 96 - 97.  
(Hereafter, Heclo, The Clinton Health Plan) 
3 Schlesinger, Arthur, The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1958, print. 1959), 20.  (Hereafter Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming) 
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I know theyll have comprehensive benefits that cant be taken away that they cant 
lose.4  Similar to FDRs language in terms of locking in benefits for a new entitlement, 
the Clinton plan was definitively different in how it made operational the financing of an 
initiative that would touch the life of every American.  Famously, FDR quipped, With 
those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my Social Security program.5  
The anchor of the Social Security program is the earmarked tax, and in its design, FDRs 
economic security team meant for that anchor to hold.  The New Democrat would shun a 
broad based tax in favor of an employer mandate to pay 80% of costs, an additional tax 
on employers of more than 5,000 employees who were allowed to opt out, and a cigarette 
tax.6  The idea of a tax as anchor was no longer considered effective, especially since this 
latest national reform effort occurred far after the Social Security and Medicare payroll 
taxes were in place and there was little room for another one. 
On September 22, 1993, the President proclaimed, At long last, after decades of 
false starts, we must make this our most urgent priority, giving every American health 
security -- health care that can never be taken away, health care that is always there.7  
The operational plans for Medicaid would fold the program into the new health alliance 
system.  Medicaid patients would receive the same benefits package as other Americans.8  
The debate teetered on discussions on low-income and uninsured Americans -- the 
Medicaid subset.   
 This chapter introduces the Clinton era prior to the national health debate.  It also 
sets the stage for the next chapter, which concentrates on a handful of major Medicaid 
waivers that occurred just before and contemporaneously with the national health debate.  
States were not waiting for national health reform.  States utilized Medicaid dollars to 
drive their own ideas via state-directed comprehensive reform.  The effects of this 
                                                
4 William J. Clinton, Remarks in the ABC News Nightline Town Meeting on Health Care Reform in 
Tampa, Florida, September 23, 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1993, Book I  
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1994), 1571. 
5 Schlesinger, The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming, 308 - 309. 
6 1993 CQ Almanac, 338. 
7 1993 CQ Almanac, 48-D. 
8 1994 CQ Almanac (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc, 1994), 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, 
1994, Volume L, 323.   
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reverberated to 2006.  This chapter reviews the 1993 Budget Reconciliation Process and 
the institution of PAYGO limits; State Directed Comprehensive Reform Efforts predating 
the national health debate; and establishes Medicaids environment before the 
multiplication of the statewide 1115 Medicaid waivers began. 
 
THE THIRTY YEAR GENERATIONAL CYCLE:  
1934-35, 1964-65, 1994-95 
  
After the New Deal was enacted in 1935, it took 30 years for the Great Societys 
Medicare and Medicaid -- the health annex to the New Deal -- to be enacted in 1965.  
Many had foretold, including the architect of the Medicaid program, Wilbur Cohen, that 
the next big reform would be 30 years after the Great Society.  Cohen said of this early 
1990s plan, It will have been built upon the experience of Medicare and Medicaid.  It 
will be a tribute to Lyndon B. Johnson..It will be an American plan worked out by the 
American Congress on some kind of an evolutionary basis.9   
Arthur Schlesinger added his prophetic review in 1990 of the expectant decade: 
There is nothing mystical about the thirty-year cycle.  Thirty years is the span of a 
generation.  People tend to be formed politically by the ideals dominant in the years when 
they first come to political consciousness.In the same manner John Kennedy touched 
and formed a political generation in the 1960s.  If the rhythm holds, that generations 
time will arrive in the 1990s.10  And so the era was ushered in with the major networks 
news shows running a weathered photograph of the newly elected president as a young 
man, William Jefferson Clinton, shaking the hand of President John F. Kennedy.  The 
Kennedy era youth were now running the country, and they had their eyes set on national 
health reform.  
                                                
9 Wilbur Cohen, From Medicare to National Health Insurance, Chapter 8 in Toward New Human Rights: 
the social policies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, David Warner (ed.) (Austin, TX: LBJ 
School of Public Affairs, 1977), 152-3.  
10 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Liberal Opportunity, American Prospect Online, (March 21, 1990), 
http://www.prospect.org/web/prinfriendly-view.ww?id=5352 (accessed on September 20, 2006).   
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THE THIRD WAY LED BY A FORMER GOVERNOR 
 
Overarching worldviews in political economy were shifting in the early 1990s.  
Far from Reagan/Thatcherism, there was a Third Way sweeping the worlds social 
democracies.  Not your old left, not your old right -- but something President Bill Clinton 
and British Prime Minister Tony Blair would mold into a new way of governing.11  In the 
past, rights based argument met rights based argument in a different wrestling dialectic.  
On the one side was the conservative rights-based rhetoric against tax increases and 
public spending12 and opposing it, a rights-based argument for economic rights and 
social equity.  Hence, the crude stereotypes of the Republican fiscal conservative 
minimizing the social safety net and the tax and spend loving Democrat expanding it.   
In the United States, even though Democrats held both the White House and the 
U.S. Congress, a major distinguishing characteristic of the time-period was that a New 
Democrat occupied the White House and a multitude of Old Democrats returned to 
Congress in 1992.13  They were split along an ideological fissure -- Old-Style 
Democrats were primarily concerned with social equity; New Democrats priority was a 
stronger economy, greater efficiency, and reform of public programs.  With a former 
Governor in the Oval Office and leading the charge, the Third Ways domestic politics 
was infused with a New, New Federalism.  Given that in the Medicaid policy arena 
Governors lead the policy bargaining for states, the fact that the Administration would 
embrace state experimentation was not a point of minor importance.  Governors face a 
multitude of different state legislative requirements that frame their own debate positions.  
At the same time, on the national stage, they are the primary state actors advised by state 
Medicaid directors, who they often appoint.   
In the Clinton era, Governors would become more active in aggressively 
advocating, designing, and overseeing the implementation of state specific Medicaid 
                                                
11 See Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (1998; repr., Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press). 
12 Zelizer, Taxing America, 276. 
13 Heclo, The Clinton Health Plan, 95. 
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programs allowed by a newly liberalized federal rules waiver process.  In fact, the 
transformation of the Medicaid waiver process under the Clinton Administration would 
begin to break apart much of the remaining uniformity requirements across states.  It also 
set off effects that would be re-directed and re-packaged when the subsequent George W. 
Bush Administration substantially strengthened the Administrative State in Medicaid 
policy via the waiver and state plan amendment processes.  The overall emphasis on 
Executive privilege to some extent transferred to concerns by the legislative branch that 
the Administrative state was legislating via agency edict. 
Policy bargaining in Medicaid was transformed by these events.  And bringing the 
discussion back to the early 1990s, to a large extent the next decade and a half of health 
and Medicaid policy was shaped by the national discussion on health care that took place 
between 1992 and 1994.  The legacy of this time era was not failure of health reform, as 
much as about the myriad of more targeted reforms that were set in motion during those 
debates and negotiations.  The policy positions agreed to by the various factions were 
noted and recycled, rehashed, and reframed for several years thereafter.  Once agreed to 
in response to a competing policy proposal, reform ideas were often implemented in the 
future rounds of Medicaid debates -- even if the competing proposals were no longer on 
the table.  This was a hallmark of Medicaids evolution over the next 15 years.   
 
NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM MEETS BUDGET RECONCILIATION AND 
PAYGO, REFORMING BOTH MEDICAID BARGAINING PROCESSES AND 
SUBSTANTIVE POLICY 
 
 The 1993 Budget Process was important for Medicaid in three major ways.  First, 
the budget process, not in existence in other major health reform eras, sapped a 
remarkable amount of legislative attention and Executive political capital from the later 
national health reform debate.  Second, the PAYGO rules passed in 1990 -- separating 
entitlements, discretionary spending, and Social Security -- were getting their first test 
run in 1993.  The BEA required that the sum of entitlement and revenue legislation had to 
be budget neutral -- or sequestration, across the board cuts on non-exempt entitlements, 
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were required.14  While the budget process had sequestration rules in place before, 
Congress could increase Medicaid spending without invoking sequestration.15  Under 
BEA, Medicaid could cause a sequestration.  Medicaid was exempt, however, from 
sequestration if PAYGO was breached by another programs increased spending.16  The 
new PAYGO rules -- in combination with political realities -- put breaks on the long 
string of Medicaid expansions.  Finally, substantive Medicaid reforms were enacted 
during the process, particularly another round of DSH restrictions.  This move was meant 
to further restrict states in effectively increasing their state match rate. 
 
The Budget Process Saps Momentum From National Health Reform 
 
At the launch of the Clinton era, as for New Democrats, they were making fiscal 
conservatism their own and planning an agenda to address the supply side of poverty.  
After all, a rising tide raises all boats.  On povertys demand side, scheduled entitlement 
reform in health and welfare programs targeted those in need.  The political manifestation 
of the Third Way was tinged by early 1990s CBO and OMB budget projections for 
unprecedented annual deficits between $350 billion and $400 billion for the foreseeable 
future.17  By White House accounting, the 1993 Omnibus Reconciliation bill (HR 2264 -
- PL 103-66) was to cut the deficit by $504.8 billion in fiscal 1994 - 1998.  It included 
$250.1 billion in net revenue increases and $254.7 billion in spending cuts.18  Medicare 
was cut $55.8 billion dollars and Medicaid by nearly $7 billion as a down payment on 
health reform, according to HHS Secretary Shalala.19  From the onset, Health Reform had 
a deficit shadow.  The requisite changes in Medicaid policy -- an appendage of the swipe 
at comprehensive health security -- were slowed also by the major omnibus budget 
reconciliation initiative. 
                                                
14 Schneider, Medicaid Source Book, 477. 
15 Gilman, Medicaid and the Costs of Federalism, 121. 
16 Schneider, Medicaid Source Book, 479 - 480. 
17 Aaron Wildavsky and Naomi Caiden, The New Politics of the Budgetary Process, 5th ed. (New York: 
Longman Classics, 2004), 108. 
18 1993 CQ Almanac, 124. 
19 1993 CQ Almanac, 366. 
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Reconciliation sapped political capital at an alarming clip.  This was a major 
distinction from the last substantial attempt at national health reform, in the Nixon era 
before budget reconciliation existed.  The budget process itself had evolved, including 
PAYGO rules in the 1990 BEA that require balancing any new initiative with a 
commensurate reduction in the budget elsewhere.  These rules stifled any profound 
restructuring that added to budget totals.  The 1993 Budget Reconciliation process itself 
extended these PAYGO rules through 1998.20  Combine this with an enormous inherited 
deficit, a presidential agenda prioritizing several other initiatives before health reform on 
the all-important legislative timeline, and a New Democrat in the White House pledged to 
balance the budget -- and the rules of American politics functioned precisely as they were 
intended to -- by preventing reform. 
 
PAYGO Limits Effects on Medicaid Policy Bargaining 
 
Some interviewees reported that the new PAYGO limit on increases in 
entitlement programs -- and the requisite requirement of finding offsets in other programs 
for any increase in program funding -- did not substantially change Medicaid bargaining.  
Others who were close to the legislative process reported not only a change but a 
fundamental reworking of how Medicaid policy is negotiated.  One policy bargainer who 
was integral to Congressman Waxmans team -- who in collaboration with Senate 
Finance Committee members and staff effectuated several major Medicaid expansions in 
the 1980s -- said of the emerging PAYGO rule, Yea.  Made a huge difference, a huge 
difference.  Well, with fiscal policy generally.  It forced people to think about tradeoffs.  
If they were going to have tax cuts and find offsets.  If you were going to expand 
Medicaid or Medicare, you had to find offsets.  It was very good, very healthy.  And no 
problem.  So, you could still do in the context of Pay-As-You-Go.  You could still make 
policy changesor create a mix of policy changes where you are saving money in the 
program and reinvesting, expanding expenditures as well by adding new populations, 
                                                
20 1993 CQ Almanac, 139. 
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expanding to new servicesimproving reimbursement levels to particular provider 
groups, whateveryou could do that, its perfectly feasible.21   
A Republican counterpart surmised that PAYGO was largely a response to 
Medicaid expansions, meaning in his view that PAYGO did not just act upon the 
Medicaid bargaining arena but that Medicaid expansions actually were part of the mix of 
factors that forced the creation of PAYGO.22  According to this source, they [the 
Democrats on the Energy and Commerce Committee] hated OBRA 93.  It was the first 
time they got a Medicaid number to meet.23 
 
1993 Budget Package Changes in Medicaid, Particularly DSH Tightening 
 
As for Medicaid, the 1993 budget package tightened restrictions on the transfer of 
assets to facilitate Medicaid eligibility, strengthened requirements to recover the cost of 
long-term care services in Medicaid estate recoveries, and further restricted DSH 
hospitals.  The new DSH restrictions re-defined how states could identify hospitals for 
disproportionate share funds, the payments to facilities that served a greater percentage of 
uncompensated patients.  The impetus behind the reform as one Senate Finance staffer 
recounted, Medicaid money is crackthere are subvarieties of Medicaid money and one 
is DSH.24  DSH restrictions were meant to stop what a Clinton Federal Administrator 
called states overdraft account in the sky.25  This referred to states maximizing federal 
contributions by tactics that recycled federal funds.  These mechanisms were used to 
generate additional matching funds from the federal government, thereby replacing state 
dollars.  These arrangements worked against the spirit of the Medicaid open matching 
grant structure.26 
                                                
21 Interview with the Author, August 23, 2006. 
22 Interview with the Author, October 13, 2006. 
23 Interview with the Author, October 13, 2006. 
24 Interview with the Author, August 15, 2006. 
25 Interview with the Author, August 3, 2006. 
26 The DSH reform stemmed payments to no more than the costs of providing inpatient and outpatient 
services to Medicaid and uninsured patients, less that amount the hospital received for those patients either 
from Medicaid or the patients themselves.  From 1993 CQ Almanac, p. 135.   
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As a Democratic Energy and Commerce Congressional staffer reminisced on the 
policy environment of the time,There is no doubt that DSH [was] a block grant.In 
OBRA90 and tracking all the way down to OBRA93, the thinking was, we need to limit 
the federal exposure here.  States are making a run on the treasury and then in exchange 
for that, we are not going to look too hard at who they give the money to and what kind 
of outcome we get.27  Agreement with further restrictions on state maximization plans 
was echoed by a Republican Energy and Commerce staffer who agreed, Even they 
agreed that they looked like skunks in the candy shop.  I mean its ridiculous.28 
 
STATES AS REFORMERS PRIOR TO THE NATIONAL DEBATE 
 
For Medicaid, the history was vital.  President Clinton, when Governor of 
Arkansas, was the point for the National Governors Association (NGA) in welfare reform 
during the enactment of The Family Support Act of 1988 (PL 100-485) -- a role which 
informed an oft-repeated campaign promise that Republicans would later use to hold his 
feet to the fire to End Welfare As We Know It.29  His experiences in bargaining both 
health care and welfare reform as a Governor imprinted his approach as President.  The 
health reform environment at this time, prior to national health reform, was decidedly 
state focused.  Pre-dating this round of national health reform summits was a good deal of 
state movement for their own solutions -- stopping at state boundaries -- for state directed 
comprehensive health reform, above and beyond the strictures of the Medicaid program. 
Some states were aggressively pursuing their own state directed initiatives.  If the 
federal government was not able to see a federal level initiative through the checks and 
balances and institutional structures of American government, then the states would see it 
through their own state legislatures.  Minnesota, Oregon, Massachusetts, Hawaii, and 
others developed state systems -- above and beyond Medicaid reform -- to accomplish 
more comprehensive reform at the state level.  During the national health reform debate, 
                                                
27 Interview with the Author, August 23, 2006. 
28 Interview with the Author, October 13, 2006. 
29 1993 CQ Almanac, 373. 
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these state directed attempts at comprehensive health reform were cited by the President 
in his speeches and by members in Congressional hearings on national health reform -- as 
examples of how a government, in this case state government, can effectuate health 
reform.30  States were cited as models for federal reform.  This state directed reform pre-
dated the Bill and Hillary Clinton led reform, and it informed their ideas for national 
change.  This is further evidence of the endogeneity of federalism -- the lessons go in 
both directions. 
As the NGA lead negotiator remembered, In the late 80s in the states there was a 
lot of movement -- you had your Oregon plan, you had your Minnesota planyou had 
Massachusetts.  The pendulum had kind of swung to state initiatives at that point.  When 
[President] Clinton was [elected], there was a feeling that.the pendulum would swing 
back to the federal government.  That basically stopped all the state work.  But again 
Clinton and the Senate were the only ones who could have gotten it done possibly.  
[Senator] Chaffee was interesting conceptually, but the centralist groups do this in a lot of 
different areas and it never gets off the ground.31 
This is a sentiment very different from the legacy of the 1960s, where states were 
distrusted in reform efforts.  Of the early to mid 1990s, two academics concluded, it is 
unlikely that ever again will state and local governments be cast so easily as the 
adversaries of the poor  they now represent a vast resource to people without means.32  
Possibly stemming from success in developing and implementing research and 
demonstration projects in hospital, outpatient, and nursing home financing -- and several 
other areas of health policy -- states have increasingly become the locus of health reform.  
In the evolution of health federalism, just prior to the Clinton Administration attempt at 
                                                
30 See House of Representatives, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Health Care Reform (Part 5), House of Representatives, One 
Hundred Third Congress, First Session, Serial No. 103-90, Friday, November 19, 1993, Health Care 
Reform: Impact on Medicaid and Low-Income People, Henry Waxman, Chairman of Subcommittee, 548.  
See also House of Representatives, Health Care Reform (Part 5), Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Health and the Environment of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, One 
Hundred Third Congress, First Session, Serial No. 103-90, Friday, November 19, 1993, Health Care 
Reform: Impact on Medicaid and Low-Income People, Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee, 
Mr. Bliley, 535 - 536. 
31 Interview with the Author, November 2, 2006. 
32 Altman, The Role of State and Local, in Prologue, 7. 
  239
national health reform, some states were actively creating state directed universal care 
models and not passively waiting for federal action.   
 
Roadblocks to State Directed Comprehensive Coverage:  
ERISA and Tax Capacity 
 
While states were moving prior to the new health reform era to take the reins on 
comprehensive coverage proposals, major roadblocks included ERISA restrictions on 
employer mandates at the state level and the limitations of state tax capacity.  States were 
experiencing first, reduced receipts on sales taxes from goods; second, a siphoning off of 
state tax revenue from internet sales; and third, an increase in untaxed services.  In 
combination, these two factors, ERISA and reduced state tax capacity, hamstrung states 
ability to self-finance comprehensive health reform within their state borders.   
ERISA, enacted in 1974, was a major increase of federal authority, as it 
preempted state laws that relate to any employee benefit plan, with some exceptions, 
such as those of state and local governments and of churches.33  After a series of broad 
judicial interpretations of ERISA, it became conventional wisdom that only the federal 
government and not state governments, could legally mandate [health] coverage.34  
Cutting into the ability for states to establish employer mandates for health insurance 
coverage, the employer mandate was an instrument of health reform largely left to the 
federal government.  In 1993-94, the Clinton Health Security Plan adopted the employer 
mandate model and other counter-proposals followed suit.  This federal restriction of 
state authority was referred to in a review of health federalism by the Urban Institute as, 
the biggest single shift in federalism until the mid-1990s, reducing state authority while 
federal authority largely deferred to private action.35  While one state, Hawaii, did 
implement an employer mandate, it was only able to do so because it had originally 
established it in 1974 just months prior to ERISAs enactment.  No other state followed 
                                                
33 John Holahan, Alan Weil and Joshua M. Wiener (eds.), Federalism & Health Policy (Washington, D.C.: 
The Urban Institute Press, 2003), 366.  (Hereafter Holahan, Federalism & Health Policy) 
34 Holahan, Federalism & Health Policy, 366. 
35 Holahan, Federalism & Health Policy, 366. 
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Hawaiis example, and the general understanding is that states are prohibited from 
mandated employer insurance for employees.36 
Even if able to remove the ERISA provision and if there was the drive to make an 
attempt at state employer mandates to provide health insurance, many state legislatures 
met the same wall that faced the National Health Reform Task Force in 1993/94 on the 
national stage -- broad based taxes are infeasible at worst and unpopular at best.  With the 
inability to deficit spend, with generally shorter political decision making horizons to 
consider, and with compromised tax capacity often based on a dwindling sales tax base -- 
states require financial assistance from the federal government to tackle comprehensive 
health care reform.  Highlighting the need for federal financing assistance to effectuate 
comprehensive reform, states began to look to Medicaid statewide waivers of federal 
requirements for ways to generate the necessary funds and flexibility to make their own 
state directed comprehensive health reform designs a reality. 
As one interviewee who has played leadership roles at both the state and the 
federal level commented, So, those two things [ERISA and state tax capacity] really 
prevent it from happening at the state level, as some states would like it to.  But at the 
federal level, you cant get an agreement.  So you are in this no-mans land.  And while 
you are in this no-mans land -- states have these horrible problems.37 
 
WHERE MEDICAID STOOD BEFORE THE NATIONAL HEALTH DEBATE 
 
In Medicaid, there was a dramatic upsurge in inpatient hospital care costs; 
between 1990 and 1992 the number of Medicaid beneficiaries was exploding at between 
20% - 30% a year; and most states were no longer shy about using creative financing to 
maximize the federal match.  In 1990, only six states had tax and donation programs; by 
1992, this number has grown to 39 states.  Also, more middle class beneficiaries were 
qualifying for Medicaid to finance long-term care costs by taking advantage of loopholes 
in asset transfer rules.  Add to this mix a major paradigm shift both in the American 
                                                
36 Holahan, Federalism & Health Policy, 366. 
37 Interview with Author, November 1, 2006. 
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health care system generally and in Medicaids political economy -- The Managed Care 
Revolution of the 1990s.   
While the two previous decades saw various federal and state attempts at 
developing pre-paid capitated health care, managed care had not yet taken hold in most 
Medicaid markets -- with the state of Arizona being one very important exception.38  The 
Medicaid managed care trend was stark.  In 1990, nearly all Medicaid beneficiaries 
received care from physicians paid fee-for-service.  By 1997, nearly half of Medicaid 
beneficiaries were enrolled in some from of pre-paid managed care.  In part, the reason 
for this is related to waiver reform, but to some extent the national discussion on health 
reform that embraced managed care delivery mechanisms for the general population 
made it more considered generally, including for Medicaid beneficiaries.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 While states were already in the ring of comprehensive health reform well before 
the national health debate, the pendulum was about to swing back to federal initiative in 
health reform.  A very important national discussion -- and a near big bang in the 
American welfare state -- was about to take place.  The Budget Reconciliation process in 
1993 took some political capital out of the sails of national health reform.  The substantial 
Medicare cuts had been called a down payment on national health reform by Secretary 
Shalala, but it was the first time a major national health reform effort had taken place 
since Reconciliation became a political reality to be reckoned with in 1981.  This 
experience left many experts after the fact considering whether national health reform 
                                                
38 An important exception is the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment (AHCCC) program, enacted in 
1982 and updated and expanded since.  Arizona did not participate in the Medicaid program until its 1115 
waiver instituted a Medicaid system rooted in managed care.  Notably, in 2006, Arizonas Governor Janet 
Napolitano testified before the Senate Special Committee on Aging on how this model may be used as a 
model in markets nationwide.  See Janet Napolitano, A Review of the Arizona Medicaid Program: 
Utilizing a Managed Care Approach to Address the Needs of a Growing Senior Population, Written 
Testimony of Janet Napolitano, Governor of Arizona, Senate Special Committee on Aging, United States 
Senate, Thursday, July 13, 2006. 
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would have faired better if staged in the budget reconciliation itself.39  Still, as the next 
chapter considers, a major change in Medicaid policy bargaining -- via the 1115 waiver 
process -- was upon the program.  States, realizing that state tax and fiscal capacity was a 
major impediment to state directed reform began utilizing successfully the Medicaid 
statewide waiver demonstration process to receive federal financing for their own 
initiatives.  The next chapter considers the origins of this and two important 1115 
statewide waivers in greater detail. 
 
                                                
39 Former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) reportedly has supported the idea that the Clinton 
health reform efforts probability of passing was much greater in a budget reconciliation process.  Interview 
with Author, October 12, 2006. 
  243
 
 
 
8. THE WAIVER PRESIDENCY:  
OREGON, TENNESSEE, AND 1115 MEDICAID 
POLITICS 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Preceding and concurrent with the national health debate were important events in 
the Medicaid waiver process that spearheaded mini reforms throughout the country to 
2007.  Two of these, the Oregon and Tennessee, 1115 waivers will be discussed in this 
chapter.  The efforts prioritized states in the health care reform process, bolstered state 
flexibility, opened the door to greater beneficiary cost sharing, allowed limitations on 
comparability of benefit structures across groups of Medicaid recipients, and several 
other state-directed reforms.  The initiatives, sparked by the 1993 Oregon and 1994 
Tenncare waivers, have changed the face of Medicaid in the modern era. 
 
THE WAIVER WAVE: THE OREGON WAIVER AND THE RISE OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN MEDICAID POLICY BARGAINING 
 
Introduction 
 
 In 1993, the Clinton Administration finally saw through the Oregon 1115 
Research and Demonstration waiver after several years of wrangling with the George 
H.W. Bush Administration.  While the Republican Administration did not move on 
granting the controversial overhaul, partially financed by federal Medicaid dollars, the 
approval by the Southern Democrat and former Governors Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) was an important event.  At the time, the controversy 
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surrounding the Oregon waiver focused on the highly controversial diagnosis/treatment 
combinations that drew a line where particular combinations would be reimbursed and 
those that would not.  This system of explicit rationing was anathema to many observers 
on ethical grounds.   
For the Medicaid subsystem though, the real paradigm shift triggered by the 
Oregon waiver was that it was the first of a new era followed by several state-wide and 
partial abdications of the federal Medicaid laws and rules under the SSA waiver authority 
enacted in 1962.  In 1993 the waiver process was modified to make it easier for states to 
use the process for state directed health reform.  The process and procedures around 
waivers changed in ways favoring states including allowing an assessment of cost 
neutrality over the life of the proposed demonstration program instead of a year-by-year 
cost neutrality requirement.1  Other influential waivers followed Oregon, including 
Tenncare in 1994 -- Tennessees statewide prepaid plan program that expanded 
enrollment to cover 50% additional lives.2  In addition, the Clinton Administration made 
a commitment to states to streamline the waiver process.  States rapidly embraced the 
new flexibility: Between 1993 and 1995 alone, 13 states received 1115 waivers.  Before 
1993, Arizona was the only state with a statewide 1115 waiver demonstration.3  As a 
Republican Energy and Commerce staffer concluded, .and they approved more 1115 
waivers in Medicaid under Clinton than theres tea in China.4 
The Administration ideology behind the decision to embrace waivers was not 
isolated to Medicaid but was a fundamental cornerstone of this third wave of reform 
minded Democratic creative federalism.5  As one high-ranking Administration official 
recalled, My view was that the people of Oregon had had an open and public process 
                                                
1 Mark S. Joffe, Court Challenge to HCFAs Authority to Approve State Health Care Reform Initiatives, 
Medical Interface (September 1994), 81.  (81 - 83).  (Hereafter Joffe, Court Challenge) 
2 Teresa A. Coughlin and Stephen Zuckerman, States Use of Medicaid Maximization Strategies to Tap 
Federal Revenues: Program Implications and Consequences, (02-09), Assessing the New Federalism 
Series Discussion Papers (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, June 2002), 7. 
3 Teresa A. Coughlin. and Stephen Zuckerman, States Use of Medicaid Maximization Strategies to Tap 
Federal Revenues: Program Implications and Consequences, Assessing the New Federalism Series 
Discussion Papers (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, June 2002), 7. 
4 Interview with the Author, October 13, 2006. 
5 The first wave was under FDR and the second was under LBJ. 
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and they deserved the right to try it.  There was opposition in the Department and my 
view was that if we were going to get fundamental change, whether it was welfare or it 
was Medicaid we had to try some waivers out.  So, we spent a lot of our time doing 
waivers.6  
 
Waiver Purpose -- Research & Development or State Directed Reform 
 
This transformation in Medicaid waiver politics did not unfold without challenge.  
On June 7, 1994, the National Association of Community Health Centers (NACHC) filed 
suit against the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), seeking to enjoin HHS 
from approving Section 1115 waivers for states attempting to implement statewide 
Medicaid managed care programs in National Association of Community Health Centers 
v. Shalala.7  The lawsuit was filed on behalf of the 700 community, migrant, and 
homeless health centers that are members of the NACHC.  They held that the waivers do 
not assure Medicaid patients access to the services of FQHCs -- a right that NACHC 
asserts is guaranteed under the Medicaid law.  Further they held that such waivers were 
intended only to test unique and experimental programs of limited scope and duration.  
From a legal perspective, this means that the waivers are contrary to Congressional intent 
in legislating Section 1115 waiver authority. 8   
 Controversial on federalism grounds due to the lack of federal oversight and 
guidance on waiver parameters, 1115 waivers also teetered on the definition of their 
Research and Demonstration mission.  If 1115 waivers were for R&D purposes, (1) 
they would remain within the five-year limit; (2) they would have a distinct evaluation 
component; and (3) they would be testing a specific hypothesis regarding Medicaid 
institutional design with the state as a laboratory.  The lines around the R&D mission 
surrounding 1115 authority was cloudy at best with HCFA, the Secretary of HHS, and 
indeed -- in speeches across America -- the President himself embracing state directed 
                                                
6 Interview with the Author, November 6, 2006. 
7 Joffe, Court Challenge, 81 - 83. 
8 Joffe, Court Challenge, 82. 
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reform.  He often referenced his own struggles as a Governor in financing competing 
state responsibilities with limited funds.  In the long-term, the ethical dilemmas of the 
Oregon waiver shaped health ethics, but in terms of Medicaid policy, the Oregon waiver 
was an important event that redefined Medicaid. 
 Several major health system reforms for Medicare and Medicaid were bolstered 
by Research and Demonstration waivers before 1992, including HMO risk contracts, 
Hospital prospective payment system (PPS), Medicaid managed care, Nursing home 
reform, Physician payment, and hospital capital prospective payment system (PPS).9 
These were targeted at testing financing, quality, and administrative systems with distinct 
goals.  Most of these, tested at the state level or in state level sites, were later 
implemented across the country.10  The Medicaid waiver paradigm shift in the early 
1990s included a turn from a specific system being tested in many states where its 
primary goal was testing an idea for eventual adoption on a nation-wide scale11 to its 
general use for state driven health reform beyond the boundaries of Medicaid.12  
Waiver reforms frequently included expanding the program to low-income workers not 
previously eligible and requiring managed care participation -- one of the waiver options 
available to states in Medicaid. 
 
Waiver Negotiations Change the Actors Involved and Shift Decision Making from 
the Legislative Wing to the Administrative State 
 
                                                
9 See Joseph R. Antos., Peer Review, Waivers, Research, and Health System Reform, Health Affairs 
(Spring 1993), 178 - 183.  (Hereafter Antos, Waivers) 
10 See Antos, Waivers, 181.  Examples of Hospital PPS include the Maryland state rate setting, New 
York PPS per diem, Massachusetts all-payer system, Rochester (NY) Area Hospital Corporation, and the 
New Jersey DRG all-payer system.  Medicaid managed care reform includes the Arizona AHCCCS.  
Nursing home reform includes the New York RUGS and Texas RUGs systems. 
11 Allen Dobson et al. distinguish between four types of Research and Demonstration waivers in The Role 
of Federal Waivers in the Health Policy Process, Health Affairs (Winter 1992), 75, including: Section 1115 
SSA Waivers; Section 402(a) (1967 SSA Amendments) as amended by Section 222(b) (1972 SSA) for 
provider reimbursement; Section 222(a) (1972 SSA) for prospective provider payment; and Section 2355 of 
the 1984 Deficit Reduction Act for social health maintenance organization (SHMO) demonstration 
projects. 
12 Howard M. Dean, New Rules and Roles for States, Health Affairs (Spring 1993), 183. 
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 A severe change for Medicaid politics ushered in with the 1115 Wave was 
intertwined between, first, the role of policy bargaining, and second, the strength of the 
Administrative Wing in negotiating with states absent of direct Congressional oversight.  
Waivers not only undercut Congress and the need for legislation, they subvert the tug-of-
war between factions that occurs when any legislative proposal passes Congress.  No 
interest groups testify, no advocacy groups pour over the legislative record, and very few 
details of the actual negotiations are available for review.  In short, the process occurs to 
a large degree outside of the legislative cycle, absent from the executive record, and 
without the reasoning of a federal judicial decision.  It is the Administrative State at 
work.  Negotiations are between federal agency staff and state agency and budget staff -- 
vertical autocracies in motion.13 
In National Association of Community Health Centers v. Shalala, the NACHC 
held that the waivers granted by HHS reflect such a major change in waiver policy that to 
do so HHS must follow the procedural requirements set forth in the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) for promulgation of regulations.  The APA requires that federal 
agencies provide notice and give the public an opportunity to comment on any proposed 
rule.  The position of NACHC is that the policy principles adopted between HHS and 
NGA constitute rule making, and therefore, their adoption was subject to the APA 
procedural requirements.14   
Not only are waiver negotiations not regulation and, therefore, not subject to the 
APA or regulatory processes, they also occur outside of legislative processes.  
Representative Waxman (D-CA), then Chair of the Health and Environment 
Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee presented the possibility 
that HCFA may use the Section 1115 waiver process as a mechanism to usurp 
Congressional authority and responsibility to regulate the Medicaid program.15  This 
subverted the legislative oversight role of Congress over the Executive given that 
                                                
13 Vertical autocracies, a concept reviewed in Chapter 2 on Federalism theory, is the relationship that 
develops between state level and federal level Administrative or Agency officials, which last over time and 
results in strong personal bonds that may subvert other governmental processes. 
14 Joffe, Court Challenge, 82. 
15 Joffe, Court Challenge, 82. 
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information on waiver negotiations is below board, but it also removed legislating from 
the Legislative branch altogether.  Agency negotiations prevailed.  These negotiations 
were not legislation or regulation -- but they were binding nonetheless.   
This manner of policy bargaining changed the evolution of the Medicaid program 
in a fundamental way; it increased the probability of wholesale reform instead of the 
usual incrementalism of Medicaid federalism.  Wholesale reform at the state level was 
commonplace after the Oregon 1115 -- after 1993.  This wholesale reform happened state 
by state and waiver negotiation by waiver negotiation.16  Compare this to the marginal 
changes usually enacted during incremental Medicaid reform.  As Thad Kousser writes, 
legislators really only look at the marginal changes in the Medicaid program.There is 
a base that is unquestioned.17   
 
Waiver of Entitlement? 
 
As a Governor the President had come into office dedicated to providing greater 
flexibility to states in Medicaid. 18  The vehicle of accomplishing this in Medicaid was the 
waiver process.  The flexibility dimension of this strategy contradicted another principle 
of the program that Congressional Democrats had traditionally staunchly defended -- 
entitlement.  This left HCFA in the place of balancing both state flexibility with 
entitlement protections -- a delicate balance.  As a Republican Senate Finance Committee 
staffer recalled, the argument was, if you have a waiver, you are giving up the 
entitlement.  So, this was a very controversial thing that Clinton did -- or Clinton allowed 
his people or encouraged his people to do.  So, that is why originally a lot of the waivers 
were very tied to the past, the existing program and you had to show that you were 
                                                
16 It should be noted that partial state reform is also available through the application for more than one 
1115 waiver -- covering part of the state or select Medicaid populations.  Also, several different types of 
programmatic waivers are available in the program.   
17 Thad Kousser, The Politics of Discretionary Medicaid Spending, 1980  1993, Journal of Health 
Politics, Policy and Law 27, no. 4 (August 2002), 659.  (Hereafter Kousser, The Politics of 
Discretionary)   
18 Interview with Author, November 6, 2006. 
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maintaining the individual entitlement to things.19  As a national state lobbying group 
representative recounted, the question was  in a publicly financed program where you 
were entitled to benefits statutorily could a state come in through any mechanism and 
basically take away some of the entitlement.20   
 
Original Principle of the Medicaid Program Eroded-- Uniform benefits across 
Categories of Medicaid Populations, or Comparability 
 
This removal of the entitlement included redefining the federal mandate for a 
minimum benefit package across beneficiary groups.  An early precept of Medicaid 
policy was that all groups of beneficiaries had to have access to the same set of federally 
required minimum benefits under Medicaid law.  As one influential staffer with the 
Energy and Commerce committee at the time said, and again the Oregon waiver.  It was 
more a discussion of whats the benefit package, what are individuals entitled to.  
Nobody was arguing, should everyone below 100% of poverty level regardless of 
category -- childless adults for example -- be entitled to coverage with federal matching 
dollars?  That was fine.  The issue was what was the coverage and was this really a back-
door way of excusing the state who wanted to come into Medicaid to cover the 
populations that it had to cover as the price to coming into Medicaid, to cover those 
populations with a minimum benefit package because, of course, both the mandatory 
populations and the expansion populations were subject to the same set of rulesand 
what the Oregon waiver was suggesting was, well maybe you dont have to do that for 
low-income women and childrenyou have to offer them some coverage but whats 
that?21 
 
 
 
 
                                                
19 Interview with Author, November 1, 2006. 
20 Interview with Author, October 24, 2006. 
21 Interview with Author, August 23, 2006. 
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Waiver Politics and the Evolution of the Block Grant Debate 
 
While medical ethics, the nature of the federal health waiver process, and a new 
Administrative Legislative capability, and Medicaid benefit structures were all at issue in 
the new Oregon process, the cost neutrality provision under waivers would also 
eventually evolve out of these and subsequent state negotiations for 1115s.  Cost 
neutrality acts as a cap on the 1115 negotiation process, meaning effectively that these 
Medicaid negotiations were not open per se as in the open matching grant structure of 
the non-waiver program.  Instead, effectively the program was capped according to the 
funds that the Health Care Financing Administration (now CMS) accorded as part of the 
federal funds previously part of the states system.   
An important financing structure twist that would eventually transpire by 2006 
from the cost neutrality cap was to what extent these waivers were used to either 
explicitly at state option to block grant the program or implicitly created a de facto block 
grant by how HCFA (CMS) had negotiated the terms and conditions with the states.  
While not a highlight of the Oregon waiver, this event would a decade later get turned 
around on states as a way to cap federal financial exposure. 
 
WAIVER POLITICS AND A REJUVENATED ROLE FOR MEDICAID 
MANAGED CARE 
 
TennCare As Major Mandatory Managed Care Reform 
 
After some early success implementing a state employee managed care system in 
Tennessee, then Governor McWherter began designing an initiative to provide full health 
coverage to Tennesseans with incomes under 400% of poverty.  Benefits would be free 
up to the poverty line.22  The theory behind the initiative was to pay for expanded 
coverage by utilizing mandatory managed care delivery methods.  The idea of using 
                                                
22 Michael S. Dukakis, The Governors and Health PolicyMaking, Chap. 3 in The New Politics of State 
Health Policy, Robert B. Hackey and David A. Rochefort (eds.) (Lawrence, Kansas: The University Press 
of Kansas, 2001). 
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managed care for an entire states Medicaid program was not an entirely new one.  The 
Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System (AHCCCS) -- in place since 1982 -- was 
a statewide managed care system.  Arizona was the last state to join the Medicaid 
program, insisting on a managed care structure via the 1115 process upon entrance into 
the program.  To some extent prior to Tenncare, AHCCCS was seen as an anomaly given 
Arizona had never had a Medicaid program prior to 1982 and was a unique market 
geographically.  While not a brand new idea, Tenncare provided an example of utilizing 
managed care that was seen as a new structure and, indeed, replaced an old Medicaid 
model with a mandatory managed care one for an expanded population and a reduction in 
benefits in a metamorphosis of Tennessee health care.  Tenncare involved several major 
reforms that waived the federal rules, including: 
 
• An expansion of the population covered;  
• A reduction in benefits provided;  
• The ability to use Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) financing within 
the budget neutrality cap; and 
• A Medicaid managed care mandate, waiving beneficiaries federal 
statutory right to freedom of choice. 
 
All of this was possible within a negotiated 1115 waiver with the federal 
government.  As well as itself being a consequential waiver, the Tenncare initiative was 
then cited in Congressional hearings on national health reform as a premier example of 
state directed comprehensive reform.  The states now were utilizing the federal 
contribution from the Medicaid program to effectuate their own state ideas for health care 
reform within their own borders.  This was an ideal way for states to get the health care 
systems they wanted while alleviating a major roadblock to just such an initiative.  States 
fiscal and tax capacities make this level of reform untenable without federal assistance.  
While previously attempting major state reform outside the confines of Medicaid, these 
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new applications of the 1115 process were going a long way to financing these same 
conceptual frameworks with federal instead of state dollars. 
The Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health and the Environment was 
holding hearings on national health reform at the same time that the waiver was 
approved.  Chairman, Henry Waxman, commented, Yesterday, the Secretary announced 
her approval of Tennessees application of waivers for a 5-year Medicaid demonstration 
under section 1115 of the Social Security Act.  Under this waiver, the State will enroll up 
to 1.5 million Medicaid beneficiaries, uninsured and uninsurables into managed care 
plans that may serve only the poor.  This is the fourth section 1115 waiver, health care 
reform type waiver, that the Secretary has granted this year.  The others have gone to 
Oregon, Hawaii, and Rhode Island.23  Examples of comprehensive health reform 
success, certain states were embraced as if to say, If they can do it, we -- the Feds -- can 
do it to.  Eventually, while national health reform did not take hold, this same line of 
argument would be used to bolster reforms so that waivers would no longer be required at 
all for states to effectuate many of these reforms. 
Republicans used Tenncare as a model for one of their national health reform 
proposals, thereby making a direct connection between a state model and a national level 
reform proposal.  In this case, federal reform and state Medicaid reform plans began to 
merge.  As Representative Bliley commented: 
 
Now today, we have another major announcement from the administration that 
the Vice Presidents home State of Tennessee has won a waiver allowing the 
State to cash out their Federal disproportionate share money for the purposes of 
buying health care for their uninsured.  We would like to congratulate the 
administration on this decision because the major Medicaid provisions of the 
Republican health task force bill, H.R. 3080, are patterned on the Tennessee 
model and we are glad to see the administration embrace our approach.  That is, 
all States would be allowed to cash out their Federal and State disproportionate 
payments in order to buy in additional poor people at below 200 percent of the 
                                                
23 U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Health Care Reform (Part 5), House of Representatives, One 
Hundred Third Congress, First Session, Serial No. 103-90, Friday, November 19, 1993, Health Care 
Reform: Impact on Medicaid and Low-Income People, Henry Waxman, Chairman of Subcommittee, 548. 
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poverty line, and subtitle H gives States the flexibility to provide managed care 
without going through the waiver process. 24 
 I would like to make one additional comment concerning the Tennessee 
program.  Tennessee is currently receiving more Federal DSH payments than 
States like New York or California.  The reason for this anomaly was that 
Tennessee was the pioneer in creative accounting and financing schemes that led 
to the explosion in provider taxes and DSH payments.  Other States went to 
school on Tennessee to see how it was done, but no State ever approached 
Tennessees skill at increasing DSH payments, and Tennessee now has a Federal 
guarantee to reap the benefits of its grossly inflated DSH payments.25 
 
Behind this initiative was a promise for states to use their DSH monies -- 
regardless of how creative they were in attaining their current level of federal DSH funds 
-- in order to expand health care coverage to those who needed it.  Also, the idea of 
allowing mandatory managed care outside of the waiver process was proposed.  In BBA 
1997, this eventually became a reality.  It took, however, the pioneering of Tennessee to 
set this reform in motion.  And so, while the Tenncare program has informed federal 
health policy in many ways, it spearheaded mandatory managed care initiatives at the 
state level and got the ball rolling on states receiving the flexibility in BBA 97 to enroll 
many Medicaid beneficiaries in mandatory Medicaid without a waiver. 
 
General Trend Toward Mandatory Managed Care Furthered by the 1993-94 
National Health Debate 
 
The Medicaid waiver revolution embraced state applications of mandatory 
managed care initiatives.  The Clinton health plan also was designed around health 
purchasing alliances buying managed care coverage for most Americans -- thus remaking 
the American health insurance industry.  The national debate and eventual settling on 
managed care as a model good enough to design the entire system around contributed to 
                                                
24 U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Health Care Reform (Part 5), One Hundred Third Congress, First 
Session, Serial No. 103-90, Friday, November 19, 1993, Health Care Reform: Impact on Medicaid and 
Low-Income People, Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Bliley, 535 - 536. 
25 U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Health Care Reform (Part 5), One Hundred Third Congress, First 
Session, Serial No. 103-90, Friday, November 19, 1993, Health Care Reform: Impact on Medicaid and 
Low-Income People, Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Bliley, 535 - 536. 
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the managed care revolution in the early 1990s.  Both the architects of the Clinton health 
plan and the advocates of increased use of mandatory managed care in Medicaid 
forecasted that greater use of managed care would cut costs.  In the longer term, this was 
not -- or only mildly -- realized.  Managed care was found to reduce costs slightly 
(around 5%) or not at all.  
Several reasons contributed to the growth in mandatory managed care, including 
the national health debate, the Tenncare waiver, and previous development of managed 
care concepts in the 1980s by groups such as the Jackson Hole initiative.  Regardless of 
the reason, the transformation prioritized state decision making over beneficiary choice.  
By 1995, federal waivers had allowed twenty-four states to force some of their Medicaid 
recipients into managed care plans.  Fourteen of these states also expanded their coverage 
to the working poor, who often had to pay sliding-scale premiums, transforming 
Medicaid from a narrow social service benefit to a wider state-sponsored insurance 
program.26  Just as President Nixon had embraced managed care, President Clinton had 
included managed care as an important delivery mechanism in his health care reform.  It 
is at least possible that the decision by the Clinton health reform team that managed care 
was viable as the insurance and service delivery mechanism for all Americans in their 
gargantuan reworking of the U.S. system, helped further the belief that mandatory 
managed care was acceptable for Medicaid beneficiaries -- in the absence of national 
health reform.  
 
Original Principle of the Medicaid Program -- Beneficiary Freedom of Choice -- 
Further Eroded 
 
As just discussed, the design of the Health Security Act around managed care 
plans was part of the domino effect that tipped states toward greater use of managed care.  
If anything, simply the two-year national discussion -- often embracing managed care 
techniques by both the left and the right -- shaped policy positions on the topic.  A key 
difference, though, was that the Presidents plan would not force Medicaid beneficiaries 
                                                
26 Kousser, The Politics of Discretionary, 649 - 650. 
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into managed care plans that served only the poor, 27 whereas this was just the feature 
that had many Medicaid advocates leery of Tenncare and the trend that it was evoking.  
Another original principle of the Medicaid program, beneficiarys freedom of choice, was 
being further eroded. 
 
State Choice Still Broad In Mandatory Managed Care Model 
 
While one of the original principles of the Medicaid program for Medicaid 
beneficiaries, freedom of choice, was removed through the use of mandatory managed 
care statewide, state choice using managed care delivery techniques was still quite broad.  
States could chose (1) between models: a Primary Care Case Management (PCCM) 
Model, a Hospital Organization - Private Physician Model, or a Full or Partial Risk 
Model; (2) whether to cover urban or rural areas; and (3) the populations to enroll -- the 
disabled, the elderly, or parents and children.  Also, the issues of privatization of 
traditionally state functions in a managed care model continued to be debated and 
adjudicated.  The offloading of provider payment, beneficiary interface, and other 
traditional state government functions onto private entities was another controversial 
aspect of mandatory managed care via waivers. 
 
TennCare a De Facto Block Grant? 
 
 At the time, though, even with the budget neutrality rules and the relatively 
accurately forecasted managed care per capita rates, the extent to which Tenncare was 
considered a defacto block grant is debatable.  As one Medicaid expert recalls, I dont 
think people were viewing the TennCare waiver as a prelude to a block grant.  It did have 
a cap but it was perceived at the time as a good bargain for low-income people because 
the expansion of coverage was so broad on paper, and a lot of federal dollars that might 
                                                
27 U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Health Care Reform (Part 5), One Hundred Third Congress, First 
Session, Serial No. 103-90, Friday, November 19, 1993, Health Care Reform: Impact on Medicaid and 
Low-Income People, Henry Waxman, Chairman of Subcommittee, 548. 
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have left the state and might have left that system were captured and retained.  So that 
was generally seen as a good thing.28  With time, some state waivers would begin to take 
the form and shape of a de facto block grant, with the budget neutrality rule and various 
negotiated restrictions with states acting as caps on federal spending.   
The evidence is limited that Tenncare at the time was considered or was foreseen 
as a predecessor of a de facto block grant approach.  However, limiting state financial 
exposure was a driving force behind this significant initiative.  It should be noted, though, 
that as part of the 1995 block grant debate, Tennessee Department of Finance and 
Revenue Commissioner Bob Corker did advocate for a federal block grant, explaining 
that as the spokesman of the only budget-neutral 1115 waiver existing today, I believe 
that Tennessee has much experience to offer the Nation in this debate. 29  Taking the 
next step from budget neutrality to considering these waivers capped by budget neutrality 
rules as a de facto block grant would evolve with time, but the dawn of the discussion 
was the establishment of Tenncare in 1994. 
Under budget neutrality, statewide waivers could not cost the federal government 
more than the program would cost if the waiver were not in place.  The types of funds 
available within the Cost Neutrality umbrella would, in the future, prove to be an 
exceptionally important list.  Given states past activities in maximizing federal funds in 
the DSH program, provider taxes and donations, and various other means that would 
evolve with time, states would require many of these past investments from the federal 
government to remain as part of the calculation within Cost Neutrality.  Now entrenched 
over years as financing for their own Medicaid program, they needed these funds 
included under the budget cap to meet obligations.  These early 1115 waivers set 
precedents for what would be included in the cap.  The Tenncare waiver negotiations 
were significant in this aspect, as well. 
                                                
28 Interview with Author, August 23, 2006 
29 Bob Corker Statement, Commissioner, Department of Finance and Administration, Tennessee, 
Committee on Commerce House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the 
Committee on Commerce House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session, July 26, 
Serial No. 104-108, Transformation of the Medicaid Program -- Part 3, 64-66. 
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The Tenncare waiver included DSH funding under the cost neutrality cap.  
According to nationally recognized Medicaid expert and Director of the Tennessee 
Justice Center Gordon Bonnyman, this resulted from shrewd bargaining with federal 
officials by then Governor Ned Ray McWherter.30  The maximization of DSH funds 
from the mid-1980s gained Tennessee a reputation for accomplishing this more 
successfully than any state.  In the 1994 Tenncare statewide waiver negotiation, the state 
successfully kept all of these gains by included established federal DSH funding levels in 
Tennessee within the budget neutrality cap.  This successful state negotiation set a 
precedent, as Tennessee established its statewide waiver with budget neutrality rules that 
they themselves actively defined.  Far from being passive takers of federal policy, 
Tennessee shaped the budget neutrality cap rules. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 As predecessor to the national health debate, the Oregon waiver furthered the 
state comprehensive reform discussion to how far states could reach in utilizing federal 
Medicaid funds -- as well as several major areas of Medicaid policy including benefit 
comparability structures, the ethics of their explicit rationing design, and the security of 
the individual entitlement within that waiver environment.  Before Oregon, statewide 
demonstration programs were anathema.  As HCFA Administrator Bruce Vladeck noted 
in 1995 Congressional hearings, Mr. Chairman, if I may, let me just clarify some of the 
facts about the 1115 process.  Since the Clinton administration came into office, youre 
correct, weve approved 10 statewide health reform demonstrations.  Weve approved a 
total of 34 section 1115 demonstrations.  That contrasts to the record under the previous 
administration, in which a total of 16 1115 demonstrations were approved and a total of 
zero statewide health care reform demonstrations were approved.31   
                                                
30 Gordon Bonnyman, The Tenncare Cuts: Plunging Into the Unknown, 3, from The Tennessee Justice 
Center website www.tnjustice.org, (accessed August 9, 2006). 
31 Bruce Vladeck, HCFA Administrator, Committee on Commerce House of Representatives, 
Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the Committee on Commerce House of Representatives, One 
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Oregons 1993 1115 Medicaid waiver was tipping point that changed Medicaids 
future trajectory.  Shortly thereafter in 1994, Tenncare, highlighted important conceptual 
debates in Medicaid politics as well -- mandatory managed care, expanded coverage, 
limited benefits, and budget neutrality infused with DSH funding -- and set precedents 
that would have important implications for at least the next decade and a half. 
                                                                                                                                            
Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session, July 26, Serial No. 104-108, Transformation of the Medicaid 
Program -- Part 3, 42. 
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9. MEDICAID AND THE 1993-1994 NATIONAL 
HEALTH REFORM DISCUSSION: SETTING THE 
STAGE FOR THE BLOCK GRANT ERA AND BBA 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Within the broader health debate, the attempt at universal coverage, meaning 
coverage of the uninsured and Medicaid populations was a stumbling block between 
competing proposals.  There were also discrepancies regarding federalism --and what the 
new state role would be -- in the new health infrastructure.  Finally, the national health 
debate was extremely valuable as a national discussion where multiple coalitions vetted 
their beliefs regarding the national direction in health care.  Medicaid was vital to the 
national health debate in several ways (to be discussed in this chapter), including 
proposed financing structures for the initiative planning to shift federally directed 
Medicaid funds towards financing the national health effort.   
Several factors contributed to the Clinton Health Security Plan not passing 
Congress -- from prioritization, to lost political capital on other legislative initiatives, to 
splintering of the far left from the moderate Democrats on whether 93% population 
coverage was acceptable.  All in all, the important result was that this well-lit, well-
publicized, well- participated in national discussion set the stage for several future health 
reforms that will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.  This chapter 
concentrates on that national discussion and its plans for Medicaid. 
 
  260
MEDICAID, THE STATES, AND NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM 
 
Ending Welfare -- and Medicaid -- As We Know It 
 
While the Presidents election platform had vowed to End Welfare As We Know 
It, a second less well pronounced sideline was an implicit promise to End Medicaid As 
We Know It.  While the 103rd Congress did not address welfare reform, a Republican 
plan was generated.  This established an initial baseline for welfare reform discussions in 
the 104th Congress.  In the other policy stream, ending Medicaid was not the premise of 
the Administration.  The emphasis was on designing a system of full coverage for every 
American -- which would have implicitly ended Medicaid by replacing it with a more 
comprehensive system.   
 
States as Laboratories in Clinton Era Medicaid Policy Bargaining 
 
While the experts on federal Medicaid policy work from the agency that runs the 
program, the Health Care Financing Administration [now known as the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)], the President set a distinct tone that 
encouraged state innovation and liberalized the Medicaid waiver process.  While one 
White House advisor emphasized that the President did not favor particular states for 
special favors,1 others emphasized the Administrations states as laboratories policy 
position in Medicaid, and also for that matter generally in social policy.  One Senior 
Administration official stated, Everyone that went in believed that how the federal 
government shaped national policy was testing things out in the states.2  The official 
continued, We used waivers not only in Medicaid but also in welfarehe [President 
Clinton] saw it from the eyes of the Governor and most of us did not come in with a 
federal government orientation.  We saw our history of social policy making as state 
                                                
1 Interview with Author, October 12, 2006. 
2 Interview with Author, November 6, 2006. 
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experiments and then to see if they were experiments that could really be turned into 
national policy.3   
President Clintons federalism stance, generally and in the health policy area, was 
no doubt shaped by leading the State of Arkansas in day-to-day decision making.  It was 
also formed by his lead NGA role in negotiating the Family Support Act of 1988 (PL 100 
- 485).4  When President, he addressed the NGA in Tulsa, Oklahoma on August 16, 1993.  
Regarding health care policy, he commented and Ive been thinking about this seriously 
now for more than three years, ever since the Governors Association asked me and the 
then-Governor of Delaware, now a Congressman from Delaware, to look at the health 
issue."5  He continued, referring specifically to Medicaid, The National Government has 
a lot to learn from the States in tough decisions that some of you have made already.  I 
can honestly say that along toward the end of my tenure as Governor, the most frustrating 
part of the job was simply writing bigger checks every year for the same Medicaid 
program when I didnt have the money that all of us wanted to spend on education and 
economic development and the other important issues before us.6  Again on February 1, 
1994, the President addressed the NGA, I do believe the States are the laboratories of 
democracy.  I do believe that where people are charged with solving the real problems of 
real people, reality and truth in politics often is more likely to give way to making 
progress.7   
 
 
 
 
                                                
3 Interview with Author, November 6, 2006. 
4 1993 CQ Almanac, 373.   
5 William J. Clinton, Remarks to the National Governors Association in Tulsa, Oklahoma, August 16, 
1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1993, Book II (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), 
1386. 
6 William J. Clinton, Remarks to the National Governors Association in Tulsa, Oklahoma, August 16, 
1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1993, Book II (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1994), 
1384. 
7 William J. Clinton, Remarks to the National Governors Association, February 1, 1994, of the Presidents 
of the United States 1994, Book 1 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995), 155. 
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Medicaids Key Role in the National Health Debate 
 
Medicaid politics played a key role in the national health reform debate in four 
main ways:  
• Arguing that Medicaid was badly broken was a tactic to bolster national health 
reform;  
• The Administration prioritized -- and would not negotiate regarding -- 
coverage of every American, universal coverage, as opposed to functional 
universal coverage, defined as 93% coverage;  
• The national health reform effort was funded by shifting the cost of Medicaid 
from the government to private employers; and,  
• Finally, Task Force Democrats and Democratic Congressional staff 
historically involved in Medicaid expansions were not aligned.   
 
First, a key argument in favor of national health reform was that the current 
system -- including Medicaid -- was broken.  Medicaid continued to be an easy target for 
these types of arguments -- trashing Medicaid as proof that a new system was needed.  In 
debating in favor of national health reform, advocates were caught, at times 
inadvertently, arguing against the Medicaid program and all of its shortcomings.  In 
effect, the national debate trapped advocates of national health reform in proving their 
case in part by citing all of Medicaids shortcomings.  As one Congressman exclaimed in 
an Energy and Commerce Hearing on how Medicaid would be affected by national health 
reform, The Medicaid system today is in fact busted, it is broken, it does not work for 
millions and millions of poor people across the country.  Medicaid is a Federal-State 
partnership, and the partnership is out of whack. 8  One of several examples, supporters 
                                                
8 U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Health Care Reform (Part 5), One Hundred Third Congress, First 
Session, Serial No. 103-90, Friday, November 19, 1993, Health Care Reform: Impact on Medicaid and 
Low-Income People, Mr. Wyden, 537. 
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of national health reform found themselves dismantling Medicaid on a national stage to 
prove that a more systemic restructuring was required in the system as a whole.   
Second, the gaps in Medicaid did not cover millions of uninsured Americans that 
the reform would.  Universal coverage was a priority of the Administration -- possibly to 
the detriment of Congressional passage.  At the beginning of the term, what the 
Administration wanted was comprehensive coverage.  Not 93% coverage, not 94% 
coverage -- but full coverage.  Throwing down the gauntlet, the President had claimed in 
his 1994 State of the Union address, I want to make this very clear.  I am open, as I have 
said repeatedly, to the best ideas of concerned members of both parties.  I have no special 
brief for any specific approach, even in our own bill, except this: if you send me 
legislation that does not guarantee every American private health insurance that can never 
be taken away, you will force me to take this pen, veto the legislation, and well come 
right back here and start all over again.9  This insistence on full coverage was driven by 
a desire to finally cover everyone who had fallen through the Medicaid gaps.  In short, 
Medicaid expansions, no matter how numerous over the 1980s had not been enough -- 
this time the President would not settle for less. 
Later in negotiations of various health plans, there appeared to be some softening 
of this approach.  Encouraging Senators to keep at it, Clinton got into trouble, 
particularly, when he spoke bluntly of functional universal coverage, which he said 
meant around 95 percent of Americans.10  At the same time that Clinton may have 
softened his approach, some Congressional Democrats to the ideological left would not 
budge from the Presidents original stance.  In what CQ referred to as a blistering floor 
speech, Paul Wellstone (D-Minn.), said the plan would hurt Americans who needed 
help most and benefit insurers.11 Even moderate Democrats could not escape the 100% 
coverage or no deal mantra.  A group of Senators attempted to put together a 
Mainstream Group compromise plan but Bill Bradley (D-N.J), an original member of the 
                                                
9 William J. Clinton, The State of the Union: Clinton Stresses Welfare, Health Care Reform, January 25, 
1994, Volume L, 1994 CQ Almanac (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc, 1994), 103rd 
Congress, 2nd Session, 1994, 6-D.   
10 1994 CQ Almanac, 348. 
11 1994 CQ Almanac, 351. 
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group, said it would leave too many people uncovered and, therefore, would not restrain 
health care costs sufficiently.12  One influential Congressional staffer explained in a list 
of mistakes around the reform effort, And I think that if Clinton had called coverage 
93% coverage instead of full coverage [it would have been more effective].  You know 
there was this ridiculous fight between he and his wife at a certain point where he wanted 
to start making deals, and he was going to cut deals where you could leave out small 
businesses and leave out the last 6%.  So there were lots and lots of mistakes.13 
Third, financing of the Clinton Health Security Act was centered on re-directing 
funds from Medicaid and other health programs.  As one Clinton Health Security Task 
Force Executive commented, we were spreading the cost of Medicaid across the 
employer-population.  So, it was shifted we shifted the cost of Medicaid off the 
government rolls [and onto employers].  So, we got a lot of our ability to do what we 
were doing with limited financing by shifting that responsibility.14  An important tactic 
in many health reforms, financing often involves cost shifting between public and private 
payers and between federal and state governments.  In short, this initiative was no 
different, planning to finance the health reform in part by re-directing previous Medicaid 
dollars to the initiative and by shifting costs of some Medicaid clients onto private 
employers. 
As Secretary Shalala testified at the time regarding how the Plan would be 
financed, And so we intend to finance the system both out of savings which are 
produced by slowing down the growth in the public system out of new employer and 
employee contributions, out of two new sources of revenue, one the cigarettes and the 
other the alliance pieces, and by taking the public money that is currently being spent by 
the Medicaid system and putting it into the alliances to reimburse the alliances and to pay 
them for both the premium costs as well as for the other costs associated from the 
populations that are being phased in, the Medicaid populations.15  Medicaid would help 
                                                
12 1994 CQ Almanac, 351. 
13 Interview with Author, October 13, 2006. 
14 Interview with Author, August 10, 2006. 
15 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce, One Hundred Third Congress, 
First Session, Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment and the 
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pay for national health reform, as had been made clear during the previous years budget 
reconciliation process when cuts to Medicaid and Medicare were considered a down 
payment on health reform. 
Finally, the group of Congressional Democrat members and staffers who had 
labored to expand Medicaid over more than a decade were to some degree removed from 
the hundreds of Task Force members that labored over the Goliath and famously complex 
Administration Plan.  As one interviewee described it, Yeah, put 500 PhD academics 
around the tablehave a good laugh.  I mean they made a lot of mistakes.  They didnt 
like how Medicaid was done.  Medicaid was abolished.  Every one was rolled into, I 
think AFDC and SSI [who] had special status still, but other people in Medicaid were not 
going to still get the same benefit package that they had in the past.  So they were not 
happy.  We had one hearing where [Democratic Congressman, and Medicaid Champion, 
Henry] Waxman was just about as critical as anybody about the way the thing was 
structured.16  It is instructive that of five Congressional committees with primary 
jurisdiction over the 1993-1994 national health reform debate, the House committee with 
sole jurisdiction over Medicaid, Energy and Commerce, was the only one of the five not 
to see a bill through committee.17 Possibly the question is, particularly for those who had 
a history on the Health Subcommittee, What is the impetus of reporting a bill on 
national health reform, effectively deleting a decade and a half of arduous brick by brick 
building of Medicaid, the countrys health financing program for those in need? 
Furthering the critique, one multi-decade veteran of Congressional committee 
politics offered his view that the effort was amateur hour, and continuing this is 
Washington and there are ways to get things done and no one knew how to get things 
done like Commerce, Ways and Means, and Finance.18  In this staffers view, 
                                                                                                                                            
Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness, Serial No. 103-75, October 5, 
1993, Statement of Hon. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, 63. 
16 Interview with Author, October 13, 2006. 
17 On June 28, Dingell notified House leaders that his committee, often seen as a bellwether of 
congressional opinion, would be unable to act on health care legislation.  Energy and Commerce had been 
paralyzed for months by bipartisan opposition to President Clintons proposed employer mandate.  1994 
CQ Almanac, 335.   
18 Interview with Author, October 13, 2006. 
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Democrats were splintered.  There were Democrats working directly on the National 
Health Task Force and a separate group of Hill colleagues, having worked for so many 
years throughout the 1980s and early 1990s on Medicaid expansions, who had mixed 
views on the comprehensive health reform effort that would effectively end Medicaid.  
Another interviewee recounted this in softer terms, explaining that some Democratic 
staffers who had worked on the Medicaid expansions in the 1980s and 1990s wondered if 
the Clinton health reform was worth it.19   
Democratic coalitions in the policy bargaining of the era were not aligned and 
there was a great deal of sunk cost, arduous investment in another health program that 
stood as a wedge against national health reform.  The existence of Medicaid, with all of 
its entrenched interests in localities, states, businesses, hospitals, nursing homes, and a 
myriad of advocacy groups did not necessarily help national health reform along.  Several 
commentaries in Medicare politics find this same phenomenon.  The entrenchment of the 
Medicare program acts as a wedge against national health reform.  In 1993-94, the 
importance of Medicaid to state budgets, to local health networks, to state and local 
economic development, to groups particularly powerful at the state level such as nursing 
homes was a consideration.  In terms of Democratic coalitions -- they are more complex 
than simply listing one group simpatico in lock step towards national health reform.  In 
fact, while not necessarily working against reform in any way, several extremely highly 
respected staffers -- considered the most knowledgeable Medicaid experts -- did not want 
to be left with a system that was a step backward from what they had incrementally built 
over a very long period of time.  Given the complexity of the plan, no one was sure that 
Medicaid beneficiaries would be better off in the new system. 
 
State Representatives Perspectives on Health Reform In Their Own Words 
 
As for states own perspective, the National State Medicaid Directors Association 
(NASMD) representative who led their negotiations at the time remembers, To some 
                                                
19 Interview with Author, August 10, 2006. 
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degree, we felt helpless.  We had a sense that it was a powerful engine we werent 
going to be able to have a great deal to say about it.  We were invited to the White House 
a couple of times to talk about it with some of the health team and felt that the [Medicaid] 
program was going to go away.we were educating some of the staff about the kinds of 
problems we had run into in cost and access, particularly with services for behavioral 
health, healthcare for adolescents -- the true cost of serving them well is 
understated.we felt like we were standing on the shore and we felt a tidal wave was 
going to come.20  The National Governors Association (NGA) representative -- an 
integral body in negotiating on behalf of Governors on federal Medicaid policy -- 
remembers the national health reform effort, But to be honest our feeling out of the bag 
was that this thing was kind of dead on arrival.21  The primary reason for doubt was the 
commitment to universal coverage.  We had Bob Dole on the Senate side and we could 
have negotiated a deal on a partial fairly major step -- but not universal.22   
As a contact at a national state lobbying organization related, Well our big issue 
[with national health reform] was pre-emption and who was going to regulate health 
insurance.  So that was -- the big thing about the Clinton Health Plan at the time was this 
whole managed care thing.moving from predominant fee-for-service to managed care 
and who was going to regulate that insurance which was traditionally the role of the 
states.  In retrospect, managed care became a pretty dominant part of our health care 
policy but at the time states have retained the regulation of health insurance, subject to 
ERISA.  It was really about who was going to regulate health insurance -- was it federal 
or state working out the details.  So Medicaid was a piece of that but that was much more 
about federalizing health insurance with a managed care platform  because at the time, 
managed care was not that popular of a concept.23   
The state lobbying representative continued, So that was the biggest concern, it 
was not Medicaid.  That was not the central piece.  The central piece was moving other 
people into managed care.  Same issues but different population.   So we moved forward, 
                                                
20 Interview with Author, September 13, 2006. 
21 Interview with Author, November 2, 2006. 
22 Interview with Author, November 2, 2006. 
23 Interview with Author, October 24, 2006. 
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at least, in that wave with Medicaid Managed Care but not with everybody else.  That 
part didnt happen.24  The mandatory managed care revolution in Medicaid, helped along 
by the TennCare waiver in 1994 and formalized in the BBA 97 was sped along by the 
Clinton Health Plan embracing the concept so closely during the national health reform 
of 1993 and 1994. 
 
THE CLINTON HEALTH SECURITY ACT PLANS FOR MEDICAID 
 
As for the Clinton Health Security Act, its plans for Medicaid were outlined by 
then HCFA Chief Bruce Vladeck during Energy and Commerce Committee hearings.  
Since the Commerce Committee was Medicaids authorizing committee in the House of 
Representatives, it was particularly tuned into changes in a program it had labored 
intensively over since becoming the committee of jurisdiction in the mid-1970s.  As the 
next series of paragraphs will demonstrate, a primary criticism of the Clinton Health 
Security Act was its complexity.  One is left with more questions than answers about 
what precisely happens to Medicaid beneficiaries -- for moms and kids, for the disabled, 
for the elderly.  For some Congressional staff that specialized in Medicaid policy, the 
remaining questions left uneasiness. 
As Administrator Vladeck described, Under the Health Security Act, states will 
continue their shared partnership in the Medicaid program but will benefit from 
redirected Federal funding and from savings from a new relationship with the private 
sector through the alliance health plans.  The Health Security Act will integrate Medicaid 
acute services into alliance plans.25  The plans for Medicaid recipients were separated 
between those who received cash assistance and those who did not.  Dr. Vladeck referred 
to those who received cash assistance as the most vulnerable poor in describing the 
                                                
24 Interview with Author, October 24, 2006. 
25 House of Representatives, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Health Care Reform (Part 5), One Hundred Third Congress, First 
Session, Serial No. 103-90, Friday, November 19, 1993, Health Care Reform: Impact on Medicaid and 
Low-Income People, Statement of Bruce Vladeck, Administrator, Health Care Financing Administration, 
541 - 542. 
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Clinton plan reform proposals.  The most vulnerable poor will receive full coverage 
while maintaining their ability to choose among the plansThe State and Federal 
Governments will pay a premium to the alliance for Medicaid individuals receiving cash 
assistance based on 95 percent of current State per capita Medicaid spending on those 
covered services trended forward by national growth rates.26   
Then continuing, Other low-income individuals who do not receive cash 
assistance will also receive health care coverage through alliance plans.  These 
individuals will make a premium contribution based on a sliding scale related to income.  
Employers of low-income employees must pay premiums to the alliance based on private 
sector rates, as they do for all employees.27  States were to continue to provide health 
care to non-cash welfare Medicaid recipients [for services not covered by the alliance] 
and to make maintenance of effort payments to the alliances based on 1993 spending 
for Medicaid services.  States could also continue to provide optional Medicaid services 
to adult recipients of cash assistance as under current law.28  Disproportionate share 
hospital [DSH] payments were not continued since universal coverage removed the need 
                                                
26 U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Health Care Reform (Part 5), One Hundred Third Congress, First 
Session, Serial No. 103-90, Friday, November 19, 1993, Health Care Reform: Impact on Medicaid and 
Low-Income People, Statement of Bruce Vladeck, Administrator, Health Care Financing Administration, 
541 - 542. 
27 U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Health Care Reform (Part 5), One Hundred Third Congress, First 
Session, Serial No. 103-90, Friday, November 19, 1993, Health Care Reform: Impact on Medicaid and 
Low-Income People, Statement of Bruce Vladeck, Administrator, Health Care Financing Administration, 
541 - 542. 
28 U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Health Care Reform (Part 5), One Hundred Third Congress, First 
Session, Serial No. 103-90, Friday, November 19, 1993, Health Care Reform: Impact on Medicaid and 
Low-Income People, Statement of Bruce Vladeck, Administrator, Health Care Financing Administration, 
542. 
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for compensating hospitals for uninsured care. 29  Medicaid long-term care benefits would 
continue for eligible patients regardless of whether they receive cash assistance.30 
Medicaid, already the most complex program in the American welfare state, got 
more complex in the Clinton Health Security Act.  Understanding exactly what we were 
about to get was a primary factor in the National Governors Association (NGA) and other 
key actors not thinking this was a viable reform effort.  
 
NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM PROPOSALS, SUBSIDIES, AND THEIR 
IDEAS ON CHANGES TO THE MEDICAID PROGRAM 
 
 Several of the health reform proposals in the 1993-1994 era included a subsidy for 
low-income populations.  Others -- like the single-payer model presented by the House 
Education and Labor Committee (HR 3960), the single payer plan by the House Ways 
and Means Committee (HR 3600), and Senate Majority Leader Mitchells proposal (D-
Maine) -- planned to replace Medicaid altogether.  Several proposals gave states an 
explicit role in the new national health reform -- often either to establish their own health 
insurance systems or administer health-purchasing alliances.   
 
                                                
29 U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Health Care Reform (Part 5), One Hundred Third Congress, First 
Session, Serial No. 103-90, Friday, November 19, 1993, Health Care Reform: Impact on Medicaid and 
Low-Income People, Statement of Bruce Vladeck, Administrator, Health Care Financing Administration, 
543. 
30 U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Health Care Reform (Part 5), One Hundred Third Congress, First 
Session, Serial No. 103-90, Friday, November 19, 1993, Health Care Reform: Impact on Medicaid and 
Low-Income People, Prepared Statement of Bruce C. Vladeck, Administrator, Health Care Financing 
Administration, 547. 
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Chart 2: Clinton Health Reform Debate Timeline 
 
 
The Clinton Health Plan, designed by the Task Force on National Health Reform, 
set the tone by requiring that states establish purchasing groups called health alliances 
to bargain with health plans, pay the plans, and collect premiums from subscribers.31  The 
health alliance system was chosen to maximize the bargaining clout of the group by 
combining larger numbers of people into a collective.  Bargaining strength increases with 
numbers.  Several competing proposal followed this leading outline and folded Medicaid 
populations into mandatory alliances or health insurance purchasing cooperatives with 
other general population enrollees. 
                                                
31 1993 CQ Almanac, 346. 
CLINTON HEALTH REFORM DEBATE TIMELINE 
September 22, 1993 -- President Clinton Speech Introducing the Legislation in a nationally televised speech to Congress 
October 27, 1993 -- Clinton formally submitted his health care reform bill to Congressional leaders. 
January 25, 1994 -- State of the Union Speech 
End of 1993 -- Republican Response to Clinton Health Reform Speech; claim that Clinton blocks many Medicaid waiver requests 
March 23, 1994, House Ways & Means Committee, Subcommittee on Health 
June 9 -- Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, First Full Committee to act on health care overhaul, (S1757) 
June 14, 1994 -- Clinton unveiled welfare reform proposal (S2224, HR 4605) 
June 30, 1994, House Ways & Means Committee, Approve its version of the Health Care Bill 
July 2, 1994 -- Senate Finance Committee -- Last to complete work in the health care reform bill, approving its proposal (S2351 - 
S Rept 103-323) by vote of 12-8 
July 22, 1994, House Education and Labor (H Rept 103 - 601, Part II)   
July 29, 1994 -- House Democratic Leadership (1994 CQ, p. 348 - 349) 
August 11, 1994 -- Bipartisan Group of HOUSE moderates 
August 25, 1994  -- Crime Bill cleared August 25Partisan Bickering, sounded the death knell for health care reformIn the 
Clinton Health Care Reform Plan, Medicaid was subsumed into the Health Alliance System 
August 26, 1994 -- Mitchell scrapped his own plan 
September 26, 1994 -- Health Reform officially declared dead 
September 27, 1994 -- Contract With America unveiled 
November 11, 1994 -- POST REPUBLICAN ELECTION VICTORIES -- Speech to the Washington Research Symposium 
November 15, 1994-- House GOP released text and descriptions of Draft Bills designed to incorporate 10 elements of Contract 
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Table 1 outlines in greater detail the plans for Medicaid populations in various 
major 1993-1994 health reform proposals.  Nearly half plans (6 out of 12) proposed 
covering recipients up to 200% or 240% of the poverty level, with Senate Majority 
Leader Mitchells proposal offering pregnant women and children (a traditional Medicaid 
category) coverage up to 300% of poverty.  While Senator Mitchells plan pre-dated the 
State Childrens Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), enacted in 1997, the idea of 
extending coverage to children at higher levels of poverty was indeed later a major reason 
for passage of SCHIP.  While the current categories of Medicaid beneficiaries were 
maintained, proposals generally included subsidies for everyone below a certain defined 
poverty level regardless of categorical distinction.  This change proposed to enhance the 
equity in the Medicaid program by doing away with categorical eligibility requirements.  
In Medicaid, if an individual is low-income, but not a member of a particular pre-defined 
category, he may be ineligible.  Many of the 1993-94 reform plans were designed to do 
away with this provision, thus making income and asset levels the tests for Medicaid 
eligibility.  This change would improve equity between people, previously sorted by 
categorical groups.   
Many of the proposals also wanted to mitigate the notch effect in Medicaid by 
tapering benefits off gradually as income levels rose.  As structured, the notch effect 
currently creates a sharp drop-off where recipients either are eligible or not eligible 
at a particular income point, complicating matters if an individual gets employment 
which places their income just slightly above Medicaid eligibility cutoffs.  This results in 
completely losing Medicaid benefits -- a disincentive to accepting employment.  Many 
1993-94 proposals were structured to explicitly address this notch effect by tapering 
subsidies or vouchers at higher levels of income.  Most proposals involved cost shifting, 
funding new initiatives from former Medicaid dollars, but many proposals drew direct 
lines to new subsidies for low-income populations to former Medicaid dollars.  Some 
proposals, such as the Senate Mainstream Group proposal, required explicit scaling back 
of proposed benefits to low-income populations in order to satisfy critics. 
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Table 1: 1993/1994 Health Reform Proposals and Summary of Plans for 
Traditionally Medicaid Populations 
 MEDICAID POPULATION REFORM 
CLINTON PLAN 
(HR 3600, S1757) 
Low-income families with dependent children and those with SSI 
(60% of Medicaid population).  The Government would pay the 
employer share of the health alliance premium and subsidize the 
employee share.  The remaining 40% of Medicaid recipients would 
participate in the local health alliance.  All DSH payments would be 
ended.  Unemployed would receive subsidies from the federal 
government.32 
Sen. John H. Chafee, R-
R.I. (S1770, HR3704) 
By 1997, make vouchers available to fully subsidize health costs for 
those earning up to 90 percent of the federal poverty level.  Vouchers 
would be phased in by 2005 on a sliding scale to help cover those 
who earned up to 240 percent of the poverty level.  But subsidies 
would be available only if the federal government cut Medicare and 
Medicaid.  States could contract with health programs to serve the 
poor exclusively.33 
Rep. Jim Cooper, D-
Tenn. (HR3222, S1579) 
Abolish Medicaid replacing it with a subsidy program that would pay 
the medical costs of the 36 million Americans earning poverty wages.  
Those earning up to 200 percent of the poverty level would receive 
subsidies on a sliding scale.  States would be required to take over the 
long-term care portion of Medicaid.  The government would subsidize 
enrollment in an areas lowest priced plan.  Supplemental services 
that were provided to Medicaid beneficiaries, such as transportation to 
clinics, would continue only for those below the poverty line.34 
COMMITTEE PLANS 
 
Senate Finance  
(S2351 -- S Rept 103-323) 
Provide subsidies to help low-income people buy insurance.  The 
subsidies were to be funded by cuts in Medicaid, a $55 billion cut in 
Medicare over five years, and new taxes, including an increase in the 
cigarette tax to $1 a pack from 24 cents a pack.35 
Senate Labor and 
Education (S1757) 
Bill largely modeled on the Clinton Health Plan. 
House Ways and Means 
(HR 3600 - H Rept 103 - 
601) 
Replace Medicaid with Medicare Part C, a new government-run 
insurance program to provide health coverage for the poor who were 
on Medicaid, the uninsured and many employees of small businesses.  
Only companies with 100 workers or fewer could enroll employees in 
Part C.  Provide subsidies to the poor to defray premium costs.  The 
subsidies, to be fully phased in 2003, would operate on a sliding scale, 
becoming more generous for lower income individuals.36 
House Education and 
Labor -- Single Payer Bill 
(HR 3960 - H Rept 103-
618, Part I) 
The bill proposed a nationwide single payer system, in which the 
federal government would collect health insurance premiums and pay 
providers.  The most far-reaching plan under consideration by any 
Congressional panel, the bill aimed to eliminate the need for health 
                                                
32 1993 CQ Almanac, 341. 
33 1993 CQ Almanac, 347. 
34 1993 CQ Almanac, 347 
35 1994 CQ Almanac, 338 - 339. 
36 1994 CQ Almanac, 332. 
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insurance companies and give control of most of the health care 
system to the government.37 
LEADERSHIP MEASURES 
 
Senate Majority Leader 
Mitchell, D-Maine 
Insurance costs would be subsidized for people with incomes of up to 
200 percent of the federal poverty line and for pregnant women and 
children with incomes of up to 300 percent of the poverty line.  
People earning up to 100 percent of the poverty level or less would 
have their coverage fully subsidized.  The bill would eliminate much 
of the Medicaid program, a strategy designed to save states $232 
billion and save the federal government $387 billion over 10 years.  
The money was to be used to fund subsidies for the poor.38 
Compromise Bill --
Mitchell -- Mainstream 
Provide subsidies, on a sliding scale, to children and pregnant women 
with family incomes up to 240 percent of the federal poverty line.  
Subsidies also would be available for individuals and families with 
incomes up to 200 percent of poverty.  Pay for the subsidies largely 
through drastic cuts in Medicaid and Medicare.39   
Senate Mainstream 
Group -- Chaffee/Breaux 
The plan proposed drastic cuts in Medicaid and Medicare, in part to 
cut the deficit and in part to provide health insurance subsidies to 
people with incomes of up to 200 percent of poverty.  It did not give 
the elderly a break on prescription drug coverage or payments for 
long-term care.  To get an agreement, the group had scaled back 
subsidies to help the poor.40 
Senate Minority Leader 
Bob Dole 
Help the poorest, insured Americans pay for insurance by providing a 
full subsidy for people below 100 percent of the poverty level and 
subsidies on a sliding scale for those between 100 percent and 150 
percent of poverty.  The subsidies would drop off sharply for people 
above poverty.  The poverty level for a family of four was $14,800 
per year.41 
House Majority Leader 
Gephardt 
Low-income families and individuals with incomes of up to 240 
percent of the poverty level would receive subsidies on a sliding scale 
to help them pay for insurance.  Full subsidies would be available for 
those at or below 100 percent of poverty.  (The poverty line was about 
$14,800 for a family of four.)  The federal government was to pay 
about $150 billion annually to subsidize the purchase of premiums for 
low-income people once it was fully phased in -- about the same as 
was then spent on the governments Medicaid program.42 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
37 1994 CQ Almanac, 326. 
38 1994 CQ Almanac, 351. 
39 1994 CQ Almanac, 354. 
40 1994 CQ Almanac, 351. 
41 1994 CQ Almanac, 340. 
42 1994 CQ Almanac, 349. 
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STATE MANDATES AND NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM 
 
The fact that states were to administer this portion of the national health plan 
showed that the Administrations New Federalism was inclusive of states.  The states 
role would change from overseer of Medicaid to overseeing the health insurance 
purchasing cooperative system in the new national health plan environment.  The Clinton 
Administrations New Federalism had FDR and LBJ Creative Federalism characteristics.  
Reform-minded Democrats explicitly included states in many social policy innovations, 
but in this case it was for a broad-based reform.  In both the FDR and LBJ eras, states 
were often included in means-tested initiatives.  Broad based reforms, Social Security for 
FDR and Medicare for LBJ, were federal social insurance initiatives.  The 1993-94 
Clinton health plan did not follow these trends.  In this broad based comprehensive 
coverage proposal, states were scheduled to play a major role.  
Several alternate proposals, listed in Table 2, also structured states as organizing 
health-purchasing blocks.  The design that the Task Force presented, while differing in 
distinct ways in many alternate bills, led to several proposals extending a role to states in 
the health purchasing process, as well.  The idea seemed to catch on after first presented 
by the National Health Task Force team.  One of the striking lessons of Table 2 is the 
level of responsibility and flexibility that all Congressional Committees and Leaders 
wanted to give to states.  The fact that there appears, according to Table 2, to have been 
such consensus on the need for greater state involvement and flexibility in the health care 
system points possibly to why in the Medicaid program, the flexibility argument has been 
acted upon so strongly in subsequent years.  The political will was there in 1993 -94, and 
even with the 2006 enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA), we may not 
have seen the full fruition of this apparently very strong sentiment in Congress. 
In advocating using the states to manage the health insurance purchasing pools, 
President Clinton offered two choices, You either have to have a system where you get 
rid of insurance all together and have the Government fund it, the way Canada does, or 
you have to have a system of guaranteed insurance, the way Germany does and several 
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other countries.  I advocate -- and Ill explain why later -- I think we should have a 
system of guaranteed private insurance with comprehensive benefits, including primary 
and preventive care which saves a lot of money in the long run, with no lifetime limits, 
and insurance that you cant lose."43  Several states had tested various versions of health 
purchasing alliances in the past either on a statewide or regional basis.  Some of these 
state directed initiatives were very successful, particularly CALPERS, the California 
Public Employees Retirement System, which in 2007 covers 1.2 million active and 
retired state and local government public employees and their family members.  It is the 
third largest purchaser of employee health benefits in the nation, behind the federal 
government and General Motors.  In 1962, CALPERS first offered health benefits.44 
While the Clinton proposal was an expanded health alliance model with 
mandatory employer participation, states would manage the alliances.  If the Clinton 
Health Plan had been enacted, on the forefront were state differentials in alliance 
structure and management.  If anything, Medicaid is an example of differential 
implementation in a health federalism model.   
Federalism means pluralism, and, if the Clinton Plan had been enacted, the states 
explicit involvement meant an acceptance of differentials, variation, and state creativity 
and innovation in the management process.  Not a unique concept to either the United 
States or federalist systems, countries with universal coverage systems often organize the 
management of health delivery with subsidiary governments -- framed by national 
requirements.   
States participation in the Clinton health plan embraced the importance of states 
from this Administrations worldview.  Like FDRs and LBJs Administrations, the 
Clinton Administration embraced creative federalism as well.  Only in this case, this third 
wave of creative federalism applied to a national health reform effort with universal 
coverage in mind.  In contrast, FDRs Social Security (OASDI) and LBJs Medicare had 
                                                
43 William J. Clinton, Remarks in a Town Meeting on Health Care Reform in St. Paul, Minnesota, April 
8, 1994, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States 1994, Book 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 
1995), 646.  
44 California Public Employees Retirement System (CALPERS) information from General Facts and 
Health Benefit Facts from its website at www.calpers.ca.gov, (accessed on January 25, 2007). 
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reserved a federally administered social insurance model for their universal coverage 
initiatives.  The Clinton Administration had great faith in the power of federalism, and 
explicitly gave states responsibilities in a national universal health initiative.   
Having recognized the Administrations belief in federalism, it also must be 
acknowledged that the Clinton Administration faced a world where both Social Security 
and Medicare payroll taxes existed.  There seems to be a social insurance tax capacity 
ceiling in America, and the national health reform or long-term care insurance reform 
ideas that suggest social insurance financing bump up against that ceiling.  Social 
insurance financing of broad-based programs is a non-starter in the modern social policy 
reform circle -- and the reason is that we have Big Bang One and Big Bang Two 
deducted from our paychecks.  Any attempt at Big Bang Three will have to address, or 
work around, this reality. 
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Table 2: Summary of State Mandates from 93-94 National Health Proposals 
 STATE MANDATES/OPTIONS 
CLINTON PLAN 
(HR 3600, S1757) 
Require that states set up large consumer groups called health 
alliances to collect premiums, bargain with health plans and handle 
payments.  All companies with 5,000 or fewer employees would have to 
buy coverage through an alliance.45 
COMMITTEE PLANS 
 
Senate Finance 
(S2351 -- S Rept 103-323) 
Permit the formation of voluntary insurance purchasing pools.  If no 
pools formed by 1996, states would have to create one for underserved 
areas.  Individuals could join the federal plan.46 
Senate Labor and Human 
Resources (S1757) 
Require states to establish at least one insurance purchasing cooperative 
that would provide access to community rated insurance plans.  
Individuals would not have to purchase insurance from the cooperative.  
Instead, insurance could be bought directly from an insurer or 
independent agent, or individuals could participate in the Federal 
Employees Health Benefits Plan.47 
House Ways and Means 
(HR 3600 - H Rept 103 - 
601) 
Allow states to establish their own health insurance systems. Options 
open to states included instituting a Canadian-style single-payer system 
in which the government would replace private insurance companies.  
Companies with more than 5,000 employees nationally would be 
exempt from state insurance regulations.48 
House Education and 
Labor -- Single Payer Bill 
(HR 3960 - H Rept 103-
618, Part I) 
Replace mandatory alliances with consumer purchasing cooperatives 
established by the states, either on a voluntary or a mandatory basis.  
Most of the regulatory activities that the alliances would undertake 
according to the Clinton bill would be given to the states.49 
LEADERSHIP COMPROMISE MEASURES 
 
Senate Majority Leader 
Mitchel, D-Maine 
Allow states to choose to put in place single-payer systems.  All 
employers in the state regardless of size would have to participate.50 
Compromise Bill --
Mitchell -- Mainstream 
States -- Option of single-payer system and speed-up of waivers 
Senate Mainstream 
Group -- Chaffee/Breaux 
The plan proposed drastic cuts in Medicare and Medicaid to cut the 
deficit and to provide health insurance subsidies to people with incomes 
of up to 200 percent of poverty.  Unlike other proposals that included 
Medicare cuts, the Chaffee-Breaux bill did not give the elderly a break 
on prescription drug coverage or payments for long-term care.51 
House Majority Leader 
Gephardt 
States could choose to set up a single-payer system.  In states that did 
so, all firms would have to comply with the state single-payer systems 
                                                
45 1994 CQ Almanac, 346. 
46 1994 CQ Almanac, 346. 
47 1994 CQ Almanac, 346. 
48 1994 CQ Almanac, 332. 
49 1994 CQ Almanac, 346. 
50 1994 CQ Almanac, 351. 
51 1994 CQ Almanac, 351. 
  279
rules.  In states without single-payer plans, multi-state firms could 
remain exempt from statewide insurance rules.52 
 
REASONS CLINTON HEALTH SECURITY ACT WAS NOT ENACTED 
 
 While there are whole treatises on the topic of why the Clinton Health Plan was 
not enacted, a few of the major reasons are outlined here.53  First, the reform -- regardless 
of the commitment and desire for change -- was not prioritized on the presidential 
agenda.  NAFTA, The Crime Bill, Budget Reconciliation, and several other measures 
placed health reform as fifth or sixth or lower on the Presidential priorities.  This was not 
the HR1, SI, Priority Number One strategy that resulted in the creation of Medicaid and 
Medicare in the LBJ era.  Second, the Health Security Act was drafted by a Task Force 
and delivered to Congress without adequate inclusion of the legislative branch during 
development of the massive proposal.  Third, the gargantuan bill was made available so 
far in advance that it assisted opponents in dissecting it -- and they did.  As one staffer 
said, You dont make things available like seven weeks ahead of timeThat hurt their 
chances of being successful.54  Fourth, several influential decision makers have since 
concluded that including the comprehensive initiative in the Budget Reconciliation 
process would have increased the chances of passage given the differences in rules and 
debate.55 
Fifth, the plan was notoriously complex, meaning that no one understood it -- 
making it more difficult for members of Congress to support or the public to embrace.  
Sixth, as mentioned earlier, Health Security Act supporters, as well as many ideologically 
                                                                                                                                            
52 1994 CQ Almanac, 349. 
53 For comprehensive or partial political science reviews of the Clinton Health Plan debate, see Boomerang: 
Health Care Reform and The Turn Against Government by Theda Skocpol, The System:The American Way 
of Politics at the Breaking Point by Haynes Johnson and David S. Broder, The Road to Nowhere: The 
Genesis of President Clintons Plan for Health Security by Jacob Hacker, Governing Health: The Politics 
of Health Policy (Second Edition) by Carol and William Weissert, and Accidental Logics: The Dynamics of 
Change in the Health Care Arena in the United States, Britain, and Canada by Carolyn Hughes Tuohy. 
54 Interview with Author, October 13, 2006. 
55 Interview with Author, October 12, 2006.  Former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) 
reportedly has supported the idea that the Clinton health reform efforts probability of passing was much 
greater in a budget reconciliation process. 
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left members of Congress who had their own bills, continued to insist on full coverage.  
They were not willing to negotiate on this pivotal point, even if it meant success.  
Seventh, the opposition -- particularly the Health Insurance Association of America 
(HIAA) did a masterful job in media relations against the plan.  The advertisements with 
a fictional couple warning to keep the government out of their Medicare program was 
genius. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE 1994 ELECTION, A NATIONAL REFERENDUM ON 
HEALTH REFORM?  INTRODUCING THE MEDICAID BLOCK GRANT ERA 
 
 While the specifics of the national health reform debate did not make or break the 
1994 Congressional election, the fallout was a contributing factor, along with tax 
increases, of a political threshold overload that turned voters against Democrats.  As one 
Republican Hill Staffer recalled, So [health reform] was a really missed 
opportunity.and then we had the electionsand that was a total shock to everyone, 
particularly Republicans.56  The House of Representatives moved to Republican control 
after a forty-year draught and the United States Senate moved to Republican leadership 
after eight years of Democratic control.  The subsequent historic shift in the United States 
Congress was adorned with symbolism.  Its manifesto -- the Contract With America -- 
did not specifically address Medicaid reform, but it did address Welfare reform and 
Unfunded Mandates to States -- important co-evolutionary and interconnecting policy 
streams to the Medicaid program.  Its General, Newt Gingrich, would wield power 
unusual to a House Speaker and, in fact, was strong enough to counteract the power of 
the President. 
 According to Elizabeth Drews Showdown: The Struggle Between the Gingrich 
Congress and the Clinton White House, this movement against big, intrusive 
government began in the late 1960s as a reaction to LBJs Great Society and other forms 
                                                
56 Interview with Author, October 13, 2006. 
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of social engineering.57  As Drew writes, Some said that the revolution Gingrich 
espoused began in 1964, when the Goldwaterites -- the outsiders -- took over the 
Republican Party.  The next such victory came with Reagan, who also stood apart from 
the partys establishment; the Goldwaterites expanded and elected Reagan.  Gingrich, as 
it happened, had now become the torch-bearer for the Goldwater-Reagan revolution.58  
With Rep. Newt Gingrich at the helm, Medicaid was slated for block granting.  After the 
national health discussion, the subsequent election opened the door to an era of block 
grant debates never witnessed before in the Medicaid program.  The next chapter will 
review how these debates and the subsequent 1997 Balanced Budget Act (BBA) were 
strongly shaped -- sometimes unintentionally -- from the national Clinton Health Security 
Act discussion. 
                                                
57 Elizabeth Drew, Showdown: The Struggle Between the Gingrich Congress and the Clinton White House 
(New York, NY: Touchstone, 1996), 24.  (Hereafter Drew, Showdown) 
58 Drew, Showdown, 24. 
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10. MEDICAID BLOCK GRANT ERA, WELFARE 
REFORM, AND THE 1997 BBA: NATIONAL 
HEALTH REFORM LEAVES ITS STAMP 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Two major efforts to block grant Medicaid, one in the FY1996 Budget 
Reconciliation process, and another in concert with the block grant of cash welfare in the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, immediately 
followed the 1993-94 national health reform debate era.  Lines in the sand were drawn 
and the ideas vetted -- in combination with the history of the national health discussion -- 
resulted in The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997.  For Medicaid policy bargaining, 
there was no escaping the macro environment.  Newly installed Speaker of the House 
Newt Gingrich relished Republicans first control of the House of Representatives in forty 
years.   
Speaker Gingrich is quoted as describing his place in history this way, The 
coalition Nixon put together in 1972 was ninety-five percent identical with the coalition 
Reagan put together in 84.  Its ninety-five percent identical with the combined 
Bush/Perot vote of 92.  So, youve had this sort of anti-Great Society majority which has 
not been able to translate into Washington the policies of its politics -- if that makes 
sense.  And what I have tried to do over the last twenty years is think through what are 
the necessary steps to actually translate the political majority of 1972 into an effective 
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working majority inside Washington.  And what youre watching is the first act of doing 
that.  Part of that is to transfer power back to the states and to local governments and back 
to families.  And back to nonprofit organizations.  And this is all a very deliberate 
strategy that says that the Great Society over centralized and its not sustainable.1  By 
the time the Gingrich era came to a close, his emphasis was identified more as wanting to 
limit government altogether than devolution of power to the states.  While block granting 
Medicaid was not a part of the Contract with America, it was part of House Republican 
plans to dismantle the Great Society.  Enacted in 1965, it was another Great Society 
program, similarly structured to the soon-to-be block granted AFDC program.  
Medicaids escalating costs were a frustration to both federal and state officials. 
As for policy bargaining, the era began with scorched earth tactics by a hungry 
group of Republican Freshman House members and ended with far more conciliatory 
conflict negotiation that resulted in the historic BBA 1997.  At the beginning of the era, 
in an old fashioned game of Southern chicken, President Clinton and Republican House 
members would neither swerve, resulting in two government shutdowns and measures to 
ensure the federal government did not default on its national debt.  This chapter reviews 
the Medicaid policy bargaining between the federal government and the states during this 
next step after comprehensive health reform negotiations.  Needing a change, voters 
shifted power to Republicans in Congress and the modern era took a conservative 
ideological twist. 
 
MEDICAID BLOCK GRANT ATTEMPTS, PRESIDENTIAL PRINCIPLED 
STAND, AND CO-EVOLUTIONARY WELFARE POLITICS 
 
 The 1995-1996 Block Grant Debate was a whirlwind of policy activity.  Wrapped 
with the budget reconciliation process and also with welfare reform, the initiative was 
met by a Presidential principled stand, a veto that was the first of its kind in a Budget 
Reconciliation process.  By all accounts, President Clinton wanted to protect the 
Medicaid entitlement, in addition to several other initiatives --Medicare, Education, the 
                                                
1 Drew, Showdown, 27. 
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Environment -- that were threatened in the FY 1996 Budget Reconciliation process.  
Most policy brokers believe a principled stand was made by the President in vetoing the 
FY1996 Budget Reconciliation Bill -- in part for protecting Medicaid beneficiary private 
rights of action -- and not a political maneuver.  The legislation scheduled to reform the 
open matching grant structure of Medicaid to a capped funding structure to states, thus 
maintaining the state entitlement but not the individual beneficiary entitlement, 
enforceable by the federal courts.  Many interviewees who met with the President directly 
on the issue report that the President got it when it came to the no right without 
remedy language of Medicaids individual entitlement.2  The National Governors 
Association (NGA), requiring consensus, did not back the block grant effort.  States 
wanted flexibility but the threat of reduced federal funding was not assuaged.  As Texas 
Director of Health and Human Services put it, Our worst fear is a block grant with all 
the rules, a capped entitlement that says, Do it this way and do it with less money.3 
 
Significant Waivers Set up the Modern Medicaid Block Grant Debate 
 
 Some analysts looking back on the Clinton era, dubbed him the Waiver 
President.  When Clinton took office, only Arizona had a statewide 1115 waiver; when 
he left office, 18 states had such waivers.  When Clinton took office, 50 1915b (freedom 
of choice) waivers were in effect; when he left office, 100 such waivers were in effect. 4  
This increased the bargaining opportunities in the program generally, but also embraced 
the state flexibility argument.  As the Oregon and Tennessee 1115 waivers predated the 
following years block grant debate, the idea of liberalizing the process of state directed 
health reform via Medicaid waivers introduced important concepts that some Republicans 
used to bolster their push for an aggregate cap on the program.  Democrats and 
Republicans both, in embracing waivers which required a budget neutrality cap, moved 
                                                
2 Interviews with Author: August 10, August 23, August 24, October 12, and November 6.  All interviews 
were conducted in 2006. 
3 Kent R. Weaver, Deficits and Devolution in the 104th Congress, Publius: The Journal of Federalism 
26, no. 3 (Summer 1996), 66. 
4 Gormley, An Evolutionary Approach, 20. 
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toward acquiesance that some stemming of Medicaids run on the treasury needed 
revision. 
 Embracing state flexibility, HCFA Administrator Bruce Vladeck testified before 
the House Energy and Commerce Committee, The fact is that AHCCCS is a success, the 
Oregon program is a success, and TennCare is a success.  Nothing that important and that 
good comes automatically.5  Tennessee Finance Commissioner Bob Corker added 
regarding the 1995-1996 Medicaid block grant debate, Tennessee legislators have great 
empathy for some of the decisions youre getting ready to make, because about 18 
months ago, they were faced with some of the same decisions.  And they made the 
decision that they could no longer afford the status quo, asking ourselves many of the 
questions that, frankly, youre going to be forced to answer during this debate..We are 
close to universal coverage in Tennessee, with 95 percent of all Tennesseans having 
health care insurance todayThe best means of accomplishing this flexibility is through 
a Medicaid block grant.6  The progression of the 1115 waiver process was used by some 
to advocate for an aggregate cap of the entire program. 
 
Medigrant -- The Republican Block Grant Attempt In the FY 1996 Budget 
Reconciliation Process 
 
As part of the Fiscal Year 1996 Budget Reconciliation process, the Budget called 
for $187 billion in Medicaid savings over seven years.7  When receiving the news from 
the Budget Committee, one Energy and Commerce staffer recalled, Then we roll into 
next year and the Budget Committees come to us and say, ok we need $270 out of 
Medicare and $187 out of Medicaid, over sevenand we are looking at the Budget 
                                                
5 Bruce Vladeck, HCFA Administrator, Committee on Commerce House of Representatives, Subcommittee 
on Health and Environment of the Committee on Commerce House of Representatives, One Hundred 
Fourth Congress, First Session, July 26, Serial No. 104-108, Transformation of the Medicaid Program -- 
Part 3, 42. 
6 Bob Corker Statement, Commissioner, Department of Finance and Administration, Tennessee, Committee 
on Commerce House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the Committee on 
Commerce House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Session, July 26, Serial No. 
104-108, Transformation of the Medicaid Program -- Part 3, 64-66. 
7 1995 CQ Almanac, 2-22. 
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Committee staff and we are even looking at John Kasich, the Chairman, and when we 
first heard the numbers, we said, well should we just quit?  Because no one has every 
seen a number in Medicaid more than chump change.8   
The only way Republican staffers could reduce the program by a number that 
large was by limiting state allocations.  When asked whether the decision to design a 
block grant was ideological or budget driven, the response was, Budget driven -- 100%, 
100%, 100%.9  At the same time though, Governors were torn regarding whether to 
block grant the program.  The NGA requires consensus in order to support a legislative 
proposal and so did not formally embrace the block grant concept.  At the same time, it is 
reported, Governors across the board were like leave the money at the train station, we 
know how to spend it.10  In general, Governors continued to clamor for greater state 
flexibility with Congressional and Gubernatorial Democrats mostly not supporting the 
proposal given the removal of the individual entitlement to the program. 
A Medicaid task force of Republican Governors, some from high per capita and 
some from low per capita states, was assembled.  The goal was to arrive at a block grant 
formula distribution for the Medicaid program that would significantly increase state 
flexibility while disadvantaging as few of the states as possible from their current 
position.  The wranglings over the distributional formula were sources of tension for 
many Governors and their staffs, who wanted to be sure that their state were in no way 
disadvantaged over the seven years from where they would have been in the old program.  
One impediment to the block grants passage, more than forty percent of the projected 
Medicaid savings from the GOP block grant proposal would have come from California, 
Florida, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas.11  Most reform has policy winners 
and losers and the proposed GOP block grant formula disadvantaged some politically 
powerful states.   
                                                
8 Interview with Author, October 13, 2006. 
9 Interview with Author, October 13, 2006. 
10 Interview with Author, October 13, 2006. 
11 Marilyn Werber Serafini, Medicaid and Medicare: Within Reach National Journal 27, no. 38 
(September 23, 1995), 2338. 
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 In retrospect a High Ranking Administration official summarized the block grant 
dilemma this way, In AFDC, every Governor, Republican or Democrat, want[ed] a 
block grant.12  But when it came to state opposition to the Medicaid block grant included 
in the FY 1996 Budget Reconciliation package, states were leery  because they were 
going to get less money.  The states want block grants but they want more money along 
with it.  If block grants are a strategy to give them less money, they don't want them.  If 
they do not get the growth factor built in, they are going to oppose it.  The Republicans 
have used the block grant as an argument for containing costs.  The Democrats are 
opposed to it because they thought it would weaken the quality of the program, and the 
breadth of the program. 13  
As a counter to the Republican blueprint, the Presidents team was pulled further 
to the ideological right than it had ever gone on Medicaid restructuring, agreeing to a per 
capita cap on the program that maintained the individual entitlement to the program.14  A 
function of policy bargaining, the ideological right went ahead with its insistence for an 
aggregated block grant.  This established a very important distinction for future Medicaid 
policy bargaining within waiver negotiations-- the aggregate block grant concept versus 
the per capita cap.  Although not an oft-repeated legislative proposal, the per capita cap 
concept, in various forms, has been applied and negotiated in various waiver negotiations 
since this distinction in the 1995-1996 block grant debate.  In statutory debates, it 
appeared again during the Clinton era, in a second block grant attempt that Republicans 
attempted to wrap into welfare reform.  GOP moderates like Senator John Chafee (R-RI) 
also proposed a per capita block grant that would offer a fixed amount of federal 
spending per beneficiary, showing some support across the aisle for this concept.15  
According to Republican staffers, Democratic policy officials went to great lengths not to 
refer to the per capita cap as a block grant.  The maintenance of the individual 
                                                
12 Interview with Author, November 6, 2006. 
13 Interview with Author, November 6, 2006. 
14 1995 CQ Almanac, 2 -28. 
15 Marilyn Werber Serafini, A Senate Barrier to Medicaid Block Grants, National Journal 27, no.37 
(September 16, 1995), 2276. 
  288
entitlement, of course, was a key distinction for Democrats.16  Under a per capita cap, 
states would receive more federal dollars for more people but other cost growth factors 
were fixed. 
On November 20, 1995 the Budget Reconciliation Bill passed Congress.  This 
included the plan to revamp Medicaid, thus saving $163 billion over 7 years.17  A 
Republican staffer says of the period,  And we knew, there was no way that this was 
ever going to get signed into law.  We as health staff just couldnt believe that the Clinton 
Administration would ever sign something that was taking $270 billion out of Medicare 
and basically abolishing Medicaid.18  Add onto this the impending block granting of the 
cash welfare program, AFDC, with roots back to the New Deal and the highly increased 
use of the 1115 waiver process -- and it was framed so that the American welfare state 
reforms would roll back substantial parts of the Great Society and New Deal. 
Republicans, rather than relenting on the Medicaid provisions, stepped up the 
pressure.  As the Congressional Quarterly reported, They threatened to let the 
government default on its debt unless he capitulated to their reconciliation package.  And 
they made the continuing operation of most federal departments contingent on Clinton 
agreeing to balance the budget in seven years, using Congress more conservative 
economic assumptions.  The President called the GOP bluff on December 6, 1995 when 
he vetoed the FY 1996 Budget Reconciliation Bill (HR 2491).   
 On December 16, 1995 in Remarks on the Budget, the President pointed the finger 
across the ideological aisle, As all of you know, yesterday the Republican congressional 
leaders called the negotiations off unless we would first put much bigger Medicare and 
Medicaid cuts on the table.  I thought that was wrong and unwarranted.We dont 
believe that decimating Medicare and Medicaid and undermining our investments in 
education and the environment, raising taxes on working families is a good prescription 
for Americas future.  And it is not necessary to balance the budget.19 
                                                
16 Interview with Author, October 13, 2006. 
17 1996 CQ Almanac, 6-4. 
18 Interview with Author, October 13, 2006. 
19 William J. Clinton, Remarks on the Budget, December 16, 1995, Public Papers of the Presidents of the 
United States 1995, Book II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996), 1896. 
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Most policy brokers believe this was a principled stand by the President and not a 
political maneuver.  Most do not believe it concentrated only on Medicaid, but, indeed, 
the President got it when it came to the no right without remedy language of 
Medicaids individual entitlement.20  In a campaign speech in Michigan, the President 
made it clear that Medicaid was a distinct portion of his decision making on the historic 
veto and pair of government shutdowns.  As he told a Michigan crowd during the 1996 
Presidential Campaign, Christopher Reeve came to see me in the White House, and he 
said, Mr. President, I am so glad you fought to stop Congress from destroying the 
Medicaid program and ending its guarantee to the elderly in nursing homes, to poor 
children, and to people who have disabilities, because not everybody who gets a 
disability is a wealthy person.  And even wealthy people can be driven into poverty.  And 
if it werent for Medicaid, middle class families wouldnt be able to maintain their 
lifestyles.  Thats a part of our community.21  The two government shutdowns and 
sequence of continuing resolutions so that the federal government would not default on 
the federal debt were dramatic.  Amid the scuffle, Republican Senate Budget Committee 
Chair Pete Domenici (N. Mex.) warned that any attempt to keep full entitlement status for 
Medicaid would be a deal breaker.22   
Sticking with principles rather than compromise in order to reach a negotiated 
deal, the Administration stood firm on each and every threat as continuing resolutions 
expired, federal workers remained idle, and the nation watched.  The scorched earth, my 
way or the highway, negotiating style of the Republican House freshman did not gain 
them budget reconciliation success.  Medicaid was not block granted during this effort -- 
and the tough make my day antics left the nation worse off, stuck in political rancor, and 
without a balanced budget.  The public largely blamed Republicans for the vicious 
partisan environment.  On January 9, 1996 the President also vetoed a stand alone welfare 
reform bill, setting up the opportunity for Republicans to attempt another Medicaid block 
                                                
20 Interviews with Author: August 10, 2006; August 24, 2006, November 6, 2006. 
21 William J. Clinton, Remarks in Kalamazoo, Michigan, August 28, 1996, The American Presidency 
Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=53248 (accessed on September 20, 2006). 
22 1995 CQ Almanac, 2-62. 
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grant attempt wrapped up in the welfare debate, a reform the President was publicly 
dedicated to seeing through. 
 
Second Medicaid Block Grant Proposal Wrapped Into Welfare Reform 
 
In his January 23, 1996 State of Union Address, President Clinton challenged 
Congress to pass a bipartisan welfare plan.  In doing so, he was following through on a 
1992 election pledge to change welfare as we know it.  Republicans and Governors had 
in mind changing Medicaid, as well.  On February 6, 1996, the nations Governors 
endorsed a plan to overhaul welfare and Medicaid in the same reform package.23  For 
Medicaid, the myriad of NGA reform ideas did not include a federal aggregate cap but 
did include an increase in federal financial participation (increase in the FMAP floor 
from 50% to 60%).24  While not a block grant, the proposal would remove the 
beneficiaries federal right of action, replacing it with a state-centered approach and only 
one point of access to federal courts -- the U.S. Supreme Court.25   
Secretary of Health Donna Shalala in a Senate Finance Committee hearing 
expressed concern with the NGA proposal: But, while we recognize that the NGA plan 
is still a work-in-progress, we are concerned that some of its central elements fail to 
reflect the priorities articulated in the Presidents Medicaid plan.  These are the need for a 
real, enforceable Federal guarantee of coverage to a Congressionally-defined benefit 
package, appropriate Federal and State financing, and quality standards, beneficiary 
protections, and accountability.26  Another primary point of contention was the NGA 
                                                
23 1996 CQ Almanac, 6-3. 
24 NGA plan according to the U.S. Senate, Committee on the Budget, Personal Responsibility, Work 
Opportunity, and Medicaid Restructuring Act of 1996, 104th Congress, 2nd Session, S. Prt. 104-59, 
Committee Recommendations As Submitted To the Budget Committee on the Budget Pursuant to H. Con. 
Res. 178, July 1996, Medicaid Reform Reconciliation Provisions Summary, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 
1996), 8. 
25 U.S. Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Finance, One Hundred Fourth Congress, Second Session 
on the National Governors Association Policy on Welfare Reform and Medicaid (With Administration and 
Public Views), Statement of Hon. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services,  Wednesday, 
February 28, 1996, 56. 
26 U.S. Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Finance, One Hundred Fourth Congress, Second Session 
on the National Governors Association Policy on Welfare Reform and Medicaid (With Administration and 
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plan to repeal Medicaid and create a new Title in the Social Security Act: By repealing 
Title XIX and creating a new title for the Medicaid program we believe that the NGA 
resolution could seriously compromise the framework for quality standards for 
beneficiary and family financial protections, and for program accountability.In 
conclusion, we believe that we must reform, not repeal, Medicaid.  The NGA resolution 
has made significant contributions to our collective efforts to do just that.27 
While the Administration was concerned with the NGA proposal, the hearing 
language made it clear that they were not completely adverse to the proposal.  By the 
time Energy and Commerce designed a bill that included another initiative to block grant 
Medicaid, the legislation was different enough from the NGA proposal -- and from the 
Administrations own reform ideas, to instigate a direct veto threat from the Secretary 
during hearings.28  The President has also made clear that the current strategy of the 
majority in Congress to link welfare reform to unacceptable changes in Medicaid will 
leave him no choice but to veto the entire package.  We call on Congress and on its 
leaders to abandon this poison pill strategy that is designed to provoke a veto.29  
Secretary Shalala left no confusion, Let me be very clear.  If the current legislation is 
sent to the Presidents desk, I would recommend that he veto that legislation and send it 
back to Congress.  But it is my hope that the Congress will instead choose to seek a truly 
bipartisan approach to Medicaid reform that is consistent with the principles the President 
has stated.30   
                                                                                                                                            
Public Views), Statement of Hon. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Wednesday, 
February 28, 1996, 55. 
27 U.S. Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Finance, One Hundred Fourth Congress, Second Session 
on the National Governors Association Policy on Welfare Reform and Medicaid (With Administration and 
Public Views), Statement of Hon. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Wednesday, 
February 28, 1996, 55 - 57  
28 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Commerce, One Hundred Fourth Congress, Second 
Session on H.R. 3507, The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Serial No. 104-
102; Statement of Hon. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, June 11, 
1996; (Washington, D.C: GPO.,1996), 34   
29  U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Commerce, One Hundred Fourth Congress, Second 
Session on H.R. 3507, The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Serial No. 104-
102; Statement of Hon. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, June 11, 
1996; (Washington, D.C: GPO.,1996), 32. 
30 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Commerce, One Hundred Fourth Congress, Second 
Session on H.R. 3507, The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Serial No. 104-
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The counter-proposal to the GOP strategy presented by the Administration during 
the House hearings repeated the counter-proposal of a per capita cap (presented as a 
counterproposal to the previous years block grant negotiations) and also included 
reductions in DSH spending to help balance the budget, repeal of the Boren Amendment 
to provide greater financing flexibility to states, easier waiver procedures, and significant 
changes in Medicaid managed care requirements.31  Although the joint welfare-Medicaid 
reform would not happen, several of these provisions -- now that the Administration was 
on record in support -- would be effectuated in the near futures BBA 1997 Medicaid 
reforms. 
In terms of policy bargaining, the NGA proposal was held up as a model against 
the House plans for reform.  By the time the House had a proposal of its own on the table, 
the Administration used an unfavorable comparison to the NGA proposal to bat down the 
Congressional version, In February, the National Governors Association issued a 
bipartisan proposal for Medicaid reform that held significant promise.  Last month, 
Chairman Bliley, Mr. Bilirakis and others, introduced a new Medicaid bill that I will 
discuss today.  Sadly, these new proposals in Congress move away from the bipartisan 
approach to Medicaid reform envisioned by the Governors.As a result, four leading 
Democratic Governors have written to Senator Roth saying in part, The Republican 
Medicaid proposal is far from the NGA agreement and appears to be more like the 
proposal vetoed by the President last year and rejected by the Governors at our winter 
meeting.  It appears then that we are back on the same track we traveled last year.32 
In July 1996, after insisting that they would not move a welfare overhaul bill 
without Medicaid reform provisions, GOP leaders decided to drop the Medicaid 
                                                                                                                                            
102; Statement of Hon. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, June 11, 
1996; (Washington, D.C: GPO.,1996), 34   
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June 11, 1996 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996), 37. 
32 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Commerce, One Hundred Fourth Congress, Second 
Session on H.R. 3507, The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, Serial No. 104-
102; Statement of Hon. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, June 11, 
1996 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1996), 33-34. 
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proposals which called for ending the federal guarantee of health insurance to the poor 
and replacing it with block grants to the states.33  On July 18, 1996, the House effectively 
eliminated the Medicaid reform provisions when it adopted the rule for floor 
consideration of the welfare bill (HR 3734).  The same day, the Senate agreed by voice 
vote to an amendment by Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss., that deleted the 
Medicaid provisions from the Senate version of the welfare reform bill (S1956).34  As 
one Energy and Commerce staffer recounted, by the time we went through the second 
time, it was much more of an intellectual exercise than the first time through.  [There 
was] much less tension We were dropped before it was dropped to the floor.and that 
ended that.35  By dropping the Medicaid portion, the door was opened to welfare reform.  
Pushed well beyond the Administrations hoped for bargaining position on welfare 
reform, the intense initial hold on Medicaid left little bargaining power on the part of 
Democrats once Republicans loosened their grip on the Medicaid block grant.  Forced to 
take a far more conservative welfare bill than he wanted, President Clinton signed the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.36 
A symbolic shift was indicated by this block grant attempt era, in that Medicaid 
became a program that the President himself would protect -- even with stark 
consequences.  While not the full reason for the FY 1996 budget reconciliation veto, 
Medicaids private rights of action were protected by the principled stand by President 
Clinton -- even though two government shutdowns resulted.  In this most recent joint 
welfare-Medicaid block grant attempt, again the Administration threatened veto.  This 
time the second term election was on the horizon and the Administration threatened to 
veto welfare legislation it had promised to see through Congress in its initial election 
campaign -- all in order to protect Medicaid. 
As one policy expert onlooker said: And I can remember being at home and 
watching C-SPAN and having, Ive forgotten who the Press Secretary was by that time -- 
                                                
33 1996 CQ Almanac, 1-13.  
34 1996 CQ Almanac, 1-13. 
35 Interview with Author, October 13, 2006. 
36 For an excellent review of this policy bargaining phenomenon during welfare reform, see R. Kent 
Weaver, Ending Welfare As We Know It (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2000) . 
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maybe Joe Lockhart.  I can remember hearing the question, So, whats the difference 
between Medicaid and welfare, arent you going to end the entitlement for Medicaid.  If 
you are doing it on welfare, why not on Medicaid?  And I am sitting there in my TV 
room, thinking, that is one helluva good question.  And the answer from the Press 
Secretary was, Because people love Medicaid.  And I thought, . the guy misread his 
talking points.  You know, people love Medicare; nobody loves Medicaid.  And then I 
realized in the next day or two, this was not a mistake.  37 A symbolic shift was 
happening in Medicaid policy.  It was becoming a program worth protection and 
principled stands -- against great odds. 
 
THE BALANCED BUDGET ACT (BBA) OF 1997 
 
The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 was a major punctuation in American 
social policy.38  Possibly the pinnacle of budget reconciliation maneuvers to that point, it 
centered largely on changes to Medicare, Medicaid, restoration of welfare benefits to 
disabled legal immigrants, and entitlement reform.  It was the cuts to Medicare that were 
the starkest.  As a senior official said, We took huge cuts out of Medicare during the 
Balanced Budget Act (BBA) and protected Medicaid.39  Not only did the legislation 
create a wake going back to the Great Society, it was also seen  -- in conjunction with the 
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (HR 2014  PL 105-34) which provided historic tax cuts-- 
as perhaps President Clintons greatest legislative achievements.40  This subsection will 
first present an general overview, then outline the major changes in the Medicaid 
program, and, finally, review how these Medicaid BBA changes were shaped by many of 
the arguments from national health reform and block grant debates.  In many respects, the 
legacy of the national conversations from 1992 through 1996, first on universal coverage 
options and then on block granting Medicaid, set the table for the BBA.  Conversely, the 
                                                
37 Interview with Author, August 10, 2006. 
38 For an overall review of the passage of the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997, see Daniel J. Palazzolo, 
Done Deal? The Politics of the 1997 Budget Agreement (New York: Chatham House Publishers, 1999). 
39 Interview with Author, November 6, 2006. 
40 1997 CQ Almanac, 2-27. 
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BBA would establish a new norm in Medicaid policy, and, in fact, created a new title in 
the Social Security Act -- the State Childrens Health Insurance Program (Title XXI). 
 
Overview of the Historic Legislation 
 
 Following the FY1996 budget debacle, a new era of compromise and consensus 
created the environment for what some have termed the most far reaching social policy 
legislation since the 1965 enactment of Medicaid and Medicare.  In comparing the 
environment just one year before in the Reconciliation process that resulted in the 
government shutdowns, one key budget negotiator involved in the policy bargaining 
relayed: There was a big difference which was the Reconciliation Bills that triggered to 
government shutdown in 1996 were written by Republicans for Republicans and simply 
presented to President Clinton for signature.  1997 was profoundly different because it 
was designed to be bipartisanand it was  The President and his team -- Democrats 
and Republicans together.  Unfortunately, thats the last time its happened.41   
All in all, the balanced budget was the sum of the 1990, 1993, and 1997 budget 
deals, along with a strong economy.  The 1990 package was worth about $593 billion; the 
1993 deal was worth about $487 billion.  By contrast, the 1997 agreement was expected 
to save only about $204 billion over five years.42  Assisting these budget cuts, the 
economy had strengthened considerably, leading to the joke that President Clinton and 
the Republican Congress should seal their deal before the budget balanced itself.   
 The mood was historic.  The federal budget had not been in balance since 1969 
and this level of tax cuts had not been seen since Ronald Reagans early years in office.  
House Speaker New Gingrich (R-GA) was effusive, Were going to do everything we 
can to get the two bills signed by the president.43  A Democratic policybroker who 
helped negotiate the deal summarized: Sure.  It was an interesting process.  It was really 
a challenge.  I remember President Clinton called together the four principal budget 
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leaders and met with them and said that he would like them, with his team, to come to a 
budgeta five year or seven year budget that got to balance, and so we met 
repeatedly.repeatedly.on and on and on and both at the staff level and at the 
principal level.  After a long period of time, we were able to hammer out an agreement 
get to balance and it included lots of different programs .from Medicare to Medicaid to 
Food StampsWe didnt like everything that was in there but we thought overall it was 
better than not it did balance the budget.  It was an ordeal getting it through Congress.  
First, we had to pass a budget resolution and then we had to pass a Reconciliation Bill 
that the President would sign.  And, there were lots of stop and gos before it was finally 
enacted.  It was very contentious.  But, in the end, it worked.44   
 
Major Medicaid Provisions of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) 
 
Of the several dozen major Medicaid provisions of the Balanced Budget Act 
(BBA), a few are of particular note for policy bargaining in Medicaid Federalism.  
Certainly the creation of SSA Title XXI, the State Childrens Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP) would fulfill a four decade quest for a separate program to address health 
financing of children who were too well off to qualify for Medicaid but still uninsured.  
Second, mandatory Medicaid managed care no longer required a waiver for many 
populations.  Third, the 75/25 rule was repealed, meaning that participating managed care 
plans were no longer required to have no more than 75% of enrollees in Medicaid and 
Medicare.  The repealed provision had attempted to ensure that Medicaid and Medicare 
beneficiaries were mixed in plans with at least 25% of private enrollees.  Fourth, the 
Boren Amendment was repealed after a decade and a half of setting a minimum standard 
for states to reimburse providers.  Further restrictions to DSH were also included, placing 
specific caps on state DSH allotments.  DSH is typically described by experts as a block 
grant or revenue sharing arrangement, whereby the federal government compensates 
hospitals for providing uncompensated care. 
                                                
44 Interview with Author, August 15, 2006. 
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Table 3: Select Major Provisions of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA)45 
--Creation of the State Childrens Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) 
--In 1997, CBO estimated federal savings of $13 Billion over 5 years from reductions in 
Medicaid spending under the Balanced Budget Act. 
--Eligibility, BBA adds new state eligibility options for children and disabled persons; expands 
premium assistance for low-income Medicare beneficiaries; and restores Medicaid coverage to 
children and immigrants who lost SSI benefits as a result of the 1996 welfare reform legislation. 
--Benefits, Adds a new PCCM benefit option and liberalizes eligibility requirements for 
Medicaid assistance under home- and community-based care waivers. 
--Cost Sharing, the new law permits states to impose cost sharing on beneficiaries enrolled in 
managed care organizations to the same extent as is permitted in the fee-for-service program. 
--Provider Reimbursement and Participation, Most of the reductions in federal Medicaid 
spending are achieved through reductions in provider payments, the most significant of which are 
targeted to disproportionate share hospitals.  Boren Amendment repealed.  Phases out cost-based 
reimbursement for FQHCs and RHCs.  Also allows states to pay Medicare providers the 
Medicaid reimbursement rate for services provided to Qualified Medicare Beneficiaries and dual 
eligibles 
--Managed Care  
Permits states to require most Medicaid beneficiaries to enroll in a managed care organization 
without first obtaining waiver approval from HCFA. 
Permits the establishment of Medicaid-only plans without Secretarial approval by eliminating 
the existing 75/25 Medicare-Medicaid/private coverage composition requirement.  Increases to 
$1 million the threshold for prior federal approval of managed care contracts. 
Establishes certain new managed care consumer protections but exempts Section 1915 and 
Section 1115 waiver states from its new requirements. 
--Long-Term Care --Establishes an optional program, Program of All Inclusive Care for the 
Elderly (PACE), for duals who are 55 years of age or older, require nursing facility-level care, 
reside in the PACE program service area, and meet other applicable conditions of eligibility 
permitted under the program. 
--DSH --The law places additional caps on state DSH allotments, beginning FY 1998, with the 
specific amount established per state until FY 2002; thereafter, the allotment is increased by CPI. 
                                                
45 For an in depth review, see Sara Rosenbaum and Julie Darnell, A Comparison of the Medicaid 
Provisions in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33) with Prior Law, Center for Health Policy 
Research, The George Washington University Medical Center for the Kaiser Commission on the Future of 
Medicaid, October 1997. 
  298
The Evolution and Design of the Medicaid BBA Reforms 
 
The Medicaid reform provisions enacted in the BBA were mostly rehashed from 
previous debates.  Some of those had been debated, re-debated, and re-re debated for 
decades.  The enactment of the State Childrens Health Insurance (SCHIP) program is 
just one example of this.  Wilbur Cohen in 1968 had generated idea papers around a 
social insurance program to cover kids not covered by Medicaid.  After several proposals 
throughout the years to create such an initiative, enactment came in the BBA of 1997.  
The policy lesson from this is that over the years if a reform idea is presented enough 
times, it will become law eventually.  Policy actors want to be the ones at the helm 
designing the delivery and financing mechanisms when the actual reform does take hold 
because once in place institutional rules are much more difficult to change later. 
Among the items dropped before the deal was announced May 2 was a 
resurrected per capita cap proposition on Medicaid spending that had infuriated liberal 
Democrats and Governors of both parties.46  The per capita cap idea was rehashed after 
being negotiated originally as part of the failed Medicaid block grant attempt in the 
botched FY 1996 budget reconciliation bargaining process and later again in the 
Republican joint Medicaid/welfare rework.  During the negotiations, the National 
Governors Association issued a letter, signed by 39 Governors that began this way, Dear 
Mr. President: As budget discussions continue to move forward, we wanted to reiterate 
our concerns regarding the role of Medicaid in a deficit reduction package.  No single 
decision made in the context of balancing the budget will be of greater importance to 
states than the treatment of the Medicaid program.  Later in the letter they expressed a 
primary concern, We adamantly oppose a cap on federal Medicaid spending in any 
form.47 
As a high-ranking official noted, That [the per capita cap proposal] was all about 
politics.  We wouldnt have come up with that as anything but a counterproposal.48  This 
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47 National Governors Association letter to The Honorable William J. Clinton, April 14, 1997. 
48 Interview with Author, November 6, 2006. 
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was a policy bargaining case of one side of the debate having enough political sway that 
they were able to pull the other side to a policy proposal they would not have arrived at 
otherwise.  Several books have reviewed the basis of this phenomenon, from 1994 to 
1996, when House Freshman led by House Leader Newt Gingrich rivaled the power of 
the Executive branch so effectively.49 
 The new legislation first made it possible for states to enroll beneficiaries in 
managed care plans on a mandatory basis without a waiver, and second repealed the 
75/25 requirement which set a minimum percentage (25%) of private beneficiaries that 
must be enrolled in managed care plans served by Medicaid.  BBA 1997 legislated away 
the freedom of choice requirement for many Medicaid populations.  Once a major tenet 
of Medicaid beneficiary rights, freedom of choice had lost ground via freedom of choice, 
1915b, waivers and also increasingly in the Clinton era through increased waiver of 
freedom of choice via the 1115 waiver process.  The ability to place Medicaid 
beneficiaries in mandatory managed care was a huge fulcrum when first presented 
according to one policy negotiator.  People were like, we really should not make people 
do this.  Then it [Mandatory Managed Care] did not turn out to be that big.  Most states 
would have done this with a waiver regardless.50 
The other facet of the major Medicaid managed care revisions, the undoing of the 
75/25 rule, made All-Medicaid HMOs -- without any private beneficiaries -- a possible 
delivery mechanism.  As one policy broker involved in Capitol Hill negotiations in 
Medicaid said, I think All-Medicaid HMOs are a terrible thing.  In the past, the HMO 
had to be good enough or a beneficiary could vote with their feet and get out but 
conservatives repealed this.  This was the market way to protect quality of care.  With 
All-Medicaid HMOs, there were effectively only one not two choices in many areas like 
there was supposed to be.  Private patients kept the system honest.51  Essentially, 
according to statute, many Medicaid recipients not only could no longer chose a non-
managed care option for care, but they may in practice not even have the required two 
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choices of plans.  And the managed care plan they were assigned to could potentially 
only serve Medicaid clients.    
 The National Governors Association (NGA) had tacked on repeal of the Boren 
Amendment in suggestions for Medicaid reform during the national health debate in 
1994.52  States won repeal of these federal Medicaid minimum provider payment 
standards in BBA 97.  One Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) head 
made it clear that this repeal was much worse for nursing homes, which are more 
financially dependent on Medicaid than Medicare.  He explains,  Youve got a much 
smaller base of Medicare patients and commercial patients to cost shift to, so its must 
tougher on nursing homes.  The Boren Amendment was much tougher on nursing homes 
because when it was repealed, states started to chronically underpay nursing homes and 
they had very little cost base to shift it to.  It was much worse for nursing homes than 
hospitals.53 
 
State Childrens Health Insurance Program: Huge Success and Intentionally 
Designed to Be Different From the Medicaid Program 
 
The SCHIP design revolved around capped funding.  States could choose from 
several options, such as broadening their existing Medicaid coverage or enrolling 
uninsured children in private health plans.  Benefits packages had to be equivalent to one 
of several benchmark plans, such as the standard Blue Cross/Blue Shield preferred 
provider option offered under the Federal Employees Health Benefits plan.54  During 
SCHIP design, an explicit decision by those involved was to make sure it was unlike 
Medicaid.55  According to one interviewee, those involved in the SCHIP design in the 
Congressional ranks worried that putting the new capped funding design on the ground 
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was a disaster. 56  Although SCHIP was designed to a completely different population, 
kids in families too wealthy to be covered by Medicaid but not well enough off to 
purchase private coverage, there was concern that SCHIPs capped funding and lack of 
individual entitlement may provide a slippery slope for a possible Medicaid re-design in 
the future.  Another Centers for Medicare and Medicaid official in the Clinton 
Administration emphasized that a goal was to make SCHIP coverage look like private 
insurance as much as possible.57 
Medicaid waivers were credited with developing the concepts around SCHIP.58  A 
High-Ranking Official commented, We would have preferred an entitlement but we 
knew we werent going to get it and [Bill Sponsor and Senator] Kennedy made it clear 
that we werent going to get it.  And we figured we would build upon it.59  Policy 
decision makers often get what they can at the moment, hoping and planning to build 
upon the proposal in later years.  The Administrator continued, Well it wasnt just the 
entitlement, we wanted to expand it.  We were trying to build a political constituency.  
With Kennedy -- this program was designed to get a foot in the door.60  Some 
interviewees suggested that it was childrens advocates who first proposed a closed 
match, i.e. block grant, design for SCHIP. 61  By the ideological left starting bargaining at 
a block grant instead of insisting on individual entitlement, passage was more assured but 
at that point and time -- in that particular debate cycle -- the individual entitlement was 
not within the range of possible negotiating outcomes at all.  By starting at capped 
funding as the left most point on the bargaining table, Democrats were certainly not 
going to get individual entitlement in this round. 
 A Democrat Hill Staffer felt the SCHIP design was more purposeful in its efforts 
to influence Medicaid reform in a conservative direction in the future: In terms of 
bargaining this is the Holy Grail of Executive Branch bargaining and it started in 97. 
                                                
56 Interview with Author, August 10, 2006. 
57 Interview with Author, August 22, 2006. 
58 Interview with Author, November 6, 2006. 
59 Interview with Author, November 6, 2006. 
60 Interview with Author, November 6, 2006. 
61 Interview with Author, August 10, 2006. 
  302
Again, Im not inside their heads.  But I think what happenedthat after the dust had 
settled on the Medicaid transformation -- which is what Newt called the block grant.  And 
after Clinton vetoed it.  They just decided we cant do this straight on again.  Well take a 
different route.  Its more this.  We see that theres all this interest in kids.  Lets get our 
policy structure in place, using kids as a cover --SCHIP.  And then over time SCHIP is 
the good program, Medicaid is the bad program.  Governors love SCHIP.  They hate 
Medicaid, and well see if over time we cant persuade Medicaid or part of it into SCHIP.  
We are about to enter that discussion for reauthorization [SCHIP reauthorization in 
2007].62  Other interviewees did not see the planning as explicit for converting Medicaid 
eventually to the SCHIP model but did not necessarily deny that it may provide policy 
lessons for Medicaid federalism as it evolves over time.  Most interviewees, including 
many Democrats, thought that the populations between SCHIP and Medicaid were too 
different for there to be considerable parallelisms drawn between the financing 
arrangements. 
 When given a chance to respond to the claim that Republicans were thinking 
ahead of time of re-working Medicaid based on the SCHIP model, a Republican 
responsible for drafting and designing the SCHIP design denied the pre-meditated notion, 
I never foresaw Medicaid becoming CHIP in terms of the benefit package because the 
population [was so different]. 63 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The National Health Reform Debate in 1992 through 1994, the following nearly-
enacted block grant and per capita cap proposals, and the Balanced Budget Act were a 
power health policy trio in the 1990s.  Ending the decade were several follow-up bills.  
The type of policy maelstrom created by this type of trio tends to have spin-off twisters.  
In BBAs case, the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 
1999 and the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act 
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of 2000 (BIPA)64 were the BBA II and BBAIII, if you will.  The former bill, HR3194, 
was sometimes dubbed The Givebacks Bill.  After passage, several provider groups 
launched a lobbying blitz to readjust upward BBA Medicare payment reductions.  
Providers affected by these reductions included hospitals, nursing homes, rehabilitation 
therapists, managed care plans, and home health agencies.65  BIPA closed some of the 
new state Medicaid maximization strategies, the Upper Payment Limit (UPL) loopholes. 
A master tobacco case settlement by the State Attorneys General and the 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for FY 1999 (P.L. 106-31) Act by Congress 
transferred the federal share of settlement funds from national tobacco litigation to 
states.66  Considered beyond the scope of this project, the tobacco wars cost state 
Medicaid programs over decades in addressing the health needs of smokers and the late 
1990s saw a correction of the financial burden of this sordid history. 
More generally, there was also a greater trend toward privatization with several 
different Medicaid initiatives headed in that direction.  BBA 97 had already allowed 
mandatory managed care without state waives to the federal agency.  Also, Medicaid was 
forging into greater privatization in at least three ways towards the end of the decade.  
First, there are certain beneficiaries who also have access to employer-based group health 
insurance.67  Some states have pursued Health Insurance Premium Payment (HIPP) 
programs, where state Medicaid officials aggressively pursue cost savings by paying 
premiums, deductibles, and coinsurance on behalf of Medicaid beneficiaries eligible for 
enrollment in employer-based group health plans when cost-effective.68  Oftentimes, 
entire families are covered with varying levels of state investment under these programs.  
Paying premiums for employers encourages small employers to offer health insurance 
coverage. 
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In a second privatization model, states are now going beyond that where they are 
allowing some private employers to buy into Medicaid for employees.  Many states 
Medicaid programs already offer, for example, Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans, making it 
advantageous for a small business to buy into Medicaid if a state negotiates a win/win 
scenario.  In this case, the employer pays the match that the state traditionally would have 
paid.  It is for low-income individuals, and caught on among states.  One National 
Association of State Medicaid Directors interviewee estimated that in 2006, an additional 
eight states pursued these initiatives.69  States offer buy-ins for employers and for 
individuals. 
In a third privatization trend, states have continued to develop programs where 
they loosen the reigns in particular cases, allowing Medicaid beneficiaries to be 
consumers in purchasing their own care through Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) and 
Cash and Counseling programs.  The original Cash & Counseling demonstration was 
begun in 1998 in only three states -- Arkansas, New Jersey, and Florida.70  This late 
1990s initiative was just expanded in the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act, making it available 
to all states.71  In one success story, One gentleman in New Jersey called up and said, I 
want to buy dirt.  Can I buy dirt with my money.  And they said, Why do you want to 
buy dirt.  Well, if I fill in my lawn, I can get my wheelchair out to the back and I wont 
need an aide to get the car and Ill only need an aide once a day instead of twice a day.  
So, I want to buy dirt.  And of course they said, Sure, buy dirt.72  The privatization 
trends of the 1990s, not stymied by the Democratic Administration, fed the upcoming 
developments of the post-2000 Medicaid re-engineering. 
For the disabled, the federal courts in 1999 also decided on a momentous civil 
rights Medicaid case, while at the same time setting state fiscal priorities.  In Olmstead v. 
L.C. ex. rel. Zimring (527 U.S. 581 (1999),73 the U.S. Supreme Court held that within the 
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Americans With Disabilities Act states were required to provide services to persons with 
disabilities in community settings rather than institutions, if certain conditions were 
met.74  Developments out of Olmstead in the late 1990s included the Ticket to Work and 
Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-170), allowing the working 
disabled -- with incomes as high as 450% of the federal poverty level -- to keep receiving 
Medicaid.75   
In closing a chapter on a whirlwind decade, there are so many points of difference 
when one Executive Administration changes power to another.  In this case, consider a 
similarity between both Republicans and Democrats who held similar administrative 
roles in the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare services.   
Medicaid was soon to enter the George W. Bush decade.  With a new set of 
actors, some of the federal administrator lines of thinking would show a synchronicity.  
Just before the Presidential Administration changeover in 2000, a key Medicaid decision 
maker in the Clinton Administration offered a bargain to the states that he believed would 
benefit them for many years to come.  He suggested closing the state financing loopholes 
in exchange for the federal government giving states a permanent 2% increase in FMAP.  
As he recounts I suggested at the last National Association of State Medicaid Directors 
Meeting that states be given a 2% permanent increase in the FMAP across the board.  
They wouldnt go for it given that some of the states were in so deep [in utilizing state 
creative financing mechanisms].  He said that for states such as Pennsylvania and New 
Jersey, a 2% increase in the FMAP would have been a loss for them.  Then there are 
some states that had not started implementing UPLs.  So, the outcomes would have been 
very different for the various states.  He continued, My argument was, Hey, we are 
going to close Loopholes, lets bargain and trade on it.  The Governors are only looking 
at the short-term budget prospectus, and not considering the long-term.  In short, the 
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States flatly turned him down.76  States did not accept the federal offer and incremental 
reforms continued to wind on from there.   
When the next Administration took the reins of the Medicaid program, the 
Secretary and the Republican Administrator also offered a new, improved Medicaid 
reform idea that they believed was too good to be true for the states.  It went nowhere.77  
Different ideologies, different ends in mind, different relationships with states -- but there 
is a unifying thread between Federal Medicaid administrators, Democrat or Republican.  
Any Medicaid reform to re-divvy the pot of money creates 25 winners and 25 losers.  
Whether Democrat or Republican, Federal Administrators expressed very, very similar 
frustrations with states, as well as lessons they had learned about state responses to 
federal offers for policy bargains in the Medicaid program.  The next chapter reviews a 
new Republican Administration, the George W. Bush Administration, and their Medicaid 
Transformation. 
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11. MEDICAID TRANSFORMED: 
MEDICAID FEDERALISM DURING  
THE GEORGE W. BUSH ERA 
 
 
 
MEDICAID FEDERALISM IN THE G.W. BUSH ERA 
 
 Moving towards pre-eminence of the Administrative State in Medicaid politics, 
the G.W. Bush Administration has re-defined waiver negotiations towards limiting 
federal financial exposure.  Unintended consequences include, for example, the creation 
of a universal coverage system by Massachusetts.  The legislative movement was slow 
until the Deficit Reduction Act of 200, which re-defined comparability and statewideness 
requirements in the Medicaid benefit package.  As this chapter will outline, states were at 
the table for the DRA negotiations but absent for the Medicare Modernization Act. That 
Act created a Medicare prescription drug benefi, thereby handing the states an edict 
regarding dual eligible Medicaid costs.  An Administration Medicaid program capping 
proposal was largely ignored by states, even though they faced extremely difficult 
financial times at the beginning of the decade. 
 
THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 2005 (THE DRA) 
 
The G.W. Bush era, still underway, has formed into a potentially momentous one 
for Medicaid federalism with the enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) in 
February 2006.  With time, the DRA may prove to be the most profound Medicaid 
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federalism statute since the Nixon Watershed Era, which itself is only trumped by the 
enactment of Medicaid in 1965 in terms of importance.  The possibility that it is the third 
most influential action in Medicaid history will be proven or not with time.  Expected to 
cut Medicaid by $4.8 billion over the next five years and $26.1 billion over the next ten 
years, beneficiary cost sharing was bolstered and states were given the option of 
replacing in some cases the existing federally mandated benefits package with a more 
limited, more state specific one.1  Original principles of the Medicaid program --around 
minimizing cost sharing for beneficiaries, around a minimum benefits package for 
mandated populations, and around uniformity of benefits across categories of 
beneficiaries were re-written.  For some, the changes did not go far enough.  Mississippi 
Governor Hailey Barbour remarked,  Medicaid is a vital program which serves the 
neediest in our society.  However, the increasing costs of health care have threatened the 
solvency for this program.  To maintain this program for those who rely upon it, federal 
law needs to be further changed to all states to sue the laws of insurance to design benefit 
packages that best meet patients needs at affordable costs.2 
Of particular interest in the DRA are benchmark plans that were built on the 
exact statutory language of the SCHIP program.  In describing more about benchmark 
plans, The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured writes, The DRA would 
allow states to replace the existing Medicaid benefits package for children and certain 
other groups with benchmark coverage.  Like SCHIP, this Benchmark coverage 
would include the standard Blue Cross Blue Shield Plan offered under the Federal 
Employee Health Benefits Plan, health coverage for state employees, or the health 
coverage offered by the largest commercial HMO in the state.  Benchmark coverage 
would also include any coverage proposed by the state that CMS determines provides 
appropriate coverage for the populations affected.3  A distinct move in the direction of 
changing Medicaid from a defined benefit to, at least in principle, is a defined 
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contribution model. At the very least, this model attempts to make Medicaid look more 
like private insurance.  This attempt at transforming Medicaid to look more like private 
insurance is a reiterated theme from the G.W. Bush Administration with regard to 
Medicaid policy; in 2003, a Medicaid program financing reform attempt according to the 
Administrator was, trying to make it like a private insurance contract.4 
As mentioned, the statutory language of the SCHIP enacting legislation 
describing benchmark plans was simply lifted into the DRA statutory language -- 
basically verbatim.  In fact, some Democrats claim that this was a hope of Republicans at 
the time SCHIP was designed and that it became reality in 2006 when the DRA was 
signed into law.5  A former Democratic Hill staffer connected the dots between the DRA 
and SCHIP:  Well I dont think theres any doubt that the proponents of the SCHIP 
approach were seeing it as one way to limit the federal financial exposure -- thats always 
the bottom linebecause if they had used a Medicaid open-ended financing model, it 
doesnt work for them.  Secondly, not having the defined benefit packagehaving the 
benchmark benefit package, which is now in the DRA.  I think it took them longer than 
they thought to get to DRA [Deficit Reduction Act of 2005].  But thats where the model 
came from.the benchmark for Medicaid.6   A former Republican Hill insider, 
however, involved in the SCHIP drafting process does not accept the conspiracy theory 
that the SCHIP modeling for the DRA was somehow strategic, statingI think they 
benchmarked off of CHIP because I dont think they knew what else [to use].  They 
never understood the CHIP benchmarks up there.7 
According to the Senate Finance staff who negotiated the DRA, Benchmark 
Benefit Plans were very much a state idea.  The states were strongly in support of that.  It 
allows them to essentially waive comparability and statewideness in Medicaid 
populations.  You have a Medicaid population that is healthy, generally speaking, and 
that is Healthy Moms and Kids.  Theyre cheap to insure.  As a matter of fact, if you put 
them in another state plan -- state employee plan -- that has a population that is not so 
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healthy, you are bringing everyones costs down.  Why cant states do that?  Because 
they are required to provide uniform benefits to everyone.  One of the nice things about a 
benchmark plan is that it allows them to provide a different benefit for different 
populations.  Comparability is waived, early on.  The states wanted to testify with us 
[Senate Finance] -- with Energy and Commerce.  They brought in Governor Warner.  
They brought in Governor Huckaby.  They did their papers and we reacted, We think we 
can work with these things to turn them into real policy.8 
In terms of drafting the legislation, the House version of the DRA,which was the 
version adopted in conference negotiations for the final legislation, was the plan to a 
large degree submitted by the National Governors Association.  The Medicaid provisions 
were designed in large part by an eleven governor task force dedicated to Medicaid 
reform over the past few years.  NGA lobbied for flexibility in the Medicaid benefit 
structure over several years. So the new benefit flexibility wasa realization of several 
Medicaid debates over time and not just 2005.   
In the case of the DRA, NGA was not only at the table, it played a dominant role 
in designing the legislation itself.  As the NGA reports, We put down a wish list of the 
things wed like to see and we did that mostly in sort of a policy vacuum.  In the sense of 
in a perfect world, what would we like to see?  And we put that down.  And then sort of 
transmitted that up to Congress and then they said, Do what you can and well work with 
you to get done what you can.  They came pretty close to everything we wanted on 
benefits and on cost sharing.  A lot of the way, part of the way on long-term care and 
drug costs.  But given that there are very, very powerful forces at work there in those 
realms, I think its not terribly surprising that we werent given carte blanche.9 
The DRA negotiations, according to the Senate Finance Republican staff, evolved 
as The Budget Committee came to us and said You Shall Cut and we went off and 
tried to find billions of dollars.  Now how many billions of dollars that at some point in 
time -- those varied, but generally we got in the range of ten billion is what we were 
trying to find in savings out of the Medicaid program.  The advocacy community was not 
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going to be happy.  The Democrats werent going to be happy.  We had no friends in this.  
The only friends that we had were when we did one or two things which were arguably 
state hits.10 
Democratic Budget leaders thought the entire Deficit Reduction Act did not 
reduce the deficit at all.  The DRA is a misnomer.  The term Deficit Reduction Act -- the 
term they use for it -- is really misapplied because the savings they claim through the 
spending cuts were more than offset by the tax cuts.  So, in truth the Reconciliation Bill, 
they separated the two really for display purposes to claim that the DRA was really 
reducing the deficit.  It was if they were saying Dont look at the tax cut.  Generally, 
when Congress has Reconciliation Bills, they reduced the deficit, they didnt increase the 
deficit.  But what they did this year, they separated the spending from the tax cut.  So 
they had the so-called DRA which didnt save anything but $40 billion dollars and then 
they had the tax-cuts, which were well in excess of $40 billion dollars and so together 
they actually added to the deficit, they didnt reduce the deficit.11   
 Plagued by procedural snags, House members filed suit to stop the DRAs 
Medicaid reforms.  As one advocacy group wrote, Congressman John Conyers, Jr., the 
ranking member on the House Judiciary Committee, and ten other ranking member of 
Congress have filed a lawsuit to stop the federal government from implementing the 
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA).  The legislation was signed by President Bush on 
February 9 but it has since been revealed that the President, apparently knowingly, signed 
a version of the bill that was passed by the U.S. Senate but not the U.S. House of 
Representatives.12  The Newsletter of the National Health Law Program reported that 
there were at least five lawsuits challenging the legislation as unconstitutional.13 
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THE CLAWBACK -- DUAL ELIGIBLES PRESCRIPTION DRUG COSTS 
TRANSFERRED TO MEDICARE 
 
 The G.W. Bush era also saw the transfer of financing of pharmaceutical costs for 
those eligible for both Medicaid and Medicare to the federal government from the states.  
The overall macro environment of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 was tinged 
by the historic floor vote.  Usually 15 minutes in length, as the precedent set in 1973, this 
vote was open for two hours and fifty-one minutes.  The New York Times reported the 
floor environment to involve an extraordinary bout of Republican arm twisting to muster 
a majority.14  A small step towards accomplishing a broader National Governors 
Association (NGA) goal of complete transfer of the financing for dual enrollees from 
Medicaid to Medicare, it was surprising that so many state representatives consider the 
Clawback -- as it is called -- pejoratively.15  State officials -- not at the bargaining table 
during the Medicare Prescription drug debate -- were stung by several aspects of the 
required transfer of funds from the states to the federal government.   
 The Clawback resulted in legal challenges by some states.  Kentucky Attorney 
General Greg Stumbo sued the federal government over its demand for $7.5 million per 
month in prescription drug Clawback payments from Kentucky, beginning January 
2006.  It was estimated that the Clawback will take $88 million in state funds from 
Kentuckys Medicaid program in 2006.  Attorney General Stumbo said, It is my job to 
protect taxpayers from unlawful demands on their money.  Stumbo continued, Never 
before has the Federal Government made such a bold, and I believe unconstitutional, 
attack on Kentuckys right to control the spending of its own tax money.16 
An example of a reverse block grant, with movement of funds from states to the 
Federal Government is unique in health federalism.  Perspectives on the Clawback 
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provision were as starkly contrasting as they come with one state representative saying, I 
think that was probably the worse legislative defeat states have ever had.  Absolutely.  
Without a doubt.17  And in contrast on the other side, a federal official integral to 
negotiating the Medicare Prescription drug plan explained why states did not need to be 
at the bargaining table, If I was going to show up and say, Id like to give you a couple 
hundred million bucks, do you think youd need to be at the table.  States were at the 
table.  States got a huge windfall!  Every single one of them was a huge winner.  Its not 
that they lose anything.18   
The official went on to say, I mean if you look at it state by state -- it was the 
biggest windfall, probably, in the history of state government.  Every state -- despite their 
whining -- was a huge winner. The biggest, fastest growing expense was seniors drugs in 
the Medicaid program.  We totally bought it out and so they had to pay back 90% of their 
static baseline in year one going down to 75% in year -- whatever it was, four or five. Its 
a joke. It wasa huge windfall to every state.19  The States view was antithetical.  A 
NGA official held that the federal government structured the Clawback in a way so that 
states would help fund a federal Medicare reform that they would not be able to get 
through Congress without another contributing financier.  In this case, the states via 
Medicaid.  As the head of the NGA explains, Infinitely we are supposed to pay 
75%that was the last deal cut.  They needed more money for the rest of the program 
and it was out of our hide.  The fact is that they all lied by factors of 50 to 100 % of what 
the total cost of the program was going to be.20   
As this shows, states expressed concern that there is not currently a schedule to 
bring their contribution percentage down to zero.  As one state organization leading 
official exclaimed, Where we are a line item in the funding of a federal program.  Its 
never occurred before!21  Another state lobbying representative was blunt about states 
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take on the Clawback, as well, We got screwed on thatIts a very interesting story.  
There were some states that tried to go to the Supreme Court.22 
There remained concerns on the part of states if their purchasing power for drug 
products in the long-run would be compromised by giving up a high-utilization group to 
Medicare, thus decreasing the rest of the state Medicaid programs drug purchasing 
power with pharmacy benefit managers.  States said only time would tell how removing 
dual eligibles from their overall Medicaid pharma purchasing pools would affect their 
purchasing power and the deals they could negotiate in the future.   
On the other side, Federal Administration officials who designed the Medicare 
Prescription Drug benefit thought the attainment of duals prescription drug benefit 
responsibility by Medicare may in fact be the reason for its success.  One reason why -- 
if you remember the debate during the Medicare Prescription Drug benefit --when it went 
through there was the thought that nobody was going to show up.  Well, too many 
contractors showed up and there are complaints about that now   Its Oh my God, theres 
40 per regionBut if you remember at the time, we had to do this fallback because we 
had people convinced that in places like North Dakota and South Dakota, nobody would 
show up.  Well, in North Dakota, there are 42 plans.  So people showed up in droves.  
One of the things that I did not anticipate was what caused people [pharmaceutical 
benefit managers] to show up in droves was the dual eligibles.  The Medicaid dual 
eligible population -- which is probably six million people-- has turned out to be the 
fundamental contracting base of the program because that is a big, guaranteed block of 
people.  So, the fact that we put the Medicaid population in the Medicare drug benefit, 
which we didnt foresee at allwas actually one of the things that made it work so well.  
If you notice, the cost of the Medicare drug benefit has turned out to be about 30% lower 
than projected.  And year after yearthe last year, the beneficiary premium and the total 
cost of the program last year was already 30% lower than anticipated and the premiums 
from 2006 to 2007 were going to drop by 10%.23   
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Prior to the measure, states received the best price for pharmaceutical products 
after the Veterans Affairs system.  1990 legislation advantaged these two buyers in 
pharmaceutical pricing.  After the Medicare prescription drug plan was enacted in 2003, 
Medicaid, at best, received the third best price, according to interviewees.24 
One of the most interesting stories in Medicaid federalism, the contribution by 
states to the Medicare prescription drug program is a historic twist.  States were not at the 
table during the Medicare prescription drug debate given that Medicare is a federal 
program.  While the NGA advocated for more than a decade to have dual eligibles 
transferred to the Medicare program, the NGA says the Clawback experience makes 
some states think twice about asking for this reform.  And people say, dont ask for it 
because of what you get.25  Never considered seriously enough for the NGA to draw 
together a detailed plan, the call for Medicare to take back responsibility for duals stems 
from several federal mandates where states were required to pay Medicare Part B 
premiums for some individuals eligible for both Medicaid and Medicare.  As one state 
representative explained, Every time the Medicare Part B premium goes up, every $10 
the premium goes up, thats a billion dollars that states are spending.  Its a billion 
dollars!  That is completely invisible to anyone in the outside world.26  In the aftermath 
of the Clawback, states are concerned that any volunteering on the federal governments 
part to take financial responsibility of dual eligibles may only be if states can help fund a 
federal initiative. 
 
NONSTARTER: MEDICAID CAPPED FUNDING PROPOSAL AMID STATE 
FISCAL STRESS 
 
At a January 31, 2003 press conference, HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson 
announced that as part of his fiscal year 2004 budget, President Bush was proposing 
sweeping financing and programmatic changes for Medicaid and the State Childrens 
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Health Insurance Program.27  As one analysis assessed, In exchange for giving up 
open-ended federal financing, the block grant option would offer states, in the words of 
Secretary Thompson, carte blanch flexibility to change eligibility, benefits, cost 
sharing and other key features of the program for so-called optional groups.28  The 
capped funding attempt was largely considered a non-starter.   
Secretary Thompson and CMS Administrator Tom Scully advocated an option for 
states to choose a per capita cap for certain parts of the program.  The early years of the 
Bush Administration were very difficult economic times for the states and the initiative 
was offered as a way to dodge the immediate state fiscal crisis.  As a high-ranking 
Administrator said, We wanted to move the program more towards a private insurance 
model.29  States, leery of being in a much worse financial position in the long run with 
this Medicaid option, stayed away.   
As one operative explained,  
 
At that time the baseline was projected to be going very fast and we said, Well give you 
your current spending and well build it on that, which would have been a windfall for 
them.  And said, Were doing this to try to get rid of the gaming, to get rid of the 
incentive for all this churning through all these gimmicksand wed like to get back to a 
rational financing system where we understand what we are paying for.if we give you 
$10,000 dollars a patient, well give you 7, you spend 3 and its easier to audit and match 
and were willing to basically pay out of our inflated baseline in order to get to do that 
and they all thought, No, no -- well fight it.  And we all come back and year later and 
Thompson and I probably had 17 or 18 bi-partisan governors in Thompsons conference 
room for 2 days going over this and were trying to get the NGA to support doing 
this.as a way to transition back to a rational policy and the Democrats on the Hill went 
crazy.  I forget .we pretty much had a done deal.the main guy was Vilsack from 
Iowa who thought it was a good idea and was ready to go with it and a couple of the other 
Governors are ready to go with it.  And Congressman Dingell and some others on the Hill 
called up and said that this was anti-Democrat and this was terrible and youre selling out 
the Medicaid program.  I dont think they knew what they were doing.  And what 
happened was, which you knew was going to happen, was that the next year because of 
how the Federal budget works the baseline comes down and the states had had a one time 
shot in 2001 and 2002 to basically lock themselves in at a higher growth rate with fair 
                                                
27 Cindy Mann, The Bush Administrations Medicaid and State Childrens Health Insurance Program 
Proposal, Institute for Health Care Research and Policy, Georgetown University, February 10, 2003. 
28 Cindy Mann, The Bush Administrations Medicaid and State Childrens Health Insurance Program 
Proposal, Institute for Health Care Research and Policy, Georgetown University, February 10, 2003, 4. 
29 Interview with Author, August 30, 2006. 
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rules that would have been easier to manage the program and they came back the next 
year and said, Wed like to get that deal you offered us last year, and we said, Sorry, 
its gone.  The baseline was built on a higher number and this year its projected down 
and we told them it was going to happen and they said wed love to build on those 8 or 
9% inflation rates you were talking about last year.  And we said, Sorry, now the 
inflation rate is 3%.  See you later.30   
 
According to G.W. Bush Administration officials, the proposal was not capped 
funding and not a block grant, Well we tried that [capped funding for Medicaid] in Bush 
I and its not a cap and its not a block grant.  The Democrats all screamed that it was a 
block grant.  It really wasnt.31  The dance away from the term block grant to describe 
any Medicaid proposal that suggested any form of limits on the open matching grant in 
the overall Medicaid program was not only a Republican phenomenon, the Democrats 
also ran away from the claim when their per capita cap proposal was in existence from 
1995 through 1997.  Officials described the 2003 plan,   
 
Lets figure out what youre spending per capita on the three big groups of 
people: women and kids; the disabled; and nursing homesthose are the three 
big pots of money.Lets figure out the capsthe caps by state, what you are 
spending per capita and come up with a federal match rate per capita and well 
pay you per capita because right now we dont just pay on the volume of 
services.well give you its not a block grantif the number of people goes 
up, you are in a recession, the number of Medicaid people goes up youll get 
more.if the number of Medicaid people goes down, youll get less.32   
 
 The reasoning behind the FY 2004 Medicaid reform proposal was to  get back to 
a rational financing system where we understand what we are paying for.  State 
financing maximization of mechanisms of all types -- school based financing, DSH, 
provider taxes and donations, intergovernmental transfers, and the most recent 
phenomenon of upper payment limit (UPL) maximization strategies -- create a system 
where no one knows what the real federal matching rate is anymore.  According to 
G.W. Bush officials, it is much higher than the matching rate tables claim.  The federal 
government is not a voluntary actor and has absolutely no idea whats going onthe 
                                                
30 Interview with Author, August 30, 2006. 
31 Interview with Author, August 30, 2006. 
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money is going out the door in truckloads and theres no auditing; theres no 
understanding of how it goes on; its basically a pilfering of the federal treasury without 
anybody knowing it.  I dont blame the states for trying it; its just outrageous that they 
get away with it.33   
The proposal was scheduled to apply to optional groups of Medicaid 
beneficiaries, but it remained unclear to many onlookers if the G.W. Bush Administration 
was dedicated to protecting federal rights of action for mandatory Medicaid beneficiaries.  
Further, as one expert testified before the House Budget Committee, it is unclear 
whether these exemptions would apply to all the services these groups currently receive.  
New types of restriction may apply to optional services.34  Republicans calling for state 
flexibility and rationalization of Medicaids funding formula were willing to place the 
individual entitlement on the brink; whereas Democrats largely stood in defense of 
private rights of action.  Again, entitlement status for Medicaid was at issue.  As for the 
states, the proposal was plain and simple -- in their view -- not good for them.  Even two 
former Governors, President G.W. Bush and Secretary of Health Tommy Thompson, 
now seeing health financing from a wholly different world-view could convince the 
nations Governors to come on board for this Medicaid re-working.  The Fiscal Year 
2004 Presidential Budget Proposal for a cap on portions of the Medicaid program was 
largely a non-starter.   
 
THE RISE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN MEDICAID FEDERALISM 
POLICY BARGAINING 
 
Finally, in possibly the strongest trend of the era, waiver politics pushed power 
towards the Administrative State.  CMS legislated through agency decision making and 
state negotiations on waivers.  Also acting via Executive Orders on Medicaid, Medicaid 
politics in the G.W. Bush era tilted away from legislative politics until the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005.  Agency and Executive decision making power trumped 
                                                
33 Interview with Author, August 30, 2006. 
34 Judith Feder, Impact of the Presidents 2004 Budget on Medicare and Medicaid, Testimony before the 
House Budget Committee, U.S. Congress, February 26, 2003. 
  319
legislative action for the first term and into the second term.  This played out in the macro 
trends as well, as Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute and Thomas 
Mann of The Brookings Institution penned Our Pathetic Congress in the Los Angeles 
Times and The Broken Branch: How Congress Is Failing America and How To Get It 
Back On Track.  They wrote, After 37 years in Washington -- 18 elections -- we are 
pretty well inured to these shenanigans.  But even those of us with strong stomachs are 
getting indigestion from the farcical end of the 109th Congress.35 
Waivers increasingly took on stealth properties, as so much of the negotiations 
happened outside of a public record.  As one Congressman suggested, waivers were now 
seen as a way to pass on responsibility to the states and be done with it instead of a 
federal-state partnership.36  As opposed to waivers being used as a means for state 
directed comprehensive coverage, waivers became a way for the federal government to 
minimize their financial exposure and shift risk to the states.  This capping occurs via 
negotiations with states and takes on either a per capita cap or aggregate cap structure.  
Recently, in 2006, Vermont accepted as part of an 1115 negotiation two aggregate caps 
for their Medicaid program -- one for acute care and another for long-term care.  A 
Medicaid expert shared this, One theory of 1115 waivers is towards block grants.  For 
many federal and state policymakers there was one objective.  They are not going to get 
up and say it often, but clearly capping the federal financial exposure, whether an 
aggregate cap basis or a per capita cap basis.  And in Vermonts case I am virtually 
certain that they are both aggregate caps.  And its clear in the terms and conditions37 that 
Vermont is assuming risk for not just per capita growth.  So thats pretty different.  Now 
obviously there are a lot of 1115 waiverswhere there are per capita caps and the feds 
still continue to share in the risk of enrollment growth.38 
 
                                                
35 Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein, Our Pathetic Congress: Little Has Been Done in the Final Days of 
Congress, Los Angeles Times, September 27, 2006.   
36 Conversation with Author, August 2006. 
37 The Terms and Conditions of Medicaid waivers are available on the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) website, www.cms.hhs.gov. 
38 Interview with Author, August 23, 2006. 
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The Administrative State Loses Control of a Reform That They Instigated:  
Passing the Buck Politics Results in Unintended Consequences in Massachusetts 
 
One oft-repeated theme in Medicaid federalism is Passing the Buck Politics.  
This bargaining behavior works in both directions, with the federal government in some 
cases trying to pass responsibilities to states , often through unfunded mandates, and the 
states trying to maneuver for the federal government to take greater responsibility, as in 
the NGAs repeated calls for the federal government to take financial responsibility for 
dual eligibles. 
While waiver negotiations between states and CMS are largely off the public 
record, the recent Massachusetts waiver negotiations reportedly pitted CMS against the 
State over the ability for the state to continue to use certain funds historically obtained 
through creative state financing mechanisms within its statewide waiver budget neutrality 
limit.  CMS was taking a hard-line stance on the use of these funds as a way to limit 
federal financial exposure. 
As one onlooker remembers, As Im sure you know the whole Massachusetts 
miracle this time around is essentially done with a gun to their head for the 
dismantlement of Medicaid because of the IGTs (Intergovernmental Transfers).  They 
were going to close BMC (Boston Medical Center) and Cambridge basically.  Same in 
Tennessee.  Same in Florida.  Same in Missouri.  All these states caught in an IGT 
squeeze, having to agree to slap a limit on the amount of federal funds they would get; 
give up essentially what they believed they were entitled for in the way of IGTs and agree 
to set up an insurance plan -- right, for a demonstration group -- even though there are no 
benefits in it; even though Massachusetts doesnt know how the hell its going to come 
up with an affordable package to cover everything for what it has to spend.39 
 While CMS had planned to reduce the amount of federal outlays to the states 
using these tactics, it did not work in certain cases.  The newfound power of the 
Administrative State intended to transfer responsibility for Medicaid to the states through 
these types of limitations in waiver bargaining.  Outside of legislative or regulatory 
                                                
39 Interview with Author, October 31, 2006. 
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review, the waiver process would be an ideal bargaining arena to accomplish buck 
passing.  In this case, the budget neutrality cap, already a cap on statewide Medicaid 
waivers, would have the noose tightened by further reducing the cap level.  The amount 
allowed under the budget neutrality cap would shrink through these negotiating tactics of 
the federal government no longer allowing funds states had gained over the years through 
state financing schemes.   
 In response to the G.W. Bush CMS stance, the states of Massachusetts devised a 
universal coverage system to get around the CMS provisions for an agreement on the 
statewide waiver.  One Massachusetts official said Theres nothing we could do but 
some form of universal coverage because of the way the uncompensated care pool and 
DSH payments worked in Massachusetts.  If we had lost that money it was like a billion 
dollars.  So, the fact is that they pushed us into doing something in Massachusetts that is 
going to be heralded as Universal Coverage which we probably wouldnt have ended up 
doing.40    
As Figure 4 depicts, given there was no overlapping bargaining zone, the state of 
Massachusetts removed the debate to a different venue altogether, creating a universal 
health coverage system in order to remove itself from this particular bargaining 
paradigm, where there was no overlapping bargaining situation. 
 
                                                
40 Interview with Author, November 1, 2006. 
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Figure 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The hard bargaining tactics and strong use of The Administrative State on the part 
of the Bush Administration had unintended consequences -- pushing the states towards 
universal coverage.  As one state official said, I think ironically, the Bush 
Administration may actually end up causing a health reform revolution because of the 
kinds of changes that they are seeking administratively and through the waivers and an 
example of that, in effect, is Massachusetts.41  Enacting a universal coverage system, the 
state was pushed into it -- unintentionally during Medicaid waiver negotiations with 
CMS.  A state official described the situation, The threat was that they were not going to 
allow a series of waivers that we had in Massachusetts that allowed us to collect these 
payments -- the tax.  And then pay particular hospitals in particular ways.  And we had 
special arrangements for Boston Medical Center and the Cambridge Health Alliance.  
And they were going to declare that those were not acceptable.  Theres no way that we 
could have survived in Massachusetts without that money.42   
                                                
41 Interview with Author, November 1, 2006. 
42 Interview with Author, November 1, 2006. 
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And in describing the unintended consequences of the CMS bargaining tactics, 
So, the response was to create a health insurance system that basically requires everyone 
to sign up for health insurance [an individual mandate] and the state to subsidize to use 
that same money to subsidize the purchase of insurance that will be through some of 
these entities.  So, its an interesting --- its an interesting kind of catalyst -- that really 
came from the federal level.  Otherwise, I dont think the negotiations between the 
Governor and the legislature would have actually happened.  Because it is very 
controversial.  There are lots of cases of it that are very tough and controversial.43  
According to the source, Theres nothing we could do but some form of universal 
coverage because of the way the uncompensated care pool and DSH payments worked in 
Massachusetts.  If we had lost that money it was like a billion dollars.  So, the fact is that 
they pushed us into doing something in Massachusetts that is going to be heralded as 
Universal Coverage which we probably wouldnt have ended up doing.44   
 
                                                
43 Interview with Author, November 1, 2006. 
44 Interview with Author, November 1, 2006. 
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Table 4: Passing the Buck Politics Negotiating Outcomes of the Massachusetts 1115 
Statewide Waiver Negotiations 
 CMS State of Massachusetts Result 
Issues 
Wants IGT program 
stopped in order to attain 
cost control and cost 
rationalization 
Needs IGT programs to 
keep Boston Medicaid 
Center, Cambridge, other 
hospitals open 
State of Mass. scraps 
negotiations, creates a universal 
health model for the entire state 
Priorities 
Cap Medicaid 
Administratively waiver 
by waiver, piecemeal 
instead of through 
aggregate cap via 
Congressional action 
Wants to maintain its 
intergovernmental 
transferred 
dollars within the budget 
neutrality limits to keep 
hospital financing afloat 
State of Mass steps outside of the 
negotiation process to find an 
altogether different universal 
health coverage solution 
Bargaining 
Zones 
 Bargaining zone does not 
include the use of 
intergovernmental transfers 
to fund the Massachusetts 
Medicaid program 
Some variation of use of IGTs in 
creative ways that goes beyond 
the standard use within the current 
Medicaid Mass. program structure 
Critical 
Points - 
High 
CMS prefers that IGTs be 
abolished in favor of a 
strict budget neutrality 
cap that does not include 
these funding 
mechanisms. 
Mass. required the IGT 
funds to keep hospitals 
afloat so their critical point 
was quite high. 
The Bargaining structure was 
turned from a zero sum game to 
an integrative one by a switch in 
what type of initiative was 
bargained -- Medicaid only vs. 
state comprehensive health 
coverage 
Critical 
Points - 
Low 
Unknown at what point 
CMS would be willing to 
maintain some form of 
IGT structure. 
The low critical point for 
Mass. is a bare bones 
solution to keep hospital 
funding afloat. 
IGTs were used but not in the way 
that either party originally 
intended 
Positions 
CMS does not want IGT 
to be used. 
Mass. requires IGTs be 
used to keep health care 
providers afloat 
The Two-Dimensional Position 
framework was subverted for a 
wholly new model of how to use 
IGT funding in an integrative 
bargaining scheme. 
Interests 
Must institute caps on the 
Medicaid program waiver 
by waiver since the 
overall aggregate capped 
funding option is not a 
viable possibility 
Must pay hospitals reliant 
on IGT funds 
Mass. interests were better served 
in this case, but were pushed into 
a scenario they would not have 
considered without the G.W. 
Admin. pressure.  Unintended 
consequences from the hard-line 
tactics of the G.W. Bush Admin. 
BATNAs 
(Best 
Alternative 
to a 
Negotiated 
Solution) 
CMS has more power in 
the BATNA area.  It is in 
their interest to get Mass. 
Medicaid waiver in plan 
but on CMS terms. 
Very weak BATNA, Mass. 
needs the IGT funds for 
their health institutions to 
stay afloat financially 
By turning a zero-sum negotiation 
into an integrative one, the state 
of Mass. creative a wholly new 
solution that benefited them. 
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PRESIDENTS, POLITICS, AND MEDICAID BARGAINING 
 
Previous compacts with previous Administrations and CMS Administrators had 
allowed, even encouraged, the creative state financing programs.  According to one CMS 
chief, Well, in some states the waiver negotiations was to give them these schemes.  
Well, to give you an example when I was in the Government I spent a lot of time trying 
to straighten out Californias mess.  But the problem with 1996 when Clinton was 
running for re-election, Nancy Ann-Deparle and Bruce Vladeck had both tried to slow 
down the California scams and make them less damaging.  He continued, President 
Clinton went out there in 96 and came back and promised the loosening up, Yea, well 
take care of it.  Dont worry about it. Well bail out the public hospitals in L.A. and well 
give you more money.  He came back and directed them to give them more money -- so 
it got worse instead of better.45   
To be fair, Presidential political trading with Governors and Congress using 
Medicaid waivers on these issues was not limited to President Clinton.  According to one 
source, The last thing President [G.H.W.] Bush did on the way out was to give Michigan 
a $500 million dollar approval the day after I left over my objectionAccording to Andy 
Carr, the only subject in the one hour meeting between Clinton and [G.H.W.] Bush 
during the Administration switch-over was Medicaid Disproportionate Share.  
Specifically, though not present, Carr said that Clinton asked Bush about the Medicaid 
scams. Whats going on and what are you going to do?   Carr went on to say that on 
the last day out President Bush gave $500 million bucks to Michigan and I had been 
sitting on about $350 for New Jersey for two years.  It was totally bogus.  And the first 
day he came in, Clinton gave New Jersey their $350 million bucks.  It was all about 
money and politics.  They didnt understand.  If they really understood what was going 
on, they would have been outraged -- both of them.  But it was all about the Governors 
and the Congress.46  In another account by a Democrat, In the Upper Payment Limit 
                                                
45 Interview with Author, August 30, 2006. 
46 Interview with Author, August 30, 2006. 
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(UPL) Regulation in 2000, Bush re-opened the issue, let three Republican Governors get 
into the schemes -- Florida, Virginia, and Wisconsin -- and then kept to phase out.47 
Generally, interviewees emphasized the degree to which Presidents stayed out of 
Medicaid politics, but it is striking when and how they are directly involved.  It generally 
involves deal making and the Presidential budget numbers chosen for Medicaid annually. 
 
HIFA WAIVERS: REPACKAGING 
 
A new waiver authority, The Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability 
(HIFA) initiative, was underway in August 2001, with the intent of increasing the 
numbers of individuals with health insurance coverage within current-level Medicaid and 
SCHIP resources.48  By several accounts both within and outside the Administration, 
HIFA waivers were a re-working of what was already going on with the 1115 waiver 
authority.  One state representative labeled HIFA waivers repackaging.  A federal 
official in charge of its creation agreed the G.W. Bush Administration was already doing 
the same thing via the 1115 process and formalized it via HIFA waivers.49 
 
HURRICANE KATRINA AND MEDICAID WAIVERS 
 
Waivers also were the instrument of choice when Hurricane Katrina required a 
Medicaid response across state boundaries.  Instead of legislation, the Medicaid waiver 
process was utilized for financing of health needs of the evacuees.  Medicaid, and its 
waiver process, was now also an instrument of the post 9-11 Homeland Security State.   
While in an interview, Hailey Barbour, Governor of Mississippi and a former 
Republican National Committee Chairman, said Mississippi had received the support it 
needed from the G.W. Bush Administration during the Katrina disaster.50  Governor 
Barbour claimed he was very pleased with the federal governments response to the 
health care needs of Mississippians following Hurricane Katrina.  The Congress and 
                                                
47 Interview with Author, August 3, 2006. 
48 Alan, Weil, Theres Something About Medicaid, Health Affairs 22, no. 1 (Jan./Feb. 2003), 13 - 30. 
49 Interviews with Author, October 24 and August 30, 2006. 
50 Interview with Author, December 15, 2006. 
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President Bush provided more than $500 million to pay for uncompensated care in the 
disaster area and to help with the increased burden on our states finances through our 
Medicaid program.  In addition, the federal government provided $128 million of Social 
Services Block Grant funds to help restore the health care and human services 
infrastructure in the affected areas.  The use of Medicaid waivers across state lines 
provided a easy administrative process to quickly provide health care for eligible 
displaced individuals.51 
Some Democrats, however, questioned whether the use of the waiver to address 
Medicaid financing for Katrina was politically motivated.52  For example, Rep. Bennie G. 
Thompson of Mississippi, the Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, 
noted that a bipartisan effort had been made to extend Medicaid coverage to those 
affected by Katrina. The Administration took the easy way out. As a result, a lot of good 
people who were dislocated and disenfranchised in the Gulf Coast region suffered. These 
folks found themselves moved to other states where they werent able to get the Medicaid 
benefits they absolutely needed. They deserved better.53 
Some held that the Bush Administration did not want to set a precedent of the 
Federal Government financing health services during times of crisis because it may be 
used as a possible wedge in support of the federal government funding national health 
reform, or an expanded Medicaid program, in the future.54  By this argument, if the 
federal government must respond with federally financed health care in a broad 
catastrophe, it must have the same responsibility in the everyday catastrophes that happen 
in individual lives across the country -- Specifically, it must deal with the everyday 
catastrophe brought on by people who cannot finance their own health care when they 
desperately need it.  Others were less damning, pointing more to facts than assessing 
motive in identifying that the Bush Administrations preferred Administrative handling of 
Hurricane Katrinas health financing of evacuees across state boundaries via Medicaid 
waivers to Congressional action.   
                                                
51 Interview with Author, August 15, 2006. 
52 Interview with Author, August 10, 2006. 
53 Interview with Author, October 12, 2006.  
54 Interview with Author, August 10, 2006. 
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Congressional Action was proposed in such bill as the Emergency Health Care 
Relief Act of 2005 (S.1716), introduced by Senate Finance Chairman Chuck Grassley of 
Iowa and Max Baucus (D - Mont.) on September 14, 2005.  The Bush Administration, 
however, strongly preferred Executive branch decision making and state directed action 
to federal pre-emption of Medicaid financing issues after Katrina.  The legislation 
provided for temporary federally funded Medicaid coverage to low-income individuals 
affected by the hurricane.  It also planned to provide $800 million for uncompensated 
care provided to the uninsured hurricane victims.  The hurricane created a Diaspora of 
more than a million evacuees to every state in the nation.55 
As one state lobbying organization said, What was Governor Huckabys reaction 
when this waive of Katrina and Rita evacuees came into Arkansas? Get them on 
Medicaid -- it doesnt matter; well figure it all out later It was the figuring it out that 
made you realize just how complicated it was.  You know, it was fascinating for me 
because one day we were in the weeds on DRA specifics and the next day it went to just 
silence and then we went straight from that to figuring out what the heck to do on 
Medicaid and Katrina victims.56   
In the end, waivers were preferred because neither the federal government nor 
states wanted to extend the Medicaid entitlement to a broad base of people -- Katrina 
evacuees -- as opposed to Medicaid enrollees.  So, the federal government established a 
system of Medicaid waivers plus an uncompensated care pool.  Medicaid enrollees were 
covered via Medicaid waivers and the uncompensated care pool covered everyone else.  
As a NGA representative said, You know one thing that is interesting that you bring up 
and its one of the biggest complications is that -- for something like that is -- what 
happens once a person enrolls in Medicaid and all the rights and responsibilities that are 
related to that.  Especially when you are not able to control somebody coming in.  In 
some places thousands of them -- you know they may not have their documents.  They 
may not have  but once theyre in; the state has all sorts of responsibilities -- and that is 
what we were bumping up against -- and it may be because of situations in New York, 
                                                
55 Jeanne M. Lambrew and Donna E. Shalala, JAMA 296, no. 11 (September 20, 2006).  
56 Interview with Author, August 16, 2006. 
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Im not sure57but there was a real hesitancy from some Governors and CMS to opening 
up Medicaid to all of these people for that period of time.58 
Many overnors did not want severely enhanced Medicaid roles.  They did not 
want Medicaid becoming a universal coverage program, and neither did the G.W. Bush 
Administration for that matter.  As one NGA representative continued, You had a 
number of Governors after Katrina say, We dont want all of these people on Medicaid.  
Yes, its the quickest way to get people health care but the headaches of having to deal 
with that are too great.  We saw back in 2002 when states were in the budget pit with the 
fiscal relief money and we would argue thats an effective way of getting money to flow 
quickly, but that starts this huge political debate about the role of Medicaid.  I think thats 
a much more vitriolic debate at the federal level than the state level.59   
As for the President, the NGA representative stated that he did not want to set a 
precedent for putting everyone, regardless of categorical eligibility into Medicaid  -- there 
is no precedent for thatit was held to that this did not happen in Medicaidthe 
President was able to hold to that precedent.60 
                                                
57 After the 9-11 terrorist attacks, Medicaid waivers were used to address immediate health needs of 
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58 Interview with Author, August 16, 2006. 
59 Interview with Author, August 16, 2006. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) may be a watershed event in Medicaid politics 
over the long-term.  The state flexibility and benefits changes were spearheaded by the 
NGA -- as they had a prominent spot at the bargaining table.  The Medicare 
Modernization Act on the other hand left states out of the mix, with the federal 
government handing states a new deal on the dual eligible prescription drug benefit.  
States remain unhappy with an arrangement where they continue to contribute to drug 
costs for dual eligibles but do not benefit from the high utilization population enhancing 
their bargaining position for their other pharmaceutical costs.   
While the Bush Administration attempted a capped funding initiative in 2003, it 
was largely a non-starter with no states electing the uptake option.  Of the general trends 
of the era, the transcendence of the Administrative state in waiver bargaining is of note.  
Medicaid politics in the Bush era up until the DRA, which was signed in February 2006, 
was largely negotiated in vertical autocracies -- from federal agency to state agency or 
from federal agency to Governor.  Waiver politics now involves transfer of federal 
financial exposure to the states via explicit or implicit caps, both of aggregate and per 
capita cap varieties.  Possibly, the idea on caps is stated best though comments made by 
Mississippi Governor Hailey Barbour, For all Governors, Democrat and Republican, 
there is already a cap on Medicaid expenditures; that cap is each states budget.61  
Moving into the future, as Medicaid is asked to do more -- as it has with each subsequent 
decade -- state tax and fiscal capacity will still be a reality in Medicaids Political 
Economy. 
                                                
61 Interview with Author, December 15, 2006. 
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12. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Medicaid Evolution: The Political Economy of Medicaid Federalism is 
anchored in Institutional Economics and on a compilation of political science theories 
organized in a conceptual framework for this Dissertation called The Macro Public Policy 
Framework (MPP).  The conceptual framework weds Institutional Economics and a 
compilation of political science theories (the MPP).  This work traces the economic 
history of the demand side of poverty -- of a program designed in 1965 to largely 
ameliorate the demand side of poverty in health care.   
In 1965, Medicaid was designed as the basis for national health insurance.  No 
one knows if the original institutional structure was maintained, even through very 
difficult initial years of cost inflation beyond original expectations, if the program today 
would cover more people at the same -- or even lower cost.  The program is currently 
broaching $350 billion joint federal and state dollars annually and is plagued by a lack of 
rationality in the financing structure due to a history of differential state bargaining over 
decades with the federal government.  Even at this cost, 45 million Americans are 
uninsured.  And that number keeps climbing. 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THIS WORK 
 
The Dissertation is organized in four parts, consisting of an Introduction and 
twelve chapters.  In the Introduction, the Primary Research Questions are presented.  Part 
I, in two Chapters, reviews the Policy and Federalism Theory that serves as the 
  332
conceptual framework for this work.  Part II, Medicaid In Retrospective concentrates 
on four eras, one chapter per era, in Medicaid policy history from 1934 - 1992 including: 
 
1. The First Big Bang: FDRs Pre-Enactment Years;  
2. The Second Big Bang: LBJs Rights Era;  
3. The Watershed Era: Nixons Near Big Bang and New Federalism; and 
4. The Budget Era: Reagan and Medicaid Expansions. 
 
Part III focuses on The Modern Era, defined for this work as 1992 - 2007, and 
consists of five chapters broken out by The Waiver Presidency: The Clinton Era in four 
chapters, and The Rise of the Administrative State: The G.W. Bush Era in one chapter. 
Part IV, this chapter, provides Summary and Conclusions.  Figure 5: The Medicaid 
Evolution Timeline depicts Medicaids six eras along with moments of particular 
importance in the Political Economy of Medicaid Federalism 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 The methodological grounding for the Dissertation is constructed by several 
building blocks including extensive review of archival and research collections at the 
LBJ Presidential Library, The Center for Legislative Archives at the National Archives 
in Washington, D.C., The Law Library at the Library of Congress, The National 
Library of Medicine, and multiple research centers at the Library of Congress.  Several 
periodicals and newspapers were reviewed in a systematic way including The 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac from 1960 - 2004 and several major national and 
regional news sources.  The most prolific decision makers in Medicaid politics in the 
modern era were interviewed for the project from the federal and state ranks, legislative 
and executive branches, and the leading legal minds in the field.  Several search engines, 
such as EconoLit, JSTOR, and PubMed, were reviewed.  Hundreds of secondary sources 
inform this research.  A more detailed Methodology description is in the Introduction. 
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PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 
 
 There were 35 major findings from this work.  In this Summary and 
Conclusion, three are the focus: 
 
1. The Use of State Flexibility as a Bargaining Chip; 
2. State Financing Mechanisms Through Reiterative Negotiations Over Time has 
Resulted in a Complete Lack of Rationality in Medicaid Financing; and 
3. The Policy Bargaining That Has Resulted in Loss of the Original Principles of the 
Medicaid Program. 
 
The Use of State Flexibility as a Bargaining Chip 
 
State Flexibility is the G.W. Bush Administrations strongest bargaining chip.  In 
exchange they demand greater cost and overall control over states explaining how they 
fund their Medicaid programs, their certified public expenditures (CPEs), and 
interference with state taxing authority.  They are demanding to get an accounting of the 
Revenue side, not just the Expenditure side of Medicaid.  The relevance of this goes 
beyond Medicaid.  It broaches a line in the sand that states have drawn in American 
Federalism, How we fund programs is our business, not that of the Federal 
Government.  In Medicaid, the current Administration is using state flexibility to draw 
states away from this deeply held principle of state rights, and potentially infringing on 
states 10th Amendment rights. 
The change in the use of the State Plan Amendment (SPA) after the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005 only furthers this.  State Flexibility is being used to incentivize 
states into accepting terms during state-by-state waiver negotiations for their Medicaid 
programs that address the Administrations more deeply held values, such as moving 
Medicaid financing towards a Defined Contribution approach, the Purchase of 
Privatization Products, and State-by-State capping of the Medicaid program. 
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So, how did the evolution of Medicaid federalism contribute to this?  Since the 
flexibility argument was basically won by the states after the 1993-1994 national health 
discussion, it was easier for the G.W. Bush Administration to piggy-back on the precepts 
accepted by both Democrats and Republicans and engrained in Clintons Waiver 
Presidency.  The first major 1115 waivers, Oregon in 1993 and Tennessee in 1994 firmly 
established President Clintons Administration as supporting the states as laboratories 
concept.1  President Clintons years as Governor of Arkansas affected his approach to 
policy related to the American welfare state and garnered him the title The Waiver 
President.  During the 1995 - 1997 Medicaid block grant debates, the States won the 
Flexibility Argument -- and to some degree the Personal Responsibility argument.  The 
G.W. Bush Administration has cashed in on this by using state flexibility as a bargaining 
instrument in exchange for Medicaid reforms that further their more strongly held values.  
Medicaid federalism is used instrumentally, using state flexibility as a bargaining chip, in 
order to, first, move Medicaid financing towards a Defined Contribution approach; 
second, encourage the use of Medicaid funds to purchase private insurance products; and, 
third, to institute State-by-State capping of the Medicaid program. 
 
State Financing Mechanisms Through Reiterative Negotiations Over Time has 
Resulted in a Complete Lack of Rationality in Medicaid Financing 
 
The single largest inhibitor to future reform in the Medicaid program is the 
history of negotiations that each state has had since 1984 and 1986 around creative state 
financing mechanisms with HCFA/CMS.  This history began in 1984 when Florida 
started the first provider tax program and in 1986 when West Virginia began the first 
provider donation program.  Between 1990-1992, the G.H.W. Bush Administration 
intensely pressured states to stop the money laundering that was funding not only the 
Medicaid program -- but being used openly by Governors to balance state budgets.  At 
                                                
1 The State of Arizona received a 1115 waiver when the state entered the program in 1982, but this was the 
lone 1115 and a very special case.  After the Oregon and Tenncare waivers in 1993 and 1994, these waivers 
were adopted state-by state until today when many states hold multiple 1115 waiver agreements with the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). 
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that time, Congress intervened on behalf of the states -- and, interestingly, some members 
of Congress believed not only that they were acting on behalf of states by doing so, but 
on behalf of beneficiaries.  It was alright for states to institute schemes to maximize 
federal funding as long as they did not cut optional eligibility or services.  Since that 
time, there has been a back and forth on these state financing schemes.   
In interviews with Federal Administrators, they speak of the Medicaid program as 
being a blank check for states, a big overdraft account in the sky, and one influential 
Congressional staffer says at times the state money laundering has been so ridiculous that 
even they admit they look like skunks in a candy shop.  But what truly muddled the 
issue was the advent of the statewide 1115 waiver process, instigated by the negotiations 
with Tennessee over their 1994 Tenncare program.  During those negotiations, Tennessee 
was allowed to keep within the budget neutrality requirement of the waiver process a 
whole host of funds --  these are the DSH or Disproportionate Share Hospital funds -- that 
they had garnered through a state money laundering arrangement designed to maximize 
the federal match.  They were allowed to keep the same level of Medicaid funding under 
the waiver agreement even though HCFA knew that these funds were generated through 
a creative state maximization program.  For those interested in Public Finance Theory, 
this resembles The Flypaper Effect.  Money sticks where it hits.  And this precedent 
stuck.  
States that are creative in state financing schemes have more money to operate 
with in 1115 negotiations with CMS.  Bad actors are rewarded.  Every five years, 1115 
Medicaid waivers are re-negotiated.  The history of these state-by-state negotiations has 
created such differentials in federal financing arrangements with states, that no one truly 
knows what the federal matching rates to states are, regardless of what the Federal 
Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) table says.2  One CMS Administrator thought 
that in the early 1990s it was feasible that the federal government was approaching 100% 
match rates in the Medicaid program.  There is no way to audit these fathom charges.  
                                                
2 The Medicaid FMAP table reports the official match rate that the federal government will give states for 
each dollar the state spends on the Medicaid program.  The FMAP rates are based on a formula highly 
dependent on a states per capita income.  FMAP levels are supposed to mitigate the inequality that exists 
between wealthy and low-income states in dedicating state dollars to their Medicaid programs. 
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Medicaid financing is inequitable and is the result of a series of reiterative bargains 
between states and CMS over the past two decades.  There is no longer any rationality in 
the Medicaid financing arrangements and this greatly hinders future reform. 
 
The Policy Bargaining That Has Resulted in Loss of the Original Principles of the 
Medicaid Program. 
 
With the advent of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, the Original Principles of 
the Medicaid program are officially history -- a thing of the past.  If the DRA stands, it is 
possible that in five years it will be seen as a Watershed event in Medicaid policy 
bargaining.  To the extent this happens, the Original Principles of the Medicaid program 
may truly be talked about only in policy history accounts and not in terms of current 
policy negotiations shaping the program.  From the anonymous legislative counsels 
drafting of the original statutory language of Medicaid in 1965, Medicaid was the basis of 
national insurance.  The original drafter wrote Medicaid to eventually grow into a 
national insurance model.  The original skeleton of the program, the closest thing to a 
legislative history of the program, is officially entitled the Handbook of Public 
Assistance Administration -- Supplement D: Medical Assistance Programs Under Title 
XIX of the Social Security Act.  This guidance was such a powerhouse that one of the 
first acts of the Reagan Administration was to place notice in the The Federal Register 
repudiating them.  In the words of one of this countrys most highly respected Medicaid 
experts, Medicaid, how it was originally drafted, was brilliant, far more impressive than 
Medicare.3  
Some of the original principles of the program were reneged on early.  For 
example, in the 1967 Social Security Amendments, almost immediately, the program was 
re-structured to limit the populations that it would cover.  This was the first half of the 
Deal with the Devil,4 where the government took back its 1965 pledge on the 
                                                
3 Interview with Author, October 31, 2006. 
4 Interview with Author, October 31, 2006. 
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Expenditure side, placing much more strict limits on what was included in the federal 
match.5   
The Comprehensive Care Provision, 1903(e), of the original 1965 Medicaid, was 
postponed, postponed, and then -- as the LBJ Rights Era came to a close -- was dropped 
altogether.  While 1903(e) may sound like common or drab statutory language, consider 
its significance.  This provision required states to work towards providing health 
coverage for all low-income people, without regard of categorical distinction, by 1975.  It 
was the basis for covering the uninsured.  It was the basis for national health insurance.6 
The original principles of Comparability of Benefits and Statewideness have been 
worn away to some degree over several Medicaid eras, but generally required waiver 
authority.  This began with the 1972 SSA Amendments that Wilbur Mills proclaimed, 
contains the most far-reaching provisions of any Social Security bill since we passed 
Medicare in 1965. 7  Those Amendments allowed prepaid arrangements by waiver if it 
provide[d] more generous health services than those in the state Medicaid plan.8  In the 
Reagan era, OBRA 81 created 1915(b) Freedom of Choice waivers, allowing states by 
waiver to enroll Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care.  The first statewide 1115s 
which erupted during Clintons Waiver Presidency basically further eroded the notion of 
Comparability of Benefits and Statewideness.   
In terms of effects on beneficiaries, after the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, it is 
debatable whether principles of freedom of choice, comparability of benefits, or 
statewideness will exist at all in the set of events triggered by that legislation.   
In terms of effects on states, this is where we find the second half of the Deal with the 
Devil.  First in 1967, the federal government pulls back on its initial pledge on the 
                                                
5 The details of these 1967 SSA Amendment restrictions are reviewed in Chapter 4, The Second Big Bang, 
1965: The LBJ Rights Era. 
6 The Comprehensive Care Provision, 1903(e): The Secretary shall not make payments under the preceding 
provisions of this section to any State unless the State makes a satisfactory showing that it is making efforts 
in the direction of broadening the scope of the care and services made available under the plan and in the 
direction of liberalizing the eligibility requirements for medical assistance, with a view toward furnishing 
by July 1, 1975, comprehensive care and services to substantially all individuals would meet the plans 
eligibility standards with respect to income and resources, including services to enable such individuals to 
attain or retain independence or self-care.  See Stevens, Medicaid: Anatomy, 365. 
7 Reference from Chapter 5; Source from 1972 CQ Almanac, 914. 
8 Reference from Chapter 5; Source from Stevens, Welfare Medicine, 338. 
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Expenditure side so that states are no longer allowed to spend what was originally 
designed by the 1965 legislation.  In the DRA 2005, the second half of the Deal with the 
Devil is being realized where states must provide much greater transparency on the 
Revenue side of how they fund their programs.  A program, originally designed to be the 
basis of national health insurance is now a program where states are hamstrung by the 
federal government on both the Expenditure and the Revenue side.  Some believe this is 
an intentional ploy on the part of the current Administration to push states to opt out of 
the program altogether.9  Some states, such as Missouri, have hedged in that direction.10 
 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
We are headed towards a program that will be Defined Contribution and explicitly 
capped, not on a Federal basis by Congressional action, where elected officials debate 
and vote on law.  But instead in state-by-state negotiations with CMS where they 
continue to use waiver -- and now State Plan Amendment -- negotiations and The 
Administrative State to incentivize states in this direction.  The 2005 Florida and 
Vermont waivers demonstrate this.   
If the DRA of 2005 is not rolled back by the new 2007 Democratic Congress, it 
may very well be a watershed period in Medicaid as important as the 1974 time period 
that is written about so extensively in Chapter 5 of the Dissertation.  Entitlement 
bargaining was never the same after the 1974 Congressional Budget Act was fully 
operationalized in the 1981 OBRA process.  Likewise, the DRA has that potential 
watershed capacity in Medicaid political economy.  Politics will decide the policy 
direction of Medicaid.  Another reason the 2008 elections are so important. 
 
 
  
                                                
9 Interview with Author, October 31, 2006. 
10 Interview with Author, August 15, 2006. 
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